

Reading & Interpretation of Western Philosophical Classics

Textbook for the Course of Philosophical English

西方哲学经典作品解读 (英文)

—— 哲学专业英语教材

沈亚生 编著



吉林大学出版社
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代序言：关于哲学专业外语教学课程的建设与发展

Preface: Construction and Development of the Course of Professional Foreign Language

人类文化各领域都在走向全球化和国际化新时代，各国、各地区哲学的教学与研究也在进入一个全球融合与对话的新时期。中国哲学界当前处于被边缘化的状态，其重要原因之一就是我们的语言障碍问题。只依靠共同课外语教学不能真正解决此问题，还要依靠专业外语课教学，特别是哲学专业英语的教学。根据我国其它高校和吉林大学哲学系这门课程的开设情况和本人近年来讲授这门课程的经验积累，我们认为，要迅速建设好这门课程必须有教学管理上的重视与支持作为外部条件。另外，还要把这门课程的师资队伍建设、教材建设和对此课程的教学理论研究等几项工作作为最为紧迫的问题加以解决。

1) 哲学专业外语（英语）教学的重要意义、这门课的教学目的

全球化是指在人类社会生活的各领域中，跨民族和跨区域性交往和依赖越来越紧密的趋势和过程。20 世纪下半叶以来，以计算机为基础的数字化光纤网络通讯和卫星远程通讯技术革命，更是大大突破了传统文化、信息的时间、空间局限，使得人类的家园——地球变得空前狭小了。而且，“全球化早已越出单纯经济的范围，渗透向思想、文化、科学、技术、社会、政治……各个领域，改变着人类生活和地球的面貌。”¹在当代人类各种文化形式相融合的过程中，作为文化基本工具的语言、文字的相互透明和沟通起着举足轻重的作用。

当代人类哲学文明的发展也在进入国际化和全球化的新时期。这里一方面是哲学教学的国际化。各国、各民族的哲学教育、特别是高等学校中的哲学教育都在加快实现各种资源配置的国际化 and 全球化。具体说就是要求哲学专业的学者和教师素质达到国际先进水平；要求我们的哲学教育内容、教学方法、教学和科研的管理与哲学教育发达的国家相接轨；要求我们培养出来的哲学人才、特别是高学历人才在各方面不仅能参与国内的、也能参与国际哲学文化教育大市场的交往与竞争。我们看到，在发达国家著名学府中都会聚着来自世界各国的优秀学者、教授和优秀的学生。比如在美国高校哲学教育排前十名左右的亚利桑那大学哲学系，拥有一批世界一流水平的教授和客座教授，其研究生中有 10% 是国际学生，其毕业的博士也不乏在英国、加拿大著名学府获得教职的人。他们在许多哲学领域中的论文著作成果都在许多国家出版发行。²如果我们再看一下英国的牛津大学、德国的柏林大学、印度的德里大学等，可以发现他们

¹ 《全球化的悖论》[M]. 俞可平、黄卫平主编. 中央编译出版社 1998 年 11 月第一版. 第 5 页

² *Handbook of Department of Philosophy University of Arizona* Published in U.S.A.

那里的哲学教育国际化水平更高一筹。比如,牛津大学哲学系的研究人员中有一半以上是来自世界各地的优秀学者,那里的本科生和研究生也有很大比例来自世界各国,其所培养的各层次人才走红各国高等学府。当代哲学全球化的另一个方面是哲学研究的全球化。它要求各国的哲学家积极投身到当代国际哲学大论坛、大舞台的活动当中去,在这个大背景中展现自身的才能和学术价值。我们看到,当代各国著名学府中的哲学教学中都在讲授具有全球普遍意义的哲学课程,而有影响的哲学家和著作中所讨论的都是具有全人类意义的哲学问题。上个世纪之初的1900年,由西欧几个国家的哲学家发起召开了第一次世界哲学大会。特别是在1948年第10届世界哲学大会上正式成立了国际哲学团体联合会——FISP,³这个组织有常设领导层、常设的各种分支学术活动机构和常设的日常工作人员,有明确的目标、宗旨和章程。除每五年发起召开一次世界哲学大会之外,还组织和资助各种国际性哲学研讨、出版了几种高质量的专门刊物。⁴除了这样最高层的哲学学术组织和最高级别哲学会议、刊物之外,其它各种规模和形式的跨地区、国家的哲学研讨交往也越来越多。

我们在当代世界哲学发展中处于被边缘化状态,2001年4月16日至29日,德国当代著名哲学家哈贝马斯对中国进行了为期十四天的访问。在访华期间,哈贝马斯说了两句非常耐人寻味的话,“我不是来当教师的,我是来对话的。”

“我们正在进入对话状态”。⁵哈贝马斯的话显然是针对我国哲学界还没有真正进入全球性研讨与对话角色的状况而言。当前,我们的哲学家确实还没有广泛积极地参与到当代世界各种形式的国际性哲学学术活动中去,我们虽然有几万名专业哲学工作者,这个数字比欧、美、日等发达国家哲学家数目的总和还要多,我们每年也出版大量的哲学论文和著作,但是,我们的哲学家和哲学成果大多停留于国内范围的自言自语和自我欣赏,能在国际哲学论坛上有所影响、能获奖的东西屈指可数,我们对当代世界哲学文明的贡献和影响力还远远没有达到所期望的应有价值。我们当中能够保持与当代世界哲学发展最新成果相接轨、相同步的人很少,而能在国际哲学论坛上发表文章、著作,在国际学术活动中发挥重要影响的人就更是凤毛麟角。

上个世纪80年代以后,中国进入改革开放历史新时期。国家教育部和各高校哲学系越来越重视哲学教学与国际先进水平的接轨和沟通,我们的哲学家、研究人员普遍意识到必须使自己的工作融合进全人类哲学文明的大背景之中。1985年冬,中国社会科学院哲学研究所正式加入FISP。1988年8月21日至27

³ 这是法文缩写形式,在英文中是 International Federation of Philosophical Societies

⁴ 见因特网网址 <http://www.fisp.org.tr>, FISP 所发布关于世界哲学大会文件

⁵ 哈贝马斯《哈贝马斯在华讲演集》[M] 北京:人民出版社,2002年出版

日,中国社会科学院哲学研究所首次派出汝信、邢贲思等6位学者出席第18次世界哲学大会。此后,在1993年莫斯科举行的第19次世界哲学大会上,在1998年美国波士顿举行的第20次世界哲学大会上,中国大陆越来越多的学者参会。⁶这些都显示出我国哲学家参与世界高层哲学论坛对话素质和能力的增强。但是,从我们参会的人员情况和参会的历史可以看出,要想根本扭转我们在当代世界哲学中被边缘化的状况,我们还有许多工作要做。

我国哲学在当前所处的被边缘化现实固然有着多方面的原因,比如东西方冷战时代意识形态斗争的影响;又比如中国传统文化中封闭内向的观念等。但是语言、文字方面的障碍无疑也是关键性的原因之一。中国近代科技文化的落后状况使得我们的语言、文字不能为国际文化界所广泛运用,而由于“文革”等历史条件的原因,我们的大多数哲学家、各层次哲学人才又缺失了学习和运用当代世界优势语言(特别是英语)的素质和能力,这就从根本上制约了我们实现哲学教育国际化和哲学研究、哲学成果走向世界的步伐。克服语言、文字障碍,使我们的哲学人才、哲学成果、哲学教学都能融合到当今世界文化中的优势语言——英语的语言背景中去,已成为中国哲学发展各项工作中最为迫切的任务之一。当前,我们的各层次教育中都高度重视外语,特别是英语的素质问题。但是,所有这些共同课英语教学都旨在提高学生对日常生活用语的英语语言、文字的运用能力。它们虽然有益于,却不能代替较强专业性英语课程的学习。普通英语学习得再好,如果没有专攻某学科的专业英语训练,在运用英语进行学科专业性学习和研究活动时也难免陷入困境。

就哲学专业英语课程的教学目的来讲,这门课主要是提高学生运用英语进行哲学理论阅读、写作和语言交流的能力,进一步激活学生学习和运用英语进行各种哲学学术活动的兴趣和潜质,起到引导学生进入英语哲学世界的作用。这项教学的另一个目的是通过此课程,使学生能够直接学习到一些西方哲学经典文献的英文原著作品。哲学专业英语教学的必要性还在于,英文哲学文献中有一些专用词汇和话语与普通英语中相同的词汇和话语意义大不相同。如果不经过哲学专业英语教学的训练,学生很难悟通其准确含意。比如 *A priori*, 在这里 *A* 和 *priory* 两词联用在普通英语中是极少的, *priory* 这个词在一般英语中被理解为“优先的”、“前边的”等,而 *posteriority* 一词在一般英文中也很少用,与其相近的 *posterior* *posteriority* 则被理解为“背面的”、“其次的”或“时间上在后的”等。但是这样的理解与英文中哲学所运用这两个词的意义相差甚远。在哲学认识论中,前一词专指先验论,如柏拉图的“理念论、回忆说”就是这

⁶ 王玉梁.“第20届世界哲学大会在美国举办”《哲学动态》[J].1998年,第12期

种理论之源。而后一词则专指经验论。如伊壁鸠鲁、亚里士多德的“第一实体论”和“感觉论”被看作是这种理论的最早来源。又比如“*Nothing will occur without enough cause or determining reason.*”⁷这句话是西方哲学史上著名的莱布尼茨表达其理由充足律的命题，这个命题应理解为“人的一切所作所为都是由充分的理性所支配。”即使是一个哲学专业的本科生或研究生，哲学文献中许多诸如此类的词汇和命题、话语都需要通过哲学专业英语课程的训练才能达到专业性的理解。

2) 国内各高校和吉大哲学系专业外语课程的设置情况

国家教育部和重点高校教学指导部门在上世纪 90 年代初提出了在各专业院系开设专业外语课程的要求。进入新世纪新千年之初，国家教委又提出在各高校建设一批双语教学和纯外语教学课程，并逐步实现各学科主干课基本运用英语授课的要求。这显然是要加速我们的科教文化与世界接轨的步伐。其实在发达国家、世界著名学府中，早就实现了学者、学生、教学语言的国际化。那里的许多重要课程都是用英语讲授，而且作为这类学府教授、学者的基本资质之一就是能够熟练地运用英语讲授相关课程。与这些情况相比，我们在专业外语教学方面所要努力的方向也就不言自明了。

就哲学专业来看，北京大学、中国人大、复旦大学等高校哲学系对专业外语课程的建设更为得力。他们不仅在上个世纪 90 年代初就为哲学专业本科生开设专业英语教学课程，而且目前还开设出其它语种，如德语、希腊语的哲学专业外语教学课程。在对哲学专业硕士生和博士生的教学当中，他们还较早地开设出直接运用外语进行教学的西方哲学原著、西方哲学史等课程的教学。在复旦大学哲学系，近些年本科生和研究生的哲学专业外语教学都主要是聘请外教来进行的。整体来看，我国高校专业外语课程建设还处于起步阶段，这对有志于从事这门课教学工作的教师来说是不利情况，但这也是一个好时机。正因为是新的教学领域，我们就会有更多的展示自己才能和做出贡献的广阔空间。吉林大学哲学社会学院哲学系从上个世纪 90 年代中期开始为哲学系本科生开设哲学专业英语课程，初为选修，后为必修，最初的教学时数为 30~40 课时左右，现在已经增至 70~80 课时左右，历年来基本上没有间断过。教学对象都是大三的学生，因为这时的学生大多已通过了共同课英语的四级考试，具备了较好的普通英语基础。在教学内容的选择上，我们在本科生教学中使用了美国马萨诸塞大学哲学系编写出版，而且在全美国以至于其它国家都广为采用的一本《哲

⁷ 见《哲学导论》(Introduction to Philosophy [M]. Edited by Fred Feldman Published by McCraw Hill Inc. U.S.A.) 第 29 页

学导论》(*Introduction to Philosophy*) 作为教材。这本教材覆盖了西方古代至近现代特别著名哲学家的重要文献, 从而比较系统地反映了西方哲学所特别关注的几个哲学领域的中心问题, 和一些具有代表意义的思潮和观点。在本科教学有了充分积累的基础之上, 我们于 2000 年起为哲学专业硕士研究生、2001 年起为哲学专业博士研究生开出了更有深度的专业英语课程。但是由于研究生层次这门课教学处于刚刚起步阶段, 我们的课程还只安排 20~30 课时较少的教学量。我们目前对硕士生采用的教材是一本美国大学哲学系在哲学本科教学中广为使用的一本生命哲学的书——《支配生命的权力》⁸ 此书主要讨论对生命问题的哲学理解, 以及社会法律、伦理对待生命的非自然死亡, 如堕胎、死刑、自杀、安乐死等问题的观念及争论等, 其学术问题和理论都是当代世界哲学的热点。我们系的两个博士点是马克思主义哲学和科学技术哲学, 而且以前一项的博士生为主, 所以我们目前对博士生所采用的教材是一本美国分析哲学马克思主义学派代表人物爱尔斯特所著《卡尔·马克思导论》⁹ 这是一部从西方马克思主义学、分析哲学的角度全面研讨马克思本人主要著作和思想的书, 对学生研究马克思主义理论有极大的价值。这两本教材与本科生教材的最明显不同在于它们都是中等篇幅的学术专著, 每一本都有 200 页左右。而本科生教材中主要是一些短小精悍的哲学论文, 每篇最长不超过 15 页。运用英语对整部书的把握和研讨当然要比对一般论文的把握研讨难一些。从理论上讲, 研究生的英语水平要高于本科生, 但是实际上, 我们当前的博士研究生入学考试把关不严, 有些是临时应对考博而突击出来的。而且从外单位考入我校的博士生多数没有过像我校本科生和硕士生那样的专业外语课程训练, 所以博士生专业外课教学的方法和内容还有待调整。

普遍看来, 我国各高校、也包括我们吉大哲学系所培养的高学历哲学人才、特别是获博士学位的人要达到国际水准, 获得国际哲学界的认可, 在外语(特别是英语)能力方面要有很长的一段路要走, 而当前研究生、博士生的专业外语课教学就是这段漫长之路的初始步骤。我国高校目前在专业外语课程的教学方面, 即使是在重点高校, 包括吉大哲学系在内, 都还十分薄弱。而在一些普通高校的哲学系, 这门课程的设置还处于空白, 我们出自于对中国哲学发展的使命意识和紧迫感, 必须从各个方面迅速着手改变目前的状况。

3) 近年来教授此课程所取得的经验

笔者的主要专业教学课是马克思主义哲学史, 另外还给本科生、研究生开

⁸ *Dworking Life's Dominion* [M]. Published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1993, U.S.A.

⁹ *John Elster Introduction to Karl Marx* [M]. Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge 1986

设“哲学人学研究”等课程,但我自从1998年开始还在吉大哲学系担任本科生、研究生的哲学专业外语课教学,几年来也摸索和积累了一些经验。

初上这门课,首先思考的是这门课的教学目标、教学内容问题,这门课教学与共同课外语教学的关系问题,这是两个联系在一起的问题。据前任此课的教师介绍,以前此课主要目标旨在使学生提高阅读和翻译哲学文献的能力。教学内容比较零散,主要采用教师讲授和学生听、读、考的方法。其结果是学生所得并不显著,而学习这门课的热情也不高。近几年来,我们的认识逐步达到了一个飞跃。首先在本课程的教学理念、目标上,我们明确了要通过这门课程学习全面提高学生运用英语进行哲学学习和研究等各方面的能力,这不仅包括英、汉翻译,而且包括语言上的听、说表达和交流,包括文字上的阅读理解和初步的专业性写作。这个定位较高的目标要求给学生学习注入了更强更大的学习动力。其次在教学方法上,文字翻译反而成为教学中尽量少做和不做的工作。因为要使学生进入英语的哲学思维和交往,借助于翻译手段反而会成为画蛇添足,成为赛跑中多余的拐杖。我们在课堂上尽量直接运用英语来全面讲授和表达教学内容。我们通过上课提问、答题和讨论来训练学生的语言交往能力。又通过文字作业和要求学生做英文小论文来推动学生的英文写作能力。通过尽量丰富的教学环节来使学生真正进入英语背景的哲学世界,这种通过全面训练来评价学生能力和成绩的方法尽管难度增大,个别学生反映吃不消,但有力地推动了学生的学习自觉性,客观效果是成功的。通过几轮教学的不断探索和完善,我校哲学系开设的专业英语课程已经成为哲学本科生所喜爱、所特别受益的一门课程。

充分的教学投入、确保教学环节的完整是保证教学目标贯彻的首要条件,从管理角度来讲,高质量的课程教学必须是小班教学,本科生一个教学班不超过40人,研究生一个班不超过20人,而且最好配有助教来协助教学。我们国内高校教学的一个重要特色现象是共同课、以至于一些专业课的大课堂教学,一个教学班云集了上百个甚至更多的学生,教师除了背课、课堂讲授之外,不可能进行其它环节的工作。现在一般高校的许多共同课外语教学也是这样。这其实是偷工减料式教学,是违背教育规律的。对于哲学专业外语这样需要细致消化教学内容和训练学生各方面能力的课程绝不能这样。这门课要求在教师指导和学生充分自习的基础上,上课时学生不光是被动地听,也要主动地讲、问、讨论和交流。每一个学生得到均等的课堂机会和时间,一个教学班学生人数越少越好。学生在课下不仅要读、要理解,而且要通过作业、小论文、文字对话讨论的方式来锻炼写作能力。写作往往是中国学生学外语中最薄弱的方面。而未来的中国哲学家、哲学成果走向世界时这一点又是至关重要的。上一轮课最

好要每个学生至少做三、四个答题、读书报告等这样的书面作业，再写一到两个专题论文，对作业和论文都必须由教师认真批改才会起到实在的效果。这样的教师工作量也不是大班教学可能做到的。另外，在国外高校一般课程的教学，都要由教师组织由几个学生参加的课下进行的小组讨论。每次半小时左右，每个学生一门课都要准备几次这样的讨论，这也是必要的教学环节。所以，这门课必须以小班教学，要有教师充分投入和配置助教来完成教学各个环节。

在课堂语言的使用上，为使学生更真切地进入外语的哲学世界，就要尽量以外语语言讲解为主。这对已经有过长时间共同外语学习，甚至长期听外教讲课的高年级学生、研究生来讲不是太困难的。如果过多地使用中文，反而会冲淡这门课的价值和意味。但是在一些难点和要点的讲解中，不管是对学生还是对教师，外语毕竟不是我们的母语，不如汉语运用起来那样熟练和精准，辅以必要的中文讲解还是必要的。顾及到部分学生的能力差别，笔者在上课之初讲外语时尽量放慢，有时还用双语形式进行讲解，就是先讲一遍英文，然后再用中文扼要重复一遍。要求学生在回答和讨论问题时，也可采取因人而异、自便的方法。鼓励学生用外语讲，但也不反对学生用汉语讲。这样就一方面调动了学生的热情，另一方面又给予学生充分的机会来锻炼外语表达。在几乎每一轮上课时，笔者都碰到有的学生提出，要求对课文多做翻译，多讲解哲学文献中的文字和语法。这无疑是很容易的事，但长此以往，就不会有效地把学生引入外语的哲学世界。所以，笔者要求学生，在课前通过自习把文章内容基本看懂，对于大多数通过了英语四级、六级的本科生和研究生而言，下到工夫，这完全是能做到的。实在有弄不懂的字句，再拿到课堂上作为个别问题来解答，而且尽量鼓励别的学生来做出解答。读大块文章、读整本的书要靠翻译无疑是在用拐棍来助跑，只能适得其反。所以要鼓励学生尽量抛开外语学习中的翻译和语法分析拐杖。

怎样讲解哲学文献？我们在一个学期 70 课时的本科生教学中，至少要学习十几篇文章，也就是每周 4 个学时中要完成一篇十几页哲学论文的学习。这些时间中我们还要给出学生提问、答题、讨论的时间，这就不可能对文献逐段逐句地去讲解。几年来，我们逐步找到了一个得到学生认可的模式。那就是学习一篇文章之前给予学生们留出有关文章的几个关键性问题，让学生带着问题去阅读。教师上课时先就文章学术背景做些讲解，再就文章的观点、论证、一些关键性语词和命题进行说明，然后给出文献各章节的主要思想，再就文本中的难点和难句做些补充，最后由学生们提出需要进一步弄清的问题。比如讲解笛卡尔的《沉思》中的“第二个沉思”。这是西方哲学史中著名的关于心灵哲学问题的二元论思潮的代表作。我们先用英语就哲学史上有关此题的几种主要思潮、

观点做一个概论、这里有柏拉图的古典二元论、笛卡尔代表的正统二元论、在批判笛卡尔理论基础上产生的物理主义、语言分析方法的取消论和当代流行的现象学观点等。然后我们就整个笛卡尔哲学和他的《沉思》的六个部分做一个概观。再把他在“第二个沉思”中的几个主要理论论证给予概括。把他的几个关键词：自我、思想、感性、实体、直观等用英文做出准确的解说。找出“我思考、我存在”、“凡清楚明白意识到的东西就是真理”等几个命题加以解说。然后进入文本的章节和段落浏览。虽然学生大都在学习中文的西方哲学史课程时基本上熟悉了这些东西，但是在学习其英文文本时所形成的理解更深刻了。我在给博士生讲授爱尔斯特的《卡尔·马克思导论》一书时，每讲到一个爱尔斯特对马克思的批评，我们首先都是讲清马克思本人的真实思想，然后再理清爱尔斯特的思路，之后还要对爱尔斯特的思想进行分析和评价。这样，使学生达到了既提高了专业英语水平，又扩大了哲学学理视野的目标。当然我们的教学方式不可能是最优的，而且也在处于不断的改革与完善之中。

关于学生成绩评定和考试的原则，成绩评定往往不仅是检验学生学习效果的尺度，同时也起着引导学生学习方向的指挥棒作用。可以说，往往是教师怎么评成绩、学生就怎样来学习一门课。哲学专业外语的教学要求学生有充分的学习投入，在语言表达、文字写作、思考和操作哲学问题等各个教学环节上来体现自己的学习效果。我们就应把成绩分数分配给各个教学环节的检验。比如，笔者对本科生上这门课的成绩评定由几个部分构成：一般以100分为评分标准，对学生的课堂发言、提问和答题等表现给20%的成绩；对学生文字作业和课程论文给40%的成绩；再对学生期末的课堂考试给40%的成绩；相加几部分成绩而得出总成绩。我们目前还没有达到要求经常性读书报告和多次小组讨论和个别指导的教学设想，其实这也是必要的。我们中国的学生在传统模式的外语学习中往往以应试为主要目的。平时学习只是听和记，考试时多着重于选择、画圈和翻译等。其结果是在美国的大学录取中国研究生时所看到的是前所未有的高分，连美国本土的学生都望尘莫及。但是入学后在实际的学习表现中，语言表达、文字写作、思考讨论的活跃等方面这些人相对低能。那里的教授们甚至怀疑我们这些人考高分是不是有欺骗行为。在哲学专业外语课程的学习中，要避免应试型教学，我们就要充分运用成绩评定的手段，把评分尽量平衡地分配到各个教学环节中去，这样才能全面调动和提高学生的各方面能力。当然，做到这一点首先就要求教师本身付出几倍的辛勤工作。

4) 这门课程建设中亟待解决的几点问题

对高校哲学专业外语课程的建设来讲，一支高水平的师资队伍的建立是其他一切工作的基本前提。邓小平同志指出：“一个学校能不能为无产阶级培养合

格的人才，培养德智体全面发展，有社会主义觉悟、有文化的劳动者，关键在教师。”¹⁰ 邓小平这段话对我们理解某专门学科、专门课程建设中教师的主导地位都是适用的。然而当前不仅在一般大学，而且在一些重点大学哲学系，对于哲学专业外语课教学师资的来源、培养等问题都没有科学的规划。当前这门课程教师的任用有很大的盲目性，随意性、不稳定性。抓师资首先要明确合格师资的来源，哲学专业外语师资的素质要求是对哲学学术有造诣，同时又对某种外语（英语为主）有较高的修养，而最为理想的这类人才是在英语或其它语言为母语的国家大学受到过系统的哲学训练，以至于获得学位的中国人。这种第一优先的师资来源我们目前实属不多。那么第二可考虑的来源就应该是有哲学学位的外籍人，其具备了哲学和外语两方面的素质，但是很少能够精通中文，而教授中国学生，没有中文能力就等于缺少了一只手，但他们的其它方面有些优势，这个来源我们如果重视起来还是很现实的。在许多国家获得了哲学专业较高学位的人才不少，而且所求待遇也不会很高。第三个可考虑的来源是我们自己培养出来的哲学人才，派到外语系进修，或攻读双学位。反过来从外语系、外语专业吸收有志于哲学事业的人读一个哲学的学位，再做哲学专业外语课的师资也是简易可行的办法。

这门课的教学内容、教材问题也是当前迫切需要着手解决的。哲学专业外语教学，不用说其它语种，就是最为重要的英语语种的教材，目前能够成熟出版的教材，一部也没有见到。一些院校哲学系虽然开设此课程已经多年，但在教学内容和教材资料上往往是随意性、应付性地使用一些临时拼凑起来的東西。去年笔者得到吉林大学教务处一项“吉林大学十五规划教材”立项资助，开始认真着手编写这部旨在适合于我校以至于我国高校哲学专业外语课程教学的教材《西方哲学经典著作解读》（*Reading & Interpretation of Western Philosophical Classics*）。此书将参照前文所述的《哲学导论》，另外参照几本也在英、美国家哲学界广为流行的哲学导读性文选——《哲学的困惑与发现》和《西方哲学经典著作》《心灵哲学的各种理论》《心灵的本质》，以及从互联网上下载的资料，从中选编了30篇左右西方古代、近、现代哲学中经典作家的文献，组成一本较为系统反映西方哲学关于几个基本哲学领域的主要代表性思潮和观点的教科书。此书将主要以哲学专业本科生为教学对象，也可酌情在研究生教学中使用。在这门课程教材几近于空白、无所前人的情况下做一个大胆的尝试，必然会呈现许多狭隘片面和缺失。如果有一批从事于此课程教学的同仁分别从各自的角

¹⁰ 周敬思、基俊主编《高等教育理论与实践》[M]. 东北师范大学出版社1994年12月第一版，第81页

度做这种尝试,使这门课程的教材达到百家争鸣的局面,那么,真正优秀的具有价值的东西自然会涌现出来。另外,应使哲学专业外语教材的研究和编写成为有关领导部门纳入日程,有关任课教师积极投入力量的一件大事。

一门课程的建设之前提是外部环境,具体说就是各级领导部门在观念上的重视与在具体工作上的支持。哲学专业外语课的建设需要确定并大幅提高这门课程在各层次教学系统中所占的地位、学分比重,对学位、对学者资质评价的影响力。

比如,如果以英语语种为外语考核,许多院校都要求任何专业的本科生不通过四级考试就不能获得学位。对硕士研究生的招生入学考试难度要超过英语四级,在读期间还要有一年作为学位课的英语课程。对博士生的招生入学考试难度为六级水平,外加一年的学位课英语学习。从2000年起吉林大学和国内一些重点高校的哲学系把专业外语学分和成绩并入共同课外语学分和成绩,作为直接与硕士生和研究生学位挂钩的学位课程。在硕士生和博士生的外语学分总量中,专业外语的学分总量占到三分之一和四分之一。但是,这个比例如果进一步提高到二分之一,那将对这门课的建设,对学生这方面素质的培养起到更有力的推动作用。目前在本科生教学中分配给专业外语课的学分所占比例更少,而且不作为专业主干课和学位课。有的学校还根本没有专业外语课,这个状况也是应改变的。对高年级本科生、对研究生的外语训练重点应该转移到专业、专门学科的方面来。只有这样才能适应于未来各领域人才都能达到国际水准的要求。我们目前对各级专业技术职称的晋升考核只设有共同外语项目,这也是我们目前高级专门人才在专业领域里参与世界竞争能力欠缺的一个客观因素。

再者,要想全面推动哲学专业外语课程的建设,不仅要具体在各个教学环节的实践中不断探索和总结经验、发现问题,而且要从理论高度上对这门课程建设进行全面系统的研究。国家和各高校教学指导部门可以设立教学理论研究工作、教材编写项目,提供有力度的资助和引导,来鼓励教师做这方面的工作。立足于理论研究的高度来推动实践的前进是实现各项工作科学化的真正基础。国外哲学界历来重视哲学教学的研究工作,他们不仅有专门刊物来展示和鼓励哲学教学的理论研究成果,比如美国有60余种专门性哲学刊物,其中之一就是《哲学教学》。国际哲学团体联合会出版的几大世界性哲学刊物之中就有一种是《二十一世纪前夕的哲学教育》。在第21届世界哲学大会所设的50个论文选题之一就是“哲学教学”,笔者向这次大会组委会投寄论文“中国哲学教学改革所面临的主要问题”经大会专题论文小组审议接受为到大会进行交流的论文。我们国家专门性哲学刊物少得可怜,而且这些刊物长期以来也对哲学教学的研究不是十分支持。《哲学研究》作为我国哲学学科最高级别刊物,为改变这种状况

在 2000 年开辟了“高校哲学教学和哲学研究工作改革”的专栏，但是响应者寥若晨星。至今我们没有见到过一篇公开刊物上发表的有关哲学专业外语教学理论的文章。这门课程的建设要搞上去，没有相关的理论研究做支持是不可能的。

外部环境的有力支持，解决专门的师资培养，加快教材建设工作，注重于这门课教学的理论性研究，对哲学专业外语课的课程建设来说，这是几项最为根本性的，也是最为迫切要求抓紧的工作。

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The course of philosophical English (or Disciplined English of Philosophy) is a sort of advanced course. This course was inaugurated not very long ago. In Peking University, Renmin University of China and in our Jilin University, this course was provided in the late period of 1990s. In China, if we intend to access the advanced level of contemporary philosophy of the world, the improvement of our disciplined English is an emergent requirement for the teaching philosophy and studying philosophy. Now our academic achievements and our academic talents is not considered as competitive and is not really internationalized, that is primarily due to the poor situation of our English level. Therefore, To enforce the teaching of Philosophical English is a kind of major work not only for the undergraduate students, but also for the MA. Program students and for the Ph.D. program students. Based on the above consideration, the Education Department of the central government of China and the authority of many universities in China all stressed on the construction and the development of this course.

Because the history of opening the course of Philosophical English in China is not long enough, all universities in China have not been invested sufficient recourses for the construction of this course. Seldom are there any universities that organize professors to edit the specialized textbook for this course. Most lecturers collect and use teaching materials for this course temporarily. So, it is almost an empty feature in the field of textbook of teaching Philosophical English, now, to edit this kind of textbook, we need to start every thing from the very beginning, it is really a tough and challenging work.

I once studied philosophy as a graduate student in Arizona State University and University of Toledo in America for four years, and I got my second MA degree majoring in philosophy there. These experiences make me begin to understand how to teach and how to study philosophy in English, and they make me collect many materials that are available for me to edit this book today. Since 1998, I began to teach the course of Philosophical English for undergraduate students majoring in philosophy in Department of Philosophy Jilin University. Up to now, I have finished teaching of five classes, and for each class there are around 70 hours of class teaching. I also once taught the course of disciplined English of Sociology and of Social Works for undergraduate students in the department of sociology in my university, for each class there is about 40 hours of class teaching. Through these teaching practice, I grasped gradually the key points of how to process this course. In teaching of this course, I usually adopted the materials that were selected from classical works of western philosophy. And based on the suggestions provided by the students, I changed the teaching materials many times. These experiences prepared my editing of this

book, plus the support from the authority of our university, I was provided 10,000 yuan of financial aids for this project, all of these motivate me to take the work of editing a textbook specialized in philosophical English.

The objective of the course of philosophical English is to improve students' ability of doing philosophy in English, it covers the ability of reading, writing, listening, as well as speaking English and other way of communicating philosophical information in English. The other objective of this course is to help students study more classical works of western philosophy. Whereas, this course is quite different from the course of General English, it will not stress too much on the linguistic issues, such as the issue of how to spell English words, how to apply English grammar in writing a sentence, and so on. This course is also quite different from the courses of study western philosophy, it is not possible for us to introduce western philosophical works systematically and comprehensively in this course. What we will do in this course is to combine the works of the above two courses together. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to select efficiently certain amount of classical works of western philosophy to train our students. Another more important objective of this course is to stir up students' interest of doing philosophy in English. The class hour-study is very limited, only if the students cultivate their personal preference, then it is possible for them to develop the ability in doing philosophy of English over their lifetime. This course will make great help for our future philosophers of China to join the worldwide philosophical communication more actively, and this was just what the elder generation of Chinese philosophers was not able to do.

The classical works of western philosophy are always concerned with some important topics. And usually it is famous philosopher's works that represents the most important achievements of western philosophy. In their works, the keywords, propositions, central ideas and logical arguments are provided sufficiently. Consequently, in editing this book, we primarily select some representative works of the popular philosophers concerning several central topics, major doctrines of western philosophy. Only through this kind of study, it is possible for our students to improve their ability of doing philosophy in English greatly. In this book, we will have several groups of articles about the topics such as morality, free will and determinism, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophical theology and political philosophy. We select articles concerning these topic from the ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, the medieval times philosophers Augustin, Aquina, the recently European philosophers such as Descartes, Kant, Hegel and so on, to edit this textbook which is consisted of about thirty articles. Expectedly, this book will fit a course of eighty through one hundred hours of class teaching. It is not necessary for a lecturer to illustrate each one of all the articles of this book in detail. A lecturer might select some parts or some articles of this book to do intensive study, and for others, he or

she could leave them for students to study by themselves.

In this book, for each philosophical topic and for each article, we will provide a study direction regarding to the key words, the famous propositions and theoretical principles, the academic background of the author, and so on. We also will provide some comprehensive study questions concerning the articles in order that lecturers could use them to train students' ability of thinking and writing, doing philosophy in English. The introductions of each part and the study directions of each article are worked out by myself. Supposedly, it will be helpful for students to understand the view points of the authors, the arguments with which author used to support their viewpoints; to paraphrase the meaning of the disciplined terms and important propositions, to answering the study questions of each article in English. It will not make sense if students accomplish these items with only Chinese, all of the exercises are supposed to be done in English. To be noticed, some of the words of the original book are of evidently mistakes and I correct them already. But some of them, they seem wrong, not fit our dictionary, but it is the author of the original book who uses them consciously, they are of definite meaning, I have to keep them untouched.

Generally, our guiding idea of editing this book is to provide a book which is both of certain level of linguistic training and certain level of philosophical training, is available in quantity and in quality for the study of both senior undergraduate students, also graduate students whose major are philosophy. Because there is no any other book or other materials to be referring, the editing of this textbook is a kind of initial work. And due to the limitation of our time, our academic capacity, certainly, there will be some defects and mistakes with either the constitution of the book or the detail contexts of the book. As far as those defects or mistakes are concerned with, every reader of this book is welcome to point them out. We believe that better books of this kind edited by someone else will occur very soon, it is enough for this textbook to make some contributions for the further development of the construction of teaching disciplined English major in philosophy.

By the way, all the classical works included in our textbook are from the following published books:

- 1) In our book, wherever there is the abbreviation **IP**, it means the article is selected from the book edited by Fred Feldman University of Massachusetts: *Introduction to Philosophy* U.S.A. McGraw – Hill Inc. 1993.
- 2) The abbreviation **PPD** means that the article is from the book edited by Arthur J. Minton & Thomas A. Shipka *Philosophy Paradox and Discovery* Third Edition McGraw-Hill Publishing Company U. S. A. 1990.
- 3) The abbreviation **TM** means that the article is selected from Stephen Priest's *Theories of mind* U.S.A. Boston, New York, Houghton Mifflin Company 1991.

- 4) The abbreviation NM means that the article is from the book Edited by David M. Rosenthal *The Nature of Mind* Oxford University Press, Inc., 1991.
- 5) An article of introduction to philosophy is from the web site of Dept. of Philosophy Florida State University America dated on Dec. 2002.

-Editor
May.20th, 2003

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PART I
PERSPECTIVES ON
UNDERSTANDING PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

-Editor

For a philosopher, there are many difficult questions to be answered, but the most difficult one is to ask him what philosophy is. A beginning learner of philosophy usually wants to clear up what the real nature of discipline of philosophy is; what the essential property, the major topic, the right way of doing philosophy is. They even expect an accurate definition of philosophy. And sometimes, they really do get it from reading some books. But not very soon later, they will find their ideas or definitions about philosophy needs to be modified. Furthermore, as they read or study more and more philosophical works, they have to give up one and another definition or understanding of the essence of philosophy. Because we could see that how many philosophers there are in the history of philosophy, and how many versions about the essence of philosophy there will be, and we could never be able to find a perfect one.

There is an ancient times story of India, to say that, some blind fellows debate about what the elephant is like. One touches the ear of the elephant and he claims that the elephant is like a piece of leather. Another one who touches the leg of elephant, then he claims that elephant is like a pillar. The third one touches the tail of the elephant, he thinks those versions of the former two as ridiculous, because actually, the elephant is completely like a stick. An intelligent philosopher indicates that every philosopher is only able to grasp parts of the entity of philosophy, and the version about the essence of philosophy given by each philosopher could be considered as correct, but only partially correct. Hegel once said that philosophy is essentially the history of philosophy, he meant that the simple and partial description about philosophy is never available for one to understand what the real nature of philosophy is.

This being so, do we need to conclude that philosophy is a discipline of human culture that is of no any special property? But how can it be that a discipline of human theoretical culture is out of understanding and expression? In universities of Western countries, department of philosophy is popularly put in the college of liberal art and science, some times is put in the college of humanity, this seems to catch the point. "Liberal" means no limitation; "art" means the excellent skills of thinking. An excellent skill of thinking with no any limitation on its topics, methodology, objectives and functions is both the answer and the elimination of the answer to the question what philosophy is. Professor Qinghai Gao (高青海), a famous contemporary philosopher of China, after his many years of exploration of many areas of philosophy, get an idea that the essential property of philosophy is, there is no definite property to be assigned to philosophy.

As what we said in the very beginning, among the infinite versions about the

essence of philosophy, professor Gao's is only one of them, and it is also not a perfect one. Therefore, even we have formed our own understanding about the nature of philosophy, we also need to comprehend, to appreciate other versions about philosophy. In the beginning part of our textbook, we select several articles to try the issue of how to understand the nature of philosophy, to learn different perspectives of how to view the discipline of philosophy. Our aim is not to teach our students any dogma or canon, but to provide students some raw materials, to help them to form their own cognition about philosophy. So, our articles are used to present different perspectives of understanding philosophy for our students to study.

The first article in this part is loaded down from the web site of the Department of Philosophy Florida State University of America. Actually, department of philosophy in each university prepares its own document, to introduce its perspective of viewing philosophy, and to introduce the course, the faculties, the study programs of the department. The reason why we select this one is that this article makes many issues very clear. It tells you what the nature of philosophy is; how to study, why do we study philosophy; how to read, how to write philosophy and it provide us some other suggestions. From reading this article, we may get a rough idea about the discipline of philosophy, the way of doing philosophy and the career prospect of students' futures all-roundly. It is really necessary and beneficial for a beginning learner of philosophy.

The second article of this part "*What Do You Mean Philosophy???*" is aimed to tell us the essential nature of "Synoptic" philosophy, and some problems to be noticed when people study philosophy. It claims that philosophy essentially is not a system of knowledge, but a methodological inspiration to motivate people to think critically, comprehensively and all-roundly. What it studies is beyond any special discipline and also could be connected with any disciple. In studying philosophy, we need to be aware that no any school, however it is appreciated, could be considered as the end of the study. Doing philosophy is a kind of endless enterprise. The worst matter of doing philosophy is to imitate other's ideas, and the touchstone of a good philosophy is to see whether it of enough dialectic investigation and of creative viewpoint and argument. We may say that this opinion really grasps the heart of the way of doing philosophy.

The third article aims to indicate the content, the nature, the method and the function of philosophy. The author claims that philosophy is a kind of knowledge that excludes any definition. However, according to the author, philosophy usually concerns the fundamental issues of human world view, human life issues, principles of value, the change of social institutions and so on. And traditional philosophy usually concentrates on three areas: Metaphysics, epistemology and value theories. We say that the author's idea about the topics of philosophical study is very limited.

As a matter of fact, there are much more fields that traditional philosophy has been studying. But as we have said in the beginning, it is not possible for any philosopher to grasp the infinite contents of philosophical study. The author also stresses that the strategy of doing philosophy is to co-operate with human practical considerations, to associate it self with scientific achievements, to actively reflect, to speculate issues concerning paradox of human knowledge. When talking about the functions that discipline of philosophy plays, the author stresses that philosophical study could make people's thinking clear, profound and dialectic, could make people's life more meaningful. What is more, the author indicates that the most important value is internal, is in the study philosophy it self. This opinion is intelligent and worth to be remembered forever. Most philosophers nowadays concern only on the external value of philosophy, but only if you are aware of the internal value of it, then you could be a real philosopher. By These talks, we see a special kind of viewing the nature of philosophy.

The fourth article of this part is written by David Stewart, who is a professor of Ohio University U.S.A.. He is also very popular currently and his philosophical contribution primarily concentrates on the philosophy of religion. He compares philosophy with detectives, this idea seems very cute, also very creative. He exposes that philosopher, like a detective, seeks truth. Both of them need to think rationally and logically. There are four paths of investigating, three of them lead to fallacies. If we reasons based on wrong facts or materials, if we have right facts or materials, but there are problems of our logical reasoning, if we hold both wrong facts and bad reasoning, all of above will lead us to mistakes. Only one way is available for people to get truth, that is the way of right reasoning based on true facts and materials. This idea is excellent, because to investigate philosophical paradox, good reasoning and best materials, either theoretical or practical, are the two fundamental elements to obtain better solutions. The author also tells us that Aristotle's *Poetics* and Dilthy's *Hermeneutics* all have something to do with the detective fictions. Because both of them appreciate and apply the detectives' way, the way of caring human dignity and the way of interpreting texts in their philosophical study. The author proposes that doing philosophy is like doing detective works, both of them need to be based on moral conscience. From reading this article, we may learn that in detective fictions, in literature and everywhere, there must be philosophy, and to do philosophy is like to do any other excellent, intelligent works, it must be concerned with human practical life. This essay provides us really a special way to illustrate the nature of philosophy.

INTRODUCTION OF STUDYING PHILOSOPHY

(Prepared by Department of Philosophy Florida State University U.S.A. Down load
from the web site: <http://www.fsu.edu/~philo/resources/ugrad/isphil.htm>. Dec./2001)

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

Quite literally, the term philosophy means, "love of wisdom." In a broad sense, philosophy is an activity people undertake when they seek to understand fundamental truths about themselves, the world which they live, and their relationship to the world and to each other. As an academic discipline philosophy is much the same. Those who study philosophy are perpetually engaged in asking, answering and arguing for their answers to life's most basic questions. To make such a pursuit more systematic, philosophy is traditionally divided into major areas of study

Metaphysics: At its core the study of metaphysics is the study of the nature of reality, of what exists in the world, what it is like, and how it is ordered. In metaphysics philosophers wrestle with such questions as:

Is there a God?

What is truth?

What is person? What makes a person the same through time?

Is the world strictly composed of matter?

Do people have mind? If so, how is the mind related to the body?

Do people have free wills?

What is it for one event to cause another?

Epistemology: Epistemology is the study of knowledge. It is primarily concerned with what we can know about the world and how we can know it. Typical questions of concern in epistemology are:

What is knowledge?

Do we know anything at all?

How do we know what we know?

Can we be justified in claiming to know certain things?

Ethics: The study of ethics often concerns what we ought to do and what it would be best to do. In struggling with this issue, larger questions about what is good and right arise. So, the ethicist attempts to answer such questions as:

What is good? What makes actions or people good?

What is right? What makes actions right?
Is morality objective or subjective?
How should I treat others?

Logic: Another important aspect of the study of philosophy is the arguments or reasons given for people's answers to these questions. To this end philosophers employ logic to study nature and structure of arguments. Logicians ask such questions as:

What constitutes "good" or "bad" reasoning?
How do we determine whether a given piece of reasoning is good or bad?

History of philosophy: The study of philosophy involves not only forming one's own answers to such questions, but also seek to understand the way in which people have answer such questions in the past. So, a significant part of philosophy is its history, a history of answers and arguments about these very questions. In studying the history of philosophy one explores the ideas of such historical figures as:

Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche,
Marx Mill, Wittgenstein, Sartre and so on.

What often motivates the study of philosophy is not merely answers or arguments themselves but whether or not the arguments are good and the answers are true. Moreover, many of the questions and issues in the various areas of philosophy overlap and in some cases even coverage. Thus, philosophical questions arise in almost every discipline. This is why philosophy also encompass such areas as:

Philosophy of Law	Philosophy of Feminism
Philosophy of Religion	Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Mind	Philosophy of Literature
Political philosophy	Philosophy of Art
Philosophy of history	Philosophy of language

Why Should I Study Philosophy?

Since study of philosophy will not directly result in an ability to program a computer, manage a company, or diagnosis and treat a disease, perhaps one might wonder why it is worth studying at all? The answer is simple. While the study of philosophy does not provide one with a particular set of "skill for a trade," the lifelong benefits it inculcates are virtually limitless. Here are just a few. The study of philosophy enhance

one's ability:

- To think, speak and write clearly and critically,
- To communicate effectively,
- To form original, creative solutions to problems,
- To develop reasoned arguments for one's views,
- To appreciate views different from one's own,
- To analyze complex materials, and
- To investigate difficult questions in a systematic fashion.

What should be clear even from this brief list, is that studying philosophy develops abilities that are not only essential to almost every vocation, but instill qualities vital to one's growth as a person. Moreover, for many students such qualities often produce practical benefits as well. For example, because studying philosophy improves one's analytical skills, it affords a greater probability of success on standardized tests such as the GRE, LSAT, and GMAT.

Finally, Studying philosophy is not merely useful for the benefits it bestows. It also intrinsically worthwhile, since many of the issues with which philosophers grapple are fundamental to human existence. Is there a God? What is truth? What can we know? What is beauty? Wrestling with questions such as these and learning the history of responses to them enriches one's life in way that no other discipline can.

What Can I Do With Philosophy?

It is sometimes said: "Philosophy bakes no bread." After all, how many Fortune 500 companies are advertising for philosophers? So, naturally, one might wonder, what are my career options if I study philosophy? The answer here is simple: almost anything.

Many students of philosophy go on to pursue advanced degrees. A major or minor in philosophy serve as excellent preparation for pursue advanced degree in law, theology, business, and of course, the humanities.

In addition, Studying philosophy is arguably essential for continued success in a career. This is because the study of philosophy develops two general skills that are vital for success in virtually any career field:

- The ability to think through a problem clearly, and
- The ability to communicate a solution effectively.

Whether one manage a small business, sets up computer networks, serve in law

enforcement, or care for terminally ill patients, these skills are crucial. Yet studying philosophy not only provides general career preparation, but in many cases specific preparation as well. Here are just few examples:

the students pursuing medicine will benefit from studying *bio-ethics*,
the students pursuing art, film or music will benefit from studying
aesthetics, of the *philosophy of music*,
the students pursuing literature will benefit from studying the *philosophy of literature*,
the students pursuing law, or political science will benefit from studying the
philosophy of law, or *political philosophy*,
the students pursuing business will benefit from studying *business ethics*,
the students pursuing theology, or religion will benefit from studying
philosophy of religion,
the students pursuing some areas of science will benefit from studying
philosophy of science,
the students pursuing computer science or engineering will benefit from
studying *logic*,
the students pursuing psychology will benefit from studying *philosophy of mind*.

In many ways, What you can do with philosophy is merely a matter of what you can do. A major or minor in philosophy is an ideal complement to almost any academic or career pursuit. Nevertheless, whatever career pursuit one choose it is important to insure that one is making the right preparations. For more information on career preparation contact the **FSU career center**.

In the meantime, considering the possibility of studying philosophy and see what you can do with it! For more information contact the Undergraduate Advisor at pdaton@mailers.fsu.edu.

Reading Philosophy

How someone reads works from many particular disciplines is primarily a matter of two things:

1. The central emphasis of the discipline, and
2. The style in which works of the discipline are written.

For example, in literature one typically reads a literary for the story of narrative. Issues such a character development, and tune are important. Alternatively, when

reading works in history, one is concerned with the author's account. Issues such as chronology, facts, and authorial interpretation are important.

Most philosophical literature is distinct from that of other disciplines in both content and style. So, philosophical works is different from reading works in other disciplines. Generally, because philosophy concerns with argument, you ought to read philosophical works keeping the following three ideas you read ask yourself...

What does the author's main point? In each philosophical work, try to identify the main conclusion the author is attempting to establish. Be able to summarize in your own terms.

Why does the author think his point correct? Here, focus on the reasons that the author gives support of her main conclusion. Be able to list them.

How do the reasons the author presents support the main point? Try to understand the way in which reasons the author provides are related to his main conclusion. Be able to identify the kind of arguments the author is using.

By keeping these three questions in mind, you will achieve greater level of proficiency in philosophy.

Additional Practical Suggestions

Most students, especially those who are new to philosophy, find reading philosophical materials tort difficult. Here are few practical suggestions that won't remove the pain, but will increase gain.

Read Slowly: Philosophical writings are generally not the kind of material that you can read minutes before class. Both the concepts and the arguments take time to digest.

Read Several Times: Don't deceive yourself into thinking that having read a piece of philosophical material once, you have read it enough. Make sure you alot *plenty* time of reading, re-reading, re-reading.

Read For Understanding: Many students will fall into the trap of merely reading the words on that you read philosophy in this way, you will NEVER get it. Read to understand that is being said. At time you read a sentence or a paragraph stop and ask yourself – What has the author just said? How does what the author just said related to what I have previously read? **Note:** answering these questions may require that you translate English into English (i.e., araphrase in your own words).

Take Notes: As you read, don't be afraid to interact with the text. Highlighting or underline important points. Circle words or phrases that you don't understand. Write comments on points you disagree with. Write questions on issues that are unresolved or need further exploration.

Writing Philosophy

Successful philosophical writings will exhibit clarity and excellence in both form and content. With respect to form, all philosophical papers should include an introduction, body and conclusion. It is useful to think of these three components in the following way:

Introduction: Tell the reader what you are going to say in the paper.

Body: Say what you have to say, and

Conclusion: Tell the reader what you have said in the paper.

An introduction should also include a thesis. A thesis is a single, clear statement of what you intend to accomplish or hope to show in the paper. For example, "The purpose of this paper is to show that Descartes' mind-body dualism is a more tenable position for explaining personal identity than Locke's memory criterion." In short, the thesis is the purpose of your paper.

With respect to content, most philosophy papers focus on a philosophical problem or question. For example, is the prevalence of the evil in the world compatible with the existence of a wholly and powerful God? With this philosophical problem or question as the paper's centerpiece, the author takes on one or more of the following tasks.

1. Articulate the philosophical problem or question clearly.
2. Explain other philosophical attempts to solve the problem or answer the question.
3. Offer objections to these proposed solutions or answers.
4. Suggest a new solution or answer to the philosophical problem or question, or
5. Consider and respond to objections to the new suggested solution or answer.

In fulfilling these tasks, you should support your position (s) with both

Clear reasoning and argument, and examples and illustrations.

By keeping these general guidelines in mind, you will be able to achieve a greater level of proficiency in writing philosophical papers.

Additional Suggestions

Above all, make sure that you avoid the Seven Deadly Sentences!

If you need to define a particular term or idea, summarize the meaning or definition using your own explanation of what the term means. Do not simply quote a dictionary definition.

Do not write for your instructor. Do write as an instructor. Do not assume that the

reader is familiar with you are discussing. Write as though you are explaining the material in your paper to an intelligent school senior.

Do not causally express your opinions on an argument and when expressing your opinions avoid commentary expressions. For example, do not simply say, “ I think this argument is totally lame.”

Do use terms like ‘sound,’ ‘valid,’ ‘invalid’ or ‘unsound’ when expressing your opinions about an argument. **Do give** reasons in support your opinions about an argument.

Study Questions

1. Could you name more areas of philosophical study and more Western philosophers than that mentioned in this article? Try as many as you can.
2. If the question “What can I do with philosophy?” is addressed to you, how do you answer it?
3. Could you make a summary for each part of this article with no more than ten sentences?

WHAT DO YOU MEAN PHILOSOPHY ???

-James L. Christian Saint Ana College U.S.A.

(IP Introduction from *PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ART OF WONDERING*.

Second Edition, by James L. Christian.)

1. Sometime, at your leisure—if you want to know what philosophy is—go into a large bookstore and browse. Check a variety of books in psychology, anthropology, physics, chemistry, archeology, astronomy and other nonfiction fields. Look at the last chapter in each book. In a surprising number of cases, you will find that the author has chosen to round out of his work with a final summation of what the book is all about. That is, having written a whole book on a specialized subject in which he is probably an authority, he finds that he also has ideas about the larger meaning of the facts that he has written about. The final chapter may be called “Conclusion,” “Epilogue,” “Postscript,” “My personal view,” “Implications,” “Comments,” “Speculations,” or (as in one case) “So what?” But in every instance, the author is trying to elucidate the larger implications of his subject matter and to clarify how he thinks it relates to other fields or to life. He has an urge to tell us the meaning of all his facts taken together. He wants to share with us the philosophic implications of what he has written.

When he does this, the author has moved beyond the role of a field specialist. He is a philosopher.

2. This is a textbook in synoptic (“*synopsis*” From the Greek *synoptikos*, “*seeing the whole together*” or “*taking a comprehensive view*.” The attempt to achieve an all-inclusive overview of one’s subject matter.) philosophy. It is an invitation to ponder, in a large possible perspective, the weightier, more stubborn problems of human existence. It is an invitation to think—to wonder, to question, to speculate, to reason, even to fantasize—in the eternal search for wisdom. In a word, synoptic philosophy is an attempt to weave interconnecting lines of illumination between all the disparate realm of human thought in the hope that, like a thousand dawns, new insights will burst through.

By its very nature, philosophy is a do-it-yourself enterprise. There is a common misunderstanding that philosophy—like chemistry or history—has a content to offer, a content which a teacher is to teach and a student to learn. This is not the case. There are no facts, no theories, certainly no final truth which go by name of “philosophy and which one is supposed to accept and believe. Rather, Philosophy is skill—more akin to mathematics and music; it is something that one *learns to do*.

Philosophy, that is, is a method. It is *learning how* to ask and re—ask

questions until meaningful answers begin to appear. It is *learning how* to relate materials. It is *learning where* to go for the most dependable, up-to-date information that might shed light on some problems. It is *learning how* to double check fact-claims in order to verify or falsify them. It is *learning how* to reject fallacious fact-claim—to reject them no matter how prestigious the authority who holds them deeply one would personally like to believe them.

3. The student should be aware that philosophy has never been just one kind of activity with a single approach to a single task. Rather, there have been many kinds of philosophy. The quiet philosophy of the sage who sees much but speaks little because language can not hold life; the articulate, noisy dialectics of Socrates; the calm, logical apologetics of Aquinas; the mystical philosophy of Plotinos and Chuang-tzu; the mathematical philosophy of Russell and Wittgenstein.

Each school of philosophy has concentrated upon some aspects of man's knowledge. Logical/analytical philosophy has worked long and hard on the confusion which vitiate so much of our thinking and communicating. Pragmatism has concentrated on finding solutions to problems of man's social existence. Existential philosophy has been concerned with making life meaningful to each, unique individual. Activist schools argue that philosophers spend too much time trying to make sense of the world and too little time trying to change it. Several schools of philosophy, Eastern and Western, challenge the individual to turn away from an alienating society and to seek harmony with Nature of Ultimate Reality.

Each kind of philosophy has made an immense contribution to its area of concern. Each was doubtless a part of the *Zeitgeist*—"the spirit of the age"—which give it birth and to which it spoke.

The present unhappy condition of human knowledge calls for the application of a synoptic methodology. We now posses vast accumulations of specialized knowledge in countless fields, but these fields remain isolated form one another. Yet it is increasingly clear that many of our urgent problems can be understood only the specialized information from a variety of these separate fields is integrated and "see together"—synoptically. It is only then that we can develop realistic solution to these contempt problems.

4. It is often said that philosophers engage in two basic tasks: "taking apart"—analyzing ideas to discover if we truly know what we think we know (and we don't)—and "putting together"—synthesizing all our knowledge to find if we can attain a larger and better view of life(we can).

But in practice philosophers do a lot more than this. They talk a lot. They carry on dialogues with anyone who comes within range. And they argue a great deal.

Not the usual kinds of argument in which egos fight to win, but philosophical arguments in which they attempt to clarify the reasoning that lies behind their statements; and no one cares about winning since, in philosophical arguments, every one wins.

They also ask one another for definitions to be sure they're thinking clearly, and they push one another to pursue the implications of their ideas and statements. They prod themselves and others to examine the basic assumptions upon which their beliefs and arguments rest.

Philosophers are persistent explorers in the nooks and crannies of human knowledge, which are commonly overlooked or deliberately ignored. It is an exciting but restless adventure of the mind.

5. Philosophers, However, do not engage in this critical task just to make nuisances of themselves. Indeed, the central aim of philosophers has always been ... to construct a picture of the whole of reality, in which every element of man's knowledge and every aspect of man's existence will find its proper place. Philosophy, in short, is man's quest for the unity of knowledge; it consists in a perpetual struggle to create the concepts in which the universe can be conceived as a universe. The history of philosophy is attempt, is made to grasp this total unity...

It can not be denied that this attempt stand without rival as the most audacious enterprise in which the mind of man has never engaged. Just reflect for a moment: Here is man, surrounded by the vastness of a universe, in which he is only a tiny and perhaps insignificant part –and he wants to *understand* it ...

WILLIAM HALVERSON

A concise Introduction to Philosophy
(1967, Random House, Inc., p.18f)

6. In one respect, philosophic material can be deceptive. Since it deals with life by examining the sorts of questions we ask every day, some of the subject matter will have a easy, familiar ring.

The fact is that synoptic philosophy must be as diligently as any other subject, not to remember data, but to set the mind in motion toward developing larger concept, connecting ideas, and seeing through and beyond mere words and facts.

In a sense, intellectual growth *happens to us*; it is not really something that we do. But it happen to us only when our mind are given a chance to operate on their terms. take their own time to process information and to begin developing a web of interconnecting lines of illumination among their materials. This undertaking is partly conscious, of course; but largely it is unconscious process. This is why much philosophic insight just happens, as though the light moves from the depth upward

and not from the rational conscious downward.

Only disciplined study with an open mind will produce philosophical awareness. Insight and consciousness still come with relentless labor. In this age of instant everything, there is still no instant wisdom, unfortunately.

7. No two of us possess precisely same information, or see things from the same viewpoint, or share the same values. Therefore, each of us must do synoptic philosophy in his own unique and personal way. A student entering the activity of philosophizing may need to be on guard against developing a world-view which resembles, a bit too closely, the prepackaged philosophy of life belonging to someone else or to some institution. Most of us are philosophically lazy, and it is easy to appropriate another's thoughts and rationalize our theft. The British logician Wittgenstein warned us that "a thought which is not independent is a thought only half understood." Similarly, a philosophy of life that is not authentic product of one's own experience is a philosophy only half understood.

Nor will any of us succeed in developing a finished philosophy; for as one changes with life, so does one's thinking. A philosophy *of life* must change with life. Doing philosophy is an endless activity.

For this reason, this book is merely an example of synoptic philosophy. This is the way I have had to do it because of *my* perspectives, *my* interest, *my* areas of knowledge, *my* personal concerns, and *my* limitations. But *your* world-view will be different because it will be *yours*, and *yours alone*.

This is why my attempt to do synoptic philosophy is, at most, a guideline showing how it might be done; at least, the expression of a hope that, someday, in your own way, you will resolve the contradictions of your own existence—both of knowing and being—and proceed to see life in a larger, more fulfilling way.

Study questions:

1. According to Christian, what is the general nature of philosophy?
2. What is the worst method in doing philosophy? And what other problems are we supposed to notice in doing philosophy?
3. In the part 5 of the article, there is a version provided by Harverson, about the understanding of philosophy, try some comments on this version.

INTRODUCTION

-Arthur J. Minton and Thomas A. Shipka
(PPD)

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

Philosophy, like other studies, aims at knowledge. But philosophers seek a special sort of knowledge that eludes exact definition. The word “philosophy” comes from the Greek *philein*, “to love or desire,” and *sophia*, “wisdom.” The philosopher, then, is a “lover of wisdom.” Wisdom is knowledge in its broadest sense. It does not concern things that huddle on the periphery of life. It is knowledge directed to the fundamental and pervasive concerns of existence. To desire wisdom is to seek principles that cut through the superficial and trivial facts that clutter our intellectual landscape, revealing the basic shape of things beneath. Philosophy, as a quest for wisdom, is an attempt to provide a vision of the world that is systematic and clear, in which the connections between significant facts are made manifest. It is the search for first things and last things—for first principles and their ultimate implications.

We all become philosophers at crucial points in life. We go at the painful task of living with a set of beliefs—faiths, if you will—that organize the helter-skelter of experience into a more or less systematic and coherent whole. From culture, class, religion, and family we are provided with a general framework, a world view, that filters out the unimportant and impregnates experience with meaning. This framework of beliefs and values is largely unconscious and inarticulate; and when it smashes against the hard rock of reality, the dilemma we feel, but do not yet understand, kindles philosophical reflection. As our personal relationships become more complicated, youthful optimism about human nature is tempered by disappointment and hurt. As more and more is demanded of us and we begin to see flaws in ourselves, the infinite horizon of opportunity shrinks in the face of our limitations. As we see ourselves and others repeating the same errors, playing out the same roles, we begin to wonder whether society and nature have conspired to lock us into a mechanical mode of reaction impossible to resist. As we grow conscious of the enormous amount of suffering and anguish in the world, seeing at first hand the vast waste of human life, the old easy answers about a good and loving God are shattered. As we face wholesale changes in the behavior of society, each decade overthrowing the values of the last, we cannot help wondering whether our own commitments will stand the test of time or even whether such commitments are more than subjective whims that we have elevated to first principles. At such times we lose our way in the world and we ask, “What am I about?” This is philosophical territory.

Traditionally, philosophy has been partitioned into three areas: epistemology,

metaphysics, and value theory. *Epistemology* is the theory of knowledge. The following are typical epistemological questions: What is scientific method? What is the role of observation in knowing? Can there be absolute certainty about anything? What is an explanation? What is a proof? *Metaphysics* is concerned with the description of the fundamental aspects of reality. These are typical metaphysical questions: What is mind? Is it different from matter? Is there necessity in nature? Is there necessity in human decision? Does God exist? Are numbers real? Which is basic—force or matter? *Value theory* consists in resolving a number of problems about the nature of value in art, ethics, and politics: What makes something beautiful? Is it taste or an objective property? What makes something good? Again, is personal morality subjective or can it be assessed by an absolute standard? When should I disregard my own interests, if at all? What makes one political system better than another? Should I always obey the law? What makes someone into a moral authority? As you can see, sometimes philosophical inquiry becomes lofty and abstract; but even the most abstract theorizing is generated in a practical dilemma and will eventually come back to illuminate its beginnings. The philosophical perspective is ever the human perspective.

But the human perspective is limited. No one can scan the entire horizon of human concern with the eye of a god. We see the world from where we stand, and partial vision yields only partial truth. To recognize this fact, however, is not to counsel inaction, indecision, or despair. Nor is it to fall back on the comfortable but wholly fallacious assumption that since no one has all the answers, everyone's opinion is equally valid. The recognition of fallibility is simply an acknowledgment of our humanity. We have to get on in this world, and either we entrust our course to intellect and whatever insight we can muster or we flounder and take our chances with fate. There are no other alternatives. The basic assumption of philosophical inquiry is that the most intractable puzzles of life—no matter how large—will ultimately give way to rational analysis. But before this can happen, we must develop, as carefully as we can, our own vision of things. Lived experience is the testing ground for these partial insights. The experience of one individual or even of a generation may not be sufficient; but eventually what is true in our outlook will enlarge our understanding of the world and open it up to our command, while what is false will lead us to confusion and frustration.

THE SEARCH FOR BEDROCK: PARADOX

Philosophical thought usually begins when the world does not behave as we thought it must. In frustration, the wise person takes stock. "Know thyself" is the first injunction of philosophy, for until we appreciate the extent to which self colors experience with its own loyalties, infuses it with its inarticulate commitments, we cannot enjoy the

flexibility of action and purpose that is the mark of true freedom. Many people believe that the mind is like a sponge, soaking up facts which then present themselves on the stage of consciousness in all their pristine reality. The mind, according to this view, is simply a receptacle which does not alter or transform what flows into it. This conception of the "passivity" of intellect is perhaps the greatest barrier to philosophical thinking. Philosophers are constantly reminding us that we are the active shapers of experience, investing it with meaning from a hidden fund of presuppositions, mostly submerged beneath consciousness like the great mass of an iceberg beneath the water. The first task of philosophy is to bring these presuppositions to consciousness—to remind us that the sense of obviousness accompanying certain facts has been contributed by ourselves. An example will make this clearer.

When surgical techniques allowed for the safe removal of cataracts, people who had been afflicted with this condition since birth were able to see for the first time. It is tempting to think that upon opening their eyes, they experienced the beautiful and familiar world of vision—a world of form and color, of public objects in a public space. But this does not occur. The patient is immediately confronted with a wall of brightness containing color patches that blend indistinguishably into one another. The flood of sensations is absolutely meaningless. There is no awareness of shape or size, nor any idea of distance. In fact, some patients report the impression that the swirl of color is touching their eyes. Familiar shapes, such as squares and triangles, which are easily identified by touch, are unrecognized in the visual array. One investigator writes:

The newly-operated patients do not localize their visual impressions; they do not relate them to any point, either to the eye or to any surface, even a spherical one; they see colors much as we smell an odor of peat or varnish, which enfolds and intrudes upon us, but without occupying any specific form of extension in a more exactly definable way. (Note: This quotation and all following quotations are taken from Marius Von Senden, *Space and Sight* New York: Free Press, 1960. This remarkable book is a collection of case histories of persons who acquired sight for the first time through surgery or by spontaneous remission.)

Gradually, the newly sighted learn that the color patches represent objects at a distance. They discover that they can move through the field of color, that the colors move to the edge of the visual field as they walk, and that no matter how they turn their bodies, the visual swirl surrounds them. Slowly, they begin to apprehend that there are things behind them and in inadequate. About his patient, one doctor wrote:

I have found in her no notion of size, for example, not even within the narrow limits she might have encompassed with the aid of touch. Thus when I asked her to show me how big her mother was, she did not stretch out her hands, but set her two index fingers apart.

Another physician reported similar effects in his patients:

Those who are blind from birth have no real conception of distance. A house that is a mile away is thought of as nearby, but requiring the taking of a lot of steps.

Only after long and painful experience do the patients come to have an idea of objective space. At first, only things extremely close are seen in depth, while objects at a distance remain parts of a flat wall of sensation where everything ends. Here one object moving in front of another is seen as two color patches melding into one another. When a newly sighted girl first saw photographs and paintings, she asked: "Why do they put those dark marks all over them?" "those aren't dark marks," her mother responded, "those are shadows; ...if it were not for shadows, many things would look flat." The girl answered: "Well, that's how things do look. Everything looks flat with dark patches." With time, however, the world begins to assume depth and the flat curtain of color recedes into the background.

The mental effort involved in learning to see is enormous. Without mental exertion, experimentation, and training, the bright wall of sensation remains a dazzling, incoherent barrier. Sometimes the task proves too much for adults who have spent their lifetime relying on other senses, and they relapse into their old habits. A doctor writes about his twenty-one-year-old patient:

Her unfortunate father, who had hoped for so much from this operation, wrote that his daughter carefully shuts her eyes whenever she wishes to go about the house, especially when she comes to a staircase, and that she is never happier and more at ease than when, by closing her eyelids, she relapses into her former state of total blindness.

For the first time these people are struck by the tremendous size of the world, and they are oppressed by their own insignificance. They become aware of the fact that they have been visible to others all along, and they feel it as an intrusion into their privacy. Their emotional and mental lives are shaken to the very core.

The newly sighted undergo experiences which those of us born with vision toiled through in infancy and have long since forgotten. Long ago the flat wall of sensation fragmented into objects that zoomed away into space, and now it is almost

impossible for us to regard our visual field as a blur of color patches. Our perceptual skills have become so routine and automatic that they give the illusion of naturalness, like the technique of an accomplished musician. We tend to forget that what is now easy was once painfully difficult. The experience of the blind in coping with their newfound sense of vision illustrates that even in the most elementary perception, reason and judgment are at work, albeit in dim and forgotten ways. The world that presents itself to our eyes—the world of three-dimensional objects in a public space—is as much a result of thought as of pure sensation. How much more thought and assumption, then, must lie half-hidden beneath our explicit beliefs about morality, science, politics, religion, and the other great topics of human concern. Philosophy is an attempt to ferret out the most significant of these, to bring them into the bright light of awareness, and, if possible, to submit them to critical appraisal.

Socrates was the greatest practitioner of this analytical search for fundamental assumptions. Walking through the streets of ancient Athens, he would buttonhole the powerful men of his time, asking them irreverent questions about their opinions. To those who pretended to know about justice, he quietly asked, *tò tí*—what is it? What do you mean by justice and right and goodness? Don't just give me a list of those things which possess these qualities, but tell me the essence of the idea. Define your terms. What is virtue, morality, knowledge? What do you mean by *yourself*, your soul, your mind? By skillful questioning, Socrates would pry into depths of one's system of beliefs, dragging out cherished certainties and displaying their ragged clothing. This demand for clarity of thought and exactness of definition left his victims confused and reeling. After being questioned, poor Euthyphro confesses: "I do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn around and walk away from us."

Socrates had asked Euthyphro to define piety, and then showed, through a series of deductions, that his definition was in serious conflict with other things he believed. He was trying to make him feel a paradox in those beliefs and values which, on their face, were so familiar and obvious. Piety, Euthyphro says, is whatever is pleasing to the gods. "Do the gods love piety in and of itself?" Socrates asks. "Of course," his victim replies. If this is so, Socrates retorts, then the gods must love piety because it is pleasing to them—an absurd conclusion. Euthyphro is staggered: "Come again... how was that?" This sort of procedure is analytic in nature. By bringing out the paradoxical in the familiar, our attention is forced inward, to our system of definitions, to the conceptual paths we have made for ourselves in the world. The confusion we feel is that of a traveler who has used a road daily in one direction and now for the first time must travel the opposite way. The old landmarks are alien, the curves and hills are not where they are supposed to be, the terrain is confusing. Philosophy is an adventure into the commonplace. It is the human mind become

conscious of itself and its contribution to what is known.

THE SEARCH FOR SYSTEM: DISCOVERY

The search for hidden assumptions and fundamental premises is actually part of a larger enterprise. In the end, a philosophy should present us with a unified vision of the world and of our place in it. It is impossible, however, to identify and evaluate the bedrock of our belief system without uncovering the relations, however vague, among basic beliefs. Perhaps another analogy from the study of vision will illustrate this point. Ordinary perceptual experience leads us to believe that our visual image is sharp and clear at any one time, like the image on a photograph. In fact, however, the greatest part of the visual field is a blur. Only about a one-thousandth part of the visual field—the part isolated by a focal area of 4 degrees out of a total of 180 degrees—is presented to consciousness with real clarity. The rest seems sharp and clear because the eye is constantly moving, summing up these focal areas in a fraction of a second to create a larger area of clarity. Stop the motion of the eye and concentrate on one word. You will notice how this small circle of clarity recedes into an expanse of vagueness and haze. Experiments have shown that when the eye is completely immobilized (it takes a machine to do it), the visual image fragments and disappears. Exploration is the *sine qua non*, the indispensable condition, of clear vision.

Mental clarity is not unlike visual clarity. When we try to fasten onto a concept, to hold it fixed in the light of awareness, it tends to disintegrate into meaninglessness. “Every definite image in the mind,” wrote William James, “is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows around it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The significance, the value of the image, is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it.” To see our beliefs clearly, we must scan our mental field to discover the ways an idea interacts with its surroundings. What a person does with a concept in his or her total intellectual framework is a better clue to understanding what it means than the most exacting definition.

Paradox and discovery are two sides of the same coin. Things seem paradoxical when two firmly established beliefs which have been kept apart and allowed to function in their own domains are brought side by side and seen to be inconsistent. Until then we really do not know what we believe, for usually our assumptions are nebulous and vague. We sharpen them by experimentation—by examining the effect they have on other areas of experience. What are your religious beliefs? How do you reconcile God’s goodness with the creation of people who God knows will be responsible for the suffering of millions of innocents? How do you justify Hitler, Stalin, Genghis Khan, Nero etc.? You say that they have free will and

are therefore responsible for what they do. But, then, how can free will exist in light of the findings of science? Physical processes flow inevitably from their antecedent conditions. There are no alternatives. But we are not physical, you say. We possess a soul, a nonmaterial essence that escapes the rigid fatalism of matter. What is your evidence for this? And so it goes. We shall not find systematic answers to such questions lying within us, ready to spring to light when we need them. Instead, we will have a vague feeling of where we are, and we may discover that there are cracks in our belief system that cannot be repaired. Philosophical discovery is not merely clarifying what was already fully there but hidden; it is also growth.

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

Philosophy, it seems, is speculation about matters that can have no final answers. Religion, morality, the existence of the soul, free will, the ultimate structure of the world—such issues cannot be treated with precision. Science, on the other hand, presents us with a definite method, a down-to-earth approach to things. We may have to settle for less, but at least we shall know what we have got.

Is there a yawning gap between science and philosophy? In order to answer this question, we should look briefly at the dawn of modern science.

In the thirteenth century, Christian Europe rediscovered the learning of antiquity which had been lost during the Middle Ages. This vast wealth of information had to be merged with the Christian tradition, for as a system of knowledge it was far superior to anything then known. The greatest name in Greek science was that of Aristotle, whose work systematized physics, astronomy, biology, and psychology.

Things in nature, Aristotle held, are a composite of two factors—form and matter. Matter is the raw material, form the structure. To know what a thing is, one must know both of these aspects: What is it made of? What is its form? The key to understanding the form of a thing is its *telos*—the goal or end toward which it moves. Everything in nature is directed by an inner force to a specific fulfillment. To know what an acorn is, for example, is to know that it will grow into a certain sort of tree. From common observation, Aristotle reasoned that the *telos* of matter is rest. Roll a ball, throw a stone, shoot an arrow, row a boat—all these experiences confirm it: matter naturally seeks a state of rest. Pick up a stone and feel it resist being moved. The pressure you feel against your hand, its weight, is a manifestation of an inner drive to move back to earth, its natural place of rest.

This reasoning, however, produces a problem. Matter, if left alone, should seek out its place of rest and remain there. The world should be static and dead. Why hasn't this occurred? Something must be actively interfering with the elements, Aristotle thought, to keep them in motion. Looking to the heavens, he saw the stars

moving in circular paths around the earth. Here was the force needed to account for activity and change in dead matter. The heavenly spheres must communicate some of their motion by friction to the world below. But this explanation meant that if the stars continued to move forever, they were not made of ordinary matter. Indeed, they were perfect, incorruptible bodies. Eternal circular motion was perfect motion, and the stars, following the urging of their special *telos*, were striving for perfection.

Aristotle's physics and astronomy merged with Christianity in the thirteenth century to produce a world view that was at once commonsensical and profound. Although Christian thinkers continued to regard the stars and planets as perfect, the suggestion that they moved themselves in a celestial struggle for perfection smacked too much of ancient polytheism. The heavenly bodies, like ordinary matter, required an external force to keep them in motion. Whatever such a force was, it could not be material, for then it would need a further force to move it, *ad infinitum*. God was the logical solution. God was the wind in the sails of the universe, actively moving the heavenly spheres around the center of creation. This was the element that the Christian tradition needed for intellectual completion. Here was physical proof for the existence of God. Henceforth no scientific person could doubt the religious vision of the world. Astronomy, physics, and religion were molded into a unified system of explanation.

By the sixteenth century, however, this world view had become ungainly. In order to account for the erratic movements of the planets—called “wandering stars”—the original system of eight concentric spheres had evolved into an enormously complicated and cumbersome tangle of movements. The orbits of the planets were practically unimaginable. Each planet moved in a small circle, like a horse on a merry-go-round, the center of which was attached to the periphery of a larger circle with the earth in the middle. Yet the planets did not move in their little circles around the earth, but about a point slightly off center. To the mathematical minds of the period, such a loping cosmic circus seemed unworthy of the divine intellect. But in spite of these inelegant complications, Aristotle's astronomy remained the preferred view because it rested on concepts that were in agreement with observation and common sense. Observation suggests that the earth is a steady platform around which the heavens move in large arcing paths. Common sense tells us a thousand times a day that a moving object will come to rest unless a continuous force is applied to it. These commonplaces were the cornerstones of Aristotle's science, and before a new vision of the world could hope to stand, they would have to be destroyed.

The year 1543 marked the publication by Nicholas Copernicus of *On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres*. In this book he theorized that the earth and the rest of the planets moved in circular orbits around the sun. In order to account for the

apparent movement of the sun across the sky each day, he suggested that the earth rotates on its axis once each twenty-four hours. The simplicity of this account appealed to many scientists, but it faced what appeared to be insurmountable obstacles. If the earth were rotating on its axis at the required rate, its surface at the equator would be moving at great speeds. An object thrown high into the air would not land in the same spot. Birds would not be able to fly in the direction of rotation, for they would be constantly falling behind the speeding ground beneath them. Besides, at such velocities, objects would be thrown away from the surface of the earth like stones flung from a sling. These objections strike us today as absurd, but only because we have become accustomed to the concept of inertia. In the sixteenth century, they were irrefutable.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Galileo Galilei was a professor of mathematics at the University of Padua. Early in his career he had realized that Aristotle's science could not explain the flight of a cannonball. The cannonball continues to fly through space when there are no apparent forces acting on it to keep it in motion. Most scientists, unable to surmount their theoretical assumptions, invented invisible forces to account for this kind of case. Some said that the air behind the ball continued to push it along, and as this force died, the ball fell to earth. But to Galileo, such explanations seemed to be born of desperation. Besides, God was a mathematician, he believed, and could not have made the universe as inelegant as depicted in Aristotle's astronomy. And so Galileo became a Copernican, while continuing to teach the old astronomy. Later, in 1632, he would publish *Dialogues on the Two Chief World Systems*, which would ring the death knell for Aristotle's system.

The experiments in 1640 which led to this dramatic outcome seemed innocuous enough at first glance. Galileo had already proven that the velocity acquired by a freely falling body was not proportional to its weight. Now he was seeking to establish a lawful relation between velocity and time. Lacking an accurate timepiece, he had to "slow down" a falling object in order to measure the relation between distance traversed and time elapsed. To accomplish this, he rolled smooth brass balls down an inclined plane on the assumption that the velocity achieved is due to the vertical factor alone. In this way he discovered that the distance traversed is proportional to the square of the elapsed time. No matter what the degree of the slope, this relation remained constant. Since the final velocity of a ball rolled down an inclined plane is due to the vertical factor alone, it can be assumed that it will acquire enough force to roll up a similar plane to its original height, no matter what the slope of the plane. Of course, Galileo's brass balls rolling down grooves lined with polished parchment did not roll back to exactly the height from which they began. He surmised that this was due to the friction of the plane. He then imagined a ball rolling down the grooved incline onto a plane tilted by the minutest fraction of a degree. What would

happen? All of his experiments implied that the ball would roll up the plane until it had achieved its original height, even if this meant that it had to traverse a vast distance to do so. But what if it rolled onto a horizontal *frictionless* plane? Here Galileo made a dramatic intellectual leap: the horizontal plane is simply an incline of 0 degrees. The ball should roll over an infinite distance. A moving object, then, does not come to rest because its *telos* demands it. It comes to rest because a force, such as friction, impedes its continued motion. This is the principle of inertia.

The principle of inertia turns Aristotle's common sense on its head. A body in motion will continue in motion—a rock thrown up from the surface of the moving earth will retain whatever velocity the earth imparts to it, falling back to exactly the same spot. The centuries-old arguments against a moving earth were now shown to be bankrupt. The active, moving universe no longer required God as the force to sustain its motion. With the publication of these new ideas, the Church saw Galileo and his new science as dangerous enemies of religion. Six months after its printing, *Dialogues* was banned. Galileo was called to Rome and threatened with torture. At almost seventy years of age, he recanted, in abject terms, his defense of Copernicus. Legend has it that at the end of his recantation he muttered beneath his breath *Eppur si muove* ("it still moves"). But this is mere legend. Galileo had been broken, and he died in 1642, blind and under house arrest.

This episode from the history of science shows clearly that science and philosophy do not tread different paths.

In its fundamental aspect, Galileo's defense of Copernicus was a philosophical enterprise. Aristotle's system had reigned for so long that what had originally begun as speculation had hardened into intuition. The concepts of *weight*, *force*, and *motion* rested on assumptions so deeply ingrained in habits of mind that they seemed to define the limits of thought itself. To see the world afresh, Galileo had to turn his attention to the concepts which organized experience. Every major advance in science reiterates this theme. Faraday had to think of the magnetic field as an object just as real as the gross visible magnet. In so doing he revised our conception of matter. Einstein had to imagine that clocks are not equivalent in different frames of reference. Our idea of time as flowing uniformly throughout the universe was the victim. At the frontiers of knowledge, there is no authority, no tested method, no formula to apply which will churn out the answers. Instead there is a breakdown in the usual ways of thinking. This too is philosophical territory.

The scientific image of the world affects every corner of human experience. Galileo's work began a revolution in thinking which spread out from physics to the entire conception of human knowledge. Here was a new way of explaining things—a way which ignored tradition and authority, which made no reference to purposes and goals in nature, which represented the physical world as a mechanism moving

according to its own law, not enmeshed with a spiritual force that guides it. It gave rise to a new temperament, a new faith in the power of reason to reveal the structure of things. It placed new demands on political thought, ethics, religion, and psychology to establish their credentials on a similar empirical basis.

In the end, there is no hard-and-fast distinction between philosophy and science. A philosophy worth its salt will find a place within itself for the successes of science. Conversely, science, as we know it, rests on unchallenged assumptions which deserve philosophical analysis. If there is a conflict between science and philosophy, it is not between two bodies of truth; it is an internal conflict within human experience as the mind struggles to form a comprehensive picture of the whole while the pieces in the puzzle continue to change.

VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy is valuable in itself. This is not to say that philosophical reflection is the whole end of living, but merely that such activity is an essential part of happiness. Happiness is growth. It is the expansion and refinement of those powers and drives that make us distinctly human. Since curiosity is one expression of those essential human capabilities, philosophical reflection is an important part of self-fulfillment. Imagine, if you can, a society in which philosophical thought is prohibited. You are not permitted to wonder about the foundations of morality, or to discuss theology. You cannot question the fundamental assumptions of the sciences, and you are not allowed to connect the scientific image of humanity with the usual questions about the meaning of life, the existence of the soul, the possibility of human freedom, etc. Can you imagine that every important need of the human personality has been met in such a world? Hasn't something fundamental been left out? If we acknowledge that human beings have a drive to know, to explore, to connect and analyze, then by refusing to allow philosophical reflection, we would be refusing an intelligent nature its highest logical outcome. It is like saying to an athlete: "You may run, but you may not strain." Strain, however, is the only way to growth, and philosophical thought is the mind straining to understand itself and its place in the scheme of things.

The value of philosophy does not lie exclusively in the answers it gives. There is no systematic body of knowledge called "philosophy." There are, instead, people trying to think systematically about the fundamental questions of life. The great thinkers of the past differed in their conclusions, and those of today are no better off. But this is to be expected in an undertaking so grand, so final, and so audacious. The most enduring value of philosophy lies in the habit of mind it breeds in those who have discovered its pleasures. It produces a vision of things large enough to generate a life plan, a direction, tempered by the nagging suspicion that the vision may be an illusion. Philosophic thought, the exhilarating experience of paradox and discovery, is

the first step toward a civilized faith.

Study questions

1. Compare the thesis regarding to the nature of philosophy in this article with the one of the last article, is there any similarity, and any difference between these two theses?
2. Do you have more idea about the value of philosophy?
3. Do you agree with author's idea that philosophy aims to search for the foundation and the system of our beliefs? Why or why not?
4. Make generalization on the relation between philosophy and science, based on the article, and then develop your own idea on the issue.

THE PHILOSOPHER AS DETECTIVE

-David Stewart

(PPD)

David Stewart (1938-) is professor of philosophy at Ohio University, author of several successful philosophy textbooks, and a specialist in the philosophy of religion.

What attracts me to detective fiction is also what attracts me to philosophy: dependence on reason, the search for moral order, the development of analytical skills, the desire to find things out. In no other kind of literature does reason and reason's tool—logical analysis—figure as prominently as it does in detective fiction. John Cawelti, a noted authority on popular culture, in a well turned phrase, observes that “the classical detective formula is perhaps the most effective fictional structure yet devised for creating the illusion of rational control over the mysteries of life.”

Those of us who teach courses involving detective fiction have to face the fact that most academic courses deal mainly with “serious” literature and that most people are ambivalent toward mystery stories. Nevertheless, I want to make the case for viewing mysteries as dealing with serious themes, and to argue that detective fiction provides an entrée into important philosophical issues.

Scholarly opinion is virtually united, to the extent that scholarly opinion is ever united, on the view that, in spite of the fact that it flourished in Britain (especially between the two world wars, the golden age of detective fiction), detective fiction as a literary form was invented by an American—Edgar Allan Poe. Whether Poe wrote five detective stories or only three depends on whether you agree with Howard Haycraft's rejection of “The Gold Bug” and “Thou Art the Man” as qualifying for the reason that “every shred of the evidence on which Legrand's brilliant deductions are based is withheld from the reader until *after* the solution is disclosed.” That leaves as unquestioned examples of the form “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” “The Purloined Letter,” and “The Mystery of Marie Roget.”

Haycraft's comment brings up the essential feature of detective fiction: playing fair with the reader and giving the reader all the information the fictional detective has. Equally abhorrent are explanations that fly in the face of common sense or reason. Poisons unknown to science, supernatural interventions (the *deus ex machina*), and secret passageways are all beneath the dignity of serious practitioners of the art. Poe's pioneering of the form was true to these later canons, except for the two examples already mentioned.

But something else is involved, too. Detective fiction can emerge only when there are detectives. And this requirement sets apart the true form of the mystery from its competitors and spurious antecedents. A detective *detects*. Whether the detective is

professional or amateur is not important. What is important is that the means of detection be logical and rational. Not emotion, romance, action, brute force, luck, or supernatural intervention can lead to the solution of the difficulty in a detective story. Guesswork won't do at all. Whether it is Poe's process of ratiocination, Poirot's "little grey cells," or Sherlock Holmes's search for data, the detective's only weapon is reason. At base the detective story is a match of wits between the detective and the adversary, and the detective succeeds by out thinking the criminal.

All else is irrelevant: background color, manners, locales, character development, historical settings, romance—especially romance and that *sine qua non* of current popular fiction, sex. Dorothy Sayers rails against "the heroes who insist on fooling about after young women when they ought to be putting their minds on the job of detection," though she wrote this comment in 1929, before Lord Peter Wimsey fell in love with Harriet Vane in *Gaudy Night* (1935) and married her in *Busman's Honeymoon* (1937). Sayer's reasons? "Just at the critical moment when the trap is set to catch the villain, the sleuth learns that his best girl has been spirited away. Heedlessly he drops everything, and rushes off to Chinatown or to the lonely house on the marshes or wherever it is without even leaving a note to say where he is going. Here he is promptly sandbagged or entrapped or otherwise made a fool of, and the whole story is impeded and its logical development ruined."

Detective fiction is enjoyed most by those who love puzzles and the challenge to reason correctly, and here is a major point of contact with philosophy. In a well-crafted mystery the detective confronts us, the readers, with a contest of reason as surely as the detective challenges the wrongdoer. Ellery Queen serves notice at the beginning of his first novel, *The Roman Hat Mystery* (subtitled "A Problem in Deduction"), that he intends to play fair with the reader by providing a "lexicon of persons connected with the investigation" to which Ellery Queen urges the reader to return often "if toward no other end than to ward off the inevitable cry of 'Unfair!'—the consolation of those who read and do not reason." What makes a mystery fun is matching our wits against those of the detective, and so the author must give us all the data that are available to the detective. Hence Ellery Queen's challenge to his reader at the end of the novel:

... The alert student of mystery tales, now being in possession of all the pertinent facts, should at this stage of the story have reached definite conclusions on the questions propounded. The solution—or enough of it to point unerringly to the guilty character—may be reached by a series of logical deductions and psychological observations.

But having all the facts is not enough. What conclusion you draw from these facts is as important. Someone among the ancient Greeks, probably Aristotle, first discovered that there are two ways our reasoning can go wrong: we can reason on the basis of incorrect data, or we can have correct data and reason incorrectly from them. There is actually a third way, too: we can both have erroneous information *and* reason incorrectly. What we hope for is correct information and correct reasoning, and this is what the detective must have. Three ways to go wrong and only one to go right; no wonder the fictional detective can usually outwit us!

The kind of reasoning used is also important, depending on the nature of the case. Arthur Upfield's detective Napoleon Bonaparte (Bony to his friends) observed that "crime investigators are trained minds. I have been trained to think along lines of deduction and induction. These are two separate processes of thinking..." (*The Bushman Who Came Back*). The two processes of reasoning are not really as separate as Bony says, for in the real world we alternate constantly between them. *Deduction* (all horses have hearts, and so this horse has one) and *induction* (each horse I have ever seen has had a heart, and so all horses must have them) are both important in science, though deduction is more closely associated with mathematics and induction with laboratory science.

Observational skills, often more than inductive reasoning, characterize the successful detective, who sees a problem where the surrounding dullards see only the commonplace. Watson came upon Sherlock Holmes in the act of examining a hat which Watson describes as "a very seedy and disreputable hard-felt hat, much the worse for wear." Holmes urges Watson to "look upon it not as a battered billycock but as an intellectual problem" ("The Adventure of the Blue Carbunkle")

Many think that deduction is the privileged mode of detection, but it is not. More important even than deduction is the detective's ability to form a *hypothesis* after amassing a collection of observational detail. How this comes about is something of a mystery in its own right and has been a perennial puzzle for philosophers concerned with the logic of scientific discovery, but the detective has the ability. One requirement for successful hypothesis formation is sufficient factual detail. Watson recounts Holmes's self-condemning comment: " 'I had,' said he 'come to an entirely erroneous conclusion which shows, my dear Watson, how dangerous it always is to reason from insufficient data'" ("The Adventure of the Speckled Band").

As philosophers of science know, there are no rules for hypothesis formulation as there are for deductive reasoning, but one principle that is close to being a rule is that the detective should abandon a hypothesis when the facts no longer support it. Refusing to do this is the downfall of many a detective, but philosophers are of no particular help here in telling when to abandon a hypothesis. Nicholas Blake's Superintendent Armstrong had committed himself to a theory that his sergeant was

convinced was wrong. "The sergeant felt that this reasoning, though specious, had been rather flimsily constructed by Armstrong as a defence against a possibility which he had not explored with his usual thoroughness" (*A Question of Proof*).

A second near-rule for hypothesis formation, rather the inverse of the first, is that one should not abandon a theory that fits the facts no matter how improbable the theory may be. Holmes reminded Watson, "It is an old maxim of mine that when you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth" ("The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet").

The process of hypothesis formulation and testing is the logic of scientific discovery, and as anyone who has tried to do science knows, it escapes precise formulation. It certainly is not produced by a rigid approach that sees hypothesis formulation as a step-by-step process which can be taught and perfected by practice. We should therefore forgive detectives who are unable to say precisely how they arrived at the correct conclusion; and we should not blame the author or accuse the author of foul play if the process of correct hypothesis formulation itself seems to be a little mysterious.

When to make what philosophers call the inductive leap from observational detail to causal antecedents is the critical decision. Reflecting on this difficult aspect of reasoning, Napoleon Bonaparte observed that "inductive reasoning must keep to specified rules, and often to indulge in such reasoning is unwise until all the available facts and probable assumptions are marshaled" (*The Bushman Who Came Back*). Holmes describes inductive logic as the process of analytical reasoning, or reasoning backward. "In the everyday affairs of life," he notes, "it is more useful to reason forward." He then explains to Watson what he means. "Most people, if you describe a train of events to them, will tell you what the result would be. They can put those events together in their minds, and argue from them that something will come to pass. There are few people, however, who, if you told them a result, would be able to evolve from their own inner consciousness what the steps were which led up to that result. This power is what I mean when I talk of reasoning backward, or analytically" (*A Study in Scarlet*).

If inductive reasoning can be described as reasoning backward (from effects to causes), deductive reasoning can be characterized as reasoning forward (from premises to conclusion). Deduction can be valid even if the detective does not know whether the premises reasoned from are true or false. The detective can therefore proceed with many what-if chains of reasoning: "If Lord Melbourne lied when he told me he saw the gardener in the garden, then he wasn't in the library at the time and could *not* have seen you enter the conservatory." Harry Kemelman in "The Nine Mile Walk" used this distinction between the *process* of deductive reasoning and the *content* of deductive reasoning. Overhearing someone remark that "a nine-mile walk

is no joke, especially in the rain,” Nicky Welt showed what could be deduced from this statement. The story has a surprise ending, and I will not give it away here.

The rationality that I have been describing holds true of British detective fiction and its imitators in the so-called British drawing room style of murder mystery. The fundamental assumption behind English detective fiction is that there is always a logical explanation. The contrasting assumption of American detective fiction of the hard-boiled type is that crimes are not always committed for logical reasons. The detective who emerges in the writings of Raymond Chandler and Dashiell Hammett does not confront a crime as a puzzle to be solved but is someone who earns a living by stalking criminals down “mean streets.” Raymond Chandler, in a dedication accompanying a collection of *Black Mask* stories, reflected that these stories come from “The time when we were trying to get murder away from the upper classes, the weekend house party and the vicar’s rose-garden, and back to the people who are really good at it.”

If the hard-boiled detective’s weapons are not so much deductive reasoning as quick wits and a strong right cross, the detective here in American mystery fiction confronts a world gone wrong. Rather than trying to restore a lost rationality, the hard-boiled detective, like Albert Camus’s absurd hero, struggles to find meaning in what appear to be meaningless encounters. The hard-boiled detective is presented as something like a moral man in an immoral society, an absurd hero who confronts life as a series of existential crises. Hammett’s Sam Spade is a very moral man, probably the only moral man in *The Maltese Falcon*, where he is surrounded by liars, murderers, and cheats.

While considerably more violent, American detective fiction nonetheless continues the tradition of detective fiction that presents us with a moral world in which the distinctions between right and wrong are clear and vivid. Criminals are caught and punished. There is little moral ambiguity. Crime does not pay, and it is clear that the detective thinks it *should* not pay either. Detective fiction rarely deals with the actual punishment of the criminal; but there is the demand that the guilty person be caught and punished. I think this is a partial explanation for the popularity of detective fiction. The world of detective fiction is a moral world ruled by reason. Criminals are caught and punished. It is as Lamont Cranston’s shadow observed, “The weed of crime bears bitter fruit. Crime does not pay.”

But the real world does not strike us as moral. Terrorists kill children in crowded air terminals. Murderers go free on technicalities. Dealers in illegal drugs amass huge fortunes. Crime pays, and pays very well.

The morally tidy world of detective fiction appeals to our rationality in another sense. The philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that a rational world would be

a world where virtue is rewarded and vice punished, or more specifically, where the virtuous are happy and deserve to be and the wicked are unhappy. Certainly our world is not like that, and so one can only conclude that our world is not rational. Kant disagreed with many of his contemporaries who thought that we have a special moral sense, arguing instead that we use reason to make moral judgments just as surely as we use reason to gain knowledge about the world. Any rational person, he thought, has to acknowledge the demands of moral duty. Failure to do so is a breakdown in our moral reason just as surely as an inability to do geometry would indicate an irrationality of a different kind.

No wonder detective fiction appeals to us. As moral and rational beings, we crave a world that makes sense, a world where villains are easily identified and the good guys finally win. Detective fiction presents us with all this and more: a world where there is respect for law and order, and justice triumphs. No wonder mystery stories were banned in Nazi Germany and do not flourish in countries with tyrannical regimes. The great corpus of detective fiction has come from the world's democracies.

One might think that the renewed popularity of detective fiction, with its emphasis on law and order, is just another reflection of the increasing conservatism of our age. That may be partially correct, but more is involved than that. The structure of detective fiction has pretty much remained unchanged since its beginnings. There are exceptions, but the mainstream of the genre has adhered to certain definite structural constants. Among these are concern for plot development, the buildup of dramatic tension, and the final resolution of that tension. Or to use Aristotle's words, detective stories have a beginning, a middle, and an end.

To quote Aristotle in this context is not beside the point. In her 1935 essay, "Aristotle on Detective Fiction," Dorothy Sayers convincingly showed that detective fiction fulfills many of the demands for dramatic literature which Aristotle described in his *Poetics*. She points out that Aristotle said that the characters in a dramatic story should be good. That is, "Even the wickedest of them (should) be not merely monsters and caricatures... but endued with some sort of human dignity, so that we are enabled to take them seriously." The detective should be cleverer than we are, and the villain should be bad. But how bad is *bad*? A general rule Aristotle lays down is that the character should be worse than most other people not in every respect but only regarding one particular thing; the "plot ought not to turn on the detection and punishment of a hopelessly bad man who is villainous in all directions at once—forger, murderer, adulterer, thief." Mystery stories are filled with examples of crimes committed by intelligent, even moral, people who had a single fatal flaw. Inspector Appleby of Scotland Yard describes a murderer as not an entirely evil man, certainly not stupid, a scoundrel but also "a very, very able man" (*Hamlet, Revenge*).

Then there is Aristotle's well-known view that drama imitates life and thereby arouses emotions of fear and pity. To accomplish this, the action of the story must be complete in itself. Sayers says about this Aristotelian principle that "a detective story that leaves any loose ends is no proper detective story at all—with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions." But Aristotle says that the really violent action must be committed offstage out of sight of the audience. In detective fiction proper, the punishment of the criminal takes place later—and elsewhere. Aristotle's principles can help us understand better why the English country house is such an ideal setting as the scene of the crime. A close second is a deserted island, as Agatha Christie favored in *Ten Little Indians*; or a hotel, the closest believable modern alternative to a weekend in a manor house.

Then there is the matter of plot. Detective fiction offers the essential element for a good read: a *story*. The plot, Aristotle thought, should be believable. The puzzle that dominates mystery fiction seems to serve up just the right amount of complexity. In addition to believability, an acceptable plot faces moral restraints as well. A plot is unacceptable if it shows a good person passing from happiness to misery, or a bad person from misery to happiness. Why? Because Aristotle knew that we will not feel pity if one of the characters suffers undeserved misfortune. And the characters must be like ourselves, forcing us to face the possibility that maybe we could commit a crime similar to the one which we confront in the story. Holmes says at the conclusion of "The Boscombe Valley Mystery," "There but for the grace of God goes Sherlock Holmes."

Holmes's remark points up another aspect of Aristotle's theory of tragedy. The effect of having emotions of fear and pity aroused in us is that we are somehow purged of them—Aristotle's well-known theory of catharsis. Sayers noted in her article that Aristotle used the contemporary Greek theater for his examples "because it was, at that time, the most readily available, widespread and democratic form of entertainment presented for his attention. But what, in his heart of hearts, he desired was a good detective story; and it was not his fault, poor man, that he lived some twenty centuries too early." What Aristotle really craved, though he did not know it, was nothing less than a good detective story.

A final point of contact between philosophy and detective fiction is the task detective fiction places before the reader. The predominance of the puzzle and the presence of a detective are necessary conditions for a mystery story. Certainly the detective is necessary to the story, for the role of the detective (and whether the detective is called that or not is irrelevant) is help us understand the events narrated in the story. In an adventure story the reader is borne along by the sequence of events to the ending of the story which resolves the dramatic tension. But in a detective story, we can be

brought along to the end of the story and still feel a sense of dissatisfaction. The narrative is ended, the action has stopped, but the mystery is not dispelled. Until the events of the story have been *interpreted* to us, we do not understand what the story is about. This feature of detective fiction can be best described by invoking Robert Champigny's descriptive phrase, a *hermeneutic tale*.

Hermeneutics, or interpretation theory, is almost as old as Western philosophy itself, going back to Aristotle's treatise *On Interpretation*, known to us usually under its Latin title *De interpretatione*, a Latin form of the original Greek title *Peri hermeneias*. Here Aristotle defined interpretation, or hermeneutics, as "the operation of the mind in making statements which have to do with the truth or falsity of a thing." Interpretations, in Aristotle's sense, are statements about something that are true or false. Rhetoric, or persuasive discourse, and dramatic discourse, do not deal with truth or falsity but have as their aim moving the hearer. The aim of rhetoric is to persuade, that of poetry to arouse and purge the emotions. Certainly, if on no other grounds than this, detective fiction deserves to be called hermeneutical because of its emphasis on discovering the truth of what happened.

Until recently, *hermeneutics* was used to refer to the theory for interpreting religious texts, reflecting the origin of the term from the Greek word *hermeios*, associated with the oracle of Delphi and derived from the wing-footed messenger-god Hermes. The utterances of the oracle of Delphi were notoriously obscure (sufficiently so to protect the oracle from charges of error) and therefore demanded interpretation. The Greeks associated Hermes with the origins of language and writing, the mechanisms for communicating in human terms what is beyond human understanding. Although the messages of the gods may be beyond human understanding, the task of hermeneutics is to interpret those messages into terms that can be understood. The term *hermeneutics* was by and large dormant until the seventeenth century, when it was used by the German theologian J. C. Danhauer to describe the difference between exegesis (finding out what a sacred text *says*) and hermeneutics (interpreting what it *means*). Perhaps because of the origins of the term, and because of its use in a work dealing with the interpretation of religious texts, the religious association of hermeneutics was dominant for the next two centuries, until William Dilthey used the term to characterize the method which he felt was appropriate to the social sciences.

What is a detective, anyway? A scientist? Sherlock Holmes certainly showed a smattering of scientific interests (though in selective fields), but he could scarcely be said to be a scientist in terms of what we now think of as characterizing the natural sciences. But if we characterize Holmes (and his imitators) as social scientists, we mean more than merely that they use the methods of observation and analysis that are present in the natural sciences. We can turn to Dilthey, whose view was that human society should be investigated as a kind of *text* consisting of human actions, cultural

creations, and so forth that stand in need of being interpreted.

Detective stories present us with precisely such a text: the events of the crime itself, the activities of all the participants in the dramatic events, the motives of all the suspects. From this seemingly unstructured text the detective provides an interpretation of events into a coherent story. Whereas an adventure story leads us along to a culminating event, the detective story leads us back (through interpretation) to an understanding of an event that occurred rather early in the story. But now the event is understood, whereas when we witnessed the event (through the eyes of the narrator) we did not understand it, because we did not have the proper interpretation of the event. This feature of the detective story can be used by clever authors to set up several interpretations, all of which are false, until the detective gives the final and correct interpretation.

But as Aristotle says frequently in his writings, "Enough of these things." And to paraphrase the twentieth-century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, don't think but look. While you read detective stories or see them unfold on television or the stage, look for philosophical themes yourself. Not only might you discover that you are a closet philosopher; you will also have enormous fun.

Study questions:

1. The essay refers to two types of reasoning. What are they? Give examples of each.
2. Stewart opines that the real world is not as "rational" as the world of detective fiction. What does he mean by this? What reasons does he give to support his view? Do you agree with him?
3. What is a hypothesis? What are some of the hypotheses which you have formed in recent days or weeks? Why do you embrace one hypothesis instead of another to explain a set of facts or to solve a problem?

PART II
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

INTRODUCTION

-Editor

Philosophical anthropology covers many fields of philosophical study, such as the study of the generation of human kind, the study of the development of human culture, human environment, the essential nature of human being, of human consciousness, of personal identity, of the problem of mind-body relationship, and so on. Even we may say that there is no definite title for these fields of study. Some departments of philosophy in universities of western countries have the course of "philosophy of human kind," some of them have the course of "Philosophy of Person." But in 1970s there was the World Philosophy Conference, major topic of which was *Philosophical Anthropology*, and the content of the conference was related to all of the above mentioned studies. It means that "Philosophical Anthropology" is the proper title of the above fields of philosophy.

The most important topic of philosophical anthropology is the philosophy of mind, and the issue of the relation between mind and body plays the central role in the studying philosophy of mind. There is a very popularly used textbook titled as *Introduction to Philosophy* edited by Department of Philosophy Massachusetts University. The first part of the book concerns primarily with the study of the mind-body relationship, and it is titled as *Philosophical Anthropology*. In his book *Phaedo* that is the first work in the history of Western philosophy discussing the essence of human kind, Plato concentrates also on this issue. Whereas, in this part, under the title of Philosophical Anthropology, we select a group of articles to study the mind-body problem, the problem concerning the essence of human being.

There are many doctrines concerning the issue of mind-body relationship, such as the doctrine of monism, of dualism, of eliminate-ism, of phenomenological view, and so on. The articles provided in this part are very famous classics representing the major doctrines concerning the mind-body study respectively.

The monism could be classified as materialism, idealism and neutralism. According to the monism, human being or persons are consisted of only one kind of substance, it is either mind or body, or something neutral. For materialism, the only substance consisting of human being is body or matter, or physical being. For idealism, it is the mind or the soul called by Plato, or called as psychological being by present time philosophers, which is the only substance consisting of human being. For the neutralism it is something neutral that is the substance to consist persons. For materialism, all other elements of human life or human activities could be reduced to the substance of body or matter.

Both of Plato's and Descartes' thinking belong to the doctrine of dualism, but the former one is considered as the traditional or the classical dualism and the later

one is considered as the official dualism, they are quite different. Dualism concerning the issue of mind and body problem proposes that human or person consisted of two substances, mind or soul or psychological being, and body or matter or physical being. These two substances are parallel, both of them are independent and they do not rely on each other. The traditional dualism, such as the one proposed by Plato based his theory on religious tales or superstition, his argument were somehow arbitrary. The official dualism, such as the one proposed by Descartes based his theory primarily on logical or rational arguments. There are also some new forms of dualism, which are actually sophisticated and modified forms of the official dualism.

The British philosopher Gilbert Ryle's article *Descartes' Myth* is used to expose the flaw, the problems of Descartes' idea on the issue of mind-body relationship, and Ryle directs us to a sort of eliminate-ism. This kind of doctrine considers that the study of mind-body problem is supposed to be cancelled, for this question is not a reasonable one, and for a question not addressed plausibly, we will never get any proper solution. Most of analytical or semantic philosophers incline to the doctrine of eliminate-ism.

The Australian philosopher Armstrong argue against all kinds of dualism, some of his analysis are much more comprehensive than that of Ryle's. For example, he develops the individuation problem of dualism into two correlated issues: How to identify a same person over a stretch of time; how to differentiate persons at the same time. His materialism thesis is different from the traditional one, he uses some strategy of semantics analysis and scientific study of human brain. The American philosopher Quine develops his famous materialist way on the issue of mind-body investigation along Armstrong's line.

The American philosopher Nagel's article *What Is It Like to Be A Bat?* is widely appreciated, for it presents us a new perspective to resolve the mind-body paradox, which is called as phenomenological view. It is somehow similar to the doctrine of eliminate-ism, because it considers that we will not able to resolve the paradox of the mind-body relation. However, it does not propose to cancel the question completely, it suggests that we need to suspend the answer of this question and to describe the appearance of the subjectivity or the mind instead. It is somehow incline to dualism, it criticizes the view of materialism seriously, and it holds that the subjectivity could not be reduced to objectivity, and human mind could not be reduced to body, it follows also that the two elements, human mind and human body are independent from each other. But it avoids the dualism conclusion, it claims that the mind-body problem is supposed to be suspended.

We also select an article regarding to the doctrine of idealism that is provided by the book *Theories of Mind* edited by British philosopher Stephen Priest. According to the author of the article, Hegel's absolute idealism is quite different from the kind

of general idealism. Because it aims to overcome difficulties of both materialism and idealism, and it claims that the real spirit or the real mind is not held by human being, but by something called as absolute being, human mind is only a stage toward the realization of the absolute spirit. The detail content of this version will be shown in the article, expectedly, our students hold very strong background in understanding Hegel's philosophy.

To study the philosophy of mind in detail or in advanced level, knowing the above doctrines is not enough, but for the beginning study of philosophy of mind, we must at least know the classical works of the above doctrines. From studying these articles, we may get a rough feature of dialectics of the contemporary philosophy of mind. However, you need to read hundreds of books if you really intend to be specialized in this field.

PHAEDO

-Plato

(From *The Dialogues of Plato* translated by B. Jowett, 1892.)

Direction of studying Plato's article *Phaedo*

- 1) Issues and the viewpoint of this article: This article is primarily concerned with the issue of human mind and human body relationship, and Plato's dialogues leads us to the doctrine of classical dualism regarding this issue.
 - 2) Strategy of this article: Plato's dualism is called as "traditional dualism", in reading this article, we will find that most of Plato's arguments are primarily based on ontological investigation. And some of the arguments are based on the belief of religion, tales, fables and superstition. So, the arguments are very weak, and there are some theoretical flaws.
 - 3) Arguments: The dialogues present us four arguments to support the conclusion of dualism. The first part of this article presents us Plato's famous Learning argument, which use the story of learning knowledge as the testimony to show that before a person is born, his soul is already alive and it holds all kinds of knowledge. The second part of this article presents us the immortal soul argument, which holds that a person's soul will never die, when the person's body dies, his soul keeps alive in a certain way. The third part of this article presents us the cyclical or reincarnation argument, it holds that the soul apart from person's body is able to return to this world by using a person's body as its reincarnation. And the fourth part of this article presents us the opposite argument which claims that every thing is generated from its opposite, it follows that the life is generated from death, and the immortal soul argument, the reincarnation argument are both available to prove the generation from opposite.
 - 4) Disciplined terms to be expounded in English:
Soul, body, sense, reason, essence, true nature, substance, virtue.
 - 5) classical propositions to be Explained in English:
 1. Philosophers always practice dying.
 2. To get the real knowledge, people must quit from his body.
 3. Virtue is companioned by wisdom.
 - 6) Study questions to be answered in English:
 1. What arguments does Plato use to support his dualism concerning the mind-body problem?
 2. Based on Plato's arguments, describe the nature of human mind and the nature of human body
 3. Make comments on Plato's "learning knowledge" argument.
 4. What is the implication of Plato's proposition "*Philosophers are always practice dying?*"
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PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

PYAEDO, *who is the narrator*

APPOLLODORUS

Of the Dialogue to

SIMMIAS

Echecrates of Philius

CEBES

SOCRATES

CRITO

ATTENDANT OF THE PRISON

SCENE:-*The Prison of Socrates*PLACE OF THE NARRATION: -*Philius*

Simmias & Socrates

Abstract: *The true philosopher is always dying: - why
then should he avoid the death which he desires?
(All the following abstracts are provided by the editor)*

And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain. For I deem that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always pursuing and desiring?

'How they will laugh when they hear this!'

Simmias said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have made me laugh, Socrates; for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the death which they desire.

*Yes, they do Not understand the nature of death,
or why the philosopher desires or deserves it.*

And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the words they have found them out; for they have not found out either what is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he deserves or desires death.

But enough of them:—let us discuss the matter among ourselves. Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?

To be sure, replied Simmias.

Is it not the separation of soul and body? And to be dead is the completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from the body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but death?

Just so, he replied.

Socrates, Simmias: life is best when the soul is most freed from concerns of the body, and is alone and by herself.

There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present enquiry if you and I can agree about it: --Ought the philosopher to care about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures—of eating and drinking?

Certainly not, answered Simmias.

And what about the pleasures of love—should he care for them?

By no means.

And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say?

I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.

Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body and to turn to the soul.

Quite true.

In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed in every sort of way to dis sever the soul from the communion of the body.

Very true.

Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.

That is also true.

The senses are untrustworthy guides: they mislead the soul in the search for truth.

What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?—is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate

witnesses? And yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?—for you will allow that they are the best of them?

Certainly, he replied.

Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.

True.

Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?

Yes.

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure,—when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being.

Certainly.

*And therefore the philosopher runs
away from the body.*

And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from his body and desires to be alone and by herself?

That is true. Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice.

Assuredly there is.

And an absolute beauty and absolute good?

Of course.

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Certainly not.

*Socrates, Sommius: **The doctrine of ideas** Another argument. The absolute truth of justice, beauty, and other ideas is not perceived by the senses, which only introduce a disturbing element.*

Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?—and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs? Or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing which he considers?

Certainly.

And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind

alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind in her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge—who, if not he, is likely to attain to the knowledge of true being?

What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied Simmias.

The soul in herself must perceive things in themselves.

And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the following? 'Have we not found,' they will say, 'a path of thought which seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after true being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at all. Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? Wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth. It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold things in themselves: and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers; not while we live, but after death; for if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows—either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth.' For the impure are not permitted to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which

the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You would agree; would you not?

Undoubtedly, Socrates.

Socrates, Simmias: The true philosopher

Purification is the separation of the soul from body

But, O my friend, if this be true, there is great reason to hope that, going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.

Certainly, replied Simmias.

And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;—the release of the soul from the chains of the body?

Very true, he said.

And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?

To be sure, he said.

And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?

That is true.

And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet repining when it comes upon them.

Clearly.

And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. Look at the matter thus:—if they have been in every way the enemies of the body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined, instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desire—and this was wisdom—and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm

conviction that there, and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of death.

He would indeed, replied Simmias.

Socrates, Simmias: The exchange of virtue

The true philosopher who has been always trying to disengage himself from the body will rejoice in death.

And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power, or both?

Quite so, he replied.

And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of the philosopher?

Certainly.

He alone possesses the true secret of virtue, which in ordinary men is merely based on a calculation of lesser and greater evils.

There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of superiority to them—is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only who despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy?

Most assuredly.

For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are really a contradiction.

How so?

Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a great evil.

Very true, he said.

And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet greater evils?

That is quite true.

Ordinary men are courageous only from cowardice; temperate from intemperance.

Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear and because they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing.

Very true.

And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate because they are intemperate—which might seem to be a contradiction, but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance. For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because they are overcome by others; and although to be conquered by pleasure is called by men intemperance, to them the conquest of pleasure consists in being conquered by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that, in a sense they are made temperate through intemperance.

Such appears to be the case.

Socrates, Cebes: The incredulity of Cebes

True virtue is inseparable from wisdom.

The thyrsus-bearers and the mystics.

Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is not the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?—and that is wisdom; and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. The founders of the mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For ‘many’, as they say in the mysteries, are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics, —meaning, as I interpret the words, ‘the true philosophers’. In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place; —whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will when I myself arrive in the other world—such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right, Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world, for I believe that I shall equally find good masters and friends in another world. But most men do not believe this saying; if then I succeed in convincing you by my defense better than I did the

Athenian judges, it will be well.

Fears are entertained lest the soul when she dies should be scattered to the winds.

Cebes answer I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may perish and come to an end—immediately on her release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and in her flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only be collected into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of which you were speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But surely it requires a great deal of argument and many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has any force or intelligence.

True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a little of the probabilities of these things?

I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion about them.

The discussion suited to the occasion.

I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I have no concern: —If you please, then, we will proceed with the enquiry.

Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead; but if this not so, then other arguments will have to be adduced.

Very true, replied Cebes. The discussion suited to the occasion.

Socrates, Cebes: The alternation of all existence

All things which have opposite are generated out of opposites.

Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there is generation, and

the proof will be easier. Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good and evil, just and unjust—and there are innumerable other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less.

True.

And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have become less.

Yes.

And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower.

Very true.

And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more unjust.

Of course.

And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites?

Yes.

And there are immediate processes or passages into and out of one another, such as increase and diminution, division and composition, and the like.

And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and diminution and that which grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane?

Yes, he said.

And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites even though not always expressed in words—they are really generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?

Very true, he replied.

Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking?

True, he said.

And what is it?

Death, he answered.

And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and have their two intermediate processes also?

Of course.

Socrates, Cebes: ***Life and death like waking and sleeping***

Life is opposed to death, as waking is to sleeping, and in like manner they are generated from one another.

Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other waking. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. Do you agree?

I entirely agree.

Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is not death opposed to life?

Yes.

And they are generated one from the other?

Yes.

What is generated from the living?

The dead.

And what from the dead?

I can only say in answer—the living.

Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead?

That is clear, he replied.

Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?

That is true.

And one of the two processes or generations is visible—for surely the act of dying is visible?

Surely, he said.

What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process? And shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather assign to death some corresponding process of generation?

Certainly, he replied.

And what is that process?

Return to life.

And return to life, if there be such a thing is the birth of the dead into the world of the living?

Quite true.

Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living: and this, if true, affords a most

certain proof that the souls of the dead exist in some place out of which they come again.

Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of our previous admissions.

*If there were no compensation or return in nature,
all things would pass into the states of death.*

And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, I think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of elements into their opposites, then you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation of them.

What do you mean? he said.

Socrates, Cebes: The circle of nature

The sleeping Endymion would be unmeaning in a world of sleepers.

A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other things would be asleep too, and he would not be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive—what other result could there be? For if the living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death?

There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems to be absolutely true.

Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have not been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil.

*Socrates, Cebes: The soul and ideas belong to the class of the
Unchanging which is also unseen.*

Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true existence—whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else—are these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? Or are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging forms, not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time?

They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes.

And what would you say of the many beautiful—whether men or horses or garments or any other things which are named by the same names and may be called equal or beautiful, —are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another?

The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change.

And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind—they are invisible and are not seen?

That is very true, he said.

Well then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences—one seen, the other unseen.

Let us suppose them.

The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?

That may be also supposed.

And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul?

To be sure.

And to which class is the body more alike and akin?

Clearly to the seen—no one can doubt that.

That is very true, he said.

Well then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences—one seen, the other unseen.

Let us suppose them.

The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?

That may be also supposed.

And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul?

To be sure.

And to which class is the body more alike and akin?

Clearly to the seen—no one can doubt that.

Socrates, Cebes: The nature of the soul

And is the soul seen or not seen?

Not by man, Socrates.

And what we mean by 'seen' and 'not seen' is that which is or is not visible to the eye of man?

Yes, to the eye of man.

And is the soul seen or not seen?

Not seen.

Unseen then?

Yes.

Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?

That follows necessarily, Socrates.

The soul which is unseen, when she makes use of the bodily sense, is dragged down into the region of the changeable, and must return into herself before she can attain to the wisdom.

And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through the body is perceiving through the senses) —were we not saying that the soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and is confused; the world spins round her, and she is like a drunkard, when she touches change?

Very true.

But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this state of the soul is called wisdom?

That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied.

And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one?

The soul is of the nature of the unchangeable, the body of the changing; the soul rules, the body serves; the soul is in the likeness of the divine, the body of the mortal.

I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who follows the argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable—even the most stupid person will not deny that.

And the body is more like the changing.

Yes.

Yet once more consider the matter in another light: When the soul and the body are

united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the divine? And which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is subject and servant?

True.

And which does the soul resemble?

The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal—there can be no doubt of that, Socrates.

Then reflect, Cebes: of all which has been said is not this the conclusion? —that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied?

It cannot.

*Socrates, Cebes: **The passing of the soul***

Even from the body some thing may be learned about the soul; for the corpse of a man lasts for some time; and when embalmed, in a manner forever.

But if it be true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? And is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?

Certainly.

And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, or visible part of him, which is lying in the visible world, and is called a corpse, and would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for some time, nay even for a long time, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, and the season of the year favourable? For the body when shrunk and embalmed, as the manner is in Egypt, may remain almost entire through infinite ages; and even in decay, there are still some portions, such as the bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible: —Do you agree?

Yes.

How unlikely then that the soul should at once pass away.

And is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the place of the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good and wise god, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go, —that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes.

The truth rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily during life had connection with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself; —and making such abstraction her perpetual study—which means that she has been a true disciple of philosophy; and therefore has in fact been always engaged in the practice of dying? For is not philosophy the study of death?—

Certainly—

Socrates, Crito: These descriptions are not true to the letter, but something like them is true.

A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be very confident, that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who having cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him and working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures of knowledge; and has arrayed the soul, not in some foreign attire, but in her own proper jewels, temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth—in these adorned she is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her hour comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as a tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; and I think that I had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead.

Socrates, Crito: The last words of Socrates and his friends.

When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any commands for us, Socrates—anything to say about your children, or any other matter in which we can serve you?

Nothing particular, Crito, he replied: only, as I have always told you, take care of yourselves; that is a service which you may be ever rendering to me and mine and to all of us, whether you promise to do so or not. But if you have no thought for yourselves, and care not to walk according to the rule which I have prescribed for you, not now for the first time, however much you may profess or promise at the moment,

it will be of no avail.

We will do our best, said Crito: And in what way shall we bury you?

The dead body which remains is not the true Socrates.

In any way that you like; but you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not run away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a smile: —I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body—and asks. How shall he bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed, —these words of mine, with which I was comforting you and myself, have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want you to be surety for me to him now, as at the trial he was surety to the judges for me: but let the promise be of another sort; for he was surety for me to the judges that I would remain, and you must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that whatever is usual, and what you think best.

He takes leave of his family.

When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into a chamber to bathe; Crito followed him and told us to wait. So we remained behind, talking and thinking of the subject of discourse, and also of the greatness of our sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him— (he had two young sons and an elder one); and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; then he dismissed them and returned to us.

The humanity of the jailer.

Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed while he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the Eleven, entered and stood by him,

saying: —To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me, when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison—indeed, I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are to blame. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be—you know my errand. Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.

Socrates, Crito, the Jailerr: Socrates is ready to depart

Crito would detain Socrates a little while, Socrates thinks that there is nothing to be gained by delay.

Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now see how ggenerously he sorrows on my account. We must do as he says, Crito; Nd therefore let the cup be brought if the poison is prepared; if not, let the attendant prepare some.

Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know that many a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved; do not hurry—there is time enough.

Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so acting, for they think that they will be gainers by the delay; but I am right in not following their example, for I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should only be ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing and saving a life which is already forfeit. Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me.

The poison is brought. He drinks the poison. The company friends are unable to control themselves. Says Socrates: "A man should die in peace."

Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by; and he went out, and having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man answered: You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of colour or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said: What do you say about making

a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not? The man answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough. I understand, he said: but I may and must ask the gods to prosper my journey from this to the other world—even so—and so be it according to my prayer. Then raising the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept, not for him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having to part from such a friend. Nor was I the first; for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up, and I followed; and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and passionate cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is this strange outcry? He said. I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not misbehave in this way, for I have been told that a man should die in peace. Be quiet then, and have patience.

The end

When we heard his words we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if he could feel; and he said, No; and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said: When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end. He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said—they were his last words—he said: Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there anything else? There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and justest and best.

ON THE MIND AND THE BODY

-Rene Descartes

(IP From Meditations II and VI of Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy* first published in 1641)

Direction of studying Descartes' article "*Meditations*"

- 1) Background knowledge concerning the article: Descartes is considered as the most brilliant philosopher in the seventeenth century, and his "*Meditations*" could be said as the most important works of his times. The reasons for the above consideration are primarily related to his dualism thesis and his rationalist perspective in doing philosophy. His "*Meditation Two*" and "*Meditation Six*" present us a sort of "Official Dualism" concerning the understanding of person. However, There is evident inconsistency in Descartes' arguments. In the very beginning of the "*Meditations*," person is claimed to be essentially thinking thing, then, Descartes separates Human body and human mind as two parts that are independent from each other. In the end part of the "*Meditations*," body and mind seemed to hold a sort of relation of interaction. Whatever the retreat and the paradox are in Descartes' theory, the issue of the essence of human being and the issue of mind-body relationship have been awoken in modern philosophy. Our book holds only parts of the "*Meditations*," but by reading these texts, we will see the feature of what the major points of modern dualism is.
- 2) The strategy of Descartes' *Meditations*: Descartes' arguments are primarily based on epistemological and logical analysis, and his starting point of doing philosophy is to study the subject, the person, himself. The above two perspectives of doing philosophy make him quite different from traditional, ontological philosophy.
- 3) Descartes' arguments: In our context, Descartes firstly present his "Universal Doubts" argument, then put forward the famous "Ego" argument, and he uses the wax story, the substance thesis to support his position of dualism. The contents of these arguments will be clear when you read the texts of our book. Comparing these arguments with Plato's arguments, we may find that there are some similarities, as well as big differences.
- 4) Disciplined terms in the article:
mind-body, ego, clear and distinct, understanding, intellection, rationality.
- 5) classical propositions to be Explained in English:
 1. Ego sum, ego exist.
 2. But we must at least admit that whatever I there clearly and distinctly apprehend, . . .
 3. I am not lodged in my body merely as a pilot in a ship, but so intimately conjoined, and as it were intermingled with it, that with it I form a unitary whole.
- 6) Study questions:
 1. What are the differences between Plato's and Descartes' dualism?
 2. How does Descartes get the idea that "*I think, I am*" that is out of doubt?

3. What is the implication of Descartes' "Wax" story?
 4. What does Descartes intend to show with his pilot in a ship thesis?
 5. Is there any inconsistency in Descartes' idea on the essence of person? If yes, then, what?
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MEDITATION II: Concerning the Nature of the Human Mind and how it is more easily known than the Body

So disquieting are the doubts in which yesterday's meditation has involved me that it is no longer in my power to forget them. Nor do I yet see how they are to be resolved. It is as if I had all of a sudden fallen into very deep water, and am so disconcerted that I can neither plant my feet securely on the bottom nor maintain myself by swimming on the surface. I shall, however, brace myself for a great effort, entering anew on the path which I was yesterday exploring, that is, I shall proceed by setting aside all that admits even of the very slightest doubt, just as if I had convicted it of being absolutely false; and I shall persist in following this path, until I have come upon something certain, or, failing in that, until at least I know, and know with certainty, that in the world there is nothing certain.

Archimedes[1], that he might displace the whole earth, required only that there might be some one point, fixed and immovable, to serve in leverage; so likewise I shall be entitled to entertain high hopes if I am fortunate enough to find some one thing that is certain and indubitable.

I am supposing, then, that all the things I see are false;[2] that of all the happenings my memory has ever suggested to me, none has ever so existed; that I have no senses; that body, shape, extension, movement and location are but mental fictions. What is there, then, which can be esteemed true? Perhaps this only, that nothing whatsoever is certain.

But how do I know that there is not something different from all the things I have thus far enumerated and in regard to which there is not the least occasion for doubt? Is there not some God, or other being by whatever name we call Him, who puts these thoughts into my mind? Yet why suppose such a being? May it not be that I am myself capable of being their author? Am I not myself at least a something? But already I have denied that I have a body and senses. This indeed raises awkward questions. But what is it that thereupon follows? Am I so dependent on the body and senses that without them I cannot exist? Having persuaded myself that outside me there is nothing, that there is no heaven, no Earth, that there are no minds, no bodies, am I thereby committed to the view that I also do not exist? By no means. If I am persuading myself of something in so doing I assuredly do exist. But what if, unknown to me, there be some deceiver, very powerful and very cunning, who is

constantly employing his ingenuity in deceiving me? Again, as before, without doubt, if he is deceiving me, I exist. Let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I shall be thinking that I am something. And thus, having reflected well, and carefully examined all things, we have finally to conclude that this declaration, *Ego sum, ego exist*, (I am, I exist) [3] is necessarily true every time I propound it or mentally apprehend it.

But I do not yet know in any adequate manner what I am, I who am certain that I am; and I must be careful not to substitute some other thing in place of myself, and so go astray in this knowledge which I am holding to be the most certain and evident of all that is knowable by me. This is why I shall now meditate anew on what, prior to my venturing on these questionings, I believed myself to be. I shall withdraw those beliefs which can, even in the least degree, be invalidated by the reasons cited, in order that at length, of all my previous beliefs, there may remain only what is certain and indubitable.

What then did I formerly believe myself to be? Undoubtedly I thought myself to be a man. But what is a man? Shall I say a rational animal? No, for then I should have to inquire what is "animal," what "rational"; and thus from the one question I should be drawn on into several others yet more difficult. I have not, at present, the leisure for any such subtle inquiries. Instead, I prefer to meditate on the thoughts which of themselves sprang up in my mind on my applying my self to the consideration of what I am, considerations suggested by my own proper nature. I thought that I possessed a face, hands, arms, and that whole structure to which I was giving the title "body", composed as it is of the limbs discernible in a corpse. In addition, I took notice that I was nourished, that I walked, that I sensed, that I thought, all of which actions I ascribed to the soul. But what the soul might be I did not stop to consider; or if I did, I imaged it as being something extremely rare and subtle, like a wind, a flame or an ether, and as diffused throughout my grosser parts. As to the nature of "body", no doubts whatsoever disturbed me. I had, as I thought, quite distinct knowledge of it; and had I been called upon to explain the manner in which I then conceived it, I should have explained myself somewhat thus: by body I understand whatever can be determined by a certain shape, and comprised in a certain location, whatever so fills a certain space as to exclude from it every other body, whatever can be apprehended by touch, sight, hearing, taste or smell, and whatever can be moved in various ways, not indeed of itself but something foreign to it by which it is touched and impressed. For I nowise conceived the power of self movement, of sensing or knowing, as pertaining to the nature of body: on the contrary I was somewhat astonished on finding in certain bodies faculties such as these.

But what am I now to say that I am, now that I am supposing that there exists a very powerful, and if I may so speak, malignant being, who employs all his powers

and skill in deceiving me? Can I affirm that I possess any one of those things which I have been speaking of as pertaining to the nature of body? On stopping to consider them with closer attention, and on reviewing all of them, I find none of which I can say that it belongs to me; to enumerate them again would be idle and tedious. What then, of those things which I have been attributing not to body, but to the soul? What of nutrition or of walking? If it be that I have no body, it cannot be that I take nourishment or that I walk. Sensing? There can be no sensing in the absence of body; and besides I have seemed during sleep to apprehend things which, as I afterwards noted, had not been sensed. Thinking? Here I find what does belong to me: it alone cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist.[3] This is certain. How often? As often as I think. For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist. I am not at present admitting anything which is not necessarily true; and, accurately speaking, I am therefore [taking myself to be] only a thinking thing, that is to say, a mind, an understanding or reason—terms the significance of which has hitherto been unknown to me. I am, then, a real thing, and really existent. What thing? I have said it, a thinking thing.

And what more am I? I look for aid to the imagination. [But how mistakenly!] I am not that assemblage of limbs we call the human body; I am not a subtle penetrating air distributed throughout all these members; I am not a wind, a fire, a vapor, a breath or anything at all that I can image. I am supposing all these things to be nothing. Yet I find, while so doing, that I am still assured that I am a something.

But may it not be that those very things which, not being known to me, I have been supposing non-existent, are not really different from the self that I know? As to that I cannot say, and am not now discussing it. I can judge only of things that are known to me. Having come to know that I exist, I am inquiring as to what I am, this I that I thus know to exist. Now quite certainly this knowledge, taken in the precise manner as above, is not dependent on things the existence of which is not yet known to me; consequently and still more evidently it does not depend on any of the things which are feigned by the imagination. Indeed this word *feigning* warns me of my error; for I should in truth be feigning were I to *image* myself to be a something; since imaging is in no respect distinguishable from the contemplating of the shape or image of a *corporeal* thing. Already I know with certainty that I exist, and that all these imaged things, and in general whatever relates to the nature of body, may possibly be dreams merely or deceptions. Accordingly, I see dearly that it is no more reasonable to say, “I will resort to my imagination in order to learn more distinctly what I am,” than if I were to say, “I am awake and apprehend something that is real, true; but as I do not yet apprehend it sufficiently well, I will of express purpose go to sleep, that my dreams may represent it to me with greater truth and evidence.” I know therefore that nothing of all I can comprehend by way of the imagination pertains to this knowledge

I [already] have of myself, and that if the mind is to determine the nature of the self with perfect distinctness, I must be careful to restrain it, diverting it from all such imaginative modes of apprehension.

What then is it that I am? A thinking thing.[4] What is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, abstains from willing, that also can be aware of images and sensations.

Assuredly if all these things pertain to me, I am indeed a something. And how could it be they should not pertain to me? Am I not that very being who doubts of almost everything, who none the less also apprehends certain things, who affirms that one thing only is true, while denying all the rest, who yet desires to know more, who is averse to being deceived, who images many things, sometimes even despite his will, and who likewise apprehends many things which seem to come by way of the senses? Even though I should be always dreaming, and though he who has created [5] me employs all his ingenuity in deceiving me, is there any one of the above assertions which is not as true as that I am and that I exist? Any one of them which can be distinguished from my thinking? Any one of them which can be said to be separate from the self? So manifest is it that it is I who doubt, I who apprehend I who desire, that there is here no need to add anything by way of rendering it more evident. It is no less certain that I can apprehend images. For although it may happen (as I have been supposing) that none of the things imaged are true, the imaging, and active power, is none the less really in me, as forming part of my thinking. Again, I am the being who senses, that is to say, who apprehends corporeal things, as if by the organs of sense, since I do in truth see light, hear noise, feel heat. These things, it will be said, are false, and I am only dreaming. Even so, it is none the less certain that it seems to me that I see, that I hear, and that I am warmed. This is what in me is rightly called sensing, and as used in this precise manner is nowise other than thinking.

From all this I begin to know what I am somewhat better than heretofore. But it still seems to me—for I am unable to prevent myself continuing in this way of thinking—that corporeal things, which are reconnoitered by the senses, and whose images inform thought, are known with much greater distinctness than that part of myself (whatever it be) which is not imageable—strange though it may be to be thus saying that I know and comprehend more distinctly those things which I am supposing to be doubtful and unknown, and as not belonging to me, than others which are known to me, which appertain to my proper nature and of the truth of which I am convinced—in short are known more distinctly than I know myself. But I can see how this comes about: my mind delights to wander and will not yet suffer itself to be restrained within the limits of truth.

Let us, therefore, once again allow the mind the freest reign, so that when afterwards we bring it, more opportunely, under due constraint, it may be the more

easily controlled. Let us begin by considering the things which are commonly thought to be the most distinctly known, viz., the bodies which we touch and see; not, indeed, bodies in general, for such general notions are usually somewhat confused, but one particular body. Take, for example, this piece of wax; it has been but recently taken from the hive; it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained; it still retains something of the odor of the flowers from which it has been gathered; its color, its shape, its size, are manifest to us; it is hard, cold, easily handled, and when struck upon with the finger emits a sound. In short, all that is required to make a body known with the greatest possible distinctness is present in the one now before us. But behold! While I am speaking let it be moved toward the fire. What remains of the taste exhales, the odor evaporates, the color changes, the shape is destroyed, its size increases, it becomes liquid, it becomes hot and can no longer be handled, and when struck upon emits no sound. Does the wax, notwithstanding these changes, still remain the same wax? We must admit that it does; no one doubts that it does, no one judges otherwise. What, then, was it I comprehended so distinctly in knowing the piece of wax? Certainly, it could be nothing of all that I was aware of by way of the senses, since all the things that came by way of taste, smell, sight, touch and hearing, are changed, and the wax none the less remains.

Perhaps it has all along been as I am now thinking, viz., that the wax was not that sweetness of honey, nor that pleasing scent of flowers, nor that whiteness, that shape, that sound, but a body which a little while ago appeared to me decked out with those modes, and now appears decked out with others. But what precisely is it that I am here imaging? Let us attentively consider the wax, withdrawing from it all that does not belong to it, that we may see what remains. As we find, what then alone remains is a something extended, flexible and movable. But what is this "flexible," this "movable?" What am I then imaging? That the piece of wax from being round in shape can become square, or from being square can become triangular? Assuredly not. For I am apprehending that it admits of an infinity of similar shapes, and am not able to compass this infinity by way of images. Consequently this comprehension of it cannot be the product of the faculty of imagination.

What, we may next ask, is its extension? Is it also not known [by way of the imagination]? It becomes greater when the wax is melted, greater when the wax is made to boil, and ever greater as the heat increases; and I should not be apprehending what the wax truly is, if I did not think that this piece of wax we are considering allows of a greater variety of extensions than I have ever imaged. I must, therefore, admit that I cannot by way of images comprehend what this wax is, and that it is by the mind alone that I [adequately] apprehend it. I say this particular wax, for as to wax in general that is yet more evident. Now what is this wax which cannot be [adequately] apprehended save by the mind? Certainly the same that I see, touch,

image, and in short, the very body that from the start I have been supposing it to be. And what has especially to be noted is that our [adequate] apprehension of it is not a seeing, nor a touching, nor an imaging, and has never been such, although it may formerly have seemed so, but is solely an inspection of the mind which may be imperfect and confused, as it formerly was, or clear and distinct, as it now is, according as my attention is directed less or more to the constituents composing the body.

I am indeed amazed when I consider how weak my mind is and how prone to error. For although I can, dispensing with words, [directly] apprehend all this in myself none the less words have a hampering hold upon me, and the accepted usages of ordinary speech tend to mislead me. Thus when the wax is before us we say that we see it to be the same wax as that previously seen, and not that we judge it to be the same from its retaining the same color and shape. From this I should straightway conclude that the wax is known by ocular vision, independently of a strictly mental inspection, were it not that perchance I recall how when looking from a window at beings passing by on the street below, I similarly say that it is men I am seeing, just as I say that I am seeing the wax. What do I see from the window beyond hats and cloaks, which might cover automatic machines? Yet I judge those to be men. In analogous fashion, what I have been supposing myself to see with the eyes I am comprehending solely with the faculty of judgment, a faculty proper not to my eyes but to my mind.

But aiming as I do at knowledge superior to the common, I should be ashamed to draw grounds for doubt from the forms and terms of ordinary speech. I prefer therefore to pass on, and to ask whether I apprehended the wax on my first seeing it, and while I was still believing that I knew it by way of the external senses, or at least by the *sensus communis*, as they call it, that is to say by the imaginative faculty, more perfectly and more evidently than I now apprehend it after having examined with greater care what it is and in what way it can be known. It would indeed be foolish to have doubts as to the answer to this question. Was there anything in that first apprehension which was distinct? What did I apprehend that any animal might not have seen? When, however, I distinguish the wax from its external forms; when stripped as it were of its vestments I consider it in complete nakedness, it is certain that though there may still be error in my judgment, I could not be thus apprehending it without a mind that is human.

What now shall I say of the mind itself, i.e., of myself? For as yet I do not admit in myself anything but mind. What am I to say in regard to this I which seems to apprehend this piece of wax so distinctly? Do I not know myself much more truly and much more certainly, and also much more distinctly and evidently, than I do the wax? For if I judge that the wax is or exists because I see it, evidently it follows, with

yet greater evidence that I myself am or exist, inasmuch as I am thus seeing it. For though it may be that what I see is not in truth wax, and that I do not even possess eyes with which to see anything, yet assuredly when I see, or (for I no longer allow the distinction) when I think I see, it cannot be that I myself who think am not a something. So likewise, if I judge that the wax exists because I touch it, it will follow that I am; and If I judge that the imagination, or some other cause whatever it be, persuades me that the wax exists, the same conclusion follows [viz., that I am thinking by way of an image and thinking what I thus image to be independently existing]. And what I have here said regarding the piece of wax may be said in respect of all other things which are external to me.

And yet a further point: if the apprehension of the wax has seemed to me more determinate and distinct when sight and touch, and many causes besides, have rendered it manifest to me, how much more evidently and distinctly must I now know myself, since all the reasons which can aid in the apprehension of wax, or of any body whatsoever, afford yet better evidence of the nature of my mind. Besides, in the mind itself there are so many more things which can contribute to the more distinct knowledge of it, that those which come to it by way of the body scarcely merit being taken into account.

Thus, then, I have been brought step by step to the conclusion I set out to establish. For I now know that, properly speaking, bodies are cognized not by the senses or by the imagination, but by the understanding alone. They are not thus cognized because seen or touched, but only in so far as they are apprehended understandingly. Thus, as I now recognize, nothing is more easily or more evidently apprehended by me than my mind. Difficult, however, as it is to rid oneself of a way of thinking to which the mind has been so long accustomed, it is well that I should halt for some time at this point, that by prolonged meditation I may more deeply impress upon myself this new knowledge.

From MEDITATION VI

... Now that I begin to know myself better and to discover the Author of my being, I do not in truth think that I ought rashly to admit all the things which the senses may seem to teach; but neither do I think that they should all be called in doubt.

In the first place, since I know that all the things I clearly and distinctly apprehend can be created by God exactly as I apprehend them, my being able to apprehend one thing apart from another is, in itself, sufficient to make me certain that the one is different from the other, or at least that it is within God's power to posit them separately; and even though I do not comprehend by what power this separation comes about, I shall have no option but to view them as different. Accordingly, simply

from knowing that I exist, and that, meantime, I do not observe any other thing as evidently pertaining to my nature, i.e., to my essence, except this only, that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists in this alone, that I am a thinking thing (i.e., a substance, the whole nature or essence of which consists in thinking). And although possibly (or rather certainly, as I shall shortly be declaring) I have a body with which I am very closely conjoined, yet since on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am only a thinking unextended thing, and on the other hand a distinct idea of the body in so far as it is only an extended unthinking thing, it is certain that I am truly distinct from my body, and can exist without it. [6]

I further find in myself faculties of thinking which are quite special modes of thinking, distinct from myself, viz., the faculties of imaging and sensing; I can clearly and distinctly apprehend myself as complete without them, but not them without the self, i.e., without an intelligent substance in which they reside. For in the notion we have of them, or (to use the terms of the Schools) in their formal concept, they include some sort of intellection, and I am thereby enabled to recognize that they are at once related to, and distinguished from, the self, as being its modes (just as shapes, movements, and the other modes and accidents of bodies are in respect of the bodies which uphold them).

I am also aware in me of certain faculties, such as the power of changing location, of assuming diverse postures, and the like which cannot be thought, and cannot therefore exist, any more than can the preceding, apart from some substance in which they reside. But evidently, since the clear and distinct apprehension of these faculties involves the feature of extension, but not any intellection, they must, if they indeed exist, belong to some substance which is corporeal, i.e., extended and unthinking. Now there is, indeed, a certain passive faculty of sense, i.e., of receiving and knowing the ideas of sensible things, but this would be useless to me if there did not also exist in me, or in some other being, an active faculty capable of producing or effecting these ideas. This active faculty cannot, however, be in me—not at least in so far as I am only a thinking thing—since it does not presuppose intellection, and since the ideas present themselves to me without my contributing in any way to their so doing, and often even against my will. This faculty must therefore exist in some substance different from me—a substance that, as already noted, contains, either formally or eminently, all the reality which is objectively [i.e., by way of representation] in the ideas produced by the faculty, and this substance is either body, i.e., corporeal nature, in which there is contained formally, i.e., actually, all that is objectively, i.e., by representation, in those ideas; or it is God Himself, or some creature nobler than body, in which all of it is eminently contained.

But since God is no deceiver, it is evident that He does not of Himself and

immediately, communicate those ideas to me. Nor does He do so by way of some creature in which their objective reality is not contained formally [i.e., actually], but only eminently. For as He has given me no faculty whereby I could discover this to be the case, but on the contrary a very strong inclination to believe that those ideas are conveyed to me by corporeal things, I do not see how He could be defended against the charge of deception, were the ideas produced otherwise than by corporeal things. We have, therefore, no option save to conclude that corporeal things do indeed exist.

Yet they are not perhaps exactly such as we apprehend by way of the senses; in many instances they are apprehended only obscurely and confusedly. But we must at least admit that whatever I there clearly and distinctly apprehend, i.e., generally speaking, everything comprised in the object of pure mathematics, is to be found in them. As regards those other things which are only particular, such as that the Sun is of this or that magnitude and shape, and the like, or as regards those things which are apprehended less clearly, such as light, sound, pain and the like, however dubious and uncertain all of these may be, yet inasmuch as God is no deceiver and that there cannot therefore, in the opinions I form, be any falsity for the correction of which He has not given me some faculty sufficient thereto, I may, I believe, confidently conclude that in regard to these things also the means of avoiding error are at my disposal.

Thus there can be no question that all those things in which I am instructed by nature contain some truth; for by nature, considered in general, I now understand no other than either God Himself or the order of created things as instituted by Him, and by my nature in particular I understand the totality of all those things which God has given me.

Now there is nothing which nature teaches me more expressly, or more sensibly, than that I have a body which is adversely affected when I sense pain, and stands in need of food and drink when I suffer hunger or thirst, etc.; and consequently I ought not to doubt there being some truth in all this.

Nature also teaches me by these sensings of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not lodged in my body merely as a pilot in a ship, but so intimately conjoined, and as it were intermingled with it, that with it I form a unitary whole. Were not this the case, I should not sense pain when my body is hurt, being, as I should then be, merely a thinking thing, but should apprehend the wound in a purely cognitive manner, just as a sailor apprehends by sight any damage to his ship; and when my body has need of food and drink I should apprehend this expressly, and not be made aware of it by confused sensings of hunger, thirst, pain, etc. For these sensings of hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are in truth merely confused modes of thinking, arising from and dependent on the union, and as it were, the intermingling of mind and body.

Because this, nature teaches me that my body exists as one among other

bodies, some of which are to be sought after and others shunned. And certainly on sensing colors, sounds, odors, tastes, heat, hardness and the like, I rightly conclude that in the bodies from which these various sensory apprehensions proceed, there are variations corresponding to them, though not perhaps resembling them; and since among these sense-apprehensions some are pleasing to me, and others displeasing, there can be no doubt that my body, or rather my entire self, inasmuch as I am composed of body and mind, can be variously affected, beneficially or harmfully, by surrounding bodies.

Many other things, however, that may seem to have been taught me by nature, are not learned from her, but have gained a footing in my mind only through a certain habit I have of judging inconsiderately. Consequently, as easily happens, the judgments I pass are erroneous... Thus, although the impression a star makes on my eye is no larger than that made by the flame of a small candle, there is yet in me no real or positive power determining me to believe that the star is no larger than the flame; it is merely that, without reason, I have so judged from my earliest years. And though on approaching fire I sense heat, and on approaching it too closely I sense pain, this is no ground for concluding that something resembling the heat is in the fire and also something resembling the pain, but only that in it there is something, whatever it be, which produces in me these sensations of heat and pain.

So also, although there are spaces in which I find nothing to affect my senses, it does not follow that in them there is no body, for in this, as in many other matters, I have been accustomed to pervert the order of nature. These sensuous apprehensions have been given me by nature only as testifying to my mind what things are beneficial or harmful to the composite whole of which it is a part. For this they are indeed sufficiently clear and distinct. But what I have done is to use them as rules sufficiently reliable to be employed in the immediate determination of the *essence* of bodies external to me; and, as so employed, their testimony cannot be other than obscure and confused.

NOTES:

1. Archimedes: a Greek mathematician, physicist, and inventor, third century B.C.
2. i.e., are not independent existents.
3. *Ego sum, ego existo.*
4. *Res cogitans*: Fr. *Une chose qui pense.*
5. Replying to Burman (A. T. v, p. 157; Adam's edition, p. 18). Descartes adds: "Whether this being is indeed God, I cannot yet say. Is the genius who is deluding me the Being who also created me? That I do not yet know and am here speaking only in a confused manner."
6. i.e. should God so provide.

DESCARTES' MYTH

-Gilbert Ryle

(IP from *The Concept of Mind* by Gilbert Ryle.

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Direction of studying Ryle's article:

- 1) Background of the author-Ryle and his viewpoint on the issue: Ryle was a professor of Department of Philosophy in Oxford University who died around nineteen eighties. As we know that there occurred modern analytical philosophy school in Oxford University and Ryle was a good model of that school. This article aimed to expose the theoretical difficulties of Descartes' dualism and its roots very comprehensively, and it presents us a sort of eliminate-ism view on the issue of mind-body problem. That makes the article become a classical works of studying the philosophy of mind.
- 2) The strategy of the article:
This article primarily uses the method of doing philosophy by analysis of language and analysis of logic of philosophical issues. It also uses the historical and cultural analysis method to investigate the issue, so, we say that semantic tradition of Britain philosophy makes the major feature of Ryle's perspective of doing philosophy.
- 3) Arguments with which Ryle uses to support his Viewpoints: In this article, we can see that Ryle uses three arguments to demonstrate his eliminate-ism thesis on the mind-body problem. Firstly, the *four problems of Descartes' dualism* argument, which exposes the "interaction problem," "the individuation problem," "the sub-consciousness problem" and "other's mind" problem of Descartes'; dualism. Secondly, there is the *Category mistake* argument, which generalizes all of Descartes fallacies as a sort of Category mistake, it means that the category of mind, body and person are supposed to be in the same logical level, they refer to the same thing. But Descartes considers that the concept of person as the higher level concept while considers that the concept of mind and body as the lower level concept, Descartes commits logical confusions. Thirdly, there is a *Social roots of Dualism* argument. Ryle intends to show us that it is the conflicts between science and religion of Descartes' time make Descartes' reconciliation that theoretically embodied as philosophical dualism.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
intelligent being, mind-matter, idealism, materialism, reduction, entail.
- 5) Classical propositions:
 1. The radical category mistake is the source of the double aspects life theory.
 2. Both the idealism and materialism are answering to a improper question.
- 6) Study questions:
 1. According to Ryle, what are the problems of Descartes' dualism?
 2. What is the implication of Ryle's "category mistake" argument?

3. How does Ryle analyze the epistemological roots of Descartes' dualism?
 4. How does he analyze the social roots of Descartes' dualism?
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(1) The Official Doctrine.

THERE is a doctrine about the nature and place of minds which is so prevalent among theorists and even among laymen that it deserves to be described as the official theory. Most philosophers, psychologists and religious teachers subscribe, with minor reservations, to its main articles and, although they admit certain theoretical difficulties in it, they tend to assume that these can be overcome without serious modifications being made to the architecture of the theory. It will be argued here that the central principles of the doctrine are unsound and conflict with the whole body of what we know about minds when we are not speculating about them.

The official doctrine, which hails chiefly from Descartes, is something like this. With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind. Some would prefer to say that every human being is both a body and a mind. His body and his mind are ordinarily harnessed together, but after the death of the body his mind may continue to exist and function.

Human bodies are in space and are subject to the mechanical laws which govern all other bodies in space. Bodily processes and states can be inspected by external observers. So a man's bodily life is as much a public affair as are the lives of animals and reptiles and even as the careers of trees, crystals and planets.

But minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject to mechanical laws. The workings of one mind are not witnessable by other observers; its career is private. Only I can take direct cognizance of the states and processes of my own mind. A person therefore lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind. The first is public, the second private. The events in the first history are events in the physical world, those in the second are events in the mental world.

It has been disputed whether a person does or can directly monitor all or only some of the episodes of his own private history; but, according to the official doctrine, of at least some of these episodes he has direct and unchallengeable cognizance. In consciousness, self-consciousness and introspection he is directly and authentically apprised of the present states and operations of his mind. He may have great or small uncertainties about concurrent and adjacent episodes in the physical world, but he can have none about at least part of what is momentarily occupying his mind.

It is customary to express this bifurcation of his two lives and of his two worlds by saying that the things and events which belong to the physical world,

including his own body, are external, while the workings of his own mind are internal. This antithesis of outer and inner is of course meant to be construed as a metaphor, since minds, not being in space, could not be described as being spatially inside anything else, or as having things going on spatially inside themselves. But relapses from this good intention are common and theorists are found speculating how stimuli, the physical sources of which are yards or miles outside a person's skin, can generate mental responses inside his skull, or how decisions framed inside his cranium can set going movements of his extremities.

Even when 'inner' and 'outer' are construed as metaphors, the problem how a person's mind and body influence one another is notoriously charged with theoretical difficulties. What the mind wills, the legs, arms and the tongue execute; what affects the ear and the eye has something to do with what the mind perceives; grimaces and smiles betray the mind's moods and bodily castigations lead, it is hoped, to moral improvement. But the actual transactions between the episodes of the private history and those of the public history remain mysterious, since by definition they can belong to neither series. They could not be reported among the happenings described in a person's autobiography of his inner life, but nor could they be reported among those described in some one else's biography of that person's overt career. They can be inspected neither by introspection nor by laboratory experiment. They are theoretical shuttlecocks which are forever being bandied from the physiologist back to the psychologist and from the psychologist back to the physiologist.

Underlying this partly metaphorical representation of the bifurcation of a person's two lives there is a seemingly more profound and philosophical assumption. It is assumed that there are two different kinds of existence or status. What exists or happens may have the status of physical existence, or it may have the status of mental existence. Somewhat as the faces of coins are either heads or tails, or somewhat as living creatures are either male or female, so, it is supposed, some existing is physical existing, other existing is mental existing. It is a necessary feature of what has physical existence that it is in space and time, it is a necessary feature of what has mental existence that it is in time but not in space. What has physical existence is composed of matter, or else is a function of matter; what has mental existence consists of consciousness, or else is a function of consciousness.

There is thus a polar opposition between mind and matter, an opposition which is often brought out as follows. Material objects are situated in a common field, known as 'space', and what happens to one body in one part of space is mechanically connected with what happens to other bodies in other parts of space. But mental happenings occur in insulated fields, known as 'minds', and there is, apart maybe from telepathy, no direct causal connection between what happens in one mind and what happens in another. Only through the medium of the public physical world can

the mind of one person make a difference to the mind of another. The mind is its own place and in his inner life each of us lives the life of a ghostly Robinson Crusoe. People can see, hear and jolt one another's bodies, but they are irremediably blind and deaf to the workings of one another's minds and inoperative upon them.

What sort of knowledge can be secured of the workings of a mind? On the one side, according to the official theory, a person has direct knowledge of the best imaginable kind of the workings of his own mind. Mental states and processes are (or are normally) conscious states and processes, and the consciousness which irradiates them can engender no illusions and leaves the door open for no doubts. A person's present thinkings, feelings and willings, his perceivings, remembering and imaginings are intrinsically 'phosphorescent'; their existence and their nature are inevitably betrayed to their owner. The inner life is a stream of consciousness of such a sort that it would be absurd to suggest that the mind whose life is that stream might be unaware of what is passing down it.

True, the evidence adduced recently by Freud seems to show that there exist channels tributary to this stream, which run hidden from their owner. People are actuated by impulses the existence of which they vigorously disavow; some of their thoughts differ from the thoughts which they acknowledge; and some of the actions which they think they will to perform they do not really will. They are thoroughly gulled by some of their own hypocrisies and they successfully ignore facts about their mental lives which on the official theory ought to be patent to them. Holders of the official theory tend, however, to maintain that anyhow in normal circumstances a person must be directly and authentically seized of the present state and workings of his own mind.

Besides being currently supplied with these alleged immediate data of consciousness, a person is also generally supposed to be able to exercise from time to time a special kind of perception, namely inner perception, or introspection. He can take a (non-optical) 'look' at what is passing in his mind. Not only can he view and scrutinize a flower through his sense of sight and listen to and discriminate the notes of a bell through his sense of hearing; he can also reflectively or introspectively watch, without any bodily organ of sense, the current episodes of his inner life. This self-observation is also commonly supposed to be immune from illusion, confusion or doubt. A mind's reports of its own affairs have a certainty superior to the best that is possessed by its reports of matters in the physical world. Sense-perceptions can, but consciousness and introspection cannot, be mistaken or confused.

On the other side, one person has no direct access of any sort to the events of the inner life of another. He cannot do better than make problematic inferences from the observed behaviour of the other person's body to the states of mind which, by analogy from his own conduct, he supposes to be signaled by that behaviour. Direct

access to the workings of a mind is the privilege of that mind itself; in default of such privileged access, the workings of one mind are inevitably occult to everyone else. For the supposed arguments from bodily movements similar to their own to mental workings similar to their own would lack any possibility of observational corroboration. Not unnaturally, therefore, and adherent of the official theory finds it difficult to resist this consequence of his premises, that he has no good reason to believe that there do exist minds other than his own. Even if he prefers to believe that to other human bodies there are harnessed minds not unlike his own, he cannot claim to be able to discover their individual characteristics, or the particular things that they undergo and do. Absolute solitude is on this showing the ineluctable destiny of the soul. Only our bodies can meet.

As a necessary corollary of this general scheme there is implicitly prescribed a special way of construing our ordinary concepts of mental powers and operations. The verbs, nouns and adjectives, with which in ordinary life we describe the wits, characters and higher-grade performances of the people with whom we have to do, are required to be construed as signifying special episodes in their secret histories, or else as signifying tendencies for such episodes to occur. When someone is described as knowing, believing or guessing something, as hoping, dreading, intending or shirking something, as designing this or being amused at that, these verbs are supposed to denote the occurrence of specific modifications in his (to us) occult stream of consciousness. Only his own privileged access to this stream in direct awareness and introspection could provide authentic testimony that these mental-conduct verbs were correctly or incorrectly applied. The onlooker, be he teacher, critic, biographer or friend, can never assure himself that his comments have any vestige of truth. Yet it was just because we do in fact all know how to make such comments, make them with general correctness and correct them when they turn out to be confused or mistaken, that philosophers found it necessary to construct their theories of the nature and place of minds. Finding mental conduct concepts being regularly and effectively used, they properly sought to fix their logical geography. But the logical geography officially recommended would entail that there could be no regular or effective use of these mental-conduct concepts in our descriptions of, and prescriptions for, other people's minds.

(2) The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine

Such in outline is the official theory. I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as 'the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'. I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely,

a category mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another. The dogma is therefore a philosopher's myth. In attempting to explode the myth I shall probably be taken to be denying well-known facts about the mental life of human beings, and my plea that I aim at doing nothing more than rectify the logic of mental-conduct concepts will probably be disallowed as mere subterfuge.

I must first indicate what is meant by the phrase 'Category-mistake'. This I do in a series of illustrations.

A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks 'But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your University.' It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their co-ordination is understood, the University has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that it was correct to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum *and* the University, to speak, that is, as if 'the University' stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members. He was mistakenly allocating the University to the same category as that to which the other institutions belong.

The same mistake would be made by a child witnessing the march-past of a division, who, having had pointed out to him such batteries, squadrons, etc., asked when the division was going to appear. He would be supposing that a division was a counterpart to the units already seen, partly similar to them and partly unlike them. He would be shown his mistake by being told that in watching the battalions, batteries and squadrons and such battalions, marching past he had been watching the division marching past. The march-past was not a parade of battalions, batteries, squadrons *and* a division; it was a parade of the battalions, batteries and squadrons *of* a division.

One more illustration. A foreigner watching his first game of cricket learns what are the functions of the bowlers, the batsmen, the fielders, the umpires and the scorers. He then says 'But there is no one left on the field to contribute the famous element of team-spirit. I see who does the bowling, the batting and the wicketkeeping; but I do not see whose role it is to exercise *esprit do corps*.' Once more, it would have to be explained that he was looking for the wrong type of thing. Team-spirit is not another cricketing operation supplementary to all of the other special tasks. It is, roughly, the keenness with which each of the special tasks is performed, and

performing a task keenly is not performing two tasks. Certainly exhibiting team-spirit is not the same thing as bowling or catching, but nor is it a third thing such that we can say that the bowler first bowls *and* then exhibits team-spirit or that a fielder is at a given moment *either* catching or displaying *esprit de corps*.

These illustrations of category-mistakes have a common feature which must be noticed. The mistakes were made by people who did not know how to wield the concepts *University*, *division* and *team-spirit*. Their puzzles arose from inability to use certain items in the English vocabulary.

The theoretically interesting category-mistakes are those made by people who are perfectly competent to apply concepts, at least in the situations with which they are familiar, but are still liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to logical types to which they do not belong. An instance of a mistake of this sort would be the following story. A student of politics has learned the main differences between the British, the French and the American Constitutions, and has learned also the differences and connections between the Cabinet, Parliament, the various Ministries, the Judicature and the Church of England. But he still becomes embarrassed when asked questions about the connections between the Church of England, the Home Office and the British Constitution. For while the Church and the Home Office are institutions the British Constitution is not another institution in the same sense of that noun. So inter-institutional relations which can be asserted or denied to hold between the Church and the Home Office cannot be asserted or denied to hold between either of them and the British Constitution. 'The British Constitution' is not a term of the same logical type as 'the Home Office' and 'the Church of England'. In a partially similar way, John Doe may be a relative, a friend, an enemy or a stranger to Richard Roe; but he cannot be any of these things to the Average Taxpayer. He knows how to talk sense in certain sorts of discussions about the Average Taxpayer, but he is baffled to say why he could not come across him in the street as he can come across Richard Roe.

It is pertinent to our main subject to notice that, so long as the student of politics continues to think of the British Constitution as a counterpart to the other institutions, he will tend to describe it as a mysteriously occult institution; and so long as John Doe continues to think of the Average Taxpayer as a fellow-citizen, he will tend to think of him as an elusive insubstantial man, a ghost who is everywhere yet nowhere.

My destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical category-mistakes is the source of the double-life theory. The representation of a person as a ghost mysteriously ensconced in a machine derives from this argument. Because, as is true, a person's thinking, feeling and purposive doing cannot be described solely in the idioms of physics, chemistry and physiology, therefore they must be described in

counterpart idioms. As the human body is a complex organized unit, so the human mind must be another complex organized unit, though one made of a different sort of stuff and with a different sort of structure. Or, again, as the human body, like any other parcel of matter, is a field of causes and effects, so the mind must be another field of causes and effects, though not (Heaven be praised) mechanical causes and effects.

(3) The Origin of the Category-Mistake

One of the chief intellectual origins of what I have yet to prove to be the Cartesian category-mistake seems to be this. When Galileo showed that his methods of scientific discovery were competent to provide a mechanical theory which should cover every occupant of space, Descartes found in himself two conflicting motives. As a man of scientific genius he could not but endorse the claims of mechanics, yet as a religious and moral man he could not accept, as Hobbes accepted, the discouraging rider to those claims, namely that human nature differs only in degree of complexity from clockwork. The mental could not be just a variety of the mechanical.

He and subsequent philosophers naturally but erroneously availed themselves of the following escape=route. Since mental conduct words are not to be construed as signifying the occurrence of mechanical processes, they must be construed as signifying the occurrence of non-mechanical processes; since mechanical laws explain movements in space as the effects of other movements in space, other laws must explain some of the non-spatial workings of minds as the effects of other non-spatial workings of minds. The difference between the human behaviours which we describe as intelligent and those which we describe as unintelligent must be a difference in their causation; so, while some movements of human tongues and limbs are the effects of mechanical causes, others must be the effects of non-mechanical causes, i.e. some issue from movements of particles of matter, others from workings of the mind.

The differences between the physical and the mental were thus represented as differences inside the common framework of the categories of 'thing', 'stuff', 'attribute', 'state', 'process', 'change', 'cause' and 'effect'. Minds are things, but different sorts of things from bodies; mental processes are causes and effects, but different sorts of causes and effects from bodily movements. And so on. Somewhat as the foreigner expected the University to be an extra edifice, rather like a college but also considerably different, so the repudiators of mechanism represented minds as extra centers of causal processes, rather like machines but also considerably different from them. Their theory was a para-mechanical hypothesis.

That this assumption was at the heart of the doctrine is shown by the fact that

there was from the beginning felt to be a major theoretical difficulty in explaining how minds can influence and be influenced by bodies. How can a mental process, such as willing, cause spatial movements like the movements of the tongue? How can a physical change in the optic nerve have among its effects a mind's perception of a flash of light? This notorious crux by itself shows the logical mould into which Descartes pressed his theory of the mind. It was the self-same mould into which he and Galileo set their mechanics. Still unwittingly adhering to the grammar of mechanics, he tried to avert disaster by describing minds in what was merely an obverse vocabulary. The workings of minds had to be described by the mere negatives of the specific descriptions given to bodies; they are not in space, they are not motions they are not modifications of matter, they are not accessible to public observation. Minds are not bits of clockwork, they are just bits of not-clockwork.

As thus represented, minds are not merely ghosts harnessed to machines, they are themselves just spectral machines. Though the human body is an engine, it is not quite an ordinary engine, since some of its workings are governed by another engine inside it—this interior governor-engine being one of a very special sort. It is invisible, inaudible and it has no size or weight. It cannot be taken to bits and the laws it obeys are not those known to ordinary engineers. Nothing is known of how it governs the bodily engine.

A second major crux points the same moral. Since, according to the doctrine, minds belong to the same category as bodies and since bodies are rigidly governed by mechanical laws, it seemed to many theorists to follow that minds must be similarly governed by rigid non-mechanical laws. The physical world is a deterministic system, so the mental world must be a deterministic system. Bodies cannot help the modifications that they undergo, so minds cannot help pursuing the careers fixed for them. *Responsibility, choice, merit and demerit* are therefore inapplicable concepts—unless the compromise solution is adopted of saying that the laws governing mental processes, unlike those governing physical processes, have the congenial attribute of being only rather rigid. The problem of the Freedom of the Will was the problem how to reconcile the hypothesis that minds are to be described in terms drawn from the categories of mechanics with the knowledge that higher-grade human conduct is not of a piece with the behaviour of machines.

It is an historical curiosity that it was not noticed that the entire argument was broken-backed. Theorists correctly assumed that any sane man could already recognize the differences between, say, rational and non-rational utterances or between purposive and automatic behaviour. Else there would have been nothing requiring to be salved from mechanism. Yet the explanation given presupposed that one person could in principle never recognize the difference between the rational and the irrational utterances issuing from other human bodies, since he could never get

access to the postulated immaterial causes of some of their utterances. Save for the doubtful exception of himself, he could never tell the difference between a man and a Robot. It would have to be conceded, for example, that, for all that we can tell, the inner lives of persons who are classed as idiots or lunatics are as rational as those of anyone else. Perhaps only their overt behaviour is disappointing; that is to say, perhaps 'idiots' are not really idiotic, or 'lunatics' lunatic. Perhaps, too, some of those who are classed as sane are really idiots. According to the theory, external observers could never know how the overt behaviour of others is correlated with their mental powers and processes and so they could never know or even plausibly conjecture whether their applications of mental-conduct concepts to these other people were correct or incorrect. It would then be hazardous or impossible for a man to claim sanity or logical consistency even for himself, since he would be debarred from comparing his own performances with those of others. In short, our characterizations of persons and their performances as intelligent, prudent and virtuous or as stupid, hypocritical and cowardly could never have been made, so the problem of providing a special causal hypothesis to serve as the basis of such diagnoses would never have arisen. The question, 'How do persons differ from machines?' arose just because everyone already knew how to apply mental-conduct concepts before the new causal hypothesis was introduced. This causal hypothesis could not therefore be the source of the criteria used in those applications. Nor, of course, has the causal hypothesis in any degree improved our handling of those criteria. We still distinguish good from bad arithmetic, politic from impolitic conduct and fertile from infertile imaginations in the ways in which Descartes himself distinguished them before and after he speculated how the applicability of these criteria was compatible with the principle of mechanical causation.

He had mistaken the logic of his problem. Instead of asking by what criteria intelligent behaviour is actually distinguished from non-intelligent behaviour, he asked 'Given that the principle of mechanical causation does not tell us the difference, what other principle will tell it us?' He realized that the problem was not one of mechanics and assumed that it must therefore be one of some counterpart to mechanics. Not unnaturally psychology is often cast for just this role.

When two terms belong to the same category, it is proper to construct conjunctive propositions embodying them. Thus a purchaser may say that he bought a left-hand glove and a right-hand glove, but not that he bought a left-hand glove, a right-hand glove and a pair of gloves. 'She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair' is a well-known joke based on the absurdity of conjoining terms of different types. It would have been equally ridiculous to construct the disjunction 'She came home either in a flood of tears or else in a sedan-chair'. Now the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine does just this. It maintains that there exist both bodies and

minds; that there occur physical processes and mental processes; that there are mechanical causes of corporeal movements and mental causes of corporeal movements. I shall argue that these and other analogous conjunctions are absurd; but, it must be noticed, the argument will not show that either of the illegitimately conjoined propositions is absurd in itself. I am not, for example, denying that there occur mental processes. Doing long division is a mental process and so is making a joke. But I am saying that the phrase 'there occur mental processes' does not mean the same sort of thing as 'there occur physical processes', and, therefore, that it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two.

If my argument is successful, there will follow some interesting consequences. First, the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter will be dissipated, but dissipated not by either of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of Matter by Mind, but in quite a different way. For the seeming contrast of the two will be shown to be as illegitimate as would be the contrast of 'she came home in a flood of tears' and 'she came home in a sedan-chair'. The belief that there is a polar opposition between Mind and Matter is the belief that they are terms of the same logical type.

It will also follow that both Idealism and Materialism are answers to an improper question. The 'reduction' of the material world to mental states and processes, as well as the 'reduction' of mental states and processes to physical states and processes, presuppose the legitimacy of the disjunction 'Either there exist minds or there exist bodies (but not both)'. It would be like saying, 'Either she bought a left-hand and a right-hand glove or she bought a pair of gloves (but not both)'.

It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that 'there exist bodies.' But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for 'existence' is not a generic word like 'coloured' or 'sexed'. They indicate two different senses of 'exist', somewhat as 'rising' has different senses in 'the tide is rising', 'hopes are rising', and 'the average age of death is rising'. A man would be thought to be making a poor joke who said that three things are now rising, namely the tide, hopes and the average age of death. It would be just as good or bad a joke to say that there exist prime numbers and Wednesdays and public opinions and navies; or that there exist both minds and bodies. In the succeeding chapters I try to prove that the official theory does rest on a batch of category-mistakes by showing that logically absurd corollaries follow from it. The exhibition of these absurdities will have the constructive effect of bringing out part of the correct logic of mental-conduct concepts.

(4) Historical Note

It would not be true to say that the official theory derives solely from Descartes' theories, or even from a more widespread anxiety about the implications of seventeenth century mechanics. Scholastic and Reformation theology had schooled the intellects of the scientists as well as of the laymen, philosophers and clerics of that age. Stoic-Augustinian theories of the will were embedded in the Calvinist doctrines of sin and grace; Platonic and Aristotelian theories of the intellect shaped the orthodox doctrines of the immortality of the soul. Descartes was reformulating already prevalent theological doctrines of the soul in the new syntax of Galileo. The theologian's privacy of conscience became the philosopher's privacy of consciousness, and what had been the bogey of Predestination reappeared as the bogey of Determinism.

It would also not be true to say that the two-worlds myth did no theoretical good. Myths often do a lot of theoretical good, while they are still new. One benefit bestowed by the paramechanical myth was that it partly superannuated the then prevalent para-political myth. Minds and their Faculties had previously been described by analogies with political superiors and political subordinates. The idioms used were those of ruling, obeying, collaborating and rebelling. They survived and still survive in many ethical and some epistemological discussions. As, in physics, the new myth of occult Forces was a scientific improvement on the old myth of Final Causes, so, in anthropological and psychological theory, the new myth of hidden operations, impulses and agencies was an improvement on the old myth of dictations, deferences and disobediences.

DIFFICULTIES FOR ANY DUALIST THEORY

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Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., and New Jersey: Humanities Press. Inc., 1968, pp. 24-36.).

Direction of studying Armstrong's article:

- 1) Background and the viewpoint of the author: Armstrong was an Australian philosopher who once worked for different universities. His way in answering the mind-body problem was popularly considered as a good example of modern materialism. His criticisms against Dualism is quite different from Ryle's, not only because they lead us to a different doctrine, but also because they provide us a quite different strategy and different arguments. We will see that in this article, some aspects of Armstrong's criticism on dualism are much more comprehensive than that of Ryle's.
- 2) Armstrong's strategy: Armstrong's outstanding strategy in doing philosophy is that he take advantage of the contemporary achievements of natural science, such as the achievement of the science of brain and the study of neurology. He also applies the semantic method in his illustration, such as his analysis of the logic form of some dualism theses.
- 3) Arguments with which Armstrong uses to illustrate his idea: There are four parts in his article, that can be generalized as five arguments: the Difficulties of Descartes' dualism argument; the differentiate persons, and the identifying a person argument; the scientific investigation of brain and of neurology argument; the anti-interaction-ism and parallelism argument; finally, the touchstone of theory of mind argument.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
behaviorism, identity, a priori, intuition, parallelism, interaction-ism, touchstone.
- 5) Classical propositions:
 1. Everything that is in time is also in space.
 2. It should treat mental happenings as things incapable of independent existence.
- 6) Study questions:
 1. Both Ryle and Armstrong argue against dualism, what are differences between their theses?
 2. Comparing Ryle's criticism on "individuation problem" and Armstrong's criticism on "numerically differentiate" problem of dualism, to see, what is the difference between their criticisms?
 3. How do you think of Armstrong's "touch stone of the theories of mind"?
 4. Is there any problem in Armstrong's materialist thesis of answering the mind-body question?

(a) *Can a Dualist account for the unity of mind and body?*

In his book *Individuals* P. F. Strawson has emphasized how natural it is to ascribe mental and physical properties to the same subject. We say 'I am thinking' and 'I am angry,' but we also say 'I am lying down' and 'I am twelve stone' and seem to have no consciousness of using the word 'I' in two different senses. ('I was lying down thinking.') Yet if a Dualist account of mind and body is correct, then in the first two cases the word 'I' refers to a spiritual substance or to a collection of non-physical items, while in the second set of cases the word refers to a certain physical object.

I do not think that this argument [against Dualism] is very strong as it stands. The Dualist can very well reply that, in ordinary speech, personal pronouns such as 'I' refer to a *compound* object 'spiritual object (or objects) related in a certain way to a certain physical object.' Consider the case of a motor-car. For certain purposes we might regard a car as a compound of two substances, the engine and the chassis. Now we say 'The *car* is back-firing' although we could speak more strictly and say 'The *engine* of the car is back-firing'. Again, we say 'The *car* is squeaking and rattling' although we could speak more strictly and say 'The *chassis* of the car is squeaking and rattling.' In the same way, the Dualist might urge, to say 'I am angry' could be put in a stricter way as 'The spiritual part of me is angry', while 'I am lying down' could be put in a stricter way as 'The physical part of me is lying down.' As the example of the car shows, we can attribute to wholes properties which are, strictly speaking, only properties of proper parts of the whole.

Such a line of defense would be greatly strengthened if Dualism were combined with Behaviorism. If the concept of mind involved *both* a spiritual substance (or spiritual events) and certain sorts of bodily behavior, then it would be easy to see why ordinary speech makes no sharp distinction between a spiritual subject and a material subject, but instead attributes both mental and physical characteristics of the same subject: the person.

Nevertheless, there is an underlying point to this objection to Dualism which is not so easy to deal with. The difficulty is this: does a Dualist theory provide for a sufficiently close connection between the spiritual and the physical components of man? We ordinarily think of the connection between the mind and the body as very close indeed. Man is a unity. Dualism is unsatisfactory because it breaks up that unity.

To develop this point. We could solve the problem by postulating, or claiming to observe, a unique and indefinable relation that holds together the spiritual and physical components of man. But if we disdain to resort to this manoeuvre, there remain only the relations of *temporal simultaneity* and *causal relationship* to tie the spiritual object or objects to the body. It is not easy to see clearly that these are the

only known relations we can appeal to, because the imagination is tempted, quite illegitimately from the Dualist standpoint, to add a further relation. It is very natural to think of the mind as actually situated inside the body: as an inner realm. But this is to put the mind into physical space, and the essential point about dualism is its denial that the mind is a spatial thing. And once we are rid of this picture of the mind as literally inside the body, there are only the relations of temporal simultaneity and causal connection to bind the mind and the body together.

In the *Sixth Meditation*, Descartes denies that his mind is in his body simply as a pilot is in his vessel. He says that the relationship of mind and body is much closer than this. The remark is a tribute to Descartes' philosophical honesty, but it is difficult to reconcile with his Dualism. For the pilot is not only causally related to his vessel, acting on it and being acted on by it, but he is also spatially inside the vessel. But without resort to completely *ad hoc* postulation of some further relation, a Dualist can only appeal to the causal relations of mind and body. So a *Dualist* ought to say that the relation of mind to body is in some ways more *distant* than that of pilot to vessel.

It might be suggested that the Dualist can provide a closer relationship in the following way. It is characteristic of our sensory field, in particular of our visual field, that *we* are in the center of it. We perceive things as nearer or further from *ourselves*. Now our body is also perceived to be in the center of our sensory field. So, in some sense, it seems that we are located in the same place as our body.

But what is the 'I' that is where my body is? I do not think it is anything more than *the body itself* as given to sense-perception. We perceive things as nearer or further from our body: it is our body that is the center of our sensory field. So as far as this point goes, all that a Dualist can say by way of linking the mind and the body more closely is that the body is a central object in our perceptual field, the central material object on which our attention is directed. The relationship between mind and body remains a remarkably distant one, and the Dualist cannot explain why we think the two are so closely connected.

The existence of bodily sensations may also be thought to point to a specially intimate relationship between a particular mind and a particular body. For bodily sensations (such as pains and itches) seem to have the two following characteristics. In the first place they are mind-dependent: there could not be a pain or itch without a mind to have it. In the second place, however, they have a bodily location: in the hand or behind the ear. So here mind and body seem to be commingled.

But does this apparent combination of mental being and physical location really assist the *Dualist's* case? It might show that there was a close link between mind and body, but to the extent that it did this, it would show that Dualism was false. For Dualism cannot locate the mind, or any part of the mind, in the body.

It is true, as has already been said, that the Dualist can claim that there is a special and unique relation, with which we are all acquainted, but which is quite distinct from causal connection, that binds together spiritual and bodily objects. And it should be emphasized that there is no logical difficulty in solving the problem in this way. But it can hardly be said to be a *plausible* solution.

(b) *How do we numerically differentiate spiritual objects?*

Another serious difficulty for any Dualist theory of mind is the question whether it can provide for the numerical difference of spiritual objects. If we consider two physical objects that exist at the same time, we can say that what makes them two, that is to say makes them numerically different, is that they are in different places. However alike they may be, their difference of place makes them distinct from each other. Difference of place *individuates* them. If they are in exactly the same place at the same time, they are not two objects but only one.

But now let us consider the possibility that there are two spiritual substances, or collections of spiritual items, which are exactly the same in nature at a certain time. What makes two such objects, or sets of objects, *two*? We cannot appeal to their spatial separation because, by hypothesis, they are not in space.

It might be replied that they can be differentiated by differences in their past history. But this reply is insufficient. For *firstly* it is a meaningful possibility that two spiritual substances, or collections of spiritual items, should exist like two perfectly synchronized clocks, having exactly the same past spiritual history. *Secondly*, even in a case where this is not so and the spiritual histories are identical in character for a limited time, what differentiates the objects during that time? What difference is there between the case where we have two different spiritual substances, or collections of spiritual items, and the case where the two substances, or sets of items, 'coalesce' temporarily?

It might be thought that two such spiritual substances, or collections of spiritual items, can be differentiated from each other in the following way. One is connected to *this* body, while the other is connected to *that* body. For, unlike the two spiritual substances or collections of spiritual items, however much the bodies resemble, they are nevertheless made different by being in different places.

But suppose the spiritual substance, or collection of spiritual items, were disembodied? The Dualist would have to admit that this was a meaningful possibility on pain of making nonsense of his Dualism, even if he thought that such disembodied entities should not be called 'minds'. What would make the two different then? And even if the spiritual substance or collections of spiritual items, were not disembodied, reference to the bodies would not really help. For might there not be just *one* spiritual

substance or collection of spiritual items, identically related to the *two* bodies? How would the Dualist differentiate between this case, and the case where two spiritual substances or collections of spiritual items, were identical in nature and each related to their own body?

The problem just considered is that of the individuation of spiritual objects that exist at the same time. In what does their difference consist? There is a parallel problem about the identity of one spiritual object or collection of objects over a stretch of time. What makes a spiritual object that exists now the very same one as a spiritual object that existed in the past? Resemblance cannot be the mark of identity, because there might be two or more spiritual objects identical in character and history. In the case of ordinary physical objects we can appeal to *spatio-temporal* continuity. My body is spatio-temporally continuous with my body yesterday, but not with my twin's body. This spatio-temporal continuity is what makes it one body. But in the case of the spiritual objects postulated by the Dualist, there can be no question of any spatial continuity. So what is the principle of continuity for spiritual objects?

It is interesting to notice that these problems troubled St. Thomas Aquinas. The problem came up for him in connection with angels. Angels are disembodied intelligences, and therefore raise the question what makes them numerically different from each other. Aquinas' solution was to say that each angel was of a separate species, a different *sort* of object from any other angel. Among angels, difference of number is simply difference of kind. (See *Summa Theologica*, Pt. I, Q. 50, Art. 4.) But Aquinas' resolution of the difficulty is clearly a makeshift. Why should not God create two identical angels? It is surely an intelligible possibility. And what would differentiate the two then?

As usual, the argument might be met by postulation. One could postulate a 'principle of individuation' of a non-spatial nature to ensure the numerical difference of spiritual objects. And, indeed, I think that the existence of such a principle of distinction is an intelligible conception. This last point has been denied by some modern philosophers. They seem to maintain that if we suppose two distinct objects that exist at the same time, then the only meaning we can give to this supposition is that the objects are in different places. If we accepted what they say, then it would seem to be a logically necessary truth that objects that are in time are also in space. But if this is so, a logically necessary truth seems to be giving us positive information about the nature of the world, viz., that whatever is temporal is also spatio-temporal. Now I do not believe that mere logic is capable of providing this information. I believe that it is *a fact* about the world that every object that is in time is also in space (indeed, I believe that it is a fact about the world that every object there is in space and time), but I cannot think that this is a matter of logical necessity. We cannot rule

out the existence of a nonspatial or even a non-temporal 'principle of individuation' *a priori*.

Nevertheless, it does seem likely that the only 'principle of individuation' with which we have any *concrete acquaintance* is that of being in different times and places. The inability of the Dualist to say anything at all about his spiritual 'principle of individuation' strongly suggests that the only way he can understand his notion is a negative way: as 'a non-spatial principle of individuation.' It seems that he is not in fact acquainted with such a principle, nor is there any reason to postulate it.

The position taken here is very similar to Immanuel Kant's view in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. For reasons that need not be discussed here, Kant speaks of space and time as the 'forms of intuition.' He recognizes, also, that it is space and time which secure the numerical difference of distinct objects. (See, e.g. *Critique*. A263/264 = B319/320.) But although space and time are the *human* forms of intuition, Kant thinks it is perfectly possible that there might be other forms of intuition, although we have no concrete acquaintance with any. (See, e.g. *Critique*, B72.) Presumably, then, he would have said that, if such other forms of intuition existed, they would differentiate objects one from the other just as space and time do.

(c) Is the Dualist account of the origin of the mind a plausible one?

Let us now consider whether Dualism is a plausible theory in the light of modern scientific knowledge, in particular, in the light of knowledge or plausible guesses about the working of the brain. We may begin by considering the question of exactly when the mind emerges in the growth of men and animals.

It seems that the Dualist must conceive of the emergence of mind in the following way. At some time after conception, when the nervous system of man and the higher animals reaches a certain level of physiological complexity, a completely new, non-spatial entity is brought into existence in a certain completely new sort of relation to the body. The emergence of this new existent could not have been predicted from laws that deal with the physical properties of physical things.

Already the account is highly implausible from the scientific point of view. It is not a particularly difficult notion that, when the nervous system reaches a certain level of complexity, it should develop new properties. Nor would there be anything particularly difficult in the notion that when the nervous system reaches a certain level of complexity it should affect some thing that was already in existence in a new way. But it is a quite different matter to hold that the nervous system should have the power to create something else, of a quite different nature from itself, and create it out of no materials. Admittedly, there is no *contradiction* in the notion

that the nervous system should have these powers, but what we know of the workings of the world makes the hypothesis a very unlikely one.

The need for the creation of a spiritual object or objects by the nervous system would be ruled out if we assumed that the mind existed before it was embodied, and was simply brought into a special relation to the body at a certain level of physiological development. But, of course, this removes one scientific implausibility only to create another. There is very little evidence for believing that the mind preexists its body.

But whether we assume that, at a certain point, the body creates the spiritual object or objects, or whether mind and body are simply brought together at this point, there is a further difficulty for the Dualist to surmount. At what point in the development of the organism shall we say that such a momentous event occurs? The difficulty is that there seems to be nothing in the physiological development of the organism to suggest any point of sharp break. Instead we have a gradual growth from complexity to further complexity, and there is no point of which we can say 'There is such a sharp physiological change here, that this is probably the point at which the body acquires a mind.' Organisms develop by insensible gradations, and so it is natural to say the mind develops in the same way. But because the Dualist sets up so sharp a gap between the material and the mental, he must find a definite point when the mental comes into existence.

The problem we are discussing here is closely connected with one that used to be discussed (perhaps still is?) by theologians: 'When does the infant acquire a soul?' This question may appear academic or scholastic in the worst sense, but it is one that those who believe in the soul as something distinct from the body have to consider. Equally, the Dualist has to consider the question when his spiritual object or objects come into existence. To treat the question as frivolous, while still holding to a Dualist theory of mind and body, would itself be intellectual frivolity.

(d) *Do mind and body interact?*

We may now consider the dispute between the Interactionist and the Parallelist forms of Dualism, the dispute between what we called the 'thermostat' and the 'thermometer' models of the relations between mind and body.

The first thing to be said is that the Interactionist view is the natural one, and only most compelling reasons should drive anybody to accept a Parallelist account. For consider the following sequence. I am struck on the hand, I feel pain, I wring my hand. It is completely natural, and surely correct, to say that the blow *causes* me to feel pain, and the pain in turn *causes* me to wring my hand. It appears obvious that, in a case like this, body and mind interact. A bodily event causes a mental event which

causes a further bodily event. There are, however, difficulties for the Dualist in accepting the interaction of body and mind.

Before considering these difficulties, however, we must be quite clear that there is no *logical* difficulty in the notion that nonphysical events may cause physical events, or vice-versa. It is a purely *empirical* question, to be decided by experience, what is capable of acting on what. As Hume says, discussing this very point:

... to consider the matter *a priori*, *any thing may produce any thing*. . .

(*Treatise*, Vol. I, Pt. IV, Sect. 5, p. 247, ed. Selby-Bigge).

(Acceptance of Hume's negative point here, by the way, does not require acceptance of his notorious positive analysis of the causal relationship in terms of constant conjunction. The word 'anything,' of course, must not be understood to mean 'absolutely anything.' The number 4, for instance, cannot be a cause. It must mean 'anything of the sort that it is intelligible to speak of as a cause'—for instance, an event.) If the mind is a spiritual substance, or collection of spiritual items, there is no contradiction in supposing that it acts on the body or is acted on by the body. But, as we shall now see, there are weighty *empirical* reasons which make a Dualist theory of interaction difficult to sustain.

The difficulties arise when we try to think out an Interactionist theory in a concrete way. It seems that the mind will have to act on the body by acting on the *brain*. Now, to a physiologist, the brain is an enormously complete and highly organized material system to which physical stimuli of various sorts are applied, and which in turn has certain physical effects on the rest of the body. Inside the brain one physical event is followed by, and is the cause of, another physical event. If the Dualist is to be an Interactionist two conditions must be satisfied. In the first place, there must be last physical events in the brain which are followed by, and are the causes of, mental events. (Fulfillment of just this condition does not mark off Interactionism from parallelism.) In the second place, there must be last mental events which are followed by, and are the causes of, events in the brain.

Let us now consider the situation where a physical stimulus of some sort, say the sounds of a human voice, brings about certain mental events, say perceptions and thoughts, which then issue in further physical action. On the 'way up' there must be a last physical event in the brain before the mental events ensue. The mental events must then bring about a first physical event in the brain on the 'way down.' So this second event will have to be an event that is not solely determined by the previous physical state of the brain and physical environment. This means that there will be, as it were, a 'gap' between the state of the brain before the mental event has had its effect and the state of the brain after the mental event has had its effect. The transition

between the two states will not take place solely as a result of the physical workings of the brain and physical environment.

Now, with the gradual advance of knowledge of the operation of the brain and nervous system, physiologists are becoming increasingly unwilling to think that there is any such gap.

If the mind acts on the brain, there must be one or more *points d'appui* in the brain where the first physical effects of mental events occur. Descartes, both Dualist and Interactionist, saw that he must look for such a place and thought that he had found it in the pineal gland. He was taking his own Interactionism seriously, to his eternal intellectual credit. But later research has not backed him up about the pineal gland, nor has any other plausible candidate been found for the point or points in the brain where the first physical effects of the mental appear. This suggests that the spiritual component of man cannot act on the material one, which explains why so many Dualists have not accepted Interactionism and have turned reluctantly to Parallelism.

On modern neurophysiologist, Sir John Eccles, has accepted a Dualist Interactionism. (See his *The Neurophysiological Basis of Mind*, clarendon Press, 1953, Ch. 8, 'The Mind-Brain Problem'.) But beyond making the suggestion that, if the mind could affect the pattern of discharge of relatively few neurons in a systematic manner, it could quite easily produce quite large alterations in the total patterns of stimulation in the brain, he does nothing in the way of producing a worked-out theory of how interaction occurs. Nevertheless, his idea that discharges might occur in neurons that could not be predicted by any physical laws, but which, occurring systematically, would bring about relatively big alterations in the state of the brain, is scientifically testable, at least in theory. But most neurophysiologists, I imagine, would be astounded to find any such non-physical interference in the workings of the brain. A puzzling Feature of Eccles' view is that he says it demands a 'spatio-temporal patterning of the mind'. Apparently he regards the mind as both non-physical, yet somehow in space.

On the Parallelist view, instead of the spiritual affecting the physical, events in the brain and events in the soul are *correlated* with each other, running in double-harness with each other, or, in the language of logicians, in one-to-one correlation. Whenever there are events in the brain of a certain sort, spiritual events are brought into being 'beside' the brain events, but do not modify them. On this Parallelist view, a complete science treating of the relation of the brain to the mind would consist of a huge 'dictionary' allowing us to pass from the current existence of a certain state in the brain to a certain state of mind, and vice-versa. But the dictionary would be a dictionary of contingent truths, for it would be experience that had taught us what the correlations were.

But, of course, Parallelism escapes the arguments (or perhaps we should say, more modestly, the intuitions) of modern physiology only to fall foul of ordinary experience. If we consider the sequence (i) a blow on the hand; (ii) a pain in the hand; (iii) wringing of the hand; it seems impossible to deny that, not only is the first event the cause of the second event, but also that the second event is the cause of the third event. If this is not a causal sequence, what is? Yet the Parallelist must, quite implausibly, deny that the pain makes me (causes me to) wring my hand.

It may be objected, however, that the Parallelist can provide for the interaction of mind and body in the following way. When my hand is struck, I feel distress. Equally, when my hand is struck, certain processes occur in my brain. Whenever these processes occur, I feel distress; and whenever I feel distress, these processes occur. The next thing that happens is that I wring my hand, and the physiologist would say that the wringing was caused by the processes in the brain. But, the Parallelist may say, is it not equally correct to say that the wringing was caused by my distress? In order to assert that this was not so, we would have to find a case where the same sort of brain-process occurs, the felt distress does not, but I still wring my hand. But, on the Parallelist hypothesis, we never get such a case. Whenever we have that sort of brain- process, we feel distress.

The objection to this ingenious rejoinder is that, granted there is no 'gap' in the chain of physical causation in the brain (and it is the accepting of this consequence that leads to the unwilling acceptance of Parallelism), then we can in theory deduce the wringing of the hand given no more than the physical state of the brain, the body, the environment and the physical laws by which they operate. This implies that the existence of the spiritual object, and the correlation between brain-processes and spiritual states, has no effect on the way the physical world operates. And to assert this is to deny that mind acts on body.

There is, however, one other line that a Parallelist can take. He can argue that mind and body do seem to interact, but that this interaction is an illusion, an illusion brought about by the observed fact that wringing the hand in a certain way is regularly preceded by having a sensation of pain. The sequence is mistaken for a causal sequence, a mistake that is discovered as a result of modern neurophysiological knowledge. Ordinary speech ('the pain made me wring my and') bears witness to the time before the mistake and been discovered.

This is a possible line of defense. But it must be realized how very extensive the 'error' turns out to be. We are constantly speaking, in all sorts of contexts, of mental events giving rise to bodily happenings ('An idea crossed my mind, so I said . . .'). If other evidence is sufficiently pressing, we may have to write off all these ways of expressing ourselves as embodying a mistake. But a theory that would allow for the interaction of mind and body would be preferable.

Before leaving this discussion of interactionism and Parallelism, a further objection to Parallelism may be mentioned briefly. Everything in the physical world interacts with its environment. No material thing is purely passive: it is acted on, but it also acts. The Parallelist is maintaining that the spiritual component of man is different in this respect. Unlike everything else in the universe, the spirit is powerless. We should certainly hesitate to believe that this exception occurs.

So a Dualist Interactionism cannot be squared with physiology and a Dualist Parallelism is incompatible with ordinary experience. Yet a Dualist must either be an Interactionist or Parallelist.

There seem, then, to be serious objections to any form of Dualism. Nevertheless, . . . there is no . . . logical incoherence in Cartesian Dualism. If the Cartesian is prepared to postulate, or claim to observe, a spiritual substance; if he is prepared to postulate, or care to observe, a unique relationship that ties particular spiritual substances to particular bodies; if he is prepared to postulate, or claim to observe, a principle of numerical differentiation to secure the numerical difference of spiritual substances; if he is prepared to accept the scientific implausibilities involved in the hypothesis of the emergence of spiritual substance; and if he is prepared to accept either the scientific implausibilities involved in Interactionism, or the conflict with ordinary experience involved in Parallelism; then no actual contradiction can be shown in his position. But if we could find an account of the mind that avoids such awkward consequences, it would be preferable.

Our discussion has not merely uncovered difficulties for Dualism, but has the following positive value. It has shown us that a completely satisfactory theory of mind should meet a number of demands. (i) It should allow for the logical possibility of the disembodied existence of a mind. (ii) It should treat mental happenings as things incapable of independent existence. (iii) It should account for the unity of mind and body. (iv) It should provide a principle of numerical difference for minds. (v) It should not be scientifically implausible. (vi) It should allow for the causal interaction of mind and body. Here we have some useful touchstones with which to test the worth of different theories of mind.

DIFFICULTIES FOR ANY DUALIST THEORY WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE BAT?

-Thomas Nagel

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Direction of studying Nagel's article:

- 1) Background of the author and his view point on the mind-body problem: Nagel is one of the most outstanding philosophers in American universities, his works concentrate not only in philosophy of mind, but also in other fields of philosophy. Some of his articles are translated into Chinese and published in China recently. His viewpoint on the mind-body problem is popularly accepted, because he exposed the difficulties of modern materialism and reductionism on this issue, his phenomenological way, to suspend the studying the essence of the mind and to describe only the phenomena of mind, of answering the issue, direct us a new line of considering the mind-body problem. This new line is quite different from the monism, dualism and eliminate-ism, and it could avoid the difficulties of those traditional doctrines.
- 2) The strategy Nagel used to support his phenomenology-ism: The major feature which differentiates Nagel's and other philosopher's article is that, in Nagel's works, the epistemological study, the study of the nature of subjectivity and the nature of the objectivity, takes the central part of the whole theory. The other strategies, such as the strategy of semantic analysis, the strategy of scientific analysis also play important parts in his works.
- 3) Generalization of Nagel's arguments: Nagel's article could be divided as four parts. The first part of the article presents us an anti-materialism and anti-reductionism argument; the second part presents us a bat story, or we may say, a "bat" argument; the third part can be called as the analysis of subjectivity and objectivity argument, and the last part is primarily the phenomenological solution of mind-body problem argument.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
reduction-ism, suspend, phenomenology, a point of view, subjectivity, objectivity, discrimination, in its own right.
- 5) Important propositions:
 1. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view.
 2. If mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like, intrinsically, undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a thing to be the case remain a mystery.
 3. We would have to develop such a phenomenology to describe the sonar experience of bats; but it would also be possible to begin with humans.
- 6) Study questions:

1. In Nagel's idea, what is the difficulty for materialism or reduction-ism in resolve the mind-body problem?
 2. What is the implication of Nagel's "bat" story?
 3. What is the similarity and what is the difference between phenomenology-ism and eliminate-ism?
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Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction.[1] But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H₂O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.

Every reductionist has his favorite analogy from modern science. It is most unlikely that any of these unrelated examples of successful reduction will shed light on the relation of mind to brain. But philosophers share the general human weakness for explanations of what is incomprehensible in terms suited for what is familiar and well understood, though entirely different. This has led to the acceptance of implausible accounts of the mental largely because they would permit familiar kinds of reduction. I shall try to explain why the usual examples do not help us to understand the relation between mind and body—why, indeed, we have at present no conception of what an explanation of the physical nature of a mental phenomenon would be. Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless. The most important and characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomena is very poorly understood. Most reductionist theories do not even try to explain it. And careful examination will show that no currently available concept of reduction is applicable to it. Perhaps a new theoretical form can be devised for the purpose, but such a solution, if it exists, lies in the distant intellectual future.

Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it. (Some extremists have been prepared to deny it even of mammals other than man.) No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means, basically that there is something it is

like to *be* that organism. There may be further implications about the form of the experience; there may even (though I doubt it) be implications about the behavior of the organism. But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to *be* that organism—something it is like *for* the organism.

We may call this the subjective character or experience. It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing. [2] It is not analyzable in terms of the causal role of experiences in relation to typical human behavior—for similar reasons. [3] I do not deny that conscious mental states and events cause behavior, nor that they may be given functional characterizations. I deny only that this kind of thing exhausts their analysis. Any reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the problem will be falsely posed. It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character. For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness. Without some idea, therefore, of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is required of a physicalist theory.

While an account of the physical basis of mind must explain many things, this appears to be the most difficult. It is impossible to exclude the phenomenological features of experience from a reduction in the same way that one excludes the phenomenal features of an ordinary substance from a physical or chemical reduction of it—namely, by explaining them as effects on the minds of human observers. [4] If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view.

Let me first try to state the issue somewhat more fully than by referring to the relation between the subjective and the objective, or between the *pour-soi* and the *en-soi*. This is far from easy. Facts about what it is like to be an *X* are very peculiar, so peculiar that some may be inclined to doubt their reality, or the significance of claims about them. To illustrate the connection between subjectivity and a point of view, and to make evident the importance of subjective features, it will help to explore the matter in relation to an example that brings out clearly the divergence between the

two types of conception, subjective and objective.

I assume we all believe that bats have experience. After all, they are mammals, and there is no more doubt that they have experience than that mice or pigeons or whales have experience. I have chosen bats instead of wasps or flounders because if one travels too far down the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is experience there at all. Bats, although more closely related to us than those other species, nevertheless present a range of activity and a sensory apparatus so different from ours that the problem I what to pose is exceptionally vivid (though it certainly could be raised with other species). Even without the benefit of philosophical reflection, anyone who has spent some time in an enclosed space with an excited bat knows what it is to encounter a fundamentally *alien* form of life.

I have said that the essence of the belief that bats have experience is that there is something that it is like to be a bat. Now we know that most bats (the microchiroptera, to be precise) perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation, detecting the reflections, from objects within range, of their own rapid, subtly modulated, high-frequency shrieks. Their brains are designed to correlate the outgoing impulses with the subsequent echoes, and the information thus acquired enables bats to make precise discriminations of distance, size, shape, motion, and texture comparable to those we make by vision. But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine. This appears to create difficulties for the notion of what it is like to be a bat. We must consider whether any method will permit us to extrapolate to the inner life of the bat from our own case, [5] and if not, what alternative methods there may be for understanding the notion.

Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in an attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for *me* to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a *bat* to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task. I cannot perform it either by imagining additions to my present experience, or by imagining segments gradually subtracted from it, or by imagining some combination of additions, subtractions, and modifications.

To the extent that I could look and behave like a wasp or a bat without changing my fundamental structure, my experiences would not be anything like the

experiences of those animals. On the other hand, it is doubtful that any meaning can be attached to the supposition that I should possess the internal neurophysiological constitution of a bat. Even if I could by gradual degrees be transformed into a bat, nothing in my present constitution enables me to imagine what the experiences of such a future stage of myself thus metamorphosed would be like. The best evidence would come from the experiences of bats, if we only knew what they were like.

So if extrapolation from our own case is involved in the idea of what it is like to be a bat, the extrapolation must be incompletionable. We cannot form more than a schematic conception of what it *is* like. For example, we may ascribe general *types* of experience on the basis of the animal's structure and behavior. Thus we describe bat sonar as a form of three-dimensional forward perception; we believe that bats feel some versions of pain, fear, hunger, and lust, and that they have other, more familiar types of perception besides sonar. But we believe that these experiences also have in each case a specific subjective character, which it is beyond our ability to conceive. And if there is conscious life elsewhere in the universe, it is likely that some of it will not be describable even in the most general experiential terms available to us.[6] (The problem is not confined to exotic cases, however, for it exists between one person and another. The subjective character of the experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him. This does not prevent us each from believing that the other's experience has such a subjective character.)

If anyone is inclined to deny that we can believe in the existence of facts like this whose exact nature we cannot possibly conceive, he should reflect that in contemplating the bats we are in much the same position that intelligent bats or Martians' [7] would occupy if they tried to form a conception of what it was like to be us. The structure of their own minds might make it impossible for them to succeed, but we know they would be wrong to conclude that there is not anything precise that it is like to be us: that only certain general types of mental state could be ascribed to us (perhaps perception and appetite would be concepts common to us both; perhaps not). We know they would be wrong to draw such a skeptical conclusion because we know what it is like to be us. And we know that while it includes an enormous amount of variation and complexity, and while we do not possess the vocabulary to describe it adequately, its subjective character is highly specific, and in some respects describable in terms that can be understood only by creatures like us. The fact that we cannot expect ever to accommodate in our language a detailed description of Martian or bat phenomenology should not lead us to dismiss as meaningless the claim that bats and Martians have experiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our own. It would be fine if someone were to develop concepts and a theory that enabled us to think about those things; but such an understanding may be permanently denied to us

by the limits of our nature. And to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance.

This brings us to the edge of a topic that requires much more discussion than I can give it here: namely, the relation between facts on the one hand and conceptual schemes or systems of representation on the other. My realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts. Certainly it is possible for a human being to believe that there are facts which humans never *will* possess the requisite concepts to represent or comprehend. Indeed it would be foolish to doubt this, given the finiteness of humanity's expectations. After all, there would have been transfinite numbers even if everyone had been wiped out by the Black Death before Cantor discovered them. But one might also believe that there are facts which *could* not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever—simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. (After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.) Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.

I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the topic before us (namely, the mind-body problem) is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.

I am not adverting here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a *type*. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view—to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experiencer is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise. In our own case we occupy the relevant point of view, but we will have as much difficulty understanding our own experience properly if we

approach it from another point of view as we would if we tried to understand the experience of another species without taking up *its* point of view.[8]

This bears directly on the mind-body problem. For if the facts of experience—facts about what it is like *for* the experiencing organism—are accessible only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism. The latter is a domain of objective facts *par excellence*—the kind that can be observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals with differing perceptual systems. There are no comparable imaginative obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge about bat neurophysiology by human scientists, and intelligent bats or Martians might learn more about the human brain than we ever will.

This is not by itself an argument against reduction. A Martian scientist with no understanding of visual perception could understand the rainbow, or lightning, or clouds as physical phenomena, though he would never be able to understand the human concepts of rainbow, lightning, or cloud, or the place these things occupy in our phenomenal world. The objective nature of the things picked out by these concepts could be apprehended by him because, although the concepts themselves are connected with a particular point of view and particular visual phenomenology, the things apprehended from that point of view are not: they are observable from the point of view but external to it: hence they can be comprehended from other points of view also, either by the same organisms or by others. Lightning has an objective character that is not exhausted by its visual appearance, and this can be investigated by a Martian without vision. To be precise, it has a *more* objective character than is revealed in its visual appearance. In speaking of the move from subjective to objective characterization, I wish to remain noncommittal about the existence of an end point, the completely objective intrinsic nature of the thing, which one might or might not be able to reach. It may be *moiré* accurate to think of objectivity as a direction in which the understanding can travel. And in understanding a phenomenon like lightning, it is legitimate to go as far away as one can from a strictly human viewpoint. [9]

In the case of experience, on the other hand, the connection with a particular point of view seems much closer. It is difficult to understand what could be meant by the *objective* character of an experience, apart from the particular point of view from which its subject apprehends it. After all, what would be left of what it was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat? But if experience does not have, in addition to its subjective character, an objective nature that can be apprehended from many different points of view, then how can it be supposed that a Martian investigating my brain might be observing physical processes which were my mental processes (as he might observe physical processes which were bolts of lightning),

only from a different point of view? How, for that matter, could a human physiologist observe them from another point of view? [10]

We appear to be faced with a general difficulty about psychophysical reduction. In other areas the process of reduction is a move in the direction of greater objectivity, toward a more accurate view of the real nature of things. This is accomplished by reducing our dependence on individual or species-specific points of view toward the object of investigation. We describe it not in terms of the impressions it makes on our senses, but in terms of its more general effects and of properties detectable by means other than the human senses. The less it depends on a specifically human viewpoint, the more objective is our description. It is possible to follow this path because although the concepts and ideas we employ in thinking about the external world are initially applied from a point of view that involves our perceptual apparatus, they are used by us to refer to things beyond themselves—toward which we *have* the phenomenal point of view. Therefore we can abandon it in favor of another, and still be thinking about the same things.

Experience itself, however, does not seem to fit the pattern. The idea of moving from appearance to reality seems to make no sense here. What is the analogue in this case to pursuing a more objective understanding of the same phenomena by abandoning the initial subjective viewpoint toward them in favor of another that is more objective but concerns the same thing? Certainly it *appears* unlikely that we will get closer to the real nature of human experience by leaving behind the particularity of our human point of view and striving for a description in terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us. If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity—that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint—does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it take us farther away from it.

In a sense, the seeds of this objection to the reducibility of experience are already detectable in successful cases of reduction; for in discovering sound to be, in reality, a wave phenomenon in air or other media, we leave behind one viewpoint to take up another, and the auditory, human or animal viewpoint that we leave behind remains unreduced. Members of radically different species may both understand the same physical events in objective terms, and this does not require that they understand the phenomenal forms in which those events appear to the senses of members of the other species. Thus it is a condition of their referring to a common reality that their more particular viewpoints are not part of the common reality that they both apprehend. The reduction can succeed only if the species-specific viewpoint is omitted from what is to be reduced.

But while we are right to leave this point of view aside in seeking a fuller understanding of the external world, we cannot ignore it permanently, since it is the

essence of the internal world, and not merely a point of view on it. Most of the neobehaviorism of recent philosophical psychology results from the effort to substitute an objective concept of mind for the real thing, in order to have nothing left over which cannot be reduced. If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be done. The problem is unique. If mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like, intrinsically, [11] to undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a thing to be the case remains a mystery.

What moral should be drawn from these reflections, and what should be done next? It would be a mistake to conclude that physicalism must be false. Nothing is proved by the inadequacy of physicalist hypotheses that assume a faulty objective analysis of mind. It would be truer to say that physicalism is a position we cannot understand because we do not at present have any conception of how it might be true. Perhaps it will be thought unreasonable to require such a conception as a condition of understanding. After all, it might be said, the meaning of physicalism is clear enough: mental states are states of the body; mental events are physical events. We do not know *which* physical states and events they are, but that should not prevent us from understanding the hypothesis. What could be clearer than the words "is" and "are"?

But I believe it is precisely this apparent clarity of the word "is" that is deceptive. Usually, when we are told that *X* is *Y* we know *how* it is supposed to be true, but that depends on a conceptual or theoretical background and is not conveyed by the "is" alone. We know how both "*X*" and "*Y*" refer, and the kinds of things to which they refer, and we have a rough idea how the two referential paths might converge on a single thing, be it an object, a person, a process, an event, or whatever. But when the two terms of the identification are very disparate it may not be so clear how it could be true. We may not have even a rough idea of how the two referential paths could converge, or what kind of things they might converge on, and a theoretical framework may have to be supplied to enable us to understand this. Without the framework, an air of mysticism surrounds the identification.

This explains the magical flavor of popular presentations of fundamental scientific discoveries, given out as propositions to which one must subscribe without really understanding them. For example, people are now told at an early age that all matter is really energy. But despite the fact that they know what "is" means, most of them never form a conception of what makes this claim true, because they lack the theoretical background.

At the present time the status of physicalism is similar to that which the hypothesis that matter is energy would have had if uttered by a pre-Socratic philosopher. We do not have the beginnings of a conception of how it might be true.

In order to understand the hypothesis that a mental event is a physical event, we require more than an understanding of the word "is." The idea of how a mental and a physical term might refer to the same thing is lacking, and the usual analogies with theoretical identification in other fields fail to supply it. They fail because if we construe the reference of mental terms to physical events on the usual model, we either get a reappearance of separate subjective events as the effects through which mental reference to physical events is secured, or else we get a false account of how mental terms refer (for example, a causal behaviorist one).

Strangely enough, we may have evidence for the truth of something we cannot really understand. Suppose a caterpillar is locked in a sterile safe by someone unfamiliar with insect metamorphosis, and weeks later the safe is reopened, revealing a butterfly. If the person knows that the safe has been shut the whole time, he has reason to believe that the butterfly is or was once the caterpillar, without having any idea in what sense this might be so. (One possibility is that the caterpillar contained a tiny winged parasite that devoured it and grew into the butterfly.)

It is conceivable that we are in such a position with regard to physicalism. Donald Davidson has argued that if mental events have physical causes and effects, they must have physical descriptions. He holds that we have reason to believe this even though we do not—and in fact *could* not—have a general psychophysical theory. [12] His argument applies to intentional mental events, but I think we also have some reason to believe that sensations are physical processes, without being in a position to understand how. Davidson's position is that certain physical events have irreducibly mental properties, and perhaps some view describable in this way is correct. But nothing of which we can now form a conception corresponds to it; nor have we any idea what a theory would be like that enabled us to conceive of it. [13]

Very little work has been done on the basic question (from which mention of the brain can be entirely omitted) whether any sense can be made of experiences' having an objective character at all. Does it make sense, in other words, to ask what my experiences are *really* like, as opposed to how they appear to me? We cannot genuinely understand the hypothesis that their nature is captured in a physical description unless we understand the more fundamental idea that they *have* an objective nature (or that objective processes can have a subjective nature). [14]

I should like to close with a speculative proposal. It may be possible to approach the gap between subjective and objective from another direction. Setting aside temporarily the relation between the mind and the brain, we can pursue a more objective understanding of the mental in its own right. At present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective character of experience without relying on the imagination—without taking up the point of view of the experiential subject. This should be regarded as a challenge to form new concepts and devise a new

method—an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination. Through presumably it would not capture everything, its goal would be to describe, at least in part, the subjective character of experiences in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having those experiences.

We would have to develop such a phenomenology to describe the sonar experiences of bats; but it would also be possible to begin with humans. One might try, for example, to develop concepts that could be used to explain to a person blind from birth what it was like to see. One would reach a blank wall eventually, but it should be possible to devise a method of expressing in objective terms much more than we can at present, and with much greater precision. The loose intermodal analogies—for example, “Red is like the sound of a trumpet”—which crop up in discussions of this subjects are of little use. That should be clear to anyone who has both heard a trumpet and seen red. But structural features of perception might be more accessible to objective description, even though something would be left out. And concepts alternative to those we learn in the first person may enable us to arrive at a kind of understanding even of our own experience which is denied by the very ease of description and lack of distance that subjective concepts afford.

Apart from its own interest, a phenomenology that is in this sense objective may permit questions about the physical.[15] basis of experience to assume a more intelligible form. Aspects of subjective experience that admitted this kind of objective description might be better candidates for objective explanations of a more familiar sort. But whether or not this guess is correct, it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it. [16]

NOTES:

1. . Examples are J. J. C. Smart, *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* (London, 1963); David K. Lewis, “An Argument for the Identity Theory,” *Journal of Philosophy*, LXIII (1966), reprinted with addenda in David M. Rosenthal, *Materialism & the Mind-Body Problem* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1971); Hilary Putnam, “Psychological Predicates” in Capitan and Merrill, *Art, Mind. & Religion* (Pittsburgh, 1967), reprinted in Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, as “The Nature of Mental States”; D. M. Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London, 1968); D. C. Dennett, *Content and Consciousness* (London, 1969) . I have expressed earlier doubts in “Armstrong on the Mind,” *Philosophical Review*, LXXIX (1970), 394-403; “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,” *Synthese*, 22 (1971); and a review of Dennett, *Journal of Philosophy*, LXIX (1972). See also Saul Kripke, “Naming and Necessity” in Davidson and Harman. *Semantics of Natural Language* (Dordrecht, 1972), esp. pp. 334-342; and M. T. Thornton, “Ostensive Terms and Materialism,” *The Monist*. 56 (1972).

2. Perhaps there could not actually be such robots. Perhaps anything complex enough to behave like a person would have experiences. But that, if true, is a fact which cannot be discovered merely by analyzing the concept of experience.
3. It is not equivalent to that about which we are incorrigible, both because we are not incorrigible about experience and because experience is present in animals lacking language and thought, who have no beliefs at all about their experiences.
4. Cf. Richard Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, Privacy, and Categories," *The Review of Metaphysics*, XIX (1965), esp. 37-38
5. By "our own case" I do not mean just "my own case," but rather the mentalistic ideas that we apply unproblematically to ourselves and other human beings.
6. Therefore the analogical form of the English expression "what it is *like*" is misleading. It does not mean "what (in our expression) is *resembles*," but rather "how it is for the subject himself,"
7. Any intelligent extraterrestrial beings totally different from us.
8. It may be easier that I suppose to transcend inter-species barriers with the aids of the imagination. For example, blind people are able to detect objects near them by a form of sonar, using vocal clicks or taps of a cane. Perhaps if one knew what that was like. One could by extension imagine roughly what it was like to possess the much more refined sonar of the bat. The distance between oneself and other persons and other species can fall anywhere on a continuum. Even for other persons the understanding of what it is like to be them is only partial, and when one moves to species very different from oneself, a lesser degree of partial understanding may still be available. The imagination is remarkably flexible. My point, however, is not that we can not *know* what it is like to be a bat. I am not raising that epistemological problem. My point is rather that even to form a *conception* of what it is like to be bat, (and a fortiori to know what it is like to be a bat) one must take up the bat's point of view. If one can take it up roughly, or partially, then one's conception will also be rough or partial. Or so it seems in our present state of understanding.
9. The problem I am going to raise can therefore be posed even if the distinction between more subjective and more objective descriptions or viewpoints can still be made only within a larger human point of view. I do not accept this kind of conceptual relativism, but it need not be refuted to make the point that psychological reduction can be accommodated by the subjective-to-objective model familiar from other cases.
10. The problem is not just that when I look at the "Mona Lisa," My visual experience has a certain quality, no trace of which is to be found by someone looking into my brain. For even if he did observe there a tiny image of the "Mona Lisa," he would have no reason to identify it with the experience.
11. The relation would therefore not be a contingent one, like that of a cause and its distinct effects. It would be necessary true that a certain physical state felt a certain way. Saul Kripke (*op.cit.*) argues that causal behaviorist and related analyses of the mental fail because they construe, e.g., "pain" as a merely contingent name of pains. The subjective character of an experience ("its immediate phenomenological quality" Kripke calls it [P.340]) is the essential property left out by

such analyses., and the one in virtue of which it is, necessarily, the experience it is. My view is closely related to his. Like Kripke, I find the hypothesis that a certain brain state should *necessarily* have a certain subjective character incomprehensible without further explanation. No such explanation emerges from theories which view the mind-brain relation as contingent, but perhaps there are often alternatives, not yet discovered.

12. A theory that explains how the mind-brain relation was necessary would still leave us with Kripke's problem of explaining why it nevertheless appears contingent. That difficulty seems to me surmountable, in the following way. We may imagine something by representing it to ourselves either perpetually, sympathetically, or symbolically, I shall not try to say how symbolic imagination works, but part of what happens in the other two cases is this. To imagine something perceptually, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the thing itself. (This method can be used only to imagining mental events and states-our own or another's.) When we try to imagine a mental state occurring without associated brain state, we first sympathetically imagine the occurrence of the mental state, by putting ourselves into another state unconnected with the first: one resembling that which we would be in if we perceived the non-occurrence of the physical state. Where the imagination of physical features is sympathetic, it appears to us that we can imagine any experience occurring without its associated brain state, and vice versa. The relation between them will appear contingent even if it is necessary, because of the independence of the disparate types of imagination.

(Solipsism, incidentally, results if one misinterprets sympathetic imagination as if it worked like perceptual imagination: it then seems impossible to imagine any experience that is not one's own)

13. Similar remarks apply to my paper "Physicalism" *Philosophical Review* LXXIV (1965), 339-356, reprinted with postscript in John O' Connor, *Modern Materialism* (New York, 1969).
14. This question also lies at the heart of the problem of other's mind, whose close connection with the mind-body problem is often overlooked. If one understood how subjective experience could have an objective nature, one would understand the existence of subjects other than oneself.
15. I have not defined the term "physical." Obviously, it does not apply to just what can be described by the concept of contemporary physics, since we expect further developments. Some may think there is nothing to prevent mental phenomena from eventually being recognized as physical in their own right. But whatever else may be said of the physical, it has to be objective. So if our idea of the physical ever expands to include mental phenomena, it will have to assign them an objective character whether or not this is done by analyzing them in terms of other phenomena already regarded as physical. It seems to me more likely, however, that mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed in a theory whose fundamental terms can not be placed clearly in either category.
16. I have read versions of this paper to a number of audiences, and am indebted to many people for their comments.

HEGEL'S ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

-Stephen Priest

(TM, p.p. 80-95)

Direction of studying Hegel's absolute idealism:

- 1) Background of the author and major ideas of the texts: Stephen Priest is a professor of University of Edinburgh in British that is a famous studying center on the topic of philosophy of mind. He generalizes all kinds of contemporary doctrines and classical works on philosophy of mind in his book *Theories of the Mind*. Our text "Hegel's Absolute Idealism" is only a part of the book. Priest introduces us Hegel's idea on mind-body problem based on his reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and other Hegel's works. He points out that Hegel argues against dualism, because Hegel considers that person is actually a indivisible unity, it is the self-consciousness that generates the paradox of splitting person as two parts-mind and body. And this kind of self-consciousness is only a lower stage of the development of the spirit. In the higher stage of the development, the paradox would be resolved. According to Hegel's dialectic, in obtaining truth, the spirit must go through the process of thesis, antithesis and finally the synthesis. Both materialism and ordinary idealism are at the stage of antithesis, and are going astray. Hegel provides a sort of Absolute Idealism as the stage of synthesis, the right solution on the issue of mind and body. The difference between ordinary idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism is that Hegel's concept of spirit or mind refers to the supreme being-spirit of God, but not the secular mind of persons. Hegel describes the six stages of the development of the consciousness in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the last stage is the stage of absolute spirit that leads to a sort of secret paradise. So, there is a jump in Hegel's approach, the jump from rational philosophy to religious belief, from the study of issues of human being to the study of issues of religion.

In reading Priest's interpretation of Hegel's idea, we get to know the feature of the doctrine of idealism on the issue of mind and body relation.

- 2) Disciplined terms:
holistic, absolute idealism, reflection, dialectic, speculation, opposition, synthesis, phenomenology, spirit.
- 3) Important propositions:
 1. Dialectic is the sort of thinking which exhibits philosophical problems as contradictions or apparent contradictions.
 2. The separation of the material and the immaterial can be explained only on the basis of the original unity of both.
 3. The individual finite minds of human persons will be seen to be point of view or perspectives of one universal divine called "spirit."
- 4) Study questions:

1. In Hegel's idea, how is the dualism concept concerning the mind-body issue generated?
 2. Why does Hegel consider both materialism and ordinary idealism as wrong?
 3. What is the difference between ordinary idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism?
 4. According to the author, what are the major points of Hegel's dialectic?
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The philosophical works of G. W. F. Hegel form a systematically interrelated whole and it is fair to say that no one aspect of this thought may be fully appreciated in complete abstraction from the rest. Extracting Hegel's solution to the mind—body problem therefore requires doing some violence to his holistic conception of philosophy. I shall try to keep this to a minimum by first stating his solution and then outlining its role in his philosophy as a whole.

I should warn the reader in advance that Hegel's idealism is very different from Berkeley's, and many find his prose style tortuous in the extreme. Hegel uses several ordinary words with extra, philosophical senses, and I shall try to make these reasonably clear as we encounter them. In addition, Hegel's thinking is frequently of a complexity many would call 'convoluted', but which others find subtle and original. Many great philosophers are at least as lucid as the commentators who try to make them intelligible; but in the case of Hegel it is certainly wise to read secondary literature to obtain an overview his aims and methods before tackling the primary texts. His contribution to the philosophy of mind is concentrated in two books, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807 and volume three of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), which is called *The Philosophy of Mind*. It is better to read the latter work first as it is clearer and shorter and was regarded by Hegel as a more definitive statement on the nature of mind than the 1807 *Phenomenology*. I advise this despite the fact that Hegel conceived of the *Phenomenology* as an introduction to the philosophy of the *Encyclopaedia*, and it is the order I shall adopt here.

A useful way to read the first section of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* is as an attempt to avoid the philosophical shortcomings of mind—body dualism, and to replace that theory with a kind of idealism. As we have seen, idealism and dualism are mutually inconsistent—they cannot both be true simultaneously—because dualism is the view that there are two substances, one mental and one physical, but idealism is the view that there is ultimately only one substance: mental substance or mind. Indeed, idealism is a monism and materialism is a monism, because according to each of those only one sort of substance exists and, as the names suggest, monism and dualism are incompatible. We should now inspect Hegel's rejection of dualism and his reasons for adopting that monism called idealism rather than the one called

materialism.

The Critique of Dualism

Hegel has an interesting account of how mind—body dualism comes to be a theory of the mind at all. It is his view that as children we are not mind—body dualists; on the contrary, we have an intuitive or taken-for-granted feeling of unity between ourselves and nature. He suggests that because we are alive, and so parts of the single life-process which is nature, we have a sympathy which extends so far as feeling ourselves to be a part of nature. Naturally, as children we do not rationally represent these thoughts to ourselves in language, but nevertheless this is the intuitive and pre-philosophical character of our experience. However, according to Hegel, as we grow older we lose this feeling of being at one with nature and reflect rationally on our experience instead. It is precisely this act of reflection which gives rise to an apparent split or bifurcation between oneself, as a subjective mental substance, and the rest of the world, as an objective physical substance. In the act of reflective awareness there appear to exist two separate and independent entities: the observer and the observed, or the subject and the object.

It is worth pausing at this point to ask why rational reflection should produce the appearance of a mind—body dualism. It will be Hegel's sophisticated answer that this is one of the structures of self-consciousness; but some immediate plausibility in his view may be adduced in the following way. If you consider for a moment the states of mind you are in typically during the course of the day, it seems likely that many of them are not what we would call 'self-conscious' states. I mean by this that you are conscious of whatever you are thinking about or perceiving; so, for example, you think about posting a letter, and then your attention is absorbed in the actual posting and so on. Arguably it is only intermittently that you are conscious of being conscious of the letter or of anything else. This would seem to require a new and special act of awareness—a kind of awareness of being aware. If this is correct, it supports Hegel's case in that there is no self or subject or observer present to consciousness most of the time; one appears only during those acts called acts of self-consciousness. As we shall see in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel describes many different aspects of self-consciousness, but I note this everyday fact about our mental lives to give one reason for making dualism rely on self-awareness.

Hegel makes two important points about mind—body dualism as generated by reflection: it gives rise to insuperable philosophical problems, and it is illusory. I shall take each of these in turn.

The philosophical problems cluster around the relationship between the mental and the physical substance. There is notably the time-worn problem for dualism of how causal interaction between mental and physical is possible if each is

so different in kind from the other. Hegel also notes that the empirical sciences of physiology and psychology are powerless to state what the nature of the psycho-physical relation is. This importance is due to the seeming utter heterogeneity of mental and physical. I appear to myself as a single unified subjective self, faced by a multifarious composite objective world. I have a mental life of thoughts and perceptions which is in some sense internal to me, but I am confronted by an 'external world' of physical objects. Within the Cartesian picture produced by reflection, my thoughts seem merely temporal, but the world of nature about me appears both temporal and spatial. It seems to fly in the face of common sense to deny the reality of either side of this polar opposition between mental and physical.

Mistaken metaphysical philosophies have been built on the findings of reflection, according to Hegel. Not only Descartes but also his rationalist contemporaries, Leibniz and Spinoza, tried to account for psycho-physical interaction. Hegel has some sympathy for Spinoza but thinks that in the last resort it is a mistake to try to state how mental and physical interact at all, because the question of how they interact is inappropriate. If we ask 'How do mental and physical interact?' then Hegel's answer is 'The question thus posed [i]s unanswerable' (*The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 33). Once we concede that mental and physical are really two different substances, it is impossible to explain their interaction, so the solution is to deny that they are really two substances: 'If soul and body are absolutely opposed to one another as is maintained by the abstractive intellectual consciousness, then there is no possibility of any community between them' (*The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 33.).

Part of dualism's mistake is to think of the mind as a kind of thing, not as a physical thing but as a peculiar kind of individual, a non-physical thing. Reflection gives rise to this idea of the mind because it belongs to that kind of thinking which Hegel calls '*Verstand*' or 'understanding'. The primary role of the understanding is to make intelligible to us the empirical world, the world of spatio-temporal objects we observe around us. When we try to use the concepts appropriate for that purpose for a quite different role—to think about thinking—we lose ourselves in incoherences. Concepts like 'thing' and 'indivisibility' or 'unity' mislead us into Cartesianism if we try to use them to make our mental lives intelligible to us. The argument Hegel deploys here is to be found in the writings of his German anti-metaphysical predecessor, Immanuel Kant.

Dialectic

Hegel also follows Kant in distinguishing *Verstand* from '*Vernunft*' or 'reason'. Where he parts company with Kant is in claiming that the use of reason can provide us with knowledge of the world as it really is in itself, not just as it appears to us through

observation or reflection. If reason has this power, then it follows that we may use it to discover the truth about the mental and the physical; so it is appropriate at this point to explain part of Hegel's conception of it. According to Hegel, reason divides into two parts, dialectic and speculation. Dialectic is the sort of thinking which exhibits philosophical problems as contradictions or apparent contradictions. For example, it is apparently contradictory to state that persons are completely free yet also wholly causally determined in what they do; it is also apparently contradictory to say that the world is both wholly mental and wholly physical. Yet philosophy contains many such opposed positions. For example, libertarians hold that we perform our actions by free will, but determinists say that our actions are caused and perhaps therefore inevitable and so not performed freely. Idealists hold that reality is really mental, materialists that it is really physical. Dialectic takes these oppositions seriously and tries to show that the oppositions in fact depend upon one another for their formulation—they define themselves in opposition to one another. In his book *The Science of Logic* Hegel describes the mutual dependences between the most general and fundamental concepts that he thinks we use to make sense of the world. The other part of reason, speculation, is used to transcend or overcome the oppositions by exhibiting the truth in both of the old positions in a new 'synthesis' or reconciliation.

Whether we think dialectic is a genuine or a spurious mode of problem solving, it is worth noting that the two concepts 'mental' and 'physical' often do seem to contain equally semantically opposed sub-concepts, at least within the Western intellectual tradition: private—public, subjective—objective, internal—external, temporal—spatial, one—many, free—determined, active—passive, I—other, sacred—profane, indivisible—divisible, and so on. It is also arguable that adopting a position in the philosophy of mind often partly consists in emphasizing one side of each pair or some of these opposites while playing down the importance of the other. In what follows, then, we should bear in mind that Hegel thinks he is employing a kind of reasoning which is peculiarly appropriate to philosophy. We should also perhaps bear in mind the question, whether his own version of idealism is itself 'one-sided' or succeeds as a genuine speculative synthesis.

A key statement in Hegel's criticism of dualism and his transition to idealism is this: 'The separation of the material and the immaterial can be explained only on the basis of the original unity of both' (*The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 33). This counts as a piece of dialectic, because it is the claim that two seemingly opposed elements have this status because they are in fact two aspects of one reality. This underlying reality will turn out to be spiritual for Hegel, but he does not conceive of himself as an idealist in the Berkeleyan sense because that would require his making merely one opposite depend on the other—the physical on the mental. Nor does he accept

materialism, because that would be just to make the mental depend on the physical. His own 'absolute idealism' is the view that mental and physical exist in a new synthesis called Spirit, which is the synthesis of all oppositions. This is what he means by the 'original unity' just quoted.

How does Hegel arrive at this conclusion? It will take the remainder of this chapter to explain that process, but first we should examine Hegel on conventional idealism and materialism.

Hegel has two main criticisms of these theories. First, they are undialectical or one-sided. This means that idealism is the attempt to minimize the significance of physical reality and reduce it to mind, and that materialism is the attempt to minimize the significance of mental reality and reduce it to matter. They are in fact mutually dependent philosophies because idealism is partially defined as the negation of materialism and vice versa. The second objection is that each is an answer to an inappropriate question. If we ask whether reality is really mental or physical Hegel says: 'It is just this form of the question which must be recognized as inadmissible' (*The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 33). So Hegel's answer to the mind—body problem as traditionally conceived is, roughly, 'Do not pose the question'. Why does he feel entitled to this answer?

Universal and Particular

Within the Cartesian framework we tend to think of the relation between mental and physical as that of particular to particular, and this misleads us into thinking we are dealing with the relationship between two substances. In fact the relation is universal to particular. To make sense of this, we need to understand what Hegel means by 'universal' and 'particular'. The problem of universals in philosophy may be formulated in several different ways, but some of them are as follows. What are examples, or instances, instances of? What do we mean by meaning when we speak of the meaning of some general term—a term which may be used to refer to more than one thing? What do all the things we call by the same name have in common? What entitles us to speak of kinds or sorts of things? So the problem of universals is a problem about what generality consists in, especially what the relationship is between the specific and the general or, as it is usually put, between the particular and the universal.

This bears on the mind—body problem because Hegel thinks the psycho-physical relation is universal to particular. In some sense the physical world is an exemplification of mind. He uses picturesque language to describe this relationship, sometimes he talks of nature as an expression of mind, or of mind pervading nature, or as embracing it. For example:

In truth the immaterial is not related to the material as particular to a particular but as the true universal which overarches and embraces particularity is related to the particular; the particular material thing in its isolation has no truth, no independence in face of the immaterial. (The Philosophy of Mind, p. 33)

Despite this, it is not as though the mental could exist without the physical. It is an important part of Hegel's views on politics, history, art and religion that mind cannot exist independently of its expression in these fields. Mentality is not distinct from its growing expression in human activities, and this is revealed in different kinds of political organization from the ancient Greek *polis* to the European societies which post-date the French Revolution of 1789. Again, religious practices, from those of the ancient Egyptians and Greeks to modern Christianity, and works of art from the first sculptures to modern music and painting are all stages in the historical manifestation of mind.

It follows that the psycho-physical relation is very close according to Hegel. Neither mind nor matter is an independent substance, because each depends on the other. Matter is the expression of mind. Here is his description of this relationship as it holds for a human being.

Under the head of human expression are included, for example, the upright figure in general, and the formation of the limbs, especially the hand, as the absolute instrument, of the mouth—laughter, weeping, etc., and the note of mentality diffused over the whole, which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. (*The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 147)

It is clear then that Hegel is not an idealist in Berkeley's sense. But still less is Hegel a materialist, despite the fact that the existence of mentality depends on its expression. His verdict on materialism is: 'The explanations given in materialistic writings of the various relationships and combinations which are supposed to produce a result such as thought, are unsatisfactory in the extreme' (*The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 34). Materialism does have the merit of being a monism. It is an attempt to repudiate Cartesian dualism but ironically it still operates within a fundamentally Cartesian framework. Materialists either simply deny the existence of one of Descartes' two substances—the mental one—or else they speak incoherently of causal relations between mental and physical by making mind causally dependent on matter.

If this is Hegel's philosophy of mind, why should we call him an idealist at all? Would it not be better to include him under the heading of neutral monism, as holding that mental and physical are two aspects of some underlying reality? The description

provided so far is consistent with Hegel being a neutral monist, but the rest of his system is not. Furthermore, Hegel himself says that he is an idealist, albeit a special sort of idealist, an 'absolute idealist'. We should take him at his word in this and try to decide next what exactly absolute idealism is. In this we shall take up the theme that mental and physical are united in an ultimate reality called 'Spirit', where Spirit is the unity of all dialectical oppositions, including universal and particular. To examine the grounds for this claim, we should turn to Hegel's other book concerned with the philosophy of mind, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

The Phenomenology of Spirit is a work of considerable intricacy, complexity and originality and, although it was the first sizeable book that Hegel wrote, it is regarded by many as his greatest philosophical achievement. A good way to approach its central theme is to try to make sense of its title. The word translated as 'Spirit' is 'Geist', which in ordinary German may have the sense of 'mind', 'intellect', 'intelligence', 'wit', 'imagination', 'genius', 'soul', 'morale', 'essence', 'ghost' and 'spectre', as well as 'spirit', and most of these translations seem appropriate at different points in the *Phenomenology*. Of these, 'Spirit' is to be preferred because it captures the implication of a divine character, which Hegel certainly intends *Geist* to possess; but this choice must be taken to preclude *Geist's* mental and intelligent character which is also essential to it. It would not do much harm to translate 'Geist' as 'consciousness', meaning 'consciousness in general', so long as we do not forget the connotation of divine intelligence.

The other problematic term in the title is 'phenomenology'. Phenomenology is the sort of philosophy which attempts to describe what is given to consciousness just as it presents itself. The aim is to make no prior commitment about the objective causes or nature of what appears to consciousness and in this way to provide our knowledge with foundations in experience, and thus not to rely on dubious preconceptions. In this the project of phenomenology is rather like that of Descartes' search for certainty in his first *Meditation*, examined in our first chapter. If phenomenology describes what appears to consciousnesses, and if *Geist* is consciousness, then a 'Phenomenology of Spirit' is a description of how consciousness appears to consciousness, or a description of how Spirit appears to Spirit. This is in fact exactly what Hegel attempts in the book.

In keeping with his practicing phenomenology, Hegel does not offer us any explanations, only descriptions. The *Phenomenology* is in fact a description of all the various stages or states of consciousness which Hegel thinks are possible. These range from the poorest and most rudimentary naïve awareness through the senses, called 'Sense-Certainty', to reality's complete knowledge of itself in so-called 'Absolute Knowing'. *Geist* is in fact the whole, or the totality of what exists as it really is, and Hegel's aim is to describe the various stages in *Geist's* growing

self-realization. It is clear that Hegel is a metaphysical philosopher, because he thinks it is possible to obtain knowledge of reality as a whole and of reality as it really is in itself, and these are two of the concerns traditionally held to be essential to metaphysics as a branch of philosophy. Hegel does not expect us to accept these rather grandiose claims at the start of his book, but he thinks we should be led to them as our concept of what consciousness is becomes progressively enriched. Before we examine the various stages of consciousness, an ambiguity needs to be dispelled. It is sometimes thought unclear whether Hegel is describing a chronological process or a kind of conceptual or logical structure. On the first view, one kind of consciousness is superseded in time by a new, more sophisticated version which retains its merits, and so on in a chronological progression. This reading gains support from Hegel's writings on history. In *The Philosophy of History* Hegel argues that different historical epochs are characterized by different mentalities, so that it makes sense to talk of an 'Oriental World', a 'Greek World', a 'Roman World' and 'German World', where 'world' means something like *Weltanschauung* or 'world view'. These epochs are manifestations of the 'World Spirit' (*Weltgeist*). On the other reading however, Hegel is describing conceptual or dialectical relationships between different sorts of consciousness irrespective of their expressions or temporal interrelations. Thus some kinds of consciousness are necessarily individualistic, others social, others religious, and so on, and these are arranged in a hierarchy in which some make others possible and some can be discerned as included within others. Although commentators read Hegel with different priorities in mind, I think it is best to regard the two interpretations as complementary. We can read the *Phenomenology* as describing the structures of consciousness in general, or in the abstract, and think of *The Philosophy of History* as what consciousness has amounted to in actuality. Clearly, that consciousness has a certain dialectical structure does not preclude its having a certain historical realization.

We may read the chapters of *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a sustained and increasingly satisfactory answer to the question: what is consciousness? A glance at the book's contents gives an outline of the broad sorts of consciousness Hegel thinks possible. These are: Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Reason, Spirit, Religion, and Absolute Knowing. Clearly it is impractical, in this short compass, to comment on all the subdivisions which have been philosophically influential.

The part of the book called 'Consciousness' divides into three, called 'Sense-Certainty', 'Perception' and 'Understanding' respectively. The first two are dialectically opposed or antithetical, and the third is the synthesis or reconciliation of the first two. Sense-Certainty is the bare sense experience of particular objects. Pre-philosophically it seems to us the richest and most certain kind of consciousness, but, according to Hegel, it is in fact the poorest and least sophisticated. Its limitations

are revealed as soon as we ask: what are the objects of consciousness in sense-certainty? or who is conscious in sense-certainty? Then it is apparent that immediate sense experience cannot be all that our consciousness consists in. It also involves the use of general concepts but, as soon as we admit this, sense-certainty has given way to the second state of consciousness: perception. Within the confines of sense-certainty each of us is merely presented with a bare this and a bare now. Although sense-certainty presupposes a distinction between an experiencer and an experienced or between subject and object, it cannot even make this distinction intelligible because it has no conceptual resources.

'Perception' allows the experience of the objects of perception, including oneself, as different sorts of things. This kind of consciousness includes the ability to make discriminations and generalization which require the use of language. Language is inherently universal or general in what it can express so 'Perception takes what is present to it as a universal' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 67). This applies equally to subject and object, so I can perceive myself to be a certain kind of being. As he puts it: ' "I" is a universal and the object is a universal' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 67). Within perception we use the universal or general concepts of language to make sense of the objects of perception, and so we are not confined to sensing them in their bare, given particularity. Perception involves both sensing and thinking.

But understanding the nature of the objects we perceive does not just consist in perceiving them according to different classifications. We try to explain them. The sort of consciousness called 'understanding' subsumes phenomena under natural laws and postulates forces and chemical elements in a 'supersensible realm'. Hegel means that we use the natural sciences to explain the perceptible partially by reference to the unperceptible. This scientific understanding is a synthesis of sense certainty and perception because it does justice to both particular and universal. Natural laws are absolutely universal because they are exceptionless and because they use general concepts yet subsume particulars under them. So he can say 'the absolute universal which has been purged of the antithesis between the universal and the individual... has become the object of the understanding' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 87).

Hegel's view of the natural sciences is that they are extremely useful in their proper role, making the empirical world intelligible—explaining the natural phenomena we perceive—but they are powerless to explain what consciousness is. Nor can they yield a metaphysical picture of reality as a whole which includes ourselves as perceiving subjects. Because science is empirical, 'the understanding in truth comes to know nothing else but appearance' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 102). But because appearance is always appearance to someone or other, the question arises: who? Or what am I? In this way understanding gives way to different sorts of self-consciousness. There is another, typically Hegelian aspect to the transition from

understanding to self-consciousness. It is his idealist view that the natural laws and postulates of natural sciences are ultimately best understood as intellectual constructs. They pertain to our understanding of the world not to reality as it really is in itself. For this reason he feels entitled to say 'the understanding experiences only itself' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 103). The conscious realization of this clearly requires an act of self-consciousness, so the next stage of the *Phenomenology* is to describe 'what consciousness knows in knowing itself' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 103).

Self--Consciousness

At first glance some of Hegel's characterizations of self-consciousness are rather paradoxical, but I think it is possible to make sense of them. For example, he says 'consciousness makes a distinction, but which at the same time is for consciousness not a distinction' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 104). What he means is that self-consciousness is consciousness' consciousness of consciousness—consciousness' consciousness of itself. It follows that in one sense consciousness is divided—between that which is conscious and what that consciousness is of. But in another sense that division must be artificial or not the whole truth, because in self-consciousness that which is conscious is what consciousness is of. This is what he means when he says of self-consciousness 'what it distinguishes from itself is only itself' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 105). Understood in this way, there is nothing illogical or contradictory about such a claim.

The first kind of consciousness Hegel describes under 'Self-Consciousness' is 'Self-Certainty', and this is not a fully fledged kind of self-consciousness. In self-certainty, consciousness is indeed conscious of consciousness, but it is not aware that that which is conscious is the same as what consciousness is of. There is a subject—object split in self-certainty but there is no realization of the identity of subject and object. That is one of the further steps required before we can properly speak of self-consciousness. It is Hegel's view that this transition to self-consciousness proper can be facilitated only by the encounter or meeting of two would-be self-consciousnesses. In other words, 'self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 110).

The social conditions for self-consciousness are described in the famous 'Master and Slave' chapter of the *Phenomenology* but before we examine that, one other concept needs to be mentioned; this is desire. Hegel attaches particular importance to desire in giving rise to self-consciousness. It is as though only a being capable of feeling desires can be capable of self-consciousness. I think the reason for this is that, in desiring some object in the world about us, we make a distinction

between ourselves and the object we desire. A kind of mismatch or asymmetry is set up between oneself as desiring but unfulfilled and the object which could fulfil that desire. In so far as desire is correctly described in this way, it seems reasonable to hold that it is an emotion which produces self-consciousness. It creates a self-not self distinction.

Master and Slave

However, it is only through social interaction that we become entitled to speak of self-consciousness proper. The 'Master and the Slave' chapter opens with the claim that self-consciousness can exist only if it is acknowledge as a self-consciousness. Being one partially consists in being recognized as one. Hegel says that many and varied meanings are contained in this claim, and I shall try to separate some of them out. First, we may ask, why should there not be a completely private self-consciousness? Why could there not be a self-conscious being who had had absolutely no contact with similar beings? An answer to this question may be found if we reflect on what our ordinary commonsensical self-consciousness consists in. Each of us is aware of ourselves as a human being, as a person, as a woman or as a man. But how are such thoughts about ourselves possible? Part of the answer seems to be because we have encountered other human beings, people, men or women. The concept of oneself is modeled on others. Our self-consciousness requires that I think of myself as a person, and this means one person among others, or as a human being and this means one human being among others. Hegel does not illustrate his rather abstract descriptions with these specific examples, but I think they illustrate part of his point. We can also read Hegel at a deeper level. Self-certainty established a self—not self distinction, but self-consciousness requires a self—other distinction. It must be possible to think of oneself as the same sort of being as another but also to think of oneself as a different one from the other. Additionally, modeling oneself on another further facilitates making a distinction between oneself and one's environment—I can think of myself as an autonomous individual like the others. I can think of myself as another.

To see why recognition is important, consider the converse possibility. Other self-consciousnesses do not recognize you as a self-consciousness. Or, to use my examples, other people do not recognize you as a person, other humans do not recognize you as human. It is not just that you would perhaps not count yourself as such, but that you would not be one. The concepts 'self-conscious', 'person' or 'human' would not apply to you, and that would amount to your not being those things. It is not as though you could invent such concepts for your own private use, you would simply not belong to the community of persons, human beings or

self-consciousnesses where those concepts have their meaning.

Self-consciousnesses need each other to count as such: 'they recognize as mutually recognizing each other' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 112). Thus, as self-consciousnesses we are inextricably bound up with one another for what we are. So although self-consciousness seems the most private and individual sort of consciousness, it is in fact necessarily public and social. As Hegel puts it: 'Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both' because what is to happen can only be brought about by both' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 112) and 'each is for the other what the other is for it' (*ibid.*, p. 113).

Our mutual recognition as self-consciousnesses takes the form of an antagonistic struggle, in which each tries to obtain recognition from the other. This is the 'Master and Slave' dialectic proper. On one level, each seeks the death of the other—as though that would prove its independence of the other for its own existence. Indeed, it is Hegel's view that full self-consciousness is possible only for a being which has risked its own life. What I think he means is that one fully appreciates one's own existence—one is brought up sharply, so to speak, with the very fact that one exists—only if that very existence has been threatened. He is not talking here about our habitual day-to-day self-consciousness but of a stark and immediate existential self-consciousness. But clearly, if one kills the other, the sought-for recognition is ironically frustrated. A lull in the conflict is established by the temporary victory of one self-consciousness—the master—in acquiring recognition from the other—the slave. But this provisional solution contains the seeds of its own destruction. The slave exists for the sake of the master and manufactures commodities for the master's enjoyment. But, ironically, the slave gains independence from the master by perceiving his own handiwork in the commodities. He perceives his own consciousness embodied or realized in the objects he has worked, and this gives him a new self-consciousness which the master lacks. Finally, the master realizes that a slave self-consciousness does not recognize him properly because it does not recognize him freely. To see what Hegel means here, compare the case in which a person may enter into a sexual relationship either freely or under duress. One partner (A) wants the other (B) to want him or her sexually but freely, that is, with the possibility (but not the actuality) of B not wanting A. In these two themes—labour and freedom—lie the slave's escape from servitude to the master.

Hegel is at pains to point out that each self-consciousness is both master and slave; it would be one-sided or undialectical to think otherwise. One question worth raising at this point is whether Hegel is really describing necessary structures of any self-consciousness or just engaging in some acute observations on social relations. We could no doubt substitute 'man' and 'woman', 'employer' and 'employee', 'teacher'

and 'pupil' for 'master' and 'slave' in Hegel's text and thereby obtain many insights into power and knowledge relations. But Hegel intends the chapter to be part of a necessary exposition of what consciousness is, a contribution to the phenomenology of mind. Perhaps the fundamental question in the philosophy of mind here is: is a self-conscious mind necessarily social? If so, must it exhibit the social properties Hegel ascribes to it?

Absolute Idealism

The stage of the *Phenomenology* which follows Self-consciousness is Reason, and this is a dialectical synthesis of consciousness and self-consciousness. It is facilitated by the 'Unhappy Consciousness', which is a kind of self-conscious mind which is divided against itself. The master and slave struggle is here enacted within one mind rather than two, and this mind is unhappy because it is divided between what it is and what it would like to be. This sort of consciousness is prevalent in any community which conceives of God as a transcendent being, rather than one omnipresent in the world humans know. Reason is the realization that the dualisms between the ideal and the actual self and between a transcendent God and the empirical world are in fact illusory, and that consciousness is itself what is most fully real. As Hegel puts it: 'Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 140). Clearly this is a kind of idealism, but a kind of pantheistic, metaphysical idealism where, in the last resort, the individual finite minds of human persons will be seen to be points of view or perspectives of one universal divine mind called 'spirit': 'Spirit is – this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 110).

The truth is expressed imperfectly in the forms of consciousness called 'Spirit' and 'religion'. Under 'Spirit', Hegel charts the expression of spirit in the different ethical and legal institutions which have existed historically. In religion, people come close to a true understanding of the nature of reality—so spirit comes to a close understanding of itself—but this understanding is still metaphorical and not wholly rational. This is because the great world religions rely upon images and analogies in their language. It is the role of philosophy—Hegelian philosophy—to express the real truth of religion in apposite, rational language. For example, Hegel has a dialectical interpretation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The father is the transcendent God of traditional Christianity. The son is nature, the material world which is God's creation. But the Holy Ghost is the synthesis of the two: God as both immanent and transcendent; God as the whole or *Geist*.

The culmination of the *Phenomenology* is Absolute Knowing. Here 'Spirit... knows itself as spirit' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 493). Spirit is reality as a

whole as it really is in itself, and in Absolute Knowing there is a 'unity of thought and being' (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 488). Hegel means by this that there is ultimately no difference between reality's knowing what it is and its being what it is; and it is in this that his idealism consists. Reality is self-consciousness, so, in so far as it comes to know what it is, it becomes what it really is. Consciousness and what exists are, when fully understood, understood to be absolutely identical.

What are we to make of this absolute idealism? Many thinkers regard it as the most abominable nonsense, others as a work of outstanding genius. Some have seen in it the merit of an intellectual framework within which to make sense of many puzzling problems. Others see this as no merit at all: by appearing to explain everything, Hegel explains nothing. That Hegel provokes such sharp disagreements is perhaps a sign that his work does contain genuine philosophical contention and that he should be taken seriously as a thinker, even if one would not wish to endorse his system. His importance for the philosophy of mind is that he takes our thinking outside the narrow confines of the psychology of the solitary individual and explores the social, religious and universal aspects of consciousness. He is also a philosopher who tries to provide a sustained if sometimes obscure answer to the question: what is consciousness? and this cannot safely be ignored by any serious theorist in the philosophy of mind.

PART III
PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

-Editor

Theology or religion is an important area of philosophical study, particularly for the studying of Western philosophy. We Chinese students are usually not familiar with the issues of this area, and we sometimes hold prejudices or misunderstanding about issues of religion. Accordingly, we need to be aware that religion is not only beliefs that some mysterious being exist, in fact, it is a complex net work of beliefs concerning morality, human life, social culture, the nature of individual and the ultimate explanation of almost everything. The same as philosophy, religion also intends to form a sort of world-view that could provide a coherent, meaningful, entire feature of the world, the universe. In European nations, there occurs thousand years of history of religion-dominated social culture and social system. No understanding of the feature of Christian, then, there is no understanding of European culture and the social systems. Our aim is not encourage students to be involved into the religious affairs, but to develop their critical thinking in understanding issues of every field of human culture.

There are many types of religion in different nations, different countries of our world, but what we will care is primary the issues of Judaic-Christian religious tradition. Not only because this religion now covers most districts of world, popularly accepted by large proportion of Western people, but also because it is really most comprehensive one and intelligent one among the all. Recent investigation shows that over 90% of American people claim to believe in God, evidently, some of the believers are only rhetoric, some people simply express mechanically the prevailing ideas of their community, but surely there are great deal of them holding the beliefs based on sufficient deliberation. Opposed to the theism, there also eagerly agnosticism or atheism that denies the plausibility of religious beliefs. It addresses numerous questions to theism by huge amount of theoretical works. The cross-examinations between theism and atheism pervade thousands years of human culture and history, and it makes up one of the most attracting feature of the history of Western philosophy.

Our study of philosophical theology will concentrate on some fundamental issues of theology, and the most important one is the problem of whether the God, the divine being really exist. Facing to the theoretical negation of the existence of the God, there occur some writers who engage in defending the honor of God. What we select as the first thesis for defending the God is called as *ontological* argument provided by St. Anselm who is considered as the first figure to make religious beliefs philosophized. It is called as ontological because the Greek word *on* means "being," and this argument aims to demonstrate the being of God. When we read the

article literally, we could not grasp the lines of Anselm's reasoning immediately. Only if you hold enough disciplined training, then you could understand the implication of Anselm's. In Anselm's arguments, there is a implied premise, the premise of the identity between the reality and human cognition. His idea is that only if there is the reality of something, then there could be the idea of something, and vice versa, when there is the idea of anything, there must be the reality of that thing. If you deny the reality of God while you hold the idea of God, then you undermine your premise of the identity. In case that you deny the identity between reality and ideas, then you would deny the legitimacy of all your ideas. When you say that there is no God, you are merely saying something that you can not possibly think. If we substitute Anselm's term "a being than which none greater can be thought" by a simpler word, such as "omnipotent being," then, it is easier to grasp the thinking line of Anselm's.

Another famous defense of the existence of God is provided by Thomas Aquina called as cosmological argument. He argues that human being is imperfect and limited being, and is not able to know the essence of the perfect and unlimited being directly. But we can know it by indirect inference. So, he provides us five lines of inference that is philosophically called as "*five way*" arguments to defend the existence of God. These five ways are all clues of the finding effect of God's function. He tells us that in order to understand the motions, the causalities, the contingencies, the gradual evaluations and the orderly designed in nature, we have to infer out the existence of God. Aquina's arguments are very like the ones that Aristotle once talked, but is more systematic and more comprehensive than that of Aristotle's.

Once the existence of God is admitted, there must be another issue immediately followed: what is the nature of God, what is the relationship between God and human being? In answering this question, also are there many paradoxes. The necessary assumptions are that: the nature of God must be good; the power of God must be infinite; the evil and misery of human life exist. But these three assumptions are apparently contradicted. Through the middle assumption, God is almighty, the first assumption, God is good, we are supposed to believe God making human life happy and virtuous. But the third assumption and the reality of human life is not so. To solve this paradox, it almost exhausts the energy of Christian thinkers. One of our selected articles from *Leibniz answering Gottfried Wilhelm* aims to resolve the above question. It claims that reason, freedom, goodness, almighty and perfection make the nature of God. But we human being are not able to understand by what way God realize it's nature. There is very possible a very beautiful picture how God realizes its nature. God possibly makes misery and evil of human life temporary and occasional, then it laughs and blames on human being.

When God applies its power, applies his good and reason, everything will make progress including human morality and human life. Accordingly, human misery and moral evil are only the media through which God embodies his omnipotence and good. Finally, human world will also be perfectly good and happy.

Leibniz makes only one try, there are also many other tries to resolve the problem of evil of theology. The twenty-century philosopher J. L. Mackie generalizes all of the approaches of theists' answering the question, and refutes them respectively. In the last article of this part, we could see that Mackie exposes, all theories of theists are based on irrationality. In theist's solutions of the problem of evil, there are logical flaws and self-defeated propositions every where. The nature of God-goodness and omnipotence are not compatible with the reality of human evil. Particularly, the most elaborate thesis-human free will makes evil and God is not responsible for human evil, is directly opposed to the necessary assumption that God is omnipotent.

In reading these articles we selected, we expect our students catch a rough feature of major theological issues and the dialectical debates of them. It will enforce, but not weaken our philosophical atheism.

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD -St. Anselm

(PPD Reprinted from *A Scholastic Miscellany*, edited and translated by Eugene R. Fairweather Volume X, The Library of Christian Classics. First published MCMLV by SCM Press, Ltd., London, and the Westminster Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.)

Direction of studying Anselm's article:

- 1) Background of the author and his viewpoint: St. Anselm (1033-1103) was Archbishop of Canterbury, no problem, an intelligent theist. He is often called as the father of Scholasticism and is known primarily for his ontological argument. He characterized his position as "faith seeking understanding." In other word, he believed first, then to seek demonstrations later. Anselm attempted to prove the existence of God by reflecting the concept of God. Anselm argued that the concept of God is that of "The greatest being that can be thought of." If you think of something having all the attributes of God, such as omnipotence, omniscience, etc., but you can also imagine that this thing does not exist, then you are not thinking of God. For surely a being which is thought of as existing is greater than one which is thought of as not existing. Anselm claimed that it is impossible even to frame an idea of a nonexistent God, so it is impossible to doubt the existence of God. A monk by the name of Gaunilo wrote a reply to Anselm, he claimed that if we used Anselm's method to demonstrate the existence of a perfect island that is only an illusion, then we are surely to go wrong conclusion. The last part of this article is Anselm's response to Gaunilo.
- 2) Strategy: Anselm's arguments seem literally circulated to demonstrate the existence of the God. But there is an epistemological line used to support his arguments, that is the identity principle. This principle entails that for people's idea, particularly the greatest idea, there must be reality existing to be original, or else, you would deny the legitimacy of all human ideas.
- 3) Disciplined terms:
Faith, belief, ontology, reality, contradiction, fool.
- 4) Propositions:
 1. I published a brief book, as an example of meditation on the ground of faith
 2. For something that can be thought of as existing, which can not be thought of as not existing, and this greater than that which can be thought of as not existing.
- 5) Study questions:
 1. Supposing that someone claims "I can imagine a universe which does not contain God." Does Anselm believe this is possible? Do you? What are your reasons?
 2. "Anselm has merely proven that when we define the word 'God,' we must include existence in the definition. But this is just 'definitional' existence, not 'real' existence. How do you think Anselm would reply to this?

3. Could there be an ontological argument for the “devil”?
 4. Can you prove that something *does not* exist just by looking at its definition?
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PREFACE

Some time ago, at the urgent request of some of my brethren, I published a brief work,[1] as an example of meditation on the grounds of faith. I wrote it in the role of one who seeks, by silent reasoning with himself, to learn what he does not know. But when I reflected on this little book, and saw that it was put together as a long chain of arguments, I began to ask myself whether *one* argument might possibly be found, resting on no other argument for its proof, but sufficient in itself to prove that God truly exists and that he is the supreme good, needing nothing outside himself, but needful for the being and well-being of all things. I often turned my earnest attention to this problem, and at times I believed that I could put my finger on what I was looking for, but at other times it completely escaped my mind’s eye, until finally, in despair, I decided to give up searching for something that seemed impossible to find. But when I tried to put the whole question out of my mind, so as to avoid crowding out other matters, with which I might make some progress, by this useless preoccupation, then, despite my unwillingness and resistance, it began to force itself on me more persistently than ever. Then, one day, when I was worn out by my vigorous resistance to the obsession, the solution I had ceased to hope for presented itself to me, in the very turmoil of my thoughts, so that I enthusiastically embraced the idea which, in my disquiet, I had spurned.

I thought that the proof I was so glad to find would please some readers if it were written down. Consequently, I have written the little work that follows, dealing with this and one or two other matters, in the role of one who strives to raise his mind to the contemplation of God and seeks to understand what he believes. Neither this essay nor the other one I have already mentioned really seemed to me to deserve to be called a book or to bear an author’s name; at the same time, I felt that they could not be published without some title that might encourage anyone into whose hands they fell to read them, and so I gave each of them a title. The first I called *An Example of Meditation on the Grounds of Faith*, and the second *Faith Seeking Understanding*.

But when both of them had been copied under these titles by a number of people, I was urged by many people—and especially by Hugh, the reverend archbishop of Lyons, apostolic legate in Gaul, who ordered this with apostolic authority—to attach my name to them. In order to do this more fittingly, I have named the first *Monologion* (or *Soliloquy*)

and the second *Proslogion* (or *Address*).

GOD TRULY IS

And so, O Lord, since thou givest understanding to faith, give me to understand—as far as thou knowest it to be good for me—that thou dost exist, as we believe, and that thou art what we believe thee to be. Now we believe that thou art a being than which none greater can be thought. Or can it be that there is no such being, since “the fool hath said in his heart, ‘There is no God’”? But when this same fool hears what I am saying—“A being than which none greater can be thought”—he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it exists. For it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another thing to understand that it exists. When a painter considers beforehand what he is going to paint, he has it in his understanding, but he does not suppose that what he has not yet painted already exists. But when he has painted it, he both has it in his understanding and understands that what he has now produced exists. Even the fool, then, must be convinced that a being than which none greater can be thought exists at least in his understanding, since when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding. But clearly that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the understanding alone. For if it is actually in the understanding alone, it can be thought of as existing also in reality, and this is greater. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding alone, this same thing than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But obviously this is impossible. Without doubt, therefore, there exists, both in the understanding and in reality, something than which a greater cannot be thought.

GOD CANNOT BE THOUGHT OF AS NONEXISTENT

And certainly it exists so truly that it cannot be thought of as nonexistent. For something can be thought of as existing, which cannot be thought of as not existing, and this is greater than that which *can* be thought of as not existing. Thus, if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought of as not existing, this very thing than which a greater cannot be thought is *not* that than which a greater cannot be thought. But this is contradictory. So, then, there truly is a being than which a greater cannot be thought—so truly that it cannot even be thought of as not existing.

And *thou* art this being, O Lord our God. Thou so truly art, then, O Lord my God, that thou canst not even be thought of as not existing. And this is right. For if some mind could think of something better than thou, the creature would rise above

the Creator and judge its Creator; but this is altogether absurd. And indeed, whatever is, except thyself alone, can be thought of as not existing. Thou alone, therefore, of all beings, hast being in the truest and highest sense, since no other being so truly exists, and thus every other being has less being. Why, then, has “the fool said in his heart, ‘There is no God,’” when it is so obvious to the rational mind that, of all beings, thou dost exist supremely? Why indeed, unless it is that he is a stupid fool.

HOW THE FOOL HAS SAID IN HIS HEART WHAT CANNOT BE THOUGHT

But how did he manage to say in his heart what he could not think? Or how is it that he was unable to think what he said in his heart? After all, to say in one’s heart and to think are the same thing. Now if it is true—or, rather, since it is true—that he thought it, because he said it in his heart, but did not say it in his heart, since he could not think it, it is clear that something can be said in one’s heart or thought in more than one way. For we think of a thing, in one sense, when we think of the word that signifies it, and in another sense, when we understand the very thing itself. Thus, in the first sense God can be thought of as nonexistent, but in the second sense this is quite impossible. For no one who understands what God is can think that God does not exist, even though he says these words in his heart—perhaps without any meaning, perhaps with some quite extraneous meaning. For God is that than which a greater cannot be thought, and whoever understands this rightly must understand that he exists in such a way that he cannot be nonexistent even in thought. He, therefore, who understands that God thus exists cannot think of him as nonexistent.

Thanks be to thee, good Lord, thanks be to thee, because I now understand by thy light what I formerly believed by thy gift, so that even if I were to refuse to believe in thy existence, I could not fail to understand its truth.

AN EXCERPT FROM THE AUTHOR’S REPLY TO THE CRITICISMS OF GAUNILO

But, you say, suppose that someone imagined an island in the ocean, surpassing all lands in its fertility. Because of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of finding something that does not exist, it might well be called “Lost Island.” By reasoning like yours, he might then say that we cannot doubt that it truly exists in reality, because anyone can easily conceive it from a verbal description.[2] I state confidently that if anyone discovers something for me, other than that “than which is greater cannot be thought,” existing either in reality or in thought alone, to which the logic of my argument can be applied, I shall find his lost island and give it to him,

never to be lost again. But it now seems obvious that this being than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought of as nonexistent, because it exists by such a sure reason of truth. For otherwise it would not exist at all. In short, if anyone says that he thinks it does not exist, I say that when he thinks this, he either thinks of something than which a greater cannot be thought or he does not think. If he does not think, he does not think of what he is not thinking of as nonexistent. But if he does think, then he thinks of something which cannot be thought of as nonexistent. For if it could be thought of as nonexistent, it could be thought of as having a beginning and an end. But this is impossible. Therefore, if anyone thinks of it, he thinks of something that cannot even be thought of as nonexistent. But he who thinks of this does not think that it does not exist; if he did, he would think what cannot be thought. Therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought of as nonexistent.

You say, moreover, that when it is said that the highest reality cannot be *thought of* as nonexistent, it would perhaps be better to say that it cannot be *understood* as nonexistent, or even as possibly nonexistent. [3] But it is more correct to say, as I said, that it cannot be thought. For if I had said that the reality itself cannot be understood not to exist, perhaps you yourself, who say that according to the very definition of the term what is false cannot be understood, [4] would object that nothing that is can be understood as nonexistent. For it is false to say that what exists does not exist. Therefore it would not be peculiar to God to be unable to be understood as nonexistent. [5] But if some one of the things that most certainly are can be understood as nonexistent, other certain things can similarly be understood as nonexistent. But this objection cannot be applied to "thinking," if it is rightly considered. For although none of the things that exist can be understood not to exist, still they can all be thought of as nonexistent, except that which most fully is. For all those things—and only those—which have a beginning or end or are composed of parts can be thought of as nonexistent, along with anything that does not exist as a whole anywhere or at any time (as I have already said). [6] But the only being that cannot be thought of as nonexistent is that in which no thought finds beginning or end or composition of parts, but which any thought finds as a whole, always and everywhere.

You must realize, then, that you can think of yourself as nonexistent, even while you know most certainly that you exist. I am surprised that you said you did not know this. [7] For we think of many things as nonexistent when we know that they exist, and of many things as existent when we know that they do not exist—all this not by a real judgment, but by imagining that what we think is so. And indeed, we can think of something as nonexistent, even while we know that it exists, because we are able at the same time to think the one and know the other. And yet

we cannot think of it as nonexistent, while we know that it exists, because we cannot think of something as at once existent and nonexistent. Therefore, if anyone distinguishes these two senses of the statement in this way, he will understand that nothing, as long as it is known to exist, can be thought of as nonexistent, and that whatever exists, except that than which a greater cannot be thought, can be thought of as nonexistent, even when it is known to exist. So, then, it is peculiar to God to be unable to be thought of as nonexistent, and nevertheless many things, as long as they exist, cannot be thought of as nonexistent. I think that the way in which it can still be said that God is thought of as nonexistent is stated adequately in the little book itself. [8]

Note:

1. The *Monologion*, probably Anselm's first work, was written at Bec in the second half of 1076 (cf. Landgraf, *Einführung*, 53). Text in Schmitt, I, 7-87. (Translator's note.)
2. Cf. Gaunilo, *Pro insipiente*, 6 (Schmitt, I, 128).
3. *Ibid.*, 7(I, 129). 4. *Ibid.* 5. *Ibid.*
6. *Responsio*, 1 (I, 131 f.).
7. Gaunilo, *loc. cit.*
8. Cf. *Proslogion*, Chapter IV. (See p. 9 above.)

THE FIVE WAYS

-St. Thomas Aquinas

(PPD From Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Part 1, Question 2, Article 3, pp. 22-23, in Anton C. Pegis, Editor, *The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Reprinted by permission of Richard J. Pegis.)

Direction of studying Aquinas' article:

- 1) Background of the author and his viewpoint: St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274) was one of the greatest theists and also the greatest philosophers of all the time. He inputted Aristotle's rational thinking of ancient Greek culture to the medieval times religious culture, his comprehensive philosophical considerations prepared the occurrence of the rationality of modern philosophy, and his works amounts to hundreds of volumes. Aquinas's "Five Ways" are among the most important and controversial of the arguments for God's existence. Each of the arguments is designed to show that the existence of God is required for us to explain certain features of the world. And it is usually called as the cosmological arguments of demonstrating the existence of God.

Some of Aquinas's arguments are difficult to understand because they were written within a special philosophical framework. When Aquinas talks about a "cause," for example, there are two ways of interpreting what he means. The most common interpretation is that a cause brings about the existence of something else, but it is not required to maintain that thing in existence. The second sense of "cause," and the one that concerns Aquinas, is quite different. In this sense, the continued existence of the cause is necessary for the continued existence of the effect. In his second argument, then, Aquinas is asking whether there can be an infinite series of such causes. If there cannot be such a series, he has shown that there is a *presently existing* first cause.

- 2) Strategy of Aquinas' arguments: The existence of God can be inferred out by five ways, from the motion of things; from the causality; from the contingency; from the changing and the order designed of the world. All of these inferences are based on causal deduction of logic. So, it also could be called as causal argument of demonstration.
- 3) Disciplined terms:
Cause, motion, possibility, necessity, graduation, maximum, governance.
- 4) Study questions:
 1. Suppose Aquinas's "Five Ways" are all sound arguments. Are they sufficient to prove that God exists?
 2. In his first proof, Aquinas uses the analogy of the hand pushing the stick to show that change must come from something that is not itself changed. Do you think that this is a fair analogy?
 3. In his second proof, Aquinas claims that an infinite series of causes cannot exist.
Apparently he thinks that if you believe there is such a series of causes, you cannot believe

that the world exists right now. What are the crucial assumptions in his argument? Do you see any unstated assumptions?

4. "If everything has a cause, then God must have a cause. The First Cause Argument is just that easy to refute." What do you think?
 5. Aquinas's third proof is based on a distinction between two alleged types of beings—*contingent* and *necessary*. What do these terms mean? Do you agree with Aquinas that there must be a necessary being, for if all beings were contingent, there would be nothing in existence now or ever? Explain.
-

The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is moved is moved by another, for nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is moved; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is moved must be moved by another. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, be God.

The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of

which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to be corrupted, and consequently, it is possible for them to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which can not-be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything can not-be, then at one time there was nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist begins to exist only through something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but admit the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But *more* and *less* are predicated of different things according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, something which is most being, for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in *Metaph.* II. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus, as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all hot things, as is said in the same book. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

ON THE ULTIMATE ORIGINATION OF THE UNIVERSE

-Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz

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Direction of studying Leibniz' article:

- 1) Background of the author and his viewpoint: Leibniz (1646-1716) Leibniz lived in the times when the science was going up and religion was going down. His works and his ideas were mixed of the twinkle of scientific reasoning and the background of religious culture. Anyhow, he kept being a pious theist, and tried his best to reconcile the conflicts between religion and rationality. The following article of Leibniz aims to resolve the problem of evil that is one of the most controversial issues of theology, as well as another issue-the relation between God and human being.
- 2) Strategy of Leibniz: In this article, we could see that while Leibniz uses the logical deduction to demonstrate his view, he also uses the method of analogy and imagination to support his theoretical assumption. Before he enters the topic of morality, he talks a lot about physics and mathematics, as well as stories of other scientific fields, so that to make his view on the problem of evil sounds more plausible.
- 3) Arguments used by Leibniz: In the beginning part of the article, there is a "two worlds and their essence" argument. It shows us that the divine being world of God is fulfilled of reason and freedom, called as sufficient reason, while the secular being world-our finite being world is dominated, created and inclined by the divine. Then there is a "Two kinds of necessity" argument. It proposes that different from the causal determination of the finite things that is a sort of "physical or hypothesis necessity," the divine being rule secular world with a sort of metaphysical necessity, that is beyond human understanding. To illustrate the metaphysical determination or necessity, Leibniz provides us a subtle version to reconcile the gracious and almighty God with the misery, evil of human world. At last, there is the "perfection of God's works and progress of human morality" argument. Leibniz claims that God would care everything and every person, to make them perfect and happy. But the "law of pleasure" requires taking bitter first, and then taking the sweet and enjoying it. Evil is only "one step back," and it is preparation for jumping forward. In general, evil is temporary and will be overcome, yet it is necessary for God to show his sufficient reason of works.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
Sufficient reason, physical necessity, hypothetical necessity, metaphysical necessity, maxima, minima, disorder, harmony, virtue.
- 5) Propositions:

1. Neither in any single thing, nor in the total aggregate and series of things, can the sufficient reason be discovered.

2. In general, it may be affirmed that affections are temporary evils leading to good effects.

6) Study questions:

1. Leibniz claims that there is a sort of metaphysical necessity that works in the divine world, what does he intend to show with this thesis?

2. According to Leibniz, what is the nature of the "sufficient reason, " and how does the sufficient reason work?

3. How do you think of Leibniz' "temporary evil leading to good effects" version? Is there any point to be posited in this version?

4. In your opinion, what are the major problems in Leibniz' explanation of evil ?

November 23, 1697

Besides the World, that is, besides the aggregate of finite things, there is some dominant unit, not only as my soul is in myself, or rather as my ego itself is in my body, but manifesting a much higher reason. For the one being which dominates the universe not only rules the world, it also makes or creates it. It is superior to the world and, so to speak, beyond the world, and is therefore the ultimate reason of things. Neither in any single thing, nor in the total aggregate and series of things, can the sufficient reason for their existence be discovered. Let us suppose a book entitled *The Elements of Geometry* to have existed eternally, one edition having always been copied from the preceding: it is evident then that, although you can account for the present copy by a reference to the past copy which it reproduces, yet, however far back you go in this series of reproductions, you can never arrive at a complete examination since you always will have to ask why at all times these books have existed, that is, why there have been any books at all and why this book in particular. What is true concerning these books is equally true concerning the diverse states of the world, for here too the following state is in some way a copy of the preceding one (although changed according to certain laws). However far you turn back to antecedent states, you will never discover in any or all of these states the full reason why there is a world rather than nothing, nor why it is such as it is.

You may well suppose the world to be eternal; yet what you thus posit is nothing but the succession of its states, and you will not find the sufficient reason in any one of them, nor will you get any nearer to accounting rationally for the world by taking any number of them together: the reason must therefore be sought elsewhere. Things eternal may have no cause of existence, yet a reason for their existence must be conceived. Such a reason is, for immutable things, their very

necessity or essence; while in the series of changing things, even though this series itself may be supposed a priori to be eternal, [2] this reason would consist in the very prevailing of inclinations, as will become clear soon. For in this case reasons do not necessitate (that is, operate with absolute or metaphysical necessity, so that the contrary would imply contradiction), but only incline. Hence it is evident that even by supposing the world to be eternal, the recourse to an ultimate cause of the universe beyond this world, that is, to God, cannot be avoided.

The reasons for the world are therefore concealed in some entity outside the world, which is different from the chain or series of things, the aggregate of which constitutes the world. Thus we must pass from the physical or hypothetical necessity, which determines the later states of the world by the earlier, to something endowed with absolute or metaphysical necessity, for which no reason can be given. For the actually existing world is necessary only physically or hypothetically, but not absolutely or metaphysically. Suppose the world to be indeed in a determinate state now; then other determinate states will be necessarily engendered by it. Since therefore the ultimate root of the world must be in something which exists of metaphysical necessity, and since furthermore the reason for any existent can be only another existence, it follows that a unique entity must exist of metaphysical necessity, that is, that there is a being whose essence implies existence. Hence there exists a being which is different from the plurality of beings, that is, from the world; for it has been granted and proved that the world does not exist of metaphysical necessity.

But let us explain somewhat more distinctly how, from the eternal or essential—that is, metaphysical—truths, the temporal or contingent—that is, physical—truths are derived. First we must recognize this: from the fact that something rather than nothing exists, it follows that in possible things, or in their possibility or essence itself, there is a certain demand or (so to speak) a claim for existence; in short, that essence tends by itself toward existence. From this it follows, furthermore, that everything possible, that is, all that expresses a possible essence or reality, tends with equal right toward existence, the degree of this tendency being proportionate to the quantity of essence or reality, that is, to the degree of perfection of the possible involved. Perfection, indeed, is nothing else but the quantity of essence.

From this it must be concluded that, out of the infinite number of combinations and series of possibilities, one exists through which a maximum of essence of possibilities is produced into existence. For in all things there is a principle of determination which must be drawn from the consideration of maxima or minima, namely, that the maximum effect must be attained with a minimum of expenditure. In this respect, time and space—in short, the receptivity or capacity of

the world—may be regarded as the expenditure or the area allotted for the erection of the most advantageous construction; while the variety of forms in the world represents the comfort of the building and the multitude and beauty of its rooms. The problem is analogous to that arising in certain games, in which all the squares of a board have to be filled according to given rules: if you do not use a certain skill, you eventually will find yourself excluded from certain squares and forced to leave more spaces empty than you could and should have. There is, however, a method by which a maximum number of squares can be filled with ease and certainty. [3] Or suppose, for instance, that it is decreed that a triangle be constructed, without any further determining condition being added: consequently, an equilateral triangle will be produced. [4] Or suppose that from one given point a second point has to be reached, without any further condition to determine the path: the easiest or the shortest way will be taken. So also, once it be established that being prevails over nonbeing, that is, that there is a reason why there exists something rather than nothing, or (which comes to the same) that mere possibility has to pass into actuality—this established, without any further determinations being offered; it follows that the maximum compatible with the capacity of time and place (that is, with the order of possible existence) does exist. The procedure is the same as in the game mentioned a while ago, where the greatest possible number of pieces have to be placed in a given area.

It will become admirably clear from this how, in the very origination of the universe, a sort of Divine Mathematics or a Metaphysical Mechanism is used, and how determination through the idea of a maximum takes place. Examples of this kind of determination occur in geometry where the right angle is the most determinate among all others;[5] or in physics, when one liquid put into another heterogeneous one takes the shape of the maximum volume, namely of the sphere; or in ordinary mechanics itself, when the action of several competing heavy bodies tending downward eventually results in the motion producing the maximum descent.[6] For just as all possibilities tend toward existence with the same right, but in proportion to their reality, so all weights tend toward falling downward with the same right, but in proportion to their gravity. And just as, in the case of the weights, that motion results which produces the greatest possible descent of weight, so also, in the case of the possible, that world emerges through which the maximum of possibilities is produced into actuality.

Thus, we have already derived physical from metaphysical necessity: for thought the world is not necessary, metaphysically speaking, so that the contrary would imply contradiction or logical absurdity, yet it is physically necessary, or determined in such a manner that the contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity. And just as possibility is the principle of essence, so perfection or degree

of essence (through which the greatest number is made impossible) is the principle of existence. At the same time, this makes it evident that freedom must be attributed to the Author of the World, though he does every thing in a manner which is determined: he acts according to the principle of wisdom, that is, perfection. Indifference, indeed, originates in ignorance, and the wiser anyone is, the more he is determined to choose the most perfect.

This comparison of some determinant metaphysical mechanism with the physical mechanism of heavy bodies—thus you may object—may appear ingenious. Yet it is inadequate in that the downward-tending heavy bodies really exist, while the possibles or essences are imaginary or fictitious before, or independently of, existence; therefore no reason for existence can be drawn from them. To this I answer that neither those essences nor the so-called eternal truths about them are fictitious, but that they do exist, so to speak, in some region of ideas, namely in God himself, who is the source of all essences and of the existence of all that exists outside himself. This is not to be considered a groundless affirmation: it is confirmed by the actual existence of the series of states of the world. For it has been proved above that the reason for existence cannot be found in this series, but has to be looked for in metaphysical necessities or eternal truths; it has also been pointed out that existence can derive only from existence: hence the eternal truths must have existence in some absolutely, that is, metaphysically, necessary subject, namely in God by whom the possibilities which otherwise would be imaginary are realized (if I may use a barbaric but significant expression).[7]

We observe, indeed, that everything that happens in the world follows the laws of the eternal truths, which belong not only to geometry, but equally to metaphysics. This means that whatever happens does so not only according to material necessities, but also according to formal reasons. This is true not only in general, when it is a question of explaining, as we have just done, why a world exists rather than no world, and why it is as it is and not different—a reason which certainly must be drawn from the tendency of all possibilities toward actuality; it is equally true when we now step down to special cases. We shall then understand that everywhere in nature the metaphysical laws of cause, potency, and action apply in an admirable way and that they even prevail over the very laws of pure geometry which determine material processes. This I understood with great admiration when I tried to account for the laws of movement. Finally I was forced by this discovery to abandon the law of the geometrical composition of forces, which I had myself defended in my youth, when I thought more materialistically. But this I have explained in greater detail elsewhere.[8]

Thus we have found the ultimate reason for the reality of the essences as well as of the existences in a unique being, which is necessarily and incontestably greater

than, superior to, and anterior to, the world, since to Him not only all existing things comprehended in the world but also the possibilities owe their reality. This reality can emanate only from a single source, in view of the interconnection of all these possibilities and existences. It is evident that the existing things continually emanate from this source, that they are being and have been produced by it, since there is no reason why any one state of the world rather than another, why yesterday's rather than today's, should flow from it. It becomes clear also how God acts according to laws of physics, yet freely; how he can be not only the efficient but also the final cause of the world; and how he not only manifests his greatness or power in the machine of the cause of the world; and how he not only manifests his greatness or power in the machine of the universe which is already working, but manifests also his goodness and wisdom in its construction.

Some might believe that I am here confounding moral perfection, that is, goodness, with metaphysical perfection, that is, greatness, and might concede the latter but deny the former. To avoid such a misinterpretation, the consequences of what has been proved must be kept in mind. Namely, not only that the world is physically or (if you prefer) metaphysically perfect—that is, that the series of things which has been produced offers the greatest possible sum total of actual reality—but that this world is also morally the most perfect, because moral perfection is indeed the natural perfection of minds. Hence the world is not only the most admirable machine, but in so far as it consists of minds, it is also the best Republic, that in which the minds are granted the greatest possible happiness and joy; for in this consists their natural perfection.

But experience in this world, you may object, shows us the contrary. For the best people often have the worst lives; innocents—not only beasts but also men—are cruelly afflicted with evils and even put to death; and finally, the world, particularly if we consider the government of the human race, looks like a confused chaos rather than like the well-ordered work of supreme wisdom. That *prima facie* this may be the impression you gain, I do not deny. But on closer inspection, the contrary must be stated. It is certain a priori, by the very reasons we have adduced, that all things, and especially minds, obtain the greatest possible perfection.

It is unjust indeed, as the jurists are wont to say, to judge before having studied the entire law. We know only an infinitesimally small part of the eternity which stretches out beyond measure, and the memory of a few thousand years which history preserves for us is of very little avail here. Yet from such small experience we cast judgment with temerity on the immense and eternal, behaving in this respect like men born and brought up in prison, or, if you prefer, in the underground salt mines of Sarmatia, who would believe that there is no other light in the world than that miserable lamp which hardly suffices to direct their steps. Let us view a very

beautiful picture and then cover it up, leaving visible only a tiny particle of its surface. What else will then appear to us, even if we inspect it from very near—indeed, the more so the nearer we get to it—what else will we see, but confused patches of colors without meaning and art? Yet, once you have removed the cover and contemplated the whole picture from a suitable distance, you will understand that what looked like color patches made at random has been created with art by the author of the work. What the eyes apprehend in a painting is apprehended by the ears in music. The greatest composers, indeed, are accustomed to mixing frequent dissonances among the consonances, in order to excite and to shock, so to speak, the auditor, who becomes anxious about what is going to happen; when after a short while all returns to order again, his pleasure will be so much more intense. Similarly, we enjoy insignificant dangers and painful experiences, because they give us the proud consciousness of our power and our happiness. Similarly also, when we see tight-rope walkers or sword dancers performing, we draw pleasure from our very shivers of fear. And frequently when playing with children, we laughingly pretend to throw and almost drop them. So it was that a female monkey once seized King Christian of Denmark, then still an infant in swaddling bands, and carried him to the top of the roof; then amid general anxiety the monkey—apparently enjoying the joke—carried him back, safe and sound, to his cradle. For the same reason one becomes tired of eating nothing but sweets; acrid, sour, even bitter ingredients have to be added to stimulate the taste. Who has not tasted bitter food does not deserve sweets and will not even appreciate them. This is the very law of pleasure, that uniformity does not allow it to continue with the same intensity, but produces satiety and dullness instead of enjoyment.

What we have just pointed out concerning disorder in certain parts, which may well be consistent with the harmony of the whole, should not be understood to mean that the parts were not taken into consideration at all, as though it sufficed that the world as a whole be perfect; for if this were so, the entire human race might be miserable. Nor does it mean that no care has been taken to safeguard justice or to protect our own interests. This, indeed, has been the opinion of certain authors whose judgment about the totality of things has not been sufficiently thought through. For it must be realized that in the best constituted republic care is taken to grant everyone the greatest possible good, and that, analogously, the universe would not be sufficiently perfect unless the interest of everyone were taken into consideration, without prejudice, of course, to the harmony. There is no better verification of this than the very law of justice which ordains that each one should have his share in the perfection of the universe, and that his happiness should be proportionate to his virtue and to his voluntary contribution to the common good; this is what we call charity and love of God, and in this alone consists also the

essence and power of the Christian religion, according to the judgments of learned theologians. Nor should one be surprised that in the universe spirits are the objects of so much solicitude, since they most faithfully reflect the image of the Supreme Creator, and since their relation to him is not so much that of a machine to its artificer (as is the case with all other created things), as it is that of a citizen to his prince. Moreover, the spirits will last as long as the universe itself, and in a certain way they express the whole and concentrate it in themselves, so that we may well call them total parts.

With regard to the afflictions of good people, in particular, it may be considered certain that these will turn to their greater advantage. This is true not only theologically but also physically, as evidenced by the grain of wheat fallen into the ground, which must die before it can bring forth fruit.[9] In general it may be affirmed that affections are temporary evils leading to good effects, since they are shortcuts to greater perfection. Just so, in physics, liquids with slow fermentation also clarify more slowly, while those in which the disturbance is more violent eliminate certain particles with greater force and are thus clarified more promptly. It might be said of these evils that one steps back, the better to jump forward. What I have just said is not simply pleasing and comforting; it is truth itself. And in general, I believe that nothing is truer than happiness, nor anything pleasanter and happier than the truth.

As the climax of the universal beauty and perfection of God's works, it must also be recognized that the total universe is engaged in a perpetual and spontaneous progress, so that it always advances toward greater culture. Thus a large part of our earth is now cultivated, and this part will receive ever-growing extension. Though it is true that meanwhile certain parts may return to the state of wilderness or be again destroyed or deteriorated, this must be interpreted in the same manner which we proposed a while ago, concerning the affections of good people: namely, that this very destruction and deterioration promotes the future conquest of a greater good, so that the very damage turns, in a way, into profit.

To the possible objection that thus the world would of necessity have long ago turned into a paradise, it is easy to reply: Many substances already may have attained great perfection; yet, the continuum being infinitely divisible, there will always remain in the unfathomable depth of the universe some somnolent elements which are still to be awakened, developed, and improved—in a word, promoted to higher culture. This is why the end of progress can never be attained.

NOTES:

1. The word *originatio* in this title has sometimes been translated "origin." Leibniz would certainly not have written *originatio*—a term which is used by Quintillian and later authors in the sense of

- etymology if he had wished to say *origo*—Moreover, the word origination seems to express better the active and “dynamic” character of the process by which, according to Leibniz, the possibles pass into actual existence.
2. The Latin text as it appears in Erdmann and in Gerhardt is corrupted here. The correction after the Hanover manuscript follows: Gerhardt *Philosophische Schriften*, VII. 302: line 21, for *debet* read *deberet*; line 22, for *a priore* read *a priori*; line 23, for *intelligetur* read *intelligeretur*.
 3. Leibniz was very much interested in the application of mathematics, particularly of the method of maxima and minima, to the theory of games. See the references in Couturat, *La logique de Leibniz* (*The Logic of Leibniz*), pp. 242-243. See also the discussion of the *ludus aggerum* in Leibniz’ correspondence with Jakob Bernoulli (*Mathematische Schriften*, Gerhardt edn., III, 94).
 4. Leibniz seems to have forgotten here to set the condition: “a triangle of a given perimeter.” In that case, the equilateral triangle is in fact the one which has the greatest surface. Compare *Tentamen anagoricum* (*Anagogical Essay*) (*Philosophische Schriften*, Gerhardt edn., VII, 278): “Suppose that nature had been obliged to construct a triangle, and that for this result only the perimeter or the sum of the sides, had been given, nothing more; she would construct an equilateral triangle.” It is quite possible that in our text, Leibniz wished to present an example not of determination by a maximum, but of a maximum of determination. In the *Tentamen anagoricum*—which is the most important and the most explicit text on the principle which was to give birth to the *principle of least action*—he completes the principle of determination by a maximum or minimum by that other, “that instead of the least, it is necessary to adhere to the *most determined*, which can be the *simplest*, even when it is the greatest” (p. 274). The equilateral triangle is a case of the most determined effect since there are an infinity of different triangles of unequal sides, but only one equilateral triangle.
 5. The right angle is again an example of a maximum of determination: there is only one right angle, and there is an infinity of oblique angles.
 6. It must be remembered that the lowest point of the common center of gravity of a system of bodies lies between them (for example that of a chain fixed at both ends). This principle had been established by Torricelli, *De motu gravium naturaliter descendendum* (*Opera geometrica*, Florence, 1644).
 7. In Latin, the word *realizare* is, in fact, a barbaric neologism.
 8. See the *Specimen dynamicum pro admirandis naturae legibus circa corporum vires et mutuas actions detegendis et ad suas causas revocandis* (*A Dynamic Model for Discovering and Referring Back to Their Causes the Admirable Laws of Nature Governing the Forces and Mutual Actions of Bodies*) (*Mathematische Schriften*, Gerhardt edn., VI, 234) and the *Critical Remarks Concerning the general part of Descartes’ Principles*, Part II, article 64.
 9. John 12:24

EVIL AND OMNIPOTENCE

-J. L. Mackie

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Direction of studying Mackie's article:

- 1) Background of the author and his viewpoint: J. L. Mackie (1917-1981), who taught Philosophy in Australia and England, addresses attempts by theists to solve the problem of evil in the article below. Though published in 1955, it is still recognized as probably the most powerful critique of such attempts written in that century. This article is used to refute all kinds of theism, and it focuses on the problem of evil. Mackie generalizes all theists' solution of this problem as four kinds, then he refutes them respectively. Mackie is convinced that theists who strive to reconcile evil with belief in a good and omnipotent being succeed only by implicate (if not explicitly) rejecting the central beliefs of ordinary theism—God is omnipotent, God is good, evil exist. Mackie makes up a very subtle analysis of the four theistic solutions to the problem of evil and he succeeds in exposing their flaws..
- 2) Strategy of Mackie's: We could see that most of Mackie's arguments are based on the semantic analysis of the meaning of some words, and on the logical analysis of the structure of some theoretical propositions. These analyses make the theists' solution of evil problem self-defeated.
- 3) Arguments: In the beginning parts of the article, there is the general refutation of theism argument, it exposes that all of theists' approaches are essentially grounded on irrationality, and whatever they provided must be fallacious. Then there is argument against the "evil is necessary a counterpart of good" thesis. Mackie observes that this thesis, if true, undermines the omnipotence of God because it sets a limit to what God can do, and it fails to account for superfluous (excessive) evil. The argument against the "evil is necessary as a means to good" thesis again says that this implies a severe restriction of God's power. The argument against "at the universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil" thesis exposes that such a claim affects God's benevolence. The last argument is aimed to oppose to the "evil is due to human freedom" thesis, Mackie gives two replies: (1) God could have made humans always to freely choose the good; and (2) genuine human freedom is at odds with divine omnipotence. This last point highlights what Mackie calls the "Paradox of Omnipotence"—for humans to be free means that God can make beings which God cannot subsequently control.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
non-rational, omnipotent, wholly good, Quasi-logical, counterpart,
first order evil, first order good, infinite regress, paradox of omnipotence.
- 5) Propositions:

1. And he can still retain all that is essential to his position, by holding that God's existence is known in some other non-rational way..
2. This leads us to what I call the "Paradox of Omnipotence": can an omnipotent being make things which he can not subsequently control?

6) Study questions:

1. Mackie says that the problem of evil offers a "more telling criticism" of belief in God than the criticisms of the traditional arguments for the existence of God. Why?
2. What, according to Mackie, are the core beliefs of "ordinary theism"?
3. How does Mackie define the terms "good" and "omnipotent"? Are these the only acceptable definitions?
4. What is Mackie's "paradox of omnipotence"?
5. Mackie says that even if evil is needed as a counterpart to good, "a minute dose of evil would presumably do." What does he mean ?
6. Mackie contends that there is no contradiction in asserting that God could have made humans so that they would always *freely* choose the good. What are his reasons?

The traditional arguments for the existence of God have been fairly thoroughly criticized by philosophers. But the theologian can, if he wishes, accept this criticism. He can admit that no rational proof of God's existence is possible. And he can still retain all that is essential to his position, by holding that God's existence is known in some other, non-rational way. I think, however, that a more telling criticism can be made by way of the traditional problem of evil. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another, so that the theologian can maintain his position as a whole only by a much more extreme rejection of reason than in the former case. He must now be prepared to believe, not merely what cannot be proved, but what can be *disproved* from other beliefs that he also holds.

The problem of evil, in the sense in which I shall be using the phrase, is a problem only for someone who believes that there is a God who is both omnipotent and wholly good. And it is a logical problem, the problem of clarifying and reconciling a number of beliefs: it is not a scientific problem that might be solved by further observations, or a practical problem that might be solved by a decision or an action. These points are obvious; I mention them only because they are sometimes ignored by theologians, who sometimes parry a statement of the problem with such remarks as "Well, can you solve the problem yourself?" or "This is a mystery which may be revealed to us later" or "Evil is something to be faced and overcome, not to

be merely discussed.”

In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once *must* adhere and *cannot consistently* adhere to all three. (The problem does not arise only for theists, but I shall discuss it in the form in which it presents itself for ordinary theism.)

However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-logical rules connecting the terms ‘good,’ ‘evil,’ and ‘omnipotent.’ These additional principles are that good is opposed to evil, in such a way that good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible.

A. ADEQUATE SOLUTIONS

Now once the problem is fully stated it is clear that it can be solved, in the sense that the problem will not arise if one gives up at least one of the propositions that constitute it. If you are prepared to say that God is not wholly good, or not quite omnipotent, or that evil does not exist, or that good is not opposed to the kind of evil that exists, or that there are limits to what an omnipotent thing can do, then the problem of evil will not arise for you.

There are, then, quite a number of adequate solutions of the problem of evil, and some of these have been adopted, or almost adopted, by various thinkers. For example, a few have been prepared to deny God’s omnipotence, and rather more have been prepared to keep the term ‘omnipotence’ but severely to restrict its meaning, recording quite a number of things that an omnipotent being cannot do. Some have said that evil is an illusion, perhaps because they held that the whole world of temporal, changing things is an illusion, and that what we call evil belongs only to this world, or perhaps because they held that although temporal things *are* much as we see them, those that we call evil are not really evil. Some have said that what we call evil is merely the privation of good, that evil in a positive sense, evil that would really be opposed to good, does not exist. Many have agreed with Pope that disorder is harmony not understood, and that partial evil is universal good. Whether any of these views is *true* is, of course, another question. But each of them gives an adequate solution of the problem of evil in the sense that if you accept it this problem does not arise for you, though you may, of course, have *other* problems

to face.

But often enough these adequate solutions are only *almost* adopted. The thinkers who restrict God's power, but keep the term 'omnipotence,' may reasonably be suspected of thinking, in other contexts, that his power is really unlimited. Those who say that evil is an illusion may also be thinking, inconsistently, that this illusion is itself an evil. Those who say that "evil" is merely privation of good may also be thinking, inconsistently, that privation of good is an evil. (The fallacy here is akin to some forms of the "naturalistic fallacy" in ethics, where some think, for example, that "good" is just what contributes to evolutionary progress, and that evolutionary progress is itself good.) If Pope meant what he said in the first line of his couplet, that "disorder" is only harmony not understood, the "partial evil" of the second line must, for consistency, mean "that which, taken in isolation, falsely appears to be evil," but it would more naturally mean "that which, in isolation, really is evil." The second line, in fact, hesitates between two views, that "partial evil" isn't really evil, since only the universal quality is real, and that "partial evil" is really an evil, but only a little one.

In addition, therefore, to adequate solutions, we must recognize unsatisfactory inconsistent solutions, in which there is only a half-hearted or temporary rejection of one of the propositions which together constitute the problem. In these, one of the constituent propositions is explicitly rejected, but it is covertly re-asserted or assumed elsewhere in the system.

B. FALLACIOUS SOLUTIONS

Besides these half-hearted solutions, which explicitly reject but implicitly assert one of the constituent propositions, there are definitely fallacious solutions which explicitly maintain all the constituent propositions, but implicitly reject at least one of them in the course of the argument that explains away the problem of evil.

There are, in fact, many so-called solutions which purport to remove the contradiction without abandoning any of its constituent propositions. These must be fallacious, as we can see from the very statement of the problem, but it is not so easy to see in each case precisely where the fallacy lies. I suggest that in all cases the fallacy has the general form suggested above: in order to solve the problem one (or perhaps more) of its constituent propositions is given up, but in such a way that it appears to have been retained, and can therefore be asserted without qualification in other contexts. Sometimes there is a further complication: the supposed solution moves to and fro between, say, two of the constituent propositions, at one point asserting the first of these but covertly abandoning the second, at another point asserting the second but covertly abandoning the first. These fallacious solutions

often turn upon some equivocation with the words 'good' and 'evil,' or upon some vagueness about the way in which good and evil are opposed to one another, or about how much is meant by 'omnipotence.' I propose to examine some of these so-called solutions, and to exhibit their fallacies in detail. Incidentally, I shall also be considering whether an adequate solution could be reached by a minor modification of one or more of the constituent propositions, which would, however, still satisfy all the essential requirements of ordinary theism.

1. "Good cannot exist without evil" or "Evil is necessary as a counterpart to good."

It is some times suggested that evil is necessary as a counterpart to good, that if there were no evil there could be no good either, and that this solves the problem of evil. It is true that it points to an answer to the question "Why should there be evil?" But it does so only by qualifying some of the propositions that constitute the problem.

First, it sets a limit to what God can do, saying that God *cannot* create good without simultaneously creating evil, and this means either that God is not omnipotent or that there are *some* limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. It may be replied that these limits are always presupposed, that omnipotence has never meant the power to do what is logically impossible, and on the present view the existence of good without evil would be a logical impossibility. This interpretation of omnipotence may, indeed, be accepted as a modification of our original account which does not reject anything that is essential to theism, and I shall in general assume it in the subsequent discussion. It is, perhaps, the most common theistic view, but I think that some theists at least have maintained that God can do what is logically impossible. Many theists, at any rate, have held that logic itself is created or laid down by God, that logic is the way in which God arbitrarily chooses to think. (This is, of course, parallel to the ethical view that morally right actions are those which God arbitrarily chooses to command, and the two views encounter similar difficulties.) And *this* account of logic is clearly inconsistent with the view that God is bound by logical necessities—unless it is possible for an omnipotent being to bind himself, an issue which we shall consider later, when we come to the Paradox of Omnipotence. This solution of the problem of evil cannot, therefore, be consistently adopted along with the view that logic is itself created by God.

But, secondly, this solution denies that evil is opposed to good in our original sense. If good and evil are counterparts, a good thing will not "eliminate evil as far as it can." Indeed, this view suggests that good and evil are not strictly qualities of things at all. Perhaps the suggestion is that good and evil are related in much the

same way as great and small. Certainly, when the germ 'great' is used relatively as a condensation of greater than so-and-so, and 'small' is used correspondingly, greatness and smallness are counterparts and cannot exist without each other. But in this sense greatness is not a quality, not an intrinsic feature of anything; and it would be absurd to think of a movement in favor of greatness and against smallness in this sense. Such a movement would be self-defeating, since relative greatness can be promoted only by a simultaneous promotion of relative smallness. I feel sure that no theists would be content to regard God's goodness as analogous to this—as if what he supports were not the *good* but the *better*, and as if he had the paradoxical aim that all things should be better than other things.

This point is obscured by the fact that 'great' and 'small' seem to have an absolute as well as a relative sense. I cannot discuss here whether there is absolute magnitude or not, but if there is, there could be an absolute sense for 'great,' it could mean of at least a certain size, and it would make sense to speak of all things getting bigger, of a universe that was expanding all over, and therefore it would make sense to speak of promoting greatness. But in *this* sense great and small are not logically necessary counterparts: either quality could exist without the other. There would be no logical impossibility in everything's being small or in everything's being great.

Neither in the absolute nor in the relative sense, then, of 'great' and 'small' do these terms provide an analogy of the sort that would be needed to support this solution of the problem of evil. In neither case are greatness and smallness *both* necessary counterparts *and* mutually opposed forces or possible objects for support and attack.

It may be replied that good and evil are necessary counterparts in the same way as any quality and its logical opposite: redness can occur, it is suggested, only if non-redness also occurs. But unless evil is merely the privation of good, they are not logical opposites, and some further argument would be needed to show that they are counterparts in the same way as genuine logical opposites. Let us assume that this could be given. There is still doubt of the correctness of the metaphysical principle that a quality must have a real opposite: I suggest that it is not really impossible that everything should be, say, red, that the truth is merely that if everything were red we should not notice redness, and so we should have no word 'red'; we observe and give names to qualities only if they have real opposites. If so, the principle that a term must have an opposite would belong only to our language or to our thought, and would not be an ontological principle, and, correspondingly, the rule that good cannot exist without evil would not state a logical necessity of a sort that God would just have to put up with. God might have made everything good, though we should not have noticed it if he had.

But, finally, even if we concede that this is an ontological principle, it will

provide a solution for the problem of evil only if one is prepared to say, "Evil exists, but only just enough evil to serve as the counterpart of good." I doubt whether any theist will accept this. After all, the *ontological* requirement that non-redness should occur would be satisfied even if all the universe, except for a minute speck, were red, and, if there were a corresponding requirement for evil as a counterpart to good, a minute dose of evil would presumably do. But theists are not usually willing to say, in all contexts, that all the evil that occurs is a minute and necessary dose.

2. "Evil is necessary as a means to good."

It is sometimes suggested that evil is necessary for good not as a counterpart but as a means. In its simple form this has little plausibility as a solution of the problem of evil, since it obviously implies a severe restriction of God's power. It would be a *causal* law that you cannot have a certain end without a certain means, so that if God has to introduce evil as a means to good, he must be subject to at least some causal laws. This certainly conflicts with what a theist normally means by omnipotence. This view of God as limited by causal laws also conflicts with the view that causal laws are themselves made by God, which is more widely held than the corresponding view about the laws of logic. This conflict would, indeed, be resolved if it were possible for an omnipotent being to bind himself, and this possibility has still to be considered. Unless a favorable answer can be given to this question, the suggestion that evil is necessary as a means to good solves the problem of evil only by denying one of its constituent propositions, either that God is omnipotent or that 'omnipotent' means what it says.

3. "The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil."

Much more important is a solution which at first seems to be a mere variant of the previous one, that evil may contribute to the goodness of a whole in which it is found, so that universe as a whole is better as it is, with some evil in it, than it would be if there were no evil. This solution may be developed in either of two ways. It may be supported by an aesthetic analogy, by the fact that contrasts heighten beauty, that in a musical work, for example, there may occur discords which somehow add to the beauty of the work as a whole. Alternatively, it may be worked out in connection with the notion of progress, that the best possible organization of the universe will not be static, but progressive, that the gradual overcoming of evil by good is really a finer thing than would be the eternal unchallenged supremacy of good.

In either case, this solution usually starts from the assumption that the evil whose existence gives rise to the problem of evil is primarily what is called physical evil, that is to say, pain. In Hume's rather half-hearted presentation of the problem of evil, the evils that he stresses are pain and disease, and those who reply to him argue that the existence of pain and disease makes possible the existence of sympathy, benevolence, heroism, and the gradually successful struggle of doctors and reformers to overcome these evils. In fact, theists often seize the opportunity to accuse those who stress the problem of evil of taking a low, materialistic view of good and evil, equating these with pleasure and pain, and of ignoring the more spiritual goods which can arise in the struggle against evils.

But let us see exactly what is being done here. Let us call pain and misery 'first order evil' or 'evil (1).' What contrasts with this, namely, pleasure and happiness, will be called 'first order good' or 'good (1).' Distinct from this is 'second order good' or 'good (2)' which somehow emerges in a complex situation in which evil (1) is a necessary component—logically, not merely causally, necessary. (Exactly *how* it emerges does not matter: in the crudest version of this solution good (2) is simply the heightening of happiness by the contrast with misery, in other versions it includes sympathy with suffering, heroism in facing danger, and the gradual decrease of first order evil and increase of first order good.) It is also being assumed that second order good is more important than first order good or evil, in particular that it more than outweighs the first order evil it involves.

Now this is a particularly subtle attempt to solve the problem of evil. It defends God's goodness and omnipotence on the ground that (on a sufficiently long view) this is the best of all logically possible worlds, because it includes the important second order goods, and yet it admits that real evils, namely first order evils, exist. But does it still hold that good and evil are opposed? Not, clearly, in the sense that we set out originally good does not tend to eliminate evil in general. Instead, we have a modified, a more complex pattern. First order good (*e. g.* happiness) *contrasts with* first order evil (*e.g.* misery): these two are opposed in a fairly mechanical way; some second order goods (*e.g.* benevolence) try to maximize first order good and minimize first order evil; but God's goodness is not this, it is rather the will to maximize *second* order good. We might, therefore, call God's goodness an example of a third order goodness, or good (3). While this account is different from our original one, it might well be held to be an improvement on it, to give a more accurate description of the way in which good is opposed to evil, and to be consistent with the essential theist position.

There might, however, be several objections to this solution.

First, some might argue that such qualities as benevolence—and *a fortiori* the third order goodness which promotes benevolence—have a merely derivative

value, that they are not higher sorts of good, but merely means to good (1), that is, to happiness, so that it would be absurd for God to keep misery in existence in order to make possible the virtues of benevolence, heroism, etc. The theist who adopts the present solution must, of course, deny this, but he can do so with some plausibility, so I should not press this objection.

Secondly, it follows from this solution that God is not in our sense benevolent or sympathetic: he is not concerned to minimize evil (1), but only to promote good (2); and this might be a disturbing conclusion for some theists.

But, thirdly, the fatal objection is this. Our analysis shows clearly the possibility of the existence of a second order evil, an evil (2) contrasting with good (2) as evil (1) contrasts with good (1). This would include malevolence, cruelty, callousness, cowardice, and states in which good (1) is decreasing and evil (1) increasing. And just as good (2) is held to be the important kind of good, the kind that God is concerned to promote, so evil (2) will, by analogy, be the important kind of evil, the kind which God, if he were wholly good and omnipotent, would eliminate. And yet evil (2) plainly exists, and indeed most theists (in other contexts) stress its existence more than that of evil (1). We should, therefore, state the problem of evil in terms of second order evil, and against this form of the problem the present solution is useless.

An attempt might be made to use this solution again, at a higher level, to explain the occurrence of evil (2): indeed the next main solution that we shall examine does just this, with the help of some new notions. Without any fresh notions, such a solution would have little plausibility: for example, we could hardly say that the really important good was a good (3), such as the increase of benevolence in proportion to cruelty, which logically required for its occurrence the occurrence of some second order evil. But even if evil (2) could be explained in this way, it is fairly clear that there would be third order evils contrasting with this third order good: and we should be well on the way to an infinite regress, where the solution of a problem of evil, stated in terms of evil (n), indicated the existence of an evil ($n+1$), and a further problem to be solved.

4. "Evil is due to human freewill."

Perhaps the most important proposed solution of the problem of evil is that evil is not to be ascribed to God at all, but to the independent actions of human beings, supposed to have been endowed by God with freedom of the will. This solution may be combined with the preceding one: first order evil (*e.g.* pain) may be justified as a logically necessary component in second order good (*e.g.* sympathy) while second order evil (*e.g.* cruelty) is not *justified*, but is so ascribed to human

beings that God cannot be held responsible for it. This combination evades my third criticism of the preceding solution.

The freewill solution also involves the preceding solution at a higher level. To explain why a wholly good God gave men freewill although it would lead to some important evils, it must be argued that it is better on the whole that men should act freely, and sometimes err, than that they should be innocent automata, acting rightly in a wholly determined way. Freedom, that is to say, is now treated as a third order good, and as being more valuable than second order goods (such as sympathy and heroism) would be if they were deterministically produced, and it is being assumed that second order evils, such as cruelty, are logically necessary accompaniments of freedom, just as pain is a logically necessary pre-condition of sympathy.

I think that this solution is unsatisfactory primarily because of the incoherence of the notion of freedom of the will: but I cannot discuss this topic adequately here, although some of my criticisms will touch upon it.

First I should query the assumption that second order evils are logically necessary accompaniments of freedom. I should ask this: if God has made men such that in their free choices they sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, why could he not have made men such that they always freely choose the good? If there is no logical impossibility in a man's freely choosing the good on one, or on several, occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between making innocent automata and making beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong: there was open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right. Clearly his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good.

If it is replied that this objection is absurd, that the making of some wrong choices is logically necessary for freedom, it would seem that 'freedom' must here mean complete randomness or indeterminacy, including randomness with regard to the alternatives good and evil, in other words that men's choices and consequent actions can be "free" only if they are not determined by their characters. Only on this assumption can God escape the responsibility for men's actions; for if he made them as they are, but did not determine their wrong choices, this can only be because the wrong choices are not determined by men as they are. But then if freedom is randomness, how can it be a characteristic of *will*? And, still more, how can it be the most important good? What value or merit would there be in free choices if these were random actions which were not determined by the nature of the agent?

I conclude that to make this solution plausible two different senses of 'freedom' must be confused, one sense which will justify the view that freedom is a

third order good, more valuable than other goods would be without it, and another sense, sheer randomness, to prevent us from ascribing to God a decision to make men such that they sometimes go wrong when he might have made them such that they would always freely go right.

This criticism is sufficient to dispose of this solution. But besides this there is a fundamental difficulty in the notion of an omnipotent God creating men with free will, for if men's wills are really free this must mean that even God cannot control them, that is, that God is no longer omnipotent. It may be objected that God's gift of freedom to men does not mean that he *cannot* control their wills, but that he always *refrains* from controlling their wills. But why, we may ask, should God refrain from controlling evil wills? Why should he not leave men free to will rightly, but intervene when he sees them beginning to will wrongly? If God could do this, but does not, and if he is wholly good, the only explanation could be that even a wrong free act of will is not really evil, that its freedom is a value which outweighs its wrongness, so that there would be a loss of value if God took away the wrongness and the freedom together. But this is utterly opposed to what theists say about sin in other contexts. The present solution of the problem of evil, then, can be maintained only in the form that God has made men so free that he *cannot* control their wills.

This leads us to what I call the Paradox of Omnipotence: can an omnipotent being make things which he cannot subsequently control? Or, what is practically equivalent to this, can an omnipotent being make rules which then bind himself? (These are practically equivalent because any such rules could be regarded as setting certain things beyond his control, and *vice versa*). The second of these formulations is relevant to the suggestions that we have already met, that an omnipotent God creates the rules of logic or causal laws, and is then bound by them.

It is clear that this is a paradox: the questions cannot be answered satisfactorily either in the affirmative or in the negative. If we answer "Yes," it follows that if God actually makes things which he cannot control, or makes rules which bind himself, he is not omnipotent once he has made them: there are *then* things which he cannot do. But if we answer "No," we are immediately asserting that there are things which he cannot do, that is to say that he is already not omnipotent.

It cannot be replied that the question which sets this paradox is not a proper question. It would make perfectly good sense to say that a human mechanic has made a machine which he cannot control: if there is any difficulty about the question it lies in the notion of omnipotence itself.

This, incidentally, shows that although we have approached this paradox from the free will theory, it is equally a problem for a theological determinist. No

one thinks that machines have free will, yet they may well be beyond the control of their makers. The determinist might reply that anyone who makes anything determines its ways of acting, and so determines its subsequent behavior: even the human mechanic does this by his *choice* of materials and structure for his machine, though he does not know all about either of these: the mechanic thus determines, though he may not foresee, his machine's actions. And since God is omniscient, and since his creation of things is total, he both determines and foresees the ways in which his creatures will act. We may grant this, but it is beside the point. The question is not whether God *originally* determined the future actions of his creatures, but whether he can *subsequently* control their actions, or whether he was able in his original creation to put things beyond his subsequent control. Even on determinist principles the answers "Yes" and "No" are equally irreconcilable with God's omnipotence.

Before suggesting a solution of this paradox, I would point out that there is a parallel Paradox of Sovereignty. Can a legal sovereign make a law restricting its own future legislative power? For example, could the British parliament make a law forbidding any future parliament to socialize banking, and also forbidding the future repeal of this law itself? Or could the British parliament, which was legally sovereign in Australia in, say, 1899, pass a valid law, or series of laws, which made it no longer sovereign in 1933? Again, neither the affirmative nor the negative answer is really satisfactory. If we were to answer "Yes," we should be admitting the validity of a law which, if it were actually made, would mean that parliament was no longer sovereign. If we were to answer "No," we should be admitting that there is a law, not logically absurd, which parliament cannot validly make, that is, that parliament is not now a legal sovereign. This paradox can be solved in the following way. We should distinguish between first order laws, that is laws governing the actions of individuals and bodies other than the legislature, and second order laws, that is laws about laws, laws governing the actions of the legislature itself. Correspondingly, we should distinguish two orders of sovereignty, first order sovereignty (sovereignty (1)) which is unlimited authority to make first order laws, and second order sovereignty (sovereignty (2)) which is unlimited authority to make second order laws. If we say that parliament is sovereign we might mean that any parliament at any time has sovereignty (1), or we might mean that parliament has both sovereignty (1) and sovereignty (2) at present, but we cannot without contradiction mean both that the present parliament has sovereignty (2) and that every parliament at every time has sovereignty (1), for if the present parliament has sovereignty (2) it may use it to take away the sovereignty (1) of later parliaments. What the paradox shows is that we cannot ascribe to any continuing institution legal sovereignty in an inclusive sense.

The analogy between omnipotence and sovereignty shows that the paradox of omnipotence can be solved in a similar way. We must distinguish between first order omnipotence (omnipotence (1)), that is unlimited power to act, and second order omnipotence (omnipotence (2)), that is unlimited power to determine what powers to act things shall have. Then we could consistently say that God all the time has omnipotence (1), but if so, no beings at any time have powers to act independently of God. Or we could say that God at one time had omnipotence (2), and used it to assign independent powers to act to certain things, so that God thereafter did not have omnipotence (1). But what the paradox shows is that we cannot consistently ascribe to any continuing being omnipotence in an inclusive sense.

An alternative solution of this paradox would be simply to deny that God is a continuing being, that any times can be assigned to his actions at all. But on this assumption (which also has difficulties of its own) no meaning can be given to the assertion that God made men with wills so free that he could not control them. The paradox of omnipotence can be avoided by putting God outside time, but the freewill solution of the problem of evil cannot be saved in this way, and equally it remains impossible to hold that an omnipotent God *binds himself* by causal or logical laws.

CONCLUSION

Of the proposed solutions of the problem of evil which we have examined, none has stood up to criticism. There may be other solutions which require examination, but this study strongly suggests that there is no valid solution of the problem which does not modify at least one of the constituent propositions in a way which would seriously affect the essential core of the theistic position.

Quite apart from the problem of evil, the paradox of omnipotence has shown that God's omnipotence must in any case be restricted in one way or another, that unqualified omnipotence cannot be ascribed to any being that continues through time. And if God and his actions are not in time, can omnipotence, or power of any sort, be meaningfully ascribed to him?

PART IV
EPISTEMOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

-- *Editor*

Epistemology plays important part in studying philosophy. Broadly speaking, epistemology covers many fields and areas. Such as the study of human mind, the study of human consciousness, human will, human belief, the logic of thinking, the nature of human knowledge, the nature of science, the laws of the development of human knowledge, the relation between human cognition and their practice, social consciousness, etc. The contemporary Western philosophy also develop some new areas of epistemological study, such as the game theory, decision theory, communication theory, and so on.

What we select in the Part IV-Epistemology in our textbook does not cover all of the above, we select primarily the examples of different doctrines concerning the central issues of traditional epistemology that make the foundation for resolving other problems.

For traditional European philosophy, the central issues of epistemology usually are concerned with the issue of whether there is universal or objective knowledge, whether human being holds the ability to obtain the objective truth or knowledge, whether we are able to express, to communicate the truth by our language. For resolving this issue, there are some important doctrines, such as the doctrine of realism, which claims that there is reality, universal causal law that make the knowledge possible, and we human being do hold the ability of obtaining the objective knowledge. The doctrine of skepticism denies the existence of truth and knowledge, denies the possibility for human being to obtain knowledge. The worldview-based skepticism even denies the causal relation, denies the natural law. The psychological-based skepticism does not care too much about the relation, the causal law of nature, but it claims that there is no any identity between human subjectivity and the objective world. Relativism is a sort of reconciliation of realism and skepticism, which does not deny the knowledge, the truth, but it considers all knowledge and truth only relatively true, relatively plausible. In this way, it limits and diminishes the function and the value of human knowledge, and it tries to avoid the defects of both absolute realism and the extreme skepticism.

The other central issue of epistemological study is that what is the origin, the foundation of human knowledge, what is the criterion, the essential nature of human knowledge and truth. To resolve this issue, there occur *a priori* doctrine and *posteriori* doctrine. The former one is initialed from Plato's "recollection" theory, which proposes that the real knowledge, the foundation of knowledge must be innate, no need of any life experience, no need of any teaching and study, every one holds the essential elements of real knowledge instinctively. The later doctrine is initiated from

Aristotle's "perceptual substance" thesis. It insists that only through the post-life learning and experience, then it is possible for people to know something. When a person is born, he or she knows nothing at all. Kant's transcendental theory tries a reconciliation of the above two doctrines. The doctrine of empiricism and rationalism in the history of European philosophy are modern varieties of *a priory* thesis and *posteriori* thesis that are also considered as opposite approaches. But we need to notice that both modern empiricism and modern rationalism appeal to human rationality. The difference between them is primarily that empiricism stresses on the lower level part of rationality, such as the perception, the sensation, the practical ideas of human rationality. While the rationalism stresses on the higher level part of rationality, such as the comprehension, the reflection, the abstract part of rationality. We have not mentioned about the anti-rationalism thesis, which is quite another line of handling the issue of human knowledge.

In our textbook, Descartes' article, Locke's article, Berkley's article, Cohen's article, all take realism as their premises of epistemological study. But Hume's article represents a Thorough-going skepticism, which claims that there is no any thing like objectivity, and anything like plausible knowledge at all. When we read Descartes' "universal doubt" argument, apparently, Descartes claims to doubt every thing, however, his doubts are used to criticize only the knowledge obtained from human experience, but not the knowledge obtained from reason and intuition.

Locke's "White Paper" thesis, properly show the key points of empiricism, while Descartes' "*ego is a thinking thing*" thesis, his criterion of truth and knowledge thesis properly indicate the points of rationalism. Descartes' criterion of truth and knowledge finally leads us to intuition and instinct reflection, this thesis was refuted by Locke's "white paper" or "blank board" thesis. But we could find that, in Locke's arguments, like many great philosophers, there occurs theoretical retreat. When Locke talks about secondary qualities, he falls into the confusion whether some qualities of things are resulted from human subjectivity or from the objectivity of the thing itself. Thus, it opens a window for entering experience-based subjectivism. Berkley's article starts from the discussing of Locke's secondary qualities, and leads to the negation of materialism and objective-ism. It claims that knowledge is generated from the subjectivity itself, it initiates the epistemological idealism of modern philosophy. Cohen's scientific positivism is actually a contemporary form of the empiricism. Some one divides the empiricism as several generations; the first generation is actually a sort of experience-ism that appeals to only the daily-life and common sense experience. The second generation of empiricism is called as scientific positivism, it stresses on the theoretical demonstration based on achievements of modern science. And then, there occurs logical positivism, which direct people to the line of logical and linguistic analysis of philosophical works.

We need to know that in Western countries, When talking about modern philosophy, it refers to the philosophical works of after the sixteen century and before the twentieth century.

MEDITATION ONE: CONCERNING THOSE THINGS THAT CAN BE CALLED INTO DOUBT

Rene Descartes

(IP Rene Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, translated by Donald A. Cress, 1979, Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge, MA.)

Directions of studying Descartes' First Meditation:

- 1) The background and the viewpoint of the author: Descartes lived in an age, when belief of traditional religion was going down and when the rationality and science were going up. Being a bright intellectual and an ingenuous mathematician, Descartes intended to create a new system of knowledge that was based on rationalistic deduction, and was out of any uncertainty and any confusion. All of these presupposed Descartes' ideas and works as realistic and rationalistic in epistemological sense. So, the first Meditation of Descartes that was usually called as "universal doubt" argument actually played the function of a mop used to clear up the work site, in order that a completely new construction of human knowledge could be founded. It is easy to find that all of Descartes doubts points to only the traditional knowledge, that are fulfilled with religious superstition and experiential confusion. His doubts never points to the knowledge based on reasoning, such as mathematics, geometry..
- 2) Strategy of Descartes' arguments: Most of Descartes' arguments are based on the epistemological analysis and logical deduction. But when there is theoretical paradox that could not be resolved by rationalistic way, he also appeals to something irrational, such as the "intuition" thesis, the "God provides guarantee" thesis, and so on. We should admire Descartes' dialectical attitude in discussing issues. He always handled his theoretical opponent seriously, the same time when he published his "Meditation," He also published other philosopher's criticism of his "Meditations."
- 3) Descartes' arguments: One argument is the "doubts of everything" argument, that aims to deconstruct traditional knowledge supported by religion and superficial experience. Another one "something out of doubts" argument, that refers to the knowledge such as geometry, arithmetic and some other disciplines. This argument opens the way of reconstruct human knowledge. The last paragraph in the article of our textbook presents us a "evil genius" and "sleep" argument that is used to enforce the plausibility of universal doubts. These three theoretical elements make up the feature of Descartes' universal doubts thesis.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
reason, sense, perceive, opinions.
- 5) important propositions:
 1. I realize that for once I had to raze everything in my life, down to the very bottom, so as to begin again from the first foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the science.

2. But arithmetic, geometry, and other such disciplines—which treat of nothing but the simplest and most general things and which are indifferent as to whether these things do or do not exist—contain something certain and indubitable.
- 6) Study questions:
1. What is the implication of Descartes' "universal doubts" argument?
 2. What does Descartes intend to show with his "evil genius" and "sleep" thesis?
-

Several years have now passed since I first realized how many were the false opinions that in my youth I took to be true, and thus how doubtful were all the things that I subsequently built upon these opinions. From the time I became aware of this, I realized that for once I had to raze everything in my life, down to the very bottom, so as to begin again from the first foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences. But the task seemed so enormous that I waited for a point in my life that was so ripe that no more suitable a time for laying hold of these disciplines would come to pass. For this reason, I have delayed so long that I would be at fault were I to waste on deliberation the time that is left for action. Therefore, now that I have freed my mind from all cares, and I have secured for myself some leisurely and carefree time, I withdraw in solitude. I will, in short, apply myself earnestly and openly to the general destruction of my former opinions.

Yet to this end it will not be necessary that I show that all my opinions are false, which perhaps I could never accomplish anyway. But because reason now persuades me that I should withhold my assent no less carefully from things which are not plainly certain and indubitable than I would to what is patently false, it will be sufficient justification for rejecting them all, if I find a reason for doubting even the least of them. Nor therefore need one survey each opinion one after the other, a task of endless proportion. Rather—because undermining the foundations will cause whatever has been built upon them to fall down of its own accord—I will at once attack those principles which supported everything that I once believed.

Whatever I had admitted until now as most true I took in either from the senses or through the senses; however, I noticed that they sometimes deceived me. And it is a mark of prudence never to trust wholly in those things which have once deceived us.

But perhaps, although the senses sometimes deceive us when it is a question of very small and distant things, still there are many other matters which one certainly cannot doubt, although they are derived from the very same senses; that I am sitting here before the fireplace wearing my dressing gown, that I feel this sheet of paper in my hands, and so on. But how could one deny that these hands and that my whole body exist? Unless perhaps I should compare myself to insane people whose brains

are so impaired by a stubborn vapor from a black bile that they continually, insist that they are kings when they are in utter poverty, or that they are wearing purple robes when they are naked, or that they have a head made of clay, or that they are gourds, or that they are made of glass. But they are all demented; and I would appear no less demented if I were to take their conduct as a model for myself.

All of this would be well and good, were I not a man who is accustomed to sleeping at night, and to undergoing in my sleep the very same things—or now and then even less likely ones—as do these insane people when they are awake. How often has my evening slumber persuader me of such customary things as these: that I am here, clothed in my dressing gown,

seated at the fireplace, when in fact I am lying undressed between the blankets! But right now I certainly am gazing upon this piece of paper with eyes wide awake. This head which I am moving is not heavy with sleep. I extend this hand consciously and deliberately and I feel it. These things would not be so distinct for one who is asleep. But this all seems as if I do not recall having been deceived by similar thoughts on other occasions in my dreams. As I consider these cases more intently, I see so plainly that there are no definite signs to distinguish being awake from being asleep that I am quite astonished, and this astonishment almost convinces me that I am sleeping.

Let us say, then, for the sake of argument, that we are sleeping and that such particulars as these are not true: that we open our eyes, move our heads, extend our hands. Perhaps we do not even have these hands or any such body at all. Nevertheless, it really must be admitted that things seen in sleep are, as it were, like painted images, which could have been produced only in the likeness of true things. Therefore at least these general things (eyes, head, hands, the whole body) are not imaginary things, but are true and exist. For indeed when painters wish to represent sirens and satyrs by means of bizarre and unusual forms they surely cannot ascribe utterly new natures to these creatures. Rather, they simply intermingle the members of various animals. And even if they concoct something so utterly novel that its likes have never been seen before (being utterly fictitious and false), certainly, at the very minimum the colors from which the painters compose the thing ought to be true. And for the same reason, although even these general things (eyes, head, hands, and the like) can be imaginary, still one must necessarily admit that at least other things that are even more simple and universal are true, from which, as from true colors, all these things—be they true or false—which in our thought are images of things, are constructed.

To this class seems to belong corporeal nature in general, together with its extension; likewise the shape of extended things, their quantity or size, their number; as well as the place where they exist, the time of their duration, and other such things.

Hence perhaps we do not conclude improperly that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all the other disciplines that are dependent upon the consideration of

composite things are all doubtful. But arithmetic, geometry, and other such disciplines—which treat of nothing but the simplest and most general things and which are indifferent as to whether these things do or do not exist—contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I be awake or asleep, two plus three makes five, and a square does not have more than four sides; nor does it seem possible that such obvious truths can fall under the suspicion of falsity.

All the same, a certain opinion of long standing has been fixed in my mind, namely that there exists a God who is able to do anything and by whom I, such as I am, have been created. How do I know that he did not bring it about that there be no earth at all, no heavens, no extended thing, no figure, no size, no place, and yet all these things should seem to me to exist precisely as they appear to do now? Moreover—as I judge that others sometimes make mistakes in matters that they believe they know most perfectly—how do I know that I am not deceived every time I add two and three or count the sides of a square or perform an even simpler operation, if such can be imagined? But perhaps God has not willed that I be thus deceived, for it is said that he is supremely good. Nonetheless, if it were repugnant to his goodness that he should have created me such that I be deceived all the time, it would seem, from this same consideration, to be foreign to him to permit me to be deceived occasionally. But we cannot make this last assertion.

Perhaps there are some who would rather deny such a powerful God, than believe that all other matters are uncertain. Let us not put these people off just yet; rather, let us grant that everything said here about God is fictitious. Now they suppose that I came to be what I am either by fate or by chance or by a continuous series of events or by some other way. But because being deceived and being mistaken seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they take the author of my being to be, the more probable it will be that I would be so imperfect as to be deceived perpetually. I have nothing to say in response to these arguments. At length I am forced to admit that there is nothing, among the things I once believed to be true, which it is not permissible to doubt—not for reasons of frivolity or a lack of forethought, but because of valid and considered arguments. Thus I must carefully withhold assent no less from these things than from the patently false; if I wish to find anything certain.

But it is not enough simply to have made a note of this; I must take care to keep it before my mind. For long-standing opinions keep coming back again and again, almost against my will; they seize upon my credulity, as if it were bound over to them by long use and the claims of intimacy. Nor will I get out of the habit of assenting to them and believing in them, so long as I take them to be exactly what they are, namely, in some respects doubtful as by now is obvious, but nevertheless highly probable, so that it is much more consonant with reason to believe them than to deny them. Hence, It seems to me, I would do well to turn my will in the opposite

direction, to deceive myself and pretend for a considerable period that they are wholly false and imaginary, until finally, as if with equal weight of prejudice¹ on both sides, no bad habit should turn my judgment from the correct perception of things. For indeed I know that no danger or error will follow and that it is impossible for me to indulge in too much distrust, since I now am concentrating only on knowledge, not on action.

Thus I will suppose not a supremely good God, the source of truth, but rather an evil genius, as clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to misleading me. I will regard the heavens, the air, the earth, colors, shapes, sounds, and all external things as nothing but the deceptive games of my dreams, with which he lays snares for my credulity. I will regard myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, no senses, but as nevertheless falsely believing that I possess all these things. I will remain resolutely fixed in this meditation, and, even if it be out of my power to know anything true, certainly it is within my power to take care resolutely to withhold my assent to what is false, lest this deceiver, powerful and clever as he is, have an effect on me. But this undertaking is arduous, and laziness brings me back to my customary way of living. I am not unlike a prisoner who might enjoy an imaginary freedom in his sleep. When he later begins to suspect that he is sleeping, he fears being awakened and conspires slowly with these pleasant illusions. In just this way, I spontaneously fall back into my old beliefs, and dread being awakened, lest the toilsome wakefulness which follows upon a peaceful rest, have to be spent hence forward not in the light but among the inextricable shadows of the difficulties now brought forward.

NOTES:

1. A "prejudice" is a prejudgment, that is, an adjudication of an issue without having first reviewed the appropriate evidence.

THE NATURE OF OUR IDEAS

-John Locke

(IP This selection consists of excerpts from Chapters 1, 2, 8, and 23 of Book II of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, first published in 1690.)

Directions of studying Locke's "The Nature of Our Ideas":

- 1) Background of Locke and the general viewpoints of Locke: Locke's *Essays Concerning Human Understanding* is also considered as the most important classics of the seventeenth century of European philosophy, particularly the second volume of this book. Our selection is from some core parts of the second volume that presents Locke's empiricist viewpoints on the issue of the origin of human knowledge most evidently. In reading the texts, we will find that there occurs a line of retreating in Locke's arguments. When he criticizes Descartes' "innate ideas" thesis, when he talks about "white paper" or "blank board" metaphors, and his analysis on human simple ideas all incline to the extreme empiricist position on the issue of human knowledge. While when he talks about the complex ideas, the secondary properties and the issue of substance, he gradually get confused, sometimes, he has to take the same line of Descartes' rationalistic position. It shows that the elementary form of empiricism is not strong enough to handle the complicated epistemological issues.
- 2) The strategy of Locke's arguments: Locke bases most of his theory on the analysis of human psychological actions, and the relationship between human idea and the objective world, even when he discusses the issue of substances, his arguments relies on also his epistemological premises.
- 3) Arguments with which Locke used to show his empiricism: There are four parts in the article of our textbook, and they can be generalized as four arguments. The first part presents us Locke's "origin of human knowledge" argument, or we may say, the "white paper" argument. The second part gives us the "analysis of human simple idea" argument. The third part is used to discuss the issue of human complex ideas, but it is his "quality and property of body" argument impresses us the most. The last part of the article is Locke's "substances" argument. We may spell out the content of each argument by ourselves.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
Native idea, simple idea, complex idea, experience, observation, power, faculty, original or primary quality, secondary quality, substance in general, substance in particular.
- 5) Important propositions:
 1. let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas.
 2. So that if anyone will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all.

6) Study questions:

1. What is the implication of Locke's "white paper" thesis?
2. What is Locke's opinion on the difference between the primary quality and secondary quality?
3. What does Locke intend to show with his talking about the "Billiard ball?"
4. Make generalization on Locke's idea of substance.

Of Ideas In General, and Their Original

Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks; and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the *ideas* that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas—such as are those expressed by the words *whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness*, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired. *How he comes by them?*

I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already; and, I suppose what I have said in the foregoing Book will be much more easily admitted, when I have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has; and by, what ways and degrees they may come into the mind—for which I shall appeal to everyone's own observation and experience.

Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: —How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the *materials* of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the *materials* of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of *yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet*, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.

Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnish the understanding

with ideas is, —the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; —which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without. And such are *perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds; —which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *internal sense*. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of SENSATION, and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term *operations* here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. *External objects* furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and *the mind* furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.

Of Simple Ideas

The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are *simple* and some *complex*.

Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed. For, though the sight and touch often take in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas; —as a man sees at once motion and color; the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax: yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses. The coldness and

hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of sugar, and smell of a rose. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but *one uniform appearance, or conception in the mind*, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.

These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to *invent* or *frame* one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the understanding *destroy* those that are there. The dominion of man, in this little world of his own understanding being much what the same as it is in the great world of visible things; wherein his power, however managed by, art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing toward the making the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being. The same inability will everyone find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his understanding one simple idea, not received in by his senses from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have anyone try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt: and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colors, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds.

Some further Considerations Concerning our Simple Ideas of Sensation

Concerning the simple ideas of Sensation, it is to be considered, —that whatsoever is so constituted in nature as to be able, by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea; which whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on and considered there to be a real positive idea in the understanding, as much as any other whatsoever; though, perhaps, the cause of it be but a privation of the subject.

Thus the ideas of heat and cold, light and darkness, white and black, motion and rest, are equally clear and positive ideas in the mind; though, perhaps, some of the causes which produce them are barely privations, in those subjects from whence our

senses derive those ideas. These the understanding, in its view of them, considers all as distinct positive ideas, without taking notice of the causes that produce them: which is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the understanding, but to the nature of the things existing without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished; it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white or black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the superficies, to make any object appear white or black.

To discover the nature of our *ideas* the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them *as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds*; and *as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us*: that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.

Whatsoever the mind perceives *in itself*; or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call *idea*; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call *quality* of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold. and round, —the power to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them ideas; which *ideas*, if I speak of sometimes as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us.

Qualities thus considered in bodies are,

First, such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be; and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived; and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses: v.g. Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility: divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible: they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter, of that which was but one before; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number.

These I call *original* or *primary qualities* of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. [namely] solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.

Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colors, sounds, tastes, etc. These I call *secondary qualities*. To these might be added a *third* sort, which are allowed to be barely powers; though they are as much real qualities in the subject as those which I, to comply with the common way of speaking, call qualities, but for distinction, secondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new color, or consistency, in *wax* or *clay*, —by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in *me* a new idea or sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before, —by the same primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts.

The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in.

If then external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas therein; and yet we perceive these *original* qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves, or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brains or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion; which produces these ideas which we have of them in us.

After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of *secondary* qualities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. For, it being manifest that there are bodies and good store of bodies, each whereof are so small, that we cannot by any of our senses discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, —as is evident in the particles of the air and water, and others extremely smaller than those; perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air and water, as the particles of air and water are smaller than peas or hailstones; —let us suppose at present that the different motions and figures, bulk and number, of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colors and smells of bodies; v.g. [for example] that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter, of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue color, and sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds. It being no more impossible to conceive that God should

annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance.

What I have said concerning colors and smells may be understood also of tastes and sounds, and other the like sensible qualities: which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us; and depend on those primary qualities. Viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts.

From whence I think it easy to draw this observation,—that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves. They are, in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts, in the bodies themselves, which we call so.

Flame is denominated hot and light; snow, white and cold: and manna, white and sweet, from the ideas they produce in us. Which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror, and it would by most men be judged very extravagant if one should say otherwise. And yet he that will consider that the same fire that, at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does, at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say—that this idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is *actually in the fire*; and his idea of pain, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is *not* in the fire. Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us: and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts?

The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them, —whether anyone's senses perceive them or no: and therefore they may be called *real* qualities, because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colors, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and all colors, tastes, odors, and sounds, *as they are such particular ideas*, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts.

Let us consider the red and white colors in porphyry. Hinder light from striking on it, and its colors vanish; it no longer produces any such ideas in us: upon the return of light it produces these appearances on us again. Can anyone think any

real alterations are made in the porphyry by the presence or absence of light; and that those ideas of whiteness and redness are really in porphyry in the light, when it is plain it *has no color in the dark*? It has, indeed, such a configuration of particles, both night and day, as are apt, by the rays of light rebounding from some parts of that hard stone, to produce in us the idea of redness, and from others the idea of whiteness; but whiteness or redness are not in it at any time, but such a texture that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us.

Ideas being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an account how the same water, at the same time, may produce the idea of cold by one hand and of heat by the other: whereas it is impossible that the same water, if those ideas were really in it, should at the same time be both hot and cold. For, if we imagine *warmth*, as it is in our hands, to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits, we may understand how it is possible that the same water may, at the same time, produce the sensations of heat in one hand and cold in the other: which yet *figure* never does, that never producing the idea of a square by one hand which has produced the idea of a globe by another. But if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any other body, it is easy to be understood, that if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one of the hands, and a less than in those of the other, it will increase the motion of the one hand and lessen it in the other; and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon.

I have in what just goes before been engaged in physical inquiries a little further than perhaps I intended. But, it being necessary to make the nature of sensation a little understood; and to make the difference between the *qualities* in bodies, and the *ideas* produced by them in the mind, to be distinctly conceived, without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them; — I hope I shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural philosophy; it being necessary in our present inquiry to distinguish the *primary* and *real* qualities of bodies, which are always in them (viz. solidity, extension, figure, number, and motion, or rest, and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the bodies they are in are big enough singly to be discerned), from those *secondary* and *imputed* qualities, which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones, when they operate without being distinctly discerned; — whereby we may also come to know what ideas are, and what are not, resemblances of something really existing in the bodies we denominate from them.

The qualities, then, that are in bodies, rightly considered, are of three sorts: —
First, The bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest of their solid

parts. Those are in them, whether we perceive them or not; and when they are of that size that we can discover them, we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself; as is plain in artificial things. These I call *primary qualities*.

Secondly, The power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colors, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. These are usually called *sensible qualities*.

Thirdly, The power that is in any body, by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of *another body*, as to make it operate on our senses differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid. These are usually called *powers*.

The first of these, as has been said, I think may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities; because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or not: and upon their different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend.

The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things: which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities.

To conclude. Beside those forementioned primary qualities in bodies, viz. bulk, figure, extension, number, and motion of their solid parts; all the rest, whereby we take notice of bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing else but several powers in them, depending on those primary qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our bodies to produce several different ideas in us; or else, by operating on other bodies, so to change their primary qualities as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what before they did. The former of these, I think, may be called secondary qualities *immediately perceivable*: the latter, secondary qualities, *mediately perceivable*.

Of Our Complex Ideas of Substances

The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas *can* subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some *substratum* wherein they do

subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call *substance*.

So that if anyone will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what *support* of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If anyone should be asked, what is the subject wherein color or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before mentioned who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was—a great tortoise: but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied—*something, he know not what*. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children: who, being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is *something*: which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the *general* name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that support *substantia*; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or upholding.

An obscure and relative idea of *substance in general* being thus made we come to have the ideas of *particular sorts of substances*, by collecting *such* combinations of simple ideas as are, by experience and observation of men's senses, taken notice of to exist together; and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of that substance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, etc.; of which substances, whether anyone has any other *clear* idea, further than of certain simple ideas co-existent together, I appeal to everyone's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a smith or a jeweler commonly knows better than a philosopher; who, whatever *substantial forms* he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them: only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and therefore when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities: as body is a thing that is

extended, figured, and capable of motion; spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate that the substance is supposed always *something besides* the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is.

Hence, when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, etc., though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we used to find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet, *because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another*, we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.

The same thing happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, etc., which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other *substance*, which we call spirit; whereby yet it is evident that, having no other idea or notion of matter, but something wherein those many sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist; by supposing a substance wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, etc., do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the *substratum* to those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the *substratum* to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain then, that the idea of *corporeal substance* in matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions, as that of *spiritual substance*, or spirit: and therefore, from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit.

OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

-George Berkeley

(IP From George Berkeley, *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*.

First published in 1710.)

Directions of studying Berkley's article:

- 1) Background of the author and his general viewpoint: Our texts are the parts of Berkley's work *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. Berkley's philosophy is popularly noticed, that is because his anti-materialism thesis and his idealism way in answering the issue of human knowledge. Another feature of Berkley's theory is that he keeps the empiricism tradition of British philosophy, his starting point is to develop Locke's idea concerning the qualities of bodies. Being a religious figure of history, Berkley does not worth studying, but being a philosopher, his religious beliefs are philosophized, Berkley's works need to be treated seriously. His theory, in a certain sense, indicates the mortal disadvantage of the extreme empiricism.
- 2) Strategy of Berkley's arguments: Berkley's arguments are primarily based on the investigation of human psychological activities, some time, are mixed up with religious superstition, and theological dogmatism.
- 3) Argumants with which Berkley used to show his idea: The beginning part of the texts can be generalized as a "mind and perceiving " argument, it shows that Berkley intends his theory to be based on empiricist way of epistemology. Then there is a "secondary quality" argument that provides the subjectivism in resolving the issue of origin of human knowledge. Thirdly, Berkley concentrates on the argument against materialism, finally, there is his substance of spirit argument, that shows the theological essence of Berkley's philosophy.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
Spirit, myself, subject, image, abstract idea, material substance, substance of spirit, passiveness, inertness.
- 5) Important propositions:
 1. This perceiving, active being is what I call "mind," "spirit," "soul," or "myself."
 2. For what are the fore-mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? And what do we perceive besides our own ideas for sensation?
 3. I shall further add that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever.
- 6) Study questions:
 1. Make summery for Berkley's "secondary quality" argument.
 2. Why does Berkley deny the material substance?

3. What connection is there between Locke's and Berkley's idea on the issue of human knowledge?
 4. What is the implication of Berkley's talking about "apple?"
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It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the *objects* of human knowledge that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination—either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colors, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive, for example, hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odors, the palate with tastes, and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain color, taste, smell, figure, and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing signified by the name "apple;" other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book and the like sensible things—which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.

2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call "mind," "spirit," "soul," or "myself." By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived—for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.

3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. —I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by anyone that shall attend to what is meant by the term "exist" when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed—meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odor, that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the

like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being Perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence so ever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? And what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?

5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of *abstract ideas*. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colors, heat and cold, extension and figures—in a word, the things we see and feel—what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? And is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract — if that may properly be called “abstraction” which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it.

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, to wit, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind—that their *being* is to be perceived or known, that, consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit—it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a

spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts, the *being* of a sensible thing from its being perceived.

7. From what has been said it follows there is not any other substance than *spirit*, or that which perceives. But, for the fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are color, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like—that is, the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as to perceive; that, therefore, wherein color, figure, and the like qualities exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or *substratum* of those ideas.

8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a color or figure can be like nothing but another color or figure. If we look but ever so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to anyone whether it be sense to assert a color is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest.

9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt *primary* and *secondary* qualities. [1] By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colors, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call “matter.” By “matter,” therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence it is plain that the very notion of what is called “matter” or “corporeal substance” involves a contradiction in it.

10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities, do exist without the mind in unthinking substances do at the same time acknowledge that colors, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities do not—which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of

matter. This they take for an undoubted truth which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire anyone to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must withal give it some color or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.

11. Again, *great* and *small*, *swift* and *slow*, are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension, therefore, which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow; that is, say are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension in general, and motion in general thus we see how much the tenet of extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on that strange doctrine of *abstract ideas*. And here I cannot but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of matter or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of *material prima*, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without extension, solidity cannot be conceived; since, therefore, it has been shown that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of solidity.

12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative and dependent on men's understanding that it is strange to think how anyone should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line; all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. And in each instance it is plain the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind.

13. Unity I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea answering the word "unity" I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it; on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and

reflection. To say no more, it is an *abstract idea*.

14. I shall further add that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear various and cannot, therefore, be the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because, the thing remaining unaltered, the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object?

15. In short, let anyone consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colors and tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or color in an outward object as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or color of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly show it to be impossible that any color or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject without the mind, or, in truth, that there should be any such thing as an outward object.

16. But let us examine a little the received opinion. —It is said extension is a mode or accident of matter, and that matter is the *substratum* that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain what is meant by matter's "supporting" extension. Say you, I have no idea of matter and, therefore, cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident "support" cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense —as when we say that pillars support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken?

17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers [2] declare themselves to mean by "material substance," we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of being in general together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of being appears to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting

accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of those words; it must, therefore, be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words "material substance," I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any further in discussing this material *substratum* or support of figure and motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy and altogether inconceivable?

18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will; but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connection betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed *without* resembling them. Hence it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order we see them in at present, without their concurrence.

19. But though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said, for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced, since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledge to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so must needs be a very precarious opinion, since it is to suppose, without any reason at

all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless and serve to no manner of purpose.

20. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose—what no one can deny possible—an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence has not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this there can be no question—which one consideration is enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have for the existence of bodies without the mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any further proof against the existence of matter after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place as well because I think arguments a posteriori are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated a priori, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think me needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two to anyone that is capable of the least reflection? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or color to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may make you see that what you contend for is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue: if you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compares of external bodies which you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say the bare possibility of your opinion's being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same

time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it does not show that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to anyone the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of *material substance*.

24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant by “the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind.” To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their conviction. It is no this, therefore, that I insist, to wit, that “the absolute existence of unthinking things” are words without a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.

25. All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive—there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived; but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflection, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything; neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sec. 8. whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles must certainly be false.

26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others

are changed or totally disappear. There is, therefore, some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains, therefore, that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal, active substance or spirit.

27. A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being—as it perceives ideas it is called “the understanding,” and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called “the will.” Hence there can be no *idea* formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (*vide* sec. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to anyone that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produces. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has ideas of two principal powers marked by the names “will” and “understanding,” distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of substance or being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers—which is signified by the name “soul” or “spirit.” This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words “will,” “soul,” “spirit” do not stand for different ideas or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. [Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating—in as much as we know or understand the meaning of those words.][3]

28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas does very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on experience; but when we talk of unthinking agents or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words.

29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some *other will* or spirit that produces them.

Note:

1. e.g. Locke, p. 139 ff.
2. e.g. Locke. P. 144: "If anyone will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it all but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents."
3. This sentence was added to the second edition of 1734 and introduces the technical term "notion", but it is doubtful whether it marks a change of doctrine.

SCEPTICAL DOUBTS CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING

David Hume

(IP From David Hume: *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding*,
posthumous edition of 1777.)

Directions of studying Hume's article:

- 1) Hume's *A treatise of Human Nature* covers three volumes, the first volume is concerned with the issue of human understanding; the second volume is concerned with the issue of human emotion; and the third volume is concerned with the issue of human morality. Hume's thinking line is to reduce all philosophical problems into the problems of human nature, and further, reduce into the problems of human understanding. Then the understanding is analyzed as the knowledge of relations among things, the essential part of all kinds of relations is considered as the causal relation. With the investigation of human knowledge of causal relation, Hume presents his answering to the question where human knowledge come from, and all other epistemological questions. Hume's doubt points to not only human reason, but also human sensation, his aim is to demolish the whole system of human knowledge. Hume's thesis denying the causal law, denying the knowledge concerning causal law makes the most brilliant part of his philosophy, and this thesis provides the foundation for his skepticism philosophy. We should notice that Hume does not really want his skepticism thorough-going, when he talks about morality and other practical issues, what he denied in the very beginning of his philosophy are actually admitted in sneakily. Hume's psychology and his ethic are inconsistent with his epistemology in many aspects.
- 2) Hume's arguments: In Part One of the article of our textbook, Hume offers his "origin of human knowledge" argument. It claims that all human knowledge is generated from experience. In Part Two, Hume claims his famous "causal inference" argument. It claims that all of our causal knowledge is actually based on analogy, similarity, customary and imagination. In one word, our causal knowledge is subjective and implausible.
- 3) Disciplined terms:
Demonstrative, analogy, similarity, conjunction, inference, probable, intuitively.
- 4) Important propositions:
 1. The contrary of every matter is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same faculty and distinctness.
 2. All reasoning concerning matter of fact seems to be founded on the relation of *cause and effect*.
 3. It is not reasoning which engage us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from similar causes which are, to appearance, similar.
- 5) Study questions:

1. What is the implication of Hume's "billiard ball" story?
 2. According to Hume, how dose people make causal inference?
 3. For what reason dose Hume think human causal inference as merely a illusion?
 4. What is the difference between Descartes' "universal doubt" and Hume's skepticism?
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PART I

ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *Relations of Ideas*, and *Matters of Fact*. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. *That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides*, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty*, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. *That the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, *that it will rise*. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.

It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of so important an enquiry, may be the more excusable; while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful, by exciting curiosity, and destroying that implicit faith and security, which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry. The discovery of defects in the common philosophy, if any such there be, will not, I presume, be a discouragement, but rather an incitement, as is usual, to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public.

All reasoning concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of

Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a reason; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark are the effects of the human make and fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other.

If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.

I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings *a priori*; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence an matter of fact.

This proposition, *that causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience*, will readily be admitted with regard to such objects, as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us; since we must be conscious of the utter inability, which we then lay under, of foretelling what could arise from them. Present two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy; he will never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as to require great force to separate them in a direct line, while they make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure. Such events, as bear little analogy to the common course of nature,

are also readily confessed to be known only by experience; nor does any man imagine that the explosion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadstone, could ever be discovered by arguments *a priori*. In like manner, when an effect is supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or secret structure of parts, we made too difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience. Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a tiger?

But the same truth may not appear, at first sight, to have the same evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from our first appearance in the world, which bear a close analogy to the whole course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the simple qualities of objects, without any secret structure of parts. We are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason, without experience. We fancy, that were we brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one Billiard ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree.

But to convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience, the following reflections may, perhaps, suffice. Were any object presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect, which will result from it, without consulting past observation; after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second Billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter *a priori*, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal?

And as the first imagination or invention of a particular effect, in all natural operations, is arbitrary, where we consult not experience; so must we also esteem the supposed tie or connexion between the cause and effect, which binds them together, and renders it impossible that any other effect could result from the operation of that cause. When I see, for instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards

another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; my I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings *a priori* will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference.

In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, *a priori*, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary; since there are always many other effects, which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and experience.

Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher, who is rational and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power, which produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer; as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.

Nor is geometry, when taken into the assistance of natural philosophy, ever able to remedy this defect, or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes, by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so justly celebrated. Every part of mixed [applied] mathematics proceeds upon the supposition that certain laws are established by nature in her operations; and abstract reasonings are employed, either to assist experience in the discovery of these laws, or to determine their influence in particular

instances, where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity. Thus, it is a law of motion, discovered by experience, that the moment or force of any body in motion is in the compound ratio or proportion of its solid contents and its velocity; and consequently, that a small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise the greatest weight, if, by any contrivance or machinery, we can increase the velocity of that force, so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist. Geometry assists us in the application of this law, by giving us the just dimensions of all the parts and figures which can enter into any species of machine; but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience, and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards the knowledge of it. When we reason *a priori*, and consider merely any object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object, such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable and inviolable connexion between them. A man must be very sagacious who could discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of heat, and ice of cold, without being previously acquainted with the operation of these qualities.

PART II

But we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard to the question first proposed. Each solution still gives rise to a new question as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther enquiries. When it is asked, *What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact?* The proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, *what is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation?* It may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we still carry on our sifting humour, and ask, *What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?* this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication. Philosophers, that give themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency, have a hard task when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push them from every corner to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to bring them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confusion, is to be modest in our pretensions; and even to discover the difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance.

I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are *not* founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend.

It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from

all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of these objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of these qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communication it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers* and principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, (*Note: The word *Power*, is here used in a loose and popular sense. The more accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argument.) and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, anything which it knows of their nature. As to past *Experience*, it can be allowed to give *direct* and *certain* information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers: but does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same, *I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect*, and *I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects*. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I

must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact.

This negative argument must certainly, in process of time, become altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philosophers shall turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or intermediate step, which supports the understanding in this conclusion. But as the question is yet new, every reader may not trust so far to his own penetration, as to conclude, because an argument escapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not really exist. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult task; and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge, endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument.

All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning *a priori*.

If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgement, these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence, according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.

In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to

reject that great guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw advantage from the similarity which nature has placed among different objects. From causes which appear *similar* we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions. Now it seems evident that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this appearing similarity, expects the same taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of reasoning which, from one instance, draws a conclusion, so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise different from that single one? This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.

Should it be said that, from a number of uniform experiments, we *infer* a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in different terms. The question still recurs, on what process of argument this *inference* is founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that the colour, consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities, without the aid of experience; contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here, then, is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform effects, resulting from certain objects, and teaches us that those particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces. When a new object, endowed with similar sensible qualities, is produced, we expect similar powers and forces, and look for a like effect. Form a body of like colour and consistence with bread we expect like nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or progress of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man says, *I have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers:* And when he says, *Similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers,* he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To say it is

experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say skepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge.

I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that, though all the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. Even though we examine all sources of our knowledge, and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain a suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the present subject, there are some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of mistake.

It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay infants, nay even brute beasts—improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may

justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your inquiry; since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle.

SCIENTIFIC METHOD -Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel

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Direction of studying the article "Scientific Method"

- 1) Background of the author and general ideas of the article: Cohen was born in Russia in 1880, after he got philosophy degree in America, he worked as a professor for several universities. And he was popularly respected for his contribution to philosophy of science. The book *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* was the last works of Cohen, the other author of the book-Nagel was a student of Cohen. The book is aimed to expose the nature, the function, different perspectives of logic and science.

Our article is only a part of the book, and in this part, the author intends to show us the nature, the function and the types of scientific method. In the beginning three parts of the article, the authors concentrate on the issue of the relationship between scientific facts and scientific hypothesis. According to the authors, science does not proceed from merely by collecting facts based on observation. Indeed, facts would not appear if there were no theoretical analysis and interpretation. What is more, the theories are always mixed up with scientific hypothesis-tentative assertions that rest on very little factual evidence. Accordingly, science involves interplay of theories and facts, evidence and hypothesis, as well as systematic investigations and occasional discoveries. The authors claim that scientific method aims to discover what the facts truly are, but the discovery of what the facts are could not occur without theoretical analysis, that must be based on the knowledge background of the scientist.

So, Cohen and Nagel stress on the important function that scientific hypothesis plays in the scientific works. They indicate that hypothesis is required everywhere of scientific works, it provides possibilities of the solution of scientific problem, and it is better to hold different hypothesis in storage, and then to examine them carefully. In the later parts of the article, they also discuss the self-corrective nature of scientific method; the abstract nature of scientific theories. Then they talk about the types of scientific theories. Cohen's and Nagel's exploration of the scientific method is not perfect, but we need to study it, because being a classical works of philosophy of science, it played great part in his times-more than half century ago. From which, many of excellent works of philosophy of science of our times are generated.

- 2) Disciplined terms:

fact, Scientific method, Hypothesis, evidence, system, self-corrective, abstraction, common sense, inquiry, formal inference.

- 3) Important propositions:

1. Consequently, scientific method aims to discover what the facts truly are, and the use of

method must be guided by discovered facts.

2. There is therefore no sharp line dividing facts from guesses or hypothesis.

3. All theories involve abstraction from concrete subject matter.

4. On the whole it may be said that the safety of science depends on there being men who care more for the justice of their method than for any result obtained by their use.

4) Study questions:

1. What do Cohen and Nagel mean by a hypothesis? When do they suggest we may rationally believe one?

2. According to the article, what is the difference between the physical theory and mathematical or abstract theory? And what are examples of each?

3. The article says that science appeals to "no special revelation or authority whose deliverance are the final," does this mean that scientist can not be religious?

4. What exactly is a "fact"? Does the article ever give a definition of one, implicitly or explicitly?

FACTS AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD

The method of science does not seek to impose the desires and hopes of men upon the flux of things in a capricious manner. It may indeed be employed to satisfy the desires of men. But its successful use depends upon seeking, in a deliberate manner, and irrespective of what men's desires are, to recognize, as well as to take advantage of, the structure which the flux possesses.

Consequently, scientific method aims to discover what the facts truly are, and the use of the method must be guided by the discovered facts. But, as we have repeatedly pointed out, what the facts are cannot be discovered without reflection. Knowledge of the facts cannot be equated to the brute immediacy of our sensations. When our skin comes into contact with objects having high temperatures or with liquid air, the immediate experiences may be similar. We cannot, however, conclude without error that the temperatures of the substances touched are the same. Sensory experience sets the *problem* for knowledge, and just because such experience is immediate and final it must become informed by reflective analysis before knowledge can be said to take place.

Every inquiry arises from some felt problem, so that no inquiry can even get under way unless some selection or sifting of the subject matter has taken place. Such selection requires, we have been urging all along, some hypothesis, preconception, prejudice, which guides the research as well as delimits the subject matter of inquiry. Every inquiry is specific in the sense that it has a definite problem to solve, and such solution terminates the inquiry. It is idle to collect "facts" unless there is a problem upon which they are supposed to bear.

The ability to formulate problems whose solution may also help solve other problems is a rare gift, requiring extraordinary genius. The problems which meet us in daily life can be solved, if they can be solved at all, by the application of scientific method. But such problems do not, as a rule, raise far-reaching issues. The most striking applications of scientific method are to be found in the various natural and social sciences.

The "facts" for which every inquiry reaches out are propositions for whose truth there is considerable evidence. Consequently what the "facts" are must be determined by inquiry, and cannot be determined antecedently to inquiry. Moreover, what we believe to be the facts clearly depends upon the stage of our inquiry. There is therefore no sharp line dividing facts from guesses or hypotheses. During any inquiry the status of a proposition may change from that of hypothesis to that of fact, or from that of fact to that of hypothesis. Every so-called fact, therefore, *may* be challenged for the evidence upon which it is asserted to be a fact, even though no such challenge is actually made.

HYPOTHESES AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD

The method of science would be impossible if the hypotheses which are suggested as solutions could not be elaborated to reveal what they imply. The full meaning of a hypothesis is to be discovered in its implications.

Hypotheses are suggested to an inquirer by something in the subject matter under investigation, and by his previous knowledge of other subject matters. No rules can be offered for obtaining fruitful hypotheses, any more than rules can be given for discovering significant problems.

Hypotheses are required at every stage of an inquiry. It must not be forgotten that what are called general principles of laws (which may have been confirmed in a previous inquiry) can be applied to a present, still untermiated inquiry only with some risk. For they may not in fact be applicable. The general laws of any science function as hypotheses, which guide the inquiry in all its phases.

Hypotheses can be regarded as suggestions of possible connections between actual facts or imagined ones. The question of the truth of hypotheses need not, therefore, always be raised. The necessary feature of a hypothesis, from this point of view, is that it should be statable in a determinate form, so that its implications can be discovered by logical means.

The number of hypotheses which may occur to an inquirer is without limit, and is a function of the character of his imagination. There is a need, therefore, for a technique to choose between the alternative suggestions, and to make sure that the alternatives are in fact, and not only in appearance, *different* theories. Perhaps the

most important and best explored part of such a technique is the technique of formal inference. For this reason, the structure of formal logic has been examined at some length. The object of that examination has been to give the reader an adequate sense of what formal validity means, as well as to provide him with a synoptic view of the power and range of formal logic.

It is convenient to have on hand—in storage, so to speak—different hypotheses whose consequences have been carefully explored. It is the task of mathematics to provide and explore alternative hypotheses. Mathematics receives hints concerning what hypotheses to study from the natural sciences; and the natural sciences are indebted to mathematics for suggestions concerning the type of order which their subject matter embodies.

The deductive elaboration of hypotheses is not the sole task of scientific method. Since there is a plurality of possible hypotheses, it is the risk of inquiry to determine which of the possible explanations or solutions of the problem is in best agreement with the facts. Formal considerations are therefore never sufficient to establish the material truth of any theory.

No hypothesis which states a general proposition can be demonstrated as absolutely true. We have seen that all inquiry which deals with matters of fact employs probable inference. The task of such investigations is to select that hypothesis which is the most probable on the factual evidence; and it is the task of further inquiry to find other factual evidence which will increase or decrease the probability of such a theory.

EVIDENCE AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD

Scientific method pursues the road of systematic doubt. It does not doubt *all* things, for this is clearly impossible. But it does question whatever lacks adequate evidence in its support.

Science is not satisfied with psychological certitude, for the mere intensity with which a belief is held is no guarantee of its truth. Science demands and looks for logically adequate grounds for the propositions it advances.

No single proposition dealing with matters of fact is beyond every significant doubt. No proposition is so well supported by evidence that other evidence may not increase or decrease its probability. However, while no single proposition is indubitable, the body of knowledge which supports it, and of which it is itself a part, is better grounded than any alternative body of knowledge.

Science is thus always ready to abandon a theory when the facts so demand. But the facts must really demand it. It is not unusual for a theory to be modified so that it may be retained in substance even though “facts” contradicted an earlier

formulation of it. Scientific procedure is therefore a mixture of a willingness to change, and an obstinacy in holding on to, theories apparently incompatible with facts.

The verification of theories is only approximate. Verification simply shows that, within the margin of experimental error, the experiment is *compatible* with the verified hypothesis.

SYSTEM IN THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE

The ideal of science is to achieve a systematic interconnection of facts. Isolated propositions do not constitute a science. Such propositions serve merely as an opportunity to find the logical connection between them and other propositions.

“Common sense” is content with a miscellaneous collection of information. As a consequence, the propositions it asserts are frequently vague, the range of their application is unknown, and their mutual compatibility is generally very questionable. The advantages of discovering a system among facts is therefore obvious. A condition for achieving a system is the introduction of accuracy in the assertions made. The limit within which propositions are true is then clearly defined. Moreover, inconsistencies between propositions asserted become eliminated gradually because propositions which are part of a system must support and correct one another. The extent and accuracy of our information is thus increased. In fact, scientific method differs from other methods in the accuracy and number of facts it studies.

When, as frequently happens, a science abandons one theory for another, it is a mistake to suppose that science has become “bankrupt” and that it is incapable of discovering the structure of the subject matter it studies. Such changes indicate rather that the science is progressively realizing its ideal. For such changes arise from correcting previous observations or reasoning, and such correction means that we are in possession of more reliable facts.

The ideal of system requires that the propositions asserted to be true should be connected without the introduction of further propositions for which the evidence is small or nonexistent. In a system the number of unconnected propositions and the number of propositions for which there is no evidence are at a minimum. Consequently, in a system the requirements of simplicity, as expressed in the principle of Occam’s razor, are satisfied in a high degree. For that principle declares that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. This may be interpreted as a demand that whatever is capable of proof should be proved. But the idea of system requires just that.

The evidence for propositions which are elements in a system accumulates more rapidly than that for isolated propositions. The evidence for a proposition may

come from its own verifying instances, or from the verifying instances of *other* propositions which are connected with the first in a system. It is this systematic character of scientific theories which gives such high probabilities to the various individual propositions of a science.

THE SELF-CORRECTIVE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD

Science does not desire to obtain conviction for its propositions in *any* manner and at *any* price. Propositions must be supported by logically acceptable evidence, which must be weighed carefully and tested by the well-known canons of necessary and probable inference. It follows that the *method* of science is more stable, and more important to men of science, than any particular result achieved by its means.

In virtue of its method, the enterprise of science is a self-corrective process. It appeals to no special revelation or authority whose deliverances are indubitable and final. It claims no infallibility, but relies upon the methods of developing and testing hypotheses for assured conclusions. The canons of inquiry are themselves discovered in the process of reflection, and may themselves become modified in the course of study. The method makes possible the noting and correction of errors by continued application of itself.

General propositions can be established only by the method of repeated sampling. Consequently, the propositions which a science puts forward for study are either confirmed in all possible experiments or modified in accordance with the evidence. It is this self-corrective nature of the method which allows us to challenge any proposition, but which also assures us that the theories which science accepts are more probable than any alternative theories. By not claiming more certainty than the evidence warrants, scientific method succeeds in obtaining more logical certainty than any other method yet devised.

In the process of gathering and weighing evidence, there is a continuous appeal from facts to theories or principles, and from principles to facts. For there is nothing intrinsically indubitable, there are no absolutely first principles, in the sense of principles which are self-evident or which must be known prior to everything else.

The method of science is thus essentially circular. We obtain evidence for principles by appealing to empirical material, to what is alleged to be "fact"; and we select, analyze, and interpret empirical material on the basis of principles. In virtue of such give and take between facts and principles, everything that is dubitable falls under careful scrutiny at one time or another.

THE ABSTRACT NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

No theory asserts *everything* that can possibly be asserted about a subject matter. Every theory selects certain aspects of it and excludes others. Unless it were possible to do this—either because such other aspects are irrelevant or because their influence on those selected is very minute—science as we know it would be impossible.

All theories involve abstraction from concrete subject matter. No rule can be given as to which aspects of a subject matter should be abstracted and so studied independently of other aspects. But in virtue of the goal of science—the achievement of a systematic interconnection of phenomena—in general those aspects will be abstracted which make a realization of this goal possible. Certain common elements in the phenomenon studied must be found, so that the endless variety of phenomena may be viewed as a system in which their structure is exhibited.

Because of the abstractness of theories, science often seems in patent contradiction with “common sense.” In “common sense” the unique character and the pervasive character of things are not distinguished, so that the attempt by science to disclose the invariant features often gives the appearance of artificiality. Theories are then frequently regarded as “convenient fictions” or as “unreal.” However, such criticisms overlook the fact that it is just certain *selected invariant relations* of things in which science is interested, so that many familiar properties of things are necessarily neglected by the sciences. Moreover, they forget that “common sense” itself operates in terms of abstractions, which are familiar and often confused, and which are inadequate to express the complex structure of the flux of things.

TYPES OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

Scientific explanation consists in subsuming under some rule or law which expresses an invariant character of a group of events, the particular events it is said to explain. Laws themselves may be explained, and in the same manner, by showing that they are consequences of more comprehensive theories. The effect of such progressive explanation of events by laws, laws by wider laws or theories, is to reveal the interconnection of many apparently isolated propositions.

It is clear, however, that the process of explanation must come to a halt at some point. Theories which cannot be shown to be special consequences from a wider connection of facts must be left unexplained, and accepted as a part of the brute fact of existence. Material considerations, in the form of contingent matters of fact, must be recognized in at least two places. There is contingency at the level of sense: just *this* and not *that* is given in sense experience. And there is contingency at the level of explanation: a definite system, although not the only possible one from the point of

view of formal logic, is found to be exemplified in the flux of things.

In a previous chapter we have enumerated several kinds of "laws" which frequently serve as explanations of phenomena. There is, however, another interesting distinction between theories. Some theories appeal to an easily imagined *hidden mechanism* which will explain the observable phenomena; other theories eschew all reference to such hidden mechanisms, and make use of *relations* abstracted from the phenomena actually observable. The former are called *physical* theories; the latter are called *mathematical* or *abstractive* theories.

It is important to be aware of the difference between these two kinds of theories, and to understand that some minds are especially attracted to one kind, while others are comfortable only with the other kind. But it is also essential not to suppose that either kind of theory is more fundamental or more valid than the other. In the history of science there is a constant oscillation between theories of these two types; sometimes both types of theories are used successfully on the same subject matter. Let us, however, make clear the difference between them.

The English physicist Rankine explained the distinction as follows: There are two methods of framing a theory. In a mathematical or abstractive theory, "a class of objects or phenomena is defined... by describing... that assemblage of properties which is common to all the objects or phenomena composing the class, as perceived by the senses, without introducing anything hypothetical." In a physical theory "a class of objects is defined... as being constituted, in a manner not apparent to the senses, by a modification of some other class of objects or phenomena whose laws are already known." [1]

In the second kind of theory, some visualizable model is made the pattern for a mechanism hidden from the senses. Some physicists, like Kelvin, cannot be satisfied with anything less than a mechanical explanation of observable phenomena, no matter how complex such a mechanism may be. Examples of this kind of theory are the atomic theory of chemistry, the kinetic theory of matter as developed in thermodynamics and the behavior of gases, the theory of the gene in studies on heredity, the theory of lines of force in electrostatics, and the recent Bohr model of the atom in spectroscopy.

In the mathematical type of theory, the appeal to hidden mechanisms is eliminated, or at any rate is at a minimum. How this may be done is graphically described by Henri Poincaré: "Suppose we have before us any machine; the initial wheel work and the final wheel work alone are visible, but the transmission, the intermediary machinery by which the movement is communicated from one to the other, is hidden in the interior and escapes our view; we do not know whether the communication is made by gearing or by belts, by connecting-rods or by other contrivances. Do we say that it is impossible for us to understand anything about this

machine so long as we are not permitted to take it to pieces? You know well we do not, and that the principle of the conservation of energy suffices to determine for us the most interesting point. We easily ascertain that the final wheel turns ten times less quickly than the initial wheel, since these two wheels are visible; we are able thence to conclude that a couple applied to the one will be balanced by a couple ten times greater applied to the other. For that there is no need to penetrate the mechanism of this equilibrium and to know how the forces compensate each other in the interior of the machine.” [2] Examples of such theories are the theory of gravitation, Galileo’s laws of falling bodies, the theory of the flow of heat, the theory of organic evolution, and the theory of relativity.

As we suggested, it is useless to quarrel as to which type of theory is the more fundamental and which type should be universally adopted. Both kinds of theories have been successful in coordinating vast domains of phenomena, and fertile in making discoveries of the most important kind. At some periods in the history of a science, there is a tendency to mechanical models and atomicity; at others, to general principles connecting characteristics abstracted from directly observable phenomena; at still others, to a fusion or synthesis of these two points of view. Some scientists, like Kelvin, Faraday, Lodge, Maxwell, show an exclusive preference for “model” theories; other scientists, like Rankine, Ostwald, Duhem, can work best with the abstractive theories; and still others, like Einstein, have the unusual gift of being equally at home with both kinds.

THE LIMITS AND THE VALUE OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD

The desire for knowledge for its own sake is more widespread than is generally recognized by anti-intellectualists. It has its roots in the animal curiosity which shows itself in the cosmological questions of children and in the gossip of adults. No ulterior utilitarian motive makes people want to know about the private lives of their neighbors, the great, or the notorious. There is also a certain zest which makes people engage in various intellectual games or exercises in which one is required to find out something. But while the desire to know is wide, it is seldom strong enough to overcome the more powerful organic desires, and few indeed have both the inclination and the ability to face the arduous difficulties of scientific method in more than one special field. The desire to know is not often strong enough to sustain critical inquiry. Men generally are interested in the results, in the story or romance of science, not in the technical methods whereby these results are obtained and their truth continually is tested and qualified. Our first impulse is to accept the plausible as true and to reject the uncongenial as false. We have not the time, inclination, or energy to investigate everything. Indeed, the call to do so is often felt as irksome and joy-killing.

And when we are asked to treat our cherished beliefs as mere hypotheses, we rebel as violently as when those dear to us are insulted. This provides the ground for various movements that are hostile to rational scientific procedure (though their promoters do not often admit that it is science to which they are hostile).

Mystics, intuitionists, authoritarians, voluntarists, and fictionalists are all trying to undermine respect for the rational methods of science. These attacks have always met with wide acclaim and are bound to continue to do so, for they strike a responsive note in human nature. Unfortunately they do not offer any reliable alternative method for obtaining verifiable knowledge. The great French writer Pascal opposed to logic the spirit of subtlety or finesse (*esprit géométrique* and *esprit de finesse*) and urged that the heart has its reasons as well as the mind, reasons that cannot be accurately formulated but which subtle spirits apprehend none the less. Men as diverse as James Russell Lowell and George Santayana are agreed that:

“The soul is oracular still,”

and

“It is wisdom to trust the heart...

To trust the soul's invincible surmise.”

Now it is true that in the absence of omniscience we must trust our soul's surmise; and great men are those whose surmises or intuitions are deep or penetrating. It is only by acting on our surmise that we can procure the evidence in its favor. But only havoc can result from confusing a surmise with a proposition for which there is already evidence. Are all the reasons of the heart sound? Do all oracles tell the truth? The sad history of human experience is distinctly discouraging to any such claim. Mystic intuition may give men absolute subjective certainty, but can give no proof that contrary intuitions are erroneous. It is obvious that when authorities conflict we must weigh the evidence in their favor logically if we are to make a rational choice. Certainly, when a truth is questioned it is no answer to say, “I am convinced,” or, “I prefer to rely on this rather than on another authority.” The view that physical science is no guide to proof, but is a mere fiction, fails to explain why it has enabled us to anticipate phenomena of nature and to control them. These attacks on scientific method receive a certain color of plausibility because of some indefensible claims made by uncritical enthusiasts. But it is of the essence of scientific method to limit its own pretension. Recognizing that we do not know everything, it does not claim the ability to solve all of our practical problems. It is an error to suppose, as is often done, that science denies the truth of all unverified propositions. For that which is unverified today may be verified tomorrow. We may get at truth by guessing or in other ways. Scientific method, however, is concerned with verification. Admittedly

the wisdom of those engaged in this process has not been popularly ranked as high as that of the sage, the prophet, or the poet. Admittedly, also, we know of no way of supplying creative intelligence to those who lack it. Scientists, like all other human beings, may get into ruts and apply their techniques regardless of varying circumstances. There will always be formal procedures which are fruitless. Definitions and formal distinctions may be a sharpening of tools without the wit to use them properly, and statistical information may conform to the highest technical standards and yet be irrelevant and inconclusive. Nevertheless, scientific method is the only way to increase the general body of tested and verified truth and to eliminate arbitrary opinion. It is well to clarify our ideas by asking for the precise meaning of our words, and to try to check our favorite ideas by applying them to accurately formulated propositions.

In raising the question as to the social need for scientific method, it is well to recognize that the suspension of judgment which is essential to that method is difficult or impossible when we are pressed by the demands of immediate action. When my house is on fire, I must act quickly and promptly—I cannot stop to consider the possible causes, nor even to estimate the exact probabilities involved in the various alternative ways of reacting. For this reason, those who are bent upon some specific course of action often despise those devoted to reflection; and certain ultramodernists seem to argue as if the need for action guaranteed the truth of our decision. But the fact that I must either vote for candidate X or refrain from doing so does not of itself give me adequate knowledge. The frequency of our regrets makes this obvious. Wisely ordered society is therefore provided with means for deliberation and reflection *before* the pressure of action becomes irresistible. In order to assure the most thorough investigation, all possible views must be canvassed, and this means toleration of views that are *prima facie* most repugnant to us.

In general the chief social condition of scientific method is a widespread desire for truth that is strong enough to withstand the powerful forces which make us cling tenaciously to old views or else embrace every novelty because it is a change. Those who are engaged in scientific work need not only leisure for reflection and material for their experiment, but also a community that respects the pursuit of truth and allows freedom for the expression of intellectual doubt as to its most sacred or established institutions. Fear of offending established dogmas has been an obstacle to the growth of astronomy and geology and other physical sciences; and the fear of offending patriotic or respected sentiment is perhaps one of the strongest hindrances to scholarly history and social science. On the other hand, when a community indiscriminately acclaims every new doctrine the love of truth becomes subordinated to the desire for novel formulations.

On the whole it may be said that the safety of science depends on there being

men who care more for the justice of their methods than for any results obtained by their use. For this reason it is unfortunate when scientific research in the social field is largely in the hands of those not in a favorable position to oppose established or popular opinion.

We may put it the other way by saying that the physical sciences can be more liberal because we are sure that foolish opinions will be readily eliminated by the shock of facts. In the social field, however, no one can tell what harm may come of foolish ideas before the foolishness is finally, if ever, demonstrated. None of the precautions of scientific method can prevent human life from being an adventure, and no scientific investigator knows whether he will reach his goal. But scientific method does enable large numbers to walk with surer steps. By analyzing the possibilities of any step or plan, it becomes possible to anticipate the future and adjust ourselves to it in advance. Scientific method thus minimizes the shock of novelty and the uncertainty of life. It enables us to frame policies of actions and of moral judgment fit for a wider outlook than those of immediate physical stimulus or organic response.

Scientific method is the only effective way of strengthening the love of truth. It develops the intellectual courage to face difficulties and to overcome illusions that are pleasant temporarily but destructive ultimately. It settles differences without any external force by appealing to our common rational nature. The way of science, even if it is up a steep mountain, is open to all. Hence, while sectarian and partisan faiths are based on personal choice or temperament and divide men, scientific procedure unites men in something nobly devoid of all pettiness. Because it requires detachment, disinterestedness, it is the finest flower and test of a liberal civilization.

Note:

1. W.J.M. Rankline, *Miscellaneous Scientific Paper*, 1881, p. 210
2. Op. cit., pp. 290-291.

PART V
PHILOSOPHICAL MORALTY

INTRODUCTION

-Editor

It is common sense that human being holds moral consciousness and moral judgement, every people is responsible for what he or she does. If a person dose something wrong, he or she would be blamed by others and by himself. If he or she does something right, it worth praise. But common sense and practical habit are usually not plausible if checked by reasoning. When the issue of human morality is philosophized, is investigated by dialectical reasoning, then the paradox occurs immediately.

Only if we presupposed that human being could make free choice when they will, think and act, then it make sense to assign moral evaluation upon the agent. If a person is strictly dominated by some powers that is out of his control completely, if whatever he does is forced by something superior to him, he is not able to think, to act otherwise, then, there will be no reason to blame or to praise the agent. When a lion tears and swallow a piece of meat, a mosquito or a fly bites any mammal alive, people have no reason to ascribe moral evaluation to it. The soldier is forced to execute whatever the commander wants, if he rejects to obey, then he would be punished, in that case, the soldier is not morally responsible for what he executes, because he has not any free choice other than to obey his commander.

The above point is accepted, then all our moral problems change into whether human being does hold free choice or not. In other word, the plausibility of human moral consciousness and moral practice must be based on human freedom. But here occurs another thinking line. It is also logically valid to consider the law of causality universally effective. Everything, every event, including human and their actions, are supposed to be in the chains of causal links of the world. It followes that human thinking and actions are preceded and conditionally caused, and the superficial free, or the free choice seemed to be an illusion. If this is true, then human morality will go collapse. Therefore, whether human action, will is free or everything including human will is pre-dominated, this makes the fundamental problem for all questions of morality study. Just in this sense, when Kant wrote his *Critique of Practical Reason* and when Hegel wrote his *Principle of the Philosophy of Right*, first of all, they had to deal with the issue of human free will. When Plato began to consider where human virtue comes from, what is the essence of virtue, how to make people virtuous, he presented several famous propositions, such as "virtue is knowledge," "virtue is wisdom," virtue, is from divine," and so on. In his final dialogues, Plato seemed to think that virtue must be formed by education. When Aristotle was involved in the considering the issue of virtue, he changed his attention to the character and disposition, but whether person was free to have a sort of character or disposition, it makes Aristotle also fall into confusion. In the philosophy of Epicurus, the concept

and the issue of freedom appeared strikingly, and then the issue penetrated the whole history of philosophy.

In the debates concerning the issue of free will and determinism, concerning the pre-foundation of morality, there occurred some doctrines that are popularly considered, such as determinism, in-determinism, libertarianism, fatalism, and so on.

The basic points of the doctrine of determinism are that, there is only one world, the world is united; every event, including human event in the world is determined by the physical law or the causal law; anything happened is determined by sufficient cause and it could not happen otherwise. Hard determinism is a sort of extreme approach, which holds that not only everything is determined under the causal law, but also all kinds of causal laws are detectable by human knowledge. It rejects any free will thesis and any moral responsibility idea. Soft determinism is a sort of weak approach, which holds that for everything, there must be causal relation, but some of the causal relations are out of human knowledge, maybe we will never be able to get it. It tries to admit the free will thesis and moral responsibility idea, actually, it tries to make reconciliation between determinism and the libertarianism.

In-determinism claims that there is no united world, everything in the world is isolated, and happens occasionally, no any law to be traced. It follows that there is no any causal relation at all, the law-like ideas of human being are only illusions. It is easy to see that in-determinism is contrary to determinism, but it also would reject free will thesis and moral responsibility idea. Because if things and human actions happened randomly, then it is not the case of free, but the case of disorder, when a person is in the situation of mentally and behavior disorder, it makes no sense to assign any moral judgement to him or her. Therefore, in-determinism is also contrary to libertarianism. Hume's concept on causality is a good example of in-determinism. Hume denies the objectivity and plausibility of causal law, and any rational knowledge, consequently, his ethic falls into a sort of feeling and sensation approach. His ethical theory opens the perspective of moral skepticism and moral nihilism.

Libertarianism is of different meaning from Liberalism, the later one is primarily a term referring to a political doctrine, and the former one usually is used in the study of morality or ethics. The basic points of libertarianism are that, there are two worlds, the natural world, namely the physical world and the human world. It does not deny the causality, but it claims that there are two worlds, and there are two kinds of causal laws. The causality in the natural world is simple and mechanical. The causality in human world is quite another kind of law, which is called as the law of human reason, or the law of human freedom. The law of human being is influenced by the natural law, but is not dominated by it. Human will, thinking and their actions are determined by their aims of truth, good, and beauty that will never be covered by the natural beings and natural movement. In addition, when human will is

independent from the natural law, then they are supposed to make free choice and they must be responsible for what they do.

The doctrine of fatalism is somehow similar to the doctrine of extreme determinism. But this doctrine does not care too much about the natural being and natural events, it cares only human life, particularly individual's life. It holds that every event in the life is fated by the person's inborn conditions. Every event happens to a person could not happen to him or her otherwise. It does not make sense to evaluate a person's activity, because the fate is out of anyone's control. Obviously, this doctrine is compatible with hard determinism, and is opposed to libertarianism.

In our textbook, we select articles to represent each of the above doctrines. After we inspect the debates on the issue whether we are rational to hold morality, there is another question immediately followed: if we conclude that morality necessary, then, is there any objective, universal effective criterion for morality? In another word, is it plausible for human being to have only one set of morality or to have many? This question leads us to the issue of moral relativism, and that is what the last article in this part is concerned with. This topic is very popularly discussed currently under the title of debate on issues of "globalization and the conflicts of values." Moral realism proposes that there is objective and universal criterion for human moral development, different moral practices or moral judgements are resulted from different stage or level of moral progress of human being. It follows that some one's or some systems of , some ear's morality need to be criticized and be reformed. But moral relativism proposes that the moral criterion is relative, each moral norm is plausible relative to its' own cultural background and conceptual scheme. Rachels' article can be good example of arguing against moral relativism. It states the theoretical points, the defects, the consequence, as well as the benefits of the doctrine of moral relativism. Expectedly, through the reading of our articles, students will get a rough idea about the theoretical foundation of moral considerations.

DETERMINISM AND THE ILLUSION OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

-Paul Ree

(IP From *Die Illusion der Willensfreiheit* by Paul Ree (first published in 1885, translated by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg). Copyright @ 1973 by Stefan Bauer.Mengelberg. Paul Edwards and Pauline Pap. Reprinted with permission.)

Note: This selection consist of the major portions of Chapters 1 and 2 of Paul Ree's *Die Illusion der Willensfreiheit*, a work published in Berlin in 1885. The third chapter of Ree's booklet, which is omitted here, is a detailed critique of Kant's views on the subject.

The subtitles in this translation were supplied by the editor of IP, the first and fifth take the place of chapter headings in the original text. Cuts have been indicated by the use of dots. The translator has supplied a few minor emendations; these have been put in square brackets.

Direction of studying Paul Ree's article:

- 1) Background of the author and his viewpoint: Paul Ree is a philosopher in the nineteen century, in his times, natural science and other areas of science were getting flourishing, but most of scientists of that times hold the mechanical world view and natural view, they believed that the world being material and being united, and everything in the world was dominated by the mechanic law, even human being also was described by some philosophers as a set of huge clock.. Ree's hard determinism reflected the spirit of his times properly. His works written to argue against Kant's libertarianism makes him famous, and his idea of a sort of hard determinism, the key points of the doctrine is expressed not only very clearly, but also very logically consistent. These make him a good model, and we select his article as the appropriate example of the doctrine of hard determinism.
- 2) Strategy of the argument: Ontological analysis makes the methodological feature of Ree's arguments. It means that the author does not care the issues of human psychology and the relations between subjective-ness and the objectivity. In reading the article, we also will notice that some ideal experiments play important functions in the author's arguments. This strategy of ideal experiment is what we usually ignore, but it is very effective method in doing philosophy.
- 3) Argument: There are six parts in the article. The first part of the article shows us the determinism in natural world argument. The second part shows us the determinism in human being world argument. The third and the fourth parts of the article could be generalized as the rejection of free will thesis argument. The fifth and the sixth part of the article present the argument of rejecting moral judgement. These arguments construct a perfect feature of the sort of hard determinism.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
causality, causal law, potential, actual, entail, suppose, character, genetic, the law of inertia.

5) Important propositions;

1. To say that the will is not free means that it is subject to the law of causality. Every act of will is in fact preceded by a sufficient cause.
2. In that sense there is no freedom of thought.
3. We cease to assign blame or merit for character and actions as soon as we recognize that they are effects, and it is impossible to assign blame or merit for effects.

6) Study questions:

1. Both the motions of a stone and the motions of a donkey are determined, what are the differences between their cause?
2. The activity and the will, the thought of man also are determined, why people always hold the idea of free will?
3. What is Paul Ree's idea on the moral judgement?
4. What does the author intend to show with his "Bogos" story?

1. Nothing Happens without a cause

. . . To say that the will is not free means that it is subject to the law of causality. Every act of will is in fact preceded by a sufficient cause. Without such a cause the act of will can not occur; and, if the sufficient cause is presented, the act of will must occur.

To say that the will is free would mean that it is not subject to the law of causality. In that case every act of will would be an absolute beginning [a first cause] and not a link [in a chain of events]; it would not be the effect of preceding causes.

The reflections that follow may serve to clarify what is meant by saying that the will is not free . . . Every object—a stone, an animal, a human being—can pass from its present state to another one. The stone that now lies in front of me may, in the next moment, fly through the air, or it may disintegrate into dust or roll along the ground. If, however, one of these *possible* states is to be *realized*, its sufficient cause must be present. The stone will fly through the air if it is tossed. It will roll if a force acts upon it. It will disintegrate into dust, given that some object hits and crushes it.

It is helpful to use the terms "potential" and "actual" in this connection. At any moment there are innumerable many potential states. At a given time, however, only one can become actual, namely, the One that is triggered by its sufficient cause.

The situation is no different in the case of an animal. The donkey that now stands motionless between two piles of hay may, in the next moment, turn to the left or to the right, or he may jump into the air or put his head between his legs. But here, too, the sufficient cause must first be present if of the *possible* modes of behavior one is to be *realized*.

Let us analyze one of these modes of behavior. We shall assume that the donkey has turned toward the bundle on his right. This turning presupposes that certain muscles were contracted. The cause of this muscular contraction is the excitation of the nerves that lead to them. The cause of this excitation of the nerves is a state of the brain. It was in a state of decision. But how did the brain come to be in that condition? Let us trace the states of the donkey back a little farther.

A few moments before he turned, his brain was not yet so constituted as to yield the sufficient cause for the excitation of the nerves in question and for the contraction of the muscles; for otherwise, the movement would have occurred. The donkey had not yet "decided" to turn. If he then moved at some subsequent time, his brain must in the meantime have become so constituted as to bring about the excitation of the nerves and the movement of the muscles. Hence the brain underwent some change. To what causes is this change to be attributed? To the effectiveness of an impression that acts as an external stimulus, or to a sensation that arose internally; for example, the sensation of hunger and the idea of the bundle on the right, by jointly affecting the brain, change the way in which it is constituted so that it now yields the sufficient cause for the excitation of the nerves and the contraction of the muscles. The donkey now "wants" to turn to the right; he now turns to the right.

Hence, just as the position and constitution of the stone, on the other hand, and the strength and direction of the force that acts upon it, on the other, necessarily determine the kind and length of its flight, so the movement of the donkey—his turning to the bundle on the right—is no less necessarily the result of the way in which the donkey's brain and the stimulus are constituted at a given moment. That the donkey turned toward this particular bundle was determined by something trivial. If the bundle that the donkey did not choose had been positioned just a bit differently, or if it had smelled different, or if the subjective factor—the donkey's sense of smell or his visual organs—had developed in a somewhat different way, then, so we may assume, the donkey would have turned to the left. But the cause was not complete there, and that is why the effect could not occur. While with respect to the other side, where the cause was complete, the effect could not fail to appear.

For the donkey, consequently, just for the stone, there are innumerable many *potential* states at any moment; he may walk or run or jump, or move to the left, to the right, Or straight ahead. But only the one whose sufficient cause is present can ever become *actual*.

At the same time, there is a difference between the donkey and the stone in that donkey moves because he wants to move, while the stone moves because it is moved, we do not deny this difference. There are, after all, a good many other differences between the donkey and the stone. We do not by any means intend to prove that this dissimilarity does not exist. We do not assert that the donkey is a stone, but

only that the donkey's every movement and act of will has causes just as the motion of the stone does. The donkey moves because he wants to move. But that he wants to move at a given moment, and in this particular direction, is causally determined.

Could it be that there was no sufficient cause for the donkey's wanting to turn around—that he simply wanted to turn around? His act of will would then be an absolute beginning. An assumption of that kind is contradicted with experience and the universal validity of the law of causality. By experience, since observation teaches us that for every act will some causes were the determining factors. By the universal validity of the law of causality, since, after all, nothing happens act of will come into being without a cause. Besides, the state of willing, the one that immediately precedes the excitation of the motor nerves, is no different in principle from other states—that of indifference, of lassitude, or of weariness. Would anyone believe that all of these states exist without a cause? And if one does not believe that, why should just the state of willing be thought to occur without a sufficient cause?

It is easy to explain why it seems to us that the motion of the stone is necessary while the donkey's act of will is not. The causes that move the stone are, after all, external and visible. But the causes of the donkey's act of will are internal and invisible; between us and locus of their effectiveness lies the skull of the donkey. Let us consider this difference somewhat more closely. The stone lies before us as it is constituted. We can also see the force acting upon it, and from these two factors, the constitution of the stone and the force, there results, likewise visible, the rolling of the stone. The case of the donkey is different. The state of his brain is hidden from our view. And, while the bundle of hay is visible, its effectiveness is not. It is an internal process. The bundle does not come into visible contact with the brain but acts at a distance. Hence, the subjective and the objective factor—the brain and the impact that the bundle has upon it—are invisible.

Let us suppose that we could depict the donkey's soul in high relief, taking account of and making visible all those states, attitudes, and feelings that characterize it before the donkey turns. Suppose further that we could see how an image detaches itself from the bundle of hay and, describing a visible path through the air, intrudes upon the donkey's brain and how it produce a change there in consequence of which certain nerves and muscles move. Suppose, finally, that we could repeat this experiment arbitrarily often, that, if we return the donkey's soul into the state preceding his turning and let exactly the same impression act upon it, we should always observe the very same result. Then we could regard the donkey's turning to the right as necessary. We would come to realize that the brain, constituted as it was at that moment, had to react to such an impression in precisely that way.

In the absence of this experiment it seems as though the donkey's act of will were not causally determined. We just do not see its being causally determined and

consequently believe that no such determination takes place. The act of will, it is said, is the cause of the turning, but it is not itself determined; it is said to be an absolute beginning.

The opinion that the donkey's act of will is not causally determined is held not only by the outsider; the donkey himself, had he the gift of reflection, would share it. The causes of his act of will would elude him, too, since in part they do not become conscious at all and in part pass through consciousness fleetingly, with the speed of lighting. If for example, what tipped the scales was that he was closer by a hair's breadth to the bundle on the right, or that it smelled a shade better, how should the donkey notice, something so trivial, something that so totally fails to force itself upon his consciousness?

In one sense, of course, the donkey is right in thinking "I could have turned to the left." His state at the moment, his position relative to the bundle, or its constitution need merely have been somewhat different, and he really would have turned to the left. The statement "I could have acted otherwise" is, accordingly, true in this sense: turning to the left is one of the movements possible for me (in contrast, for example, to the movement of flying): it lies within the realm of my possibilities.

We arrive at the same result if we take the law of inertia as our point of departure. It reads: every object strives to remain in its present state. Expressed negatively this becomes: without a sufficient cause no object can pass from its present state to another one. The stone will lie forever just as it is lying now; it will not undergo the slightest change if no cause—such as the weather or a force—act upon it to bring about a change. The donkey's brain will remain in the same state unchanged for all eternity if no causes—the feeling of hunger or fatigue, say, or external impressions—bring about a change.

If we reflect upon the entire life of the donkey *sub specie necessitatis*, we arrive at the following result. The donkey came into the world with certain properties of mind and body, his genetic inheritance. Since the day of his birth, impressions of the companions with whom he frolicked or worked, his feet, the climate—have acted upon these properties. These two factors, his inborn constitution and the way in which it was formed through the impressions of later life, are the cause of all his sensation, ideas, and moods, and of all of his movements, even the most trivial ones. If, for example, he cocks his left ear and not the right one, that is determined by causes whose historical development could be traced back ad infinitum; and likewise when he stands, vacillating, between the two bundles. And when action, the act of feeding, takes the place of vacillation, that, too, is determined: the idea of one bundle now acts upon the donkey's mind, when it has become receptive to the idea of that particular sheaf, in such a way as to produce actions.

2. Human Being and the Law of Causality

Let us now leave the realm of animals and proceed to consider man. Everything is the same here. Man's every feeling is a necessary result. Suppose, for example, that I am stirred by a feeling of pity at this moment. To what causes is it to be attributed? Let us go back as far as possible. An infinite amount of time has elapsed up to this moment. Time was never empty; objects have filled it from all eternity. These objects . . . have continually undergone change. All of these changes were governed by the law of causality; not one of them took place without a sufficient cause.

We need not consider what else may have characterized these changes. Only their *formal* aspect, only this one point is of concern to us: no change occurred without a cause.

At some time in the course of this development, by virtue of some causes, organic matter was formed, and finally man. Perhaps the organic world developed as Darwin described it. Be that as it may, it was in any case due to causes that I was born on a particular day, with particular properties of body, of spirit, and of heart. Impressions then acted upon this constitution; I had particular governesses, teachers, and playmates, Teaching and example in part had an effect and in part were lost upon me; the former, when my inborn constitution made me receptive to them, when I had an affinity for them. And that is how it has come to be, through the operation of [a chain of] causes, that I am stirred by a feeling of pity at this moment. The course of the world would have had to be somewhat different if my feelings were to be different now.

It is of no consequence for the present investigation whether the inborn capacity, for pity, for taking pleasure in another's pain, or for courage remains constant throughout life or whether teaching, example, and activity serve to change it. In any case the pity or pleasure in another's pain, the courage or cowardice, that a certain person feels or exhibits at a given moment is a necessary result, whether these traits are inborn—an inheritance from his ancestors—or were developed in the course of his own life.

Likewise every intention, indeed, every thought that passes through the brain, the silliest as well as the brilliant, the true as well as the false, exists of necessity. In that sense there is no freedom of thought. It is necessary that I sit in this place at this moment, that I hold my pen in my hand in a particular way, and that I write that every thought is necessary; and if the reader should perchance be of the opinion that this is not the case, i.e., if he should believe that thoughts may not be viewed as effects, then he holds this false opinion of necessity also.

Just as sensations and thoughts are necessary, so, too, is action. It is, after all,

nothing other than their externalization, their objective embodiment. Action is born of sensations and thoughts. So long as the sensations are not sufficiently strong, action cannot occur, and when the sensations and thoughts are constituted so as to yield the sufficient cause for it, then it must occur; then the appropriate nerves and muscles are set to work. Let us illustrate this by means of an action that is judged differently at different levels of civilization, namely, murder.[1] Munzinger, for example, says that among the Bogos the murderer, the terror of the neighborhood, who never tires of blood and murder, is a man of respect. Whoever has been raised with such views will not be deterred from murder either by external or by internal obstacles. Neither the police nor his conscience forbids him to commit it. On the contrary, it is his habit to praise murder; his parents and his gods stimulate him to commit it, and his companions encourage him by their example. And so it comes to be that, if there is a favorable opportunity, he does the deed. But it is not terribly trivial? after all, everyone knows that an act of murder is due to motives! true, but almost no one (except perhaps a philosopher) knows that an act of murder, and indeed every action, has a *cause*. Motives are a part of the cause. But to admit that there are motives for an action is not yet to recognize that it is causally determined, or to see clearly that the action is determined by thoughts and sensations—which in turn are effects—just as the rolling of a ball is determined by a force. But it is this point, and only this one, to which we must pay heed.

Let us now consider the act of murder from the same point of view in the case of civilized peoples. Someone raised at a higher level of civilization has learned from childhood on to disapprove of murder and to regard it as deserving punishment. God, his parents, and his teachers—in short, all who constitute an authority for him—condemn acts of this kind. It is, moreover, inconsistent with his character, which has been formed in an era of peace. Lastly, too, fear of punishment will deter him. Can murder prosper on such soil? not easily. Fear, pity, the habit of condemning murder—all these are just so many bulwarks that block the path to such an action. Nevertheless need, passion, or various seductive influences will perhaps remove one after another of these bulwarks. Let us consider the cause of an act of murder more closely. First it is necessary to distinguish between two components, the subjective and the objective, in the total cause. The subjective part of the cause consists of the state of the murderer at the moment of the deed. To this we must assign all ideas that he had at the time, the conscious as well as the unconscious ones, his sensations, the temperature of his blood, the state of his stomach, of his liver—of each and every one of his bodily organs. The objective component consists of the appearance of the victim, the locality in which the deed took place and the way it was illuminated. The act of murder was necessarily consummated at the moment because these impressions acted upon a human being constituted in that particular way at the time. “Necessarily”

means just that the act of murder is an effect the state of the murderer and the impressions acting upon it are its cause. If the cause had not been complete the effect could not have occurred. If, for example, the murderer had felt even a trifle more pity at that moment, if his idea of God or of the consequences that his deed would have here on earth had been somewhat more distinct, or if the moon had been a little bright, so that more light would have fallen upon the victim's face and his pleading eye—then, perhaps, the cause of the act of murder would not have become complete, and in consequence the act would not have taken place.

Thus for man, as for animal and stone, there are at any moment innumerable many *potential* states. The murderer might, at the moment when he committed the murder have climbed a tree instead or stood on his head. If, however, instead of the murder one of these actions were to have become *actual*, then its sufficient cause would have had to be present. He would have climbed a tree if he had had the intention of hiding, or of acting as a lookout, that is to say, if at that moment he had had other ideas and sensations. But this could have been the case only, if the events that took place in the world had been somewhat different [stretching back in time] ad infinitum.

3. *Determinism and will-Power*

But I can, after all, break through the network of thoughts, sensations, and impressions that surrounds me by resolutely saying "I will not commit murder!" No doubt, we must, however, not lose sight of the fact that a resolute "I will," or "I will not," is also* wherever it appears, a necessary result; it does not by any means exist without a cause. Let us return to our examples. Although the Bogos really has reasons only to commit murder, it is nevertheless possible for a resolute "I will not commit murder." to assert itself. But is it conceivable that this "I will not" should occur without a sufficient cause? Fear, pity, or some other feeling, which in turn is all effect overcomes him and gives rise to this "I will not," before the cause of the murder has yet become complete. Perhaps Christian missionaries have had an influence upon him; hence the idea of a deity that will visit retribution on him for murder comes before his soul, and that is how the "I will not," comes to be. It is easier to detect the causes of the resolute "I will not commit murder," in someone raised at a higher level of civilization: fear principles, or the thought of God in most cases produce it in time.

A resolute will can be characteristic of a man. No matter how violently jealousy, greed, or some other passion rages within him. He does not want to succumb to it; he does not succumb to it. The analogue of this constitution is a ball that, no matter how violent a force acts upon it does not budge from its place. A billiard cue will labor in vain to shake the earth. The earth victoriously resists the cue's thrusts

with its mass. Likewise man resists he thrusts of greed and jealousy with the mass of his principles. A man of that kind accordingly, is free—from being dominated by his drives. Does this contradict determinism? By no means. A man free from passion is still subject to the law of causality. He is necessarily free. It is just that the word "free" has different meanings. It may be correctly predicated of man in every sense except a single one: he is not free from the law of causality. Let us trace the causes of his freedom from the tyranny of the passions.

Let us suppose that his steadfastness of will was not inherited, or, if so, merely as a disposition. Teaching, example, and, above all, the force of circumstances developed it in him.

From early childhood on he found himself in situations in which he had to control himself if he did not want to perish. Just as someone standing at the edge of an abyss can banish dizziness by thinking "If I become dizzy, then I will plunge," so thinking "If I yield to my excitation—indeed, if I so much as betray it—I will perish," has led him to control of his drives.

It is often thought that those who deny that the will is free want to deny that man has the ability to free himself from being dominated by his drives. However one can imagine man's power to resist passions to be as great as one wants, even infinitely great that is to say, a man may possibly resist even the most violent passion: his love of God or his principles have still more power over him than the passion. The question whether even the most resolute act of will is an effect is entirely independent of this.

But is being subject to the law of causality not the weak side of the strong? By no means. Is a lion weak if he can tear a tiger apart? Is a hurricane weak if it can uproot trees? And yet the power by means of which the lion dismembers and the storm uproots is an effect, and not an absolute beginning. By having causes, by being an effect, strength is not diminished.

Just as resolute willing is to be considered an effect, so is irresolute willing. A vacillating man is characterized by the fact that he alternately wants something and then doesn't want it. To say that someone contemplating murder is still vacillating means that at one time the desire for possessions, greed and jealousy predominate—then he wants to commit murder; at another time fear of the consequences, the thought of God or pity overcomes him, and then he does not want to commit murder. In the decisive moment, when his victim is before him, everything depends upon which feeling has the upper hand. If at that moment passion predominates, then he wants to commit murder; and then he commits murder.

We see that, from whatever point of view we look at willing, it always appears as a necessary result, as a link [in a chain of events], and never as an absolute beginning.

But can we not prove by means of an experiment that willing is an absolute beginning? I lift my arm because I want to lift it . . . Here my wanting to lift my arm is the cause of the lifting, but this wanting, we are told, is not itself causally determined; rather, it is an absolute beginning. I simply want to lift my arm, and that is that. We are deceiving ourselves. This act of will, too, has causes; my intention to demonstrate by means of an experiment that my will is free gives rise to my wanting to lift my arm. But how did this intention come "I want to demonstrate my freedom", has the effect that I want to lift my arm. There is a gap in this chain.

Granted that my intention to demonstrate that my will is free stands in some relation to my wanting to lift my arm, why do I not demonstrate my freedom by means of some other movement? Why is it *just my arm* that I want to lift? This specific act of will on my part has not yet been causally explained, does it perhaps not have causes? Is it an uncaused act of will?

Let us note first that someone who wishes to demonstrate that his will is free will usually really extend or lift his arm, and in particular his right arm. He neither tears his hair nor wiggles his belly. This can be explained as follows. Of all of the parts of the body that are subject to our voluntary control, there is none that we move more frequently than the right arm. If now, we wish to demonstrate our freedom by means of some movement, we will automatically make that one to which we are most accustomed . . . Thus we first have a conversation about or reflection on the freedom of the will; this leads to the intention of demonstrating our freedom; this intention arises in an organism with certain [physiological] habits [such as that of readily lifting the right arm], and as a result we want to lift (and then lift) the right arm.

I remember once discussing the freedom of the will with a left-handed man. He asserted my will is free; I can do what I want, in order to demonstrate this he extended his *left* arm.

It is easy to see, now, what the situation is with regard to the assertion "I can do what I want." In one sense, it is indeed correct, in another, however, it is wrong. The correct sense is to regard willing as a cause and action as an effect. For example, I can kill my rival if I want to kill him. I can walk to the left if I want to walk to the left. The causes are wanting to kill and *wanting* to walk; the effects are killing and walking. In some way every action must be preceded by the act of willing it. Whether we are aware of it or not. According to this view, in fact, I can do only what I want to do, and only if I want to do it. The wrong sense is to regard willing *merely* as a cause, and not at the same time as the effect of something else. But, like everything else, *it is cause as well as effect*. An absolutely initial act of will does not exist.

Willing stands in the middle: it brings about killing and walking to the left it is the effect of thoughts and sensations (which in them are effects).

4. Ignorance of the Causation of Our Actions

Hence our volition (with respect to some action) is always causally determined. But it seems to be free (of causes); it seems to be an absolute beginning. To what is this appearance due?

We do not perceive the causes by which our volition is determined, and that is why we believe that it is not casually determined at all.

How often do we do something while “lost in thought”! We pay no attention to what we are doing, let alone to the causes from which it springs. While we are thinking, we support our head with our hand. While we are conversing, we twist a piece of paper in our hand. If we then reflect on our behavior—stimulated perhaps by a conversation about the freedom of the will and if we are quite incapable of finding a sufficient cause for it, then we believe that there was no sufficient cause for it at all, that consequently, we could have proceeded differently at that moment, e.g., supporting our head with the left hand instead of the right . . .

To adduce yet another example: suppose that here are two legs on the table, I take one of them. Why not the other one? Perhaps the one I took was a bit closer to me, or some other trivial matter, which would be very difficult to discover and is of the kind that almost never enters our consciousness, tipped the scales. If I now look back but do not see why I took that particular egg, then I come to think that I could just as well have taken the other.

Let us replace “I could have taken the other egg” by other statements containing the expression “I could have.” For example, I could when I took the egg, Have chopped off my fingers instead, or I could have jumped at my neighbor’s throat. Why do we never adduce such statements . . . but always those contemplating an action close to the one that we really carried out? Because at the moment when I took the egg, chopping off my fingers and murder were far from my mind. From this point of view the two aspects of our subject matter—the fact that acts of will are necessary and that they appear not to be necessary—can be perceived especially clearly. In fact taking the other egg was at that moment just as impossible as chopping off a finger. For’ whether a nuance of a sensation or a whole army of sensations and thoughts is lacking in the complete cause obviously does not matter, the effect cannot occur so long as the cause is incomplete. But it seems as though it would have been possible to take the other egg at that moment if something almost happened, we think that it could have happened.

While in the case of unimportant matters we perhaps do not notice the causes of our act of will and therefore think that it has no causes, the situation is quite different—it will be objected—in the case of important matters. We did not’ after all,

marry one girl rather than another while “lost in thought.” We did not close the sale of our house while “lost in thought.” Rather, everyone sees that motives determined such decisions—In spite of his, however, we think “I could have acted differently.” What is the source of this error?

In the case of unimportant matters we do not notice the cause of our action at all: in the case of important ones we perceive it, but not adequately. We do, to be sure, see the separate parts of the cause, but the special relation in which they stood to one another at the moment of the action eludes us.

Let us first consider another example from the realm of animals. A vixen vacillated whether to sneak into the chicken coop, to hunt for mice, or to return to her young in her den.

At last she sneaked into the chicken coop. Why? Because she wanted to, but why did she want to? Because this act of will on her part resulted from the relation in which her hunger, her fear of the watchdog, her maternal instinct, and her other thought, sensations, and impressions, stood to one another at that time. But a vixen with the gift of reflection would, were she to look back upon her action, say, “I could have willed differently.” For, although she realizes that hunger influenced her act of will, the *degree* of hunger on the one hand, and of fear, and maternal instinct on the other, present at the moment of the action elude her. Having become a different animal since the time of the action, perhaps because of it, she thinks—by way of a kind of optical illusion that she was that other animal already then, It is. &g same in the case of man. Suppose, for example, that someone has slain his rival out of jealousy. What does he himself and what do others, perceive with respect to this action? We see that on the one hand jealousy, the desire for possessions, hatred and rage were present in him, and on the other fear of punishment, pity, and the thought of God. We do not, however, see the particular relation in which hatred and pity, and rage and fear of punishment, stood to one another at the moment of the deed. If we could see this, keep it fixed, and recreate it experimentally, then everyone would regard this action as an effect, as a necessary result.

Let us now, with the aid of our imagination, suppose that the sensations and thoughts of the murderer at the moment of the deed were spread out before us, clearly visible as if on a map. From this reflection we shall learn that *in fact* we are lacking such an overview, and that this lack is the reason why we do not ascribe a cause (or “necessity”) to the action.

The kaleidoscopically changing sensations, thoughts and impressions would, in order for their relation to one another to become apparent, have to be returned to the state in which they were at the moment of the deed, and then made rigid, as if they were being nailed to their place. But beyond that, the thoughts and sensations would have to be spatially extended and endowed with a colored surface; a stronger

sensation would have to be represented by a bigger lump. A clearer thought would have to wear, say, a bright red color, a less clear one a gray coloration. Jealousy and rage, as well as pity and the thought of God, would have to be plastically exhibited for us in this way. We would, further, have to see how the sight of the victim acts upon these structures of thoughts and sensations, and how there arises from these two factors first the desire to commit murder and then the act of murder itself.

Moreover, we would have to be able to repeat the process, perhaps as follows: we return the murderer to the state of mind that he had some years before the act of murder we equip his mind with precisely the same thoughts and sensations, and his body with the same constitution. Then, we let the very same impressions act upon them; we bring him into contact with the same people, let him read the same books, nourish him with the same food, and, finally, we will place the murdered person, after having called him back to life, before the murderer with the very same facial expression, in the same illumination and at the same distance. Then, as soon as the parts of the cause have been completely assembled, we would always see that the very same effect occurs, namely, wanting to commit, and then committing, murder.

Finally, too, we would have to vary the experiment in the manner of the chemists; we would have to be able now to weaken a sensation, now to strengthen it, and to observe the result that this produces.

If these conditions were fulfilled, if we could experimentally recreate the process and also vary it, if we were to see its components and, above all, their relation to one another with plastic clarity before us—on the one hand, the *degree* of jealousy and of rage present at the moment; on the other, the *degree of* fear of punishment and of pity—then we would acknowledge that wanting to commit murder and committing murder are necessary results. But as it is we merely see that on the one hand, jealousy and related feelings, and, On the Other, pity and the idea of God, were present in the murderer. But, since we do not see the particular relation in which the sensations and thoughts stood to one another at the moment of the deed, we simply think that the *one* side could have produced acts of will and actions as well as the *other* that the murderer could, at the moment when he wanted to commit and did commit murder, just as well have willed and acted differently, say compassionately.

It is the same if we ourselves are the person who acts. We, too, think “I could have willed differently.” Let us illustrate this by yet another example. Yesterday afternoon at 6:03 o’clock I sold my house. Why? Because I wished to do so. But why did I wish to do so? Because my intention to change my place of residence, and other circumstances, caused my act of will. But was I compelled to will? Could I not have postponed the sale or forgone it altogether? It seems so to me, because I do not see the particular relation in which my thoughts, sensations, and impressions stood to one another yesterday afternoon at 6:03 o’clock.

Thus; we do not see the sufficient cause (either not at all, in the case of unimportant matters; or inadequately, in the case of important ones); consequently it does not exist for us; consequently we think that our volition and our actions were not causally determined at all, that we could just as well have willed and acted differently. No one would say "I could have willed differently," if he could see his act of will and its causes displayed plastically before him, in experiment permitting repetition.

But who are the mistaken "we" of whom we are speaking here? Patently the author does not consider himself to be one of them. Does he, then set himself, along with a few fellow philosophers, apart from the rest of mankind. regarding them as ignorant of the truth? Well, it really is not the case that mankind has always concerned himself with the problem of the freedom of the will and only a small part arrived at the result that the will is not free; rather, in pre-civilized ages no one, and in civilized ages almost no one, concerned himself with this problem. But of the few who did address themselves to this question, as the history of philosophy teaches us, almost all recognized that there is no freedom of the will, The others became victims of the illusion described above, without ever coming to grips with the problem in its general form (is the will subject to the law of causality or not?). . .

5. Determinism is Inconsistent with Judgement of Moral Responsibility

We hold ourselves and others responsible without taking into account the problem of the freedom of the will.

Experience shows that, if someone has lied or murdered, he is told that he has acted reprehensibly and deserves punishment. Whether his action is uncaused or whether, like the other processes in nature, it is subject to the law of causality—how would people come to raise such questions in the ordinary course of their lives? Or has any one ever heard a case in which people talking about an act of murder, a lie, or an act of, self-sacrifice discuss these actions in terms of the freedom of the will? It is the same if we ourselves are the person who acted. We say to ourselves "Oh, if only I had-not done this! Oh, if only I had acted differently!" or "I have acted laudably, as one should act." At best a philosopher here or there chances upon the question whether our actions are causally determined or not, certainly not the rest of mankind.

Suppose, however, that someone's attention is directed to the fact that the will is not free. At first it will be very difficult to make this plausible to him, His volition is suspended from threads that are too nearly invisible, and that is why he comes to think that it is not causally determined at all. At least, however—so we shall assume—he does come to recognize that actions are effects, that their causes are thought and impressions, that these must likewise be viewed as effects, and so on.

How will he then judge these actions? Will he continue to maintain that murder is to be punished by reprisal and that benevolent actions are to be considered *meritorious*? By no means. Rather, the first conclusion that he will—validly—draw from his newly acquired insight is that we can not hold anyone responsible. “*Tout comprendre c’s est tout pardonner.*”; no one can be made to answer for an *effect*.

In order to illustrate this important truth, that whoever considers intentions to be effects will cease to assign merit or blame for them, let us resume discussions of the example above. From early childhood on that Bogos has learned to praise murder. The praiseworthiness of such an action already penetrated the circumstances of the child as a secondary meaning of the word “murder,” and afterward it was confirmed by every impression; his God and his fellow men praise murder. In consequence he involuntarily judge acts of murder to be praiseworthy, no matter whether it was himself or someone else who commit them. Let us assume, now, that a philosopher had succeeded in persuading the Bogos that the act of murder and the intention to practice cruelty are causally determined. Then their judgement would undergo an essential modification.

To conceive of actions and intentions as causally determined, after all, means the following. We go back in the history of the individual, say, to his birth, and investigate which of his characteristics are inborn and to what cause they are due.[2] Then ever guided by the law of causality, we trace the development or transformation of these properties; we see how impressions, teachings, and examples come to him and, if his inborn constitution has an affinity for them, are taken up and transformed by it, otherwise passing by without leaving a trace. Finally, we recognize that the keystone, the necessary result of this course of development, is the desire to commit murder and the act of murder.

A Bogos who looks upon murder and the intention to practice cruelty in this way—that is an act—will say that it is impossible to regard them as meritorious.

But will he now look upon these actions with apathy, devoid of all feeling? By no means, he will still consider them to be pleasant or unpleasant, agreeable or disagreeable.

When the action is directed against himself, he will perceive it as pleasant or as unpleasant; the prospect of being murdered is unpleasant for everyone, whether he considers the action to be causally determined or uncaused.

Similarly, our liking or dislike for the character of a human being will persist even if we regard it as the result of causes. To say that I find someone agreeable means that I am drawn to him; I like him. Of a landscape, too, one says that it is agreeable, and just as this liking can not be diminished even if we consider the trees, meadows, and hills to be the result of causes, *so*, our liking for the character of a human being is not diminished if we regard it *sub specie necessitatis*. Hence to the

Bogos who has come to see that murder is causally determined it is still agreeable or disagreeable. Usually he will consider it to be agreeable. He will say that it warms the cockles of his heart to observe such an action; it accords with his wild temperament, as yet untouched by civilization. Therefore, he will, in view of the necessity suspend only the specifically moral and reverence. It will be objected, however, that "I reverse a mode of behavior" entails "I consider it meritorious for a person to behave in that way," and similarly for esteem. To be sure, the words "reverence" and "esteem" frequently have this meaning, and to the extent that they do a determinist would cease using them. But all words that denote human feelings have not only one, but several meanings. They have, if I may express it in that way, a harem of meanings, and they couple now with this one, now with that one. So, if I "revere" someone, it means also that I esteem him, that he impresses me, and that I wish to be like him . . . Reverence and esteem in this sense can coexist with determinism.

Hence the Bogos who conceives of intention to practice cruelty and the act of murder as effects can nevertheless consider them to be agreeable or disagreeable, and in a certain sense he can also have esteem and reverence for them, but he will not regard them as meritorious.

Let us now consider the act of murder at high levels of civilization. Civilization, as it progressed, stigmatized murder and threatened penalties for it on earth and in heaven. This censure already penetrates the consciousness of the child as a secondary meaning of the word "murder," and afterward is confirmed through every impression. All the people whom one knows, all the books that one reads, the state with its institutions' pulpit and stage always use "murder" in a censorious sense. That is how it comes to be that we involuntarily declare an act of murder to be blameworthy, be it that others or that we ourselves, driven by passion, committed it. Whether the action was determined by cause or uncaused—that question is raised neither by the person who acted nor by the uninvolved observers. But if it is raised, if someone considers the act of murder *sub specie necessitatis*, then he ceases to regard it as blameworthy. He will then no longer want to see punishment in the proper sense—suffering as retribution—meted out for it, but merely, punishment as a safety, measure.[3] The feelings of liking and dislike, however will continue to exist even then. On the whole, someone raised at a high level of civilization will have a feeling of dislike for acts of murder; he will not feel drawn to whoever commits it; he will not like him. For such an act does not accord with his temperament, which was formed as he was engaged in non-violent occupations. In spite of the recognition that the action was necessary, this dislike can at times grow, to revulsion, and even to contempt—given that the later notion is stripped of the specifically moral elements that it contains (the attribution of blame). It will then mean something like this: I do not want to be like that person.

The situation is the same in the case of benevolent actions and those performed out of a sense of duty; we cease to regard them as meritorious if we consider them to be effects. Let us look more closely at actions performed out of a sense of duty. To say that someone acts out of a sense of duty means that he performs an action, perhaps contrary to his inclinations, because his conscience commands him to do it. But how does conscience come to issue such commandments? As follows: with some actions (and intentions) there is linked for us from early childhood on a categorical "thou shalt do (or have) them," for example, "you *should* help everyone as much as possible." If someone then makes this habitual judgment into the guiding principle of his behavior, if he helps a person because his conscience commands "*thou shalt help the fellow man*," then he is acting "Out of a sense of duty." . . . If we want to consider such an action from the point of view of eternity and necessity, we shall have to proceed as follows: we investigate (1) the constitution of the child who receives the teaching "*thou shalt help*;" (2) the constitution of those who give it to him. The child absorbing this doctrine has some inborn constitution of nerves, of blood, of imagination, and of reason. The commandment "*thou shalt help*" is impressed upon this substance with some degree of insistence; the deity, heaven, hell, approval of his fellow men and of his own conscience these ideas are presented to him, depending upon his teachers, as being more or less majestic and inspiring. And the child transforms them with greater or lesser intensity, depending upon his receptivity. The ultimate constitution of a man, the preponderance within him of the sense of duty over his own desires, is in any case a necessary result, a product of his inborn constitution and the impressions received. To someone who contemplate this, such a temperament may, to be sure, still seem agreeable (perhaps because he himself is or would like to be similarly constitution), but no one can regard as *meritorious* behavior that he conceives to be an *effect*.

But what if ourselves are the person who acted? Then the circumstances are analogous; then to, liking and dislike remain, while the attribution of merit or blame (the "pangs of conscience") disappears.

Our own action, too, can remain agreeable or become disagreeable for us after it has occurred. It is agreeable if the disposition from which we acted persists after the action; it will become disagreeable if we change our frame of mind. Suppose, for example, that we have acted vengefully and are still in the same mood; then the act of revenge is still agreeable, whether we conceive it to be an effect or not. If, however, a feeling of pity takes the place of our desire for revenge, then we come to dislike our action; we cannot stand our earlier self—the less so, the more pronounced our feeling of pity is. The reflection that the action is an effect in no way affects this feeling of dislike, perhaps of disgust, or even of revulsion for ourselves. We say to ourselves that the desire for revenge was, to be sure, necessarily stronger than the ideas and

expressions that stood in its way, hence the action took place necessarily, too; but now it happens that pity is necessarily present, and, along with it, regrets that we acted as we did. . . .

6. *Con We Abandon judgements of Moral Responsibility?*

But is it really possible to shake off feelings of guilt so easily? Do they disappear, like a spook, when the magic word effect is pronounced? Is the situation with respect to this feeling not quite like that with regard to dislike? It was, to be sure' necessary that I took revenge, but now I necessarily feel dislike for my own action, along with guilt. I can no more prevent the onset of the one feeling than of the other. But if the feeling of guilt asserts itself in spite of the recognition that actions are effects, should we not suspect that our holding others responsible, too, will persist in spite of this insight? Did we commit an error somewhere? Is it that responsibility and necessity do not exclude each other? The situation is as follows. The reason

Why we assign moral praise to some actions and moral censure to others has already been mentioned repeatedly. Censure already penetrates the consciousness of the child as a secondary meaning of the word "murder," "theft," "vengefulness," and "pleasure in another's pain." And praise as a secondary meaning of the word "benevolence" and "mercy." That is why censure seems to him to be a constituent part of murder, and, praise, of benevolence. At a later point in his life, perhaps in his twentieth year, the insight comes to him from somewhere that all actions are effects and therefore can not earn merit or blame. What can this poor little insight accomplish against the accumulated habit of a lifetime of judging? The habit of mind of assigning blame for actions like murder makes it very different to think of them without this judgement. It is very well for reason to tell us that we may not assign blame for such actions, since they are effects of our habit of judging, which has become a feeling, will see to it that it is done anyway. But—let habit confront habit! Suppose that, whenever someone involuntarily wants to assign blame or merit for an action, he ascends to the point of view of eternity and necessity. He then regards the action as the necessary result of [a chain of events stretching back into] the infinite past. Through that way of looking at things the *instinctive* association between the action and the judgement will be severed, if not the first time, then perhaps by the thousandth, such a man will shed the habit of assigning blame or merit for any action whatsoever.

In fact, of course, human being almost never behave like that; this way of looking at things is completely foreign to them. Furthermore, human beings determine their actions by considering whether they will make them happy or unhappy; but shedding the habit of making

judgements of moral responsibility would increase their happiness . . .

The situation with respect to a person's character is no different from that with respect to his individual actions. *Customarily* one assign blame or merit, whether to himself or to others, for a single action: a single act of cheating or of giving offense, but sometimes we go back from the action to its source, to a person's character, in reality, of course, character, in its broadest as well as its smallest trait, is just as necessary as an individual action; it is a product of [a chain of events stretching back into] the finite past, be it that was inherited in its entirety or that was formed in past during the individual lifetime. But with regard to the character, too, hardly anyone adopts this point of view. Just as in the case of particular actions, character is regarded neither as free nor as necessary; that is to say, people do not raise the question at all whether the law of causality is applicable also to actions and character. Hence one assign blames and merit for character as for actions, though they are effects; for one does not see that they are effects. If one sees this, if one regards character *sub specie necessitatis*, then he ceases to assign blame or merit for it. Liking and dislike, on the other hand, nevertheless, persists even then, a character closely related to mine will garner my liking, my love, and perhaps even, in the same mentioned above, my esteem and reverence—whether I conceive of it as an effect or not.

Hence we assign blame or merit for character and actions out of the habit of judging, without concerning ourselves with the question whether they are causally determined or not. We cease to assign blame or merit for character and actions as soon as we recognize that they are causally determined (if we ignore the remnants of our habit).

Let us recapitulate: the character, the intentions, and the actions of every human being are effect, and it is impossible to assign blame or merit for effects.

Notes:

1. The German here is *Raubmord*, a compound noun denoting a combination of murder and robbery (with overtones of pillage and rape). In his discussion Ree will focus now on the one aspect, now on the other. To avoid lengthy periphrases in English, the action in question has been uniformly termed murder. The Bogos to whom Ree refers in the next sentence are a tribe occupying a district in the highland north of Abyssinia. Werner Munzinger (1832-1875) was a Swiss explorer and linguist who spent many years in Eritrea, Abyssinia, and the Sudan. He describe the customs of the Bogos in his book *Über die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos*, Published in 1859.
2. An investigation as detailed as that is, of course, never possible in practice.
3. Punishments are causes that prevent the repetition of the action punished.

FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

A. J. Ayer

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Direction of studying Ayer's article:

- 1) Background of the author and his viewpoints: Ayer is a big name Philosopher in contemporary British and American Philosophy. He once was the Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy Oxford University, which is considered as the biggest Department of Philosophy in the Western world. As we know, that department is a center of contemporary analytic school of philosophy. He also once was honored as the dean of the College of Philosophy of China-British, and he presented many lectures for that college. In writing this article, Ayer's aim is to make reconciliation between determinism and libertarianism, as well as moral responsibility thesis. As far as his view of the universal causality is concerned, he keeps the title of determinist. But when he suggests that many knowledge of causality are out of human ability, and he admits the valid of free will thesis and moral responsibility, his determinism becomes very weak, so, his approach is called as a sort of soft determinism.
 - 2) Strategy of Ayer's arguments: being a model of the contemporary analytical school of philosophy, great deal of Ayer's works are based on the way of analysis of the meaning of words and the structure of the contextual logic.
 - 3) Arguments: The beginning part of his article shows us the argument against the hard determinism, here, he exposes that if the hard determinism is adopted, then, we will not able to handle the problem of morality. Then, he presents the argument against in-determinism. After he refutes a kind of fallacious reconciliation between determinism and libertarianism, he proposes a new explanation of free will argument. At last, there is his semantic way of reconciliation between determinism and libertarianism.
 - 4) Disciplined terms:
Justify, statistical law, literally, free choice, arbitrary, reconcile, pure chance
 - 5) Important propositions:
 1. The idea of complete explanation may never in fact be attained, but it is theoretically attainable.
 2. We must either show that man can be held responsible for actions which they do not do freely, or else, find some way of reconciling determinism and the freedom of will.
 - 6) Study Questions:
 1. What are the difference between Paul Ree's and Ayer's determinism?
 2. What does "statistical law" mean?
 3. By what way does Ayer make reconciliation between determinism and free will thesis?
 4. Why does Ayer consider the statement "freedom is the consciousness of necessity?"
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When I am said to have done something of my own free will it is implied that I could have acted otherwise; and it is only when it is believed that I could have acted otherwise that I am held to be morally responsible for what I have done. For a man is not thought to be morally responsible for an action that it was not in his power to avoid. But if human behavior is entirely governed by causal laws, it is not clear how any action that is done could ever have been avoided. It may be said of the agent that he would have acted otherwise if the causes of his action had been different, but they being what they were, it seems to follow that he was bound to act as he did. Now it is commonly assumed both that men are capable of acting freely, in the sense that is required to make them morally responsible, and that human behavior is entirely governed by causal laws: and it is the apparent conflict between these two assumptions that gives rise to the philosophical problem of the freedom of the will.

Confronted with this problem, many people will be inclined to agree with Dr. Johnson: 'Sir, we *know* our will is free, and *there's* an end on't.' But, while this does very well for those who accept Dr. Johnson's premises, it would hardly convince anyone who denied the freedom of the will. Certainly, if we do know that our wills are free, it follows that they are so. But the logical reply to this might be that since our wills are not free, it follows that no one can know that they are: so that if anyone claims, like Dr. Johnson, to know that they are, he must be mistaken. What is evident, indeed, is that people often believe themselves to be acting freely; and it is to this 'feeling' of freedom that some philosophers appeal when they wish, in the supposed interests of morality, to prove that not all human action is causally determined. But if these philosophers are right in their assumption that a man cannot be acting freely if his action is causally determined, then the fact that someone feels free to do, or not to do, a certain action does not prove that he really is so. It may prove that the agent does not himself know what it is that makes him act in one way rather than another: but from the fact that a man is unaware of the causes of his action, it does not follow that no such causes exist.

So much may be allowed to the determinist; but his belief that all human actions are subservient to causal laws still remains to be justified. If, indeed, it is necessary that every event should have a cause, then the rule must apply to human behavior as much as to anything else. But why should it be supposed that every event must have a cause? The contrary is not unthinkable. Nor is the law of universal causation a necessary presupposition of scientific thought. The scientist may try to discover causal laws, and in many cases he succeeds; but sometimes he has to be content with statistical laws, and sometimes he comes upon events which, in the present state of his knowledge, he is not able to subsume under any law at all. In the case of these events he assumes that if he knew more he would be able to discover some law, whether causal or statistical, which would enable him to account for them.

And this assumption cannot be disproved. For however far he may have carried his investigation, it is always open to him to carry it further; and it is always conceivable that if he called it further he would discover the connection which had hitherto escaped him. Nevertheless, it is also conceivable that the events with which he is concerned are not systematically connected with any others: so that the reason why he does not discover the sort of laws that he requires is simply that they do not obtain.

Now in the case of human conduct the search for explanations has not in fact been altogether fruitless. Certain scientific laws have been established; and with the help of these laws we do make a number of successful predictions about the ways in which different people will behave. But these predictions do not always cover every detail we may be able to predict that in certain circumstances a particular man will be angry, without being able to prescribe the precise form that the expression of his anger will take. We may be reasonably sure that he will shout, but not sure how loud his shout will be, or exactly what words he will use. And it is only a small proportion of human actions that we are able to forecast even so precisely as this. But that, it may be said, is because we have not carried our investigations very far. The science of psychology is still in its infancy and, as it is developed, not only will more human actions be explained, but the explanations will go into greater detail. The ideal of complete explanation may ever in fact be attained: but it is theoretically attainable. Well, this may be so: and certainly it is impossible to show *a priori* that it is not so: but equally it cannot be shown that it is. This will not, however, discourage the scientist who, in the field of human behavior, as elsewhere, will continue to formulate theories and test them by the facts. And in this he is justified. For since he has no reason *a priori* to admit that there is a limit to what he can discover, the fact that he also cannot be sure that there is no limit does not make it unreasonable for him to devise theories, nor, having devised them, to try constantly to improve them.

But now suppose it to be claimed that, so far as men's actions are concerned, there is a limit: and that this limit is set by the fact of human freedom. An obvious objection is that in many cases in which a person feels himself be free to do, or not to do, a certain action, we are even now able to explain, in causal terms, why it is that he acts as he does. But it might be argued that even if men are sometimes mistaken in believing that they act freely, it does not follow that they are always so mistaken. For it is not always the case that when a man believes that he has acted freely we are in fact able to account for his action in causal terms. A determinist would say that we should be able to account for it if we had more knowledge of the circumstances, and had been able to discover the appropriate natural laws. But until those discoveries have been made, this remains only a pious hope. And may it not be true that, in some cases at least, the reason why we can give no causal explanation is that no causal explanation is available; and that this is because the agent's choice was literally free,

as he himself felt it to be?

The answer is that this may indeed be true, inasmuch as it is open to anyone to hold that no explanation is possible until some explanation is actually found. But even so it does not give the moralist what he wants. For he is anxious to show that men are capable of acting freely in order to infer that they can be morally responsible for what they do. But if it is a matter of pure chance that a man should act in one way rather than another, he may be free but he can hardly be responsible. And indeed when a man's actions seem to us quite unpredictable, when, as we say, there is no knowing what he will do, we do not look upon him as a moral agent. We look upon him rather as a lunatic.

To this it may be objected that we are not dealing fairly with the moralist. For when he makes it a condition of my being morally responsible that I should act freely, he does not wish to imply that it is purely a matter of chance that I act as I do. What he wishes to imply is that my actions are the result of my own free choice: and it is because they are the result of my own free choice that I am held to be morally responsible for them.

But now we must ask how it is that I come to make my choice. Either it is an accident that I choose to act as I do or it is not. If it is an accident, then it is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise; and if it is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise, it is surely irrational to hold me morally responsible for choosing as I did. But if it is not an accident that I choose to do one thing rather than another, the presumably there is some causal explanation of my choice: and in that case we are led back to determinism.

Again, the objection may be raised that we are not doing justice to the moralist's case. His view is not that it is a matter of chance that I choose to act as I do, but rather that my choice depends upon my character. Nevertheless he holds that I can still be free in the sense that he requires; for it is I who am responsible for my character. But in what way am I responsible for my character? Only, surely, in the sense that there is a causal connection between what I do now and what I have done in the past. It is only this that justifies the statement that I have made myself what I am: and even so this is an over-simplification, since it takes no account of the external influences to which I have been subjected. But, ignoring the external influences, let us assume that it is in fact the case that I have made myself what I am. Then it is still legitimate to ask how it is that I have come to make myself one sort of person rather than another. And if it be answered that it is a matter of my strength of will, we can put the same question in another form by asking how it is that my will has the strength that it has and not some other degree of strength. Once more, either it is an accident or it is not. If it is an accident, then by the same argument as before, I am not morally responsible, and if it is not an accident we are led back to determinism.

Furthermore, to say that my actions proceed from my character or, more colloquially, that I act in character, is to say that my behavior is consistent and to that extent predictable: and since it is, above all, for the actions that I perform in character that I am held to be morally responsible, it looks as if the admission of moral responsibility, so far from being incompatible with determinism, tends rather to presuppose it. But how can this be so if it is a necessary condition of moral responsibility that the person who is held responsible should have acted freely? It seems that if we are to retain this idea of moral responsibility, we must either show that men can be held responsible for actions which they do not do freely, or else find some way of reconciling determinism with the freedom of the will.

If is no doubt with the object of effecting this reconciliation that some philosophers have defined freedom as the consciousness of necessity and by so doing they are able to say not only that a man can be acting freely when his action is causally determined, but even that his action must be causally determined for it to be possible for him to be acting freely. Nevertheless this definition has the serious disadvantage that it gives to the word 'freedom' a meaning quite different from any that it ordinarily bears. It is indeed obvious that if we are allowed to give the word 'freedom' any meaning that we please, we can find a meaning that will reconcile it with determinism: but this is no more a solution of our present problem than the fact that the word 'horse' could be arbitrarily used to mean what is ordinarily meant by sparrow is a proof that horses have wings. For suppose that I am compelled by another person to do something 'against my will'. In that case, as the word freedom is ordinarily used, I should not be said to be acting freely: and the fact that I am fully aware of the constraint to which I am subjected makes no difference to the matter. I do not become free by becoming conscious that I am not. It may, indeed, be possible to show that my being aware that my action is causally determined is not incompatible with my acting freely: but it by no means follows that it is in this that my freedom consists. Moreover, I suspect that one of the reasons why people are inclined to define freedom as the consciousness of necessity is that they think that if one is conscious of necessity one may somehow be able to master it. But this is a fallacy. It is like someone's saying that he wishes he could see into the future, because if he did he would know what calamities lay in wait for him and so would be able to avoid them. But if he avoids the calamities then they don't lie in the future and it is not true that he foresees them. And similarly if I am able to master necessity, in the sense of escaping the operation of a necessary law, then the law in question is not necessary. And if the law is not necessary, then neither my freedom nor anything else can consist in my knowing that it is.

Let it be granted, then, that when we speak of reconciling freedom with determinism we are using the word 'freedom' in an ordinary sense. It still remains for

us to make this usage clear: and perhaps the best way to make it clear is to show what it is that freedom, in this sense, is contrasted with. Now we began with the assumption that freedom is contrasted with causality: so that a man cannot be said to be acting freely if his action is causally determined. But this assumption has led us into difficulties and I now wish to suggest that is mistaken. For it is not, I think, causality that freedom is to be contrasted with, but constraint. And while it is true that being constrained to do an action entails being caused to do it, I shall try to show that the converse does not hold. I shall try to show that from the fact that my action is causally determined it does not necessarily follow that I am constrained to do it and this is equivalent to saying that it does not necessarily follow that I am not free.

If I am constrained, I do not act freely. But in what circumstance can I legitimately be said to be constrained? An obvious instance is the case in which I am compelled by another person to do what he wants. In a case of this sort the compulsion need not be such as to deprive one of the power of choice. It is not required that the other person should have hypnotized me, or that he should make it physically impossible for me to go against his will. It is enough that he should induce me to do what he wants by making it clear to me that, if I do not, he will bring about some situation that I regard as even more undesirable than the consequence of the action that he wishes me to do. Thus, if the man points a pistol at my head I may still choose to disobey him: but this does not prevent its being true that if I do fall in with his wishes he can legitimately be said to have compelled me. And if the circumstances are such that no reasonable person would be expected to choose the other alternative, then the action that I am made to do is not one for which I am held to be morally responsible.

A similar but somewhat different case is that in which another person has obtained a habitual ascendancy over me. Where this is so, there may be no question of my being induced to act as the other person wishes by being confronted with a still more disagreeable alternative: for if I am sufficiently under his influence this special stimulus will not be necessary. Nevertheless I do not act freely, for the reason that I have been deprived of the power of choice. And this means that I have acquired so strong a habit of obedience that I no longer go through any process of deciding whether or not to do what the other person wants. About other matters I may still deliberate; but as regards the fulfillment of this other person's wishes, my own deliberations have ceased to be a causal factor in my behavior. And it is in this sense that I may be said to be constrained. It is not, however, necessary that such constraint should take the form of subservience to another person. A kleptomaniac is not a free agent, in respect of his stealing, because he does not go through any process of deciding whether or not to steal. Or rather, if he does go through such a process, it is irrelevant to his behavior. Whatever he resolved to do, he would steal all the same.

And it is this that distinguishes him from the ordinary thief.

But now it may be asked whether there is any essential difference between these cases and those in which the agent is commonly throughout to be free. No doubt the ordinary thief does go through a process of deciding whether or not to steal, and no doubt it does affect his behavior. If he resolved to refrain from stealing, he could carry his resolution out. But if it be allowed that his making or not making this resolution is causally determined, then how can he be any more free than the kleptomaniac? It may be true that unlike the kleptomaniac he could refrain from stealing if he chose: but if there is a cause, or set of causes, which necessitate his choosing as he does, how can he be said to have the power of choice? Again, it may be true that no one now compels me to get up and walk across the room: but if my doing so can be causally explained in terms of my history or my environment, or whatever it may be, then how am I any more free than if some other person had compelled me? I do not have the feeling of constraint that I have when a pistol is manifestly pointed at my head; but the chains of causation by which I am bound are no less effective for being invisible.

The answer to this is that the cases I have mentioned as examples of constraint do differ from the others: and they differ just in the ways that I have tried to bring out. If I suffered from a compulsion neurosis, so that I got up and walked across the room, whether I wanted to or not, or if I did so because somebody else compelled me, then I should not be acting freely. But if I do it now, I shall be acting freely, just because these conditions do not obtain; and the fact that my action may nevertheless have a cause is, from this point of view, irrelevant. For it is not when my action has any cause at all, but only when it has a special sort of cause, that it is reckoned not to be free.

But here it may be objected that, even if this distinction corresponds to ordinary usage, it is still very irrational. For why should we distinguish, with regard to a person's freedom, between the operations of one sort of cause and those of another? Do not all causes equally necessitate? And is it not therefore arbitrary to say that a person is free when he is necessitated in one fashion but not when he is necessitated in another?

That all causes equally necessitate is indeed a tautology, if the word 'necessitate' is taken merely as equivalent to 'cause:' but if, as the objection requires, it is taken as equivalent to constrain or compel, then I do not think that this proposition is true. For all that is needed for one eventually to be the cause of another is that, in the given circumstances, the event which is said to be the effect would not have occurred if it had not been for the occurrence of the event which is said to be the cause, or *vice versa*, according as causes are interpreted as necessary, or sufficient, conditions: and this fact is usually deducible from some causal law which states that

whenever an event of the one kind occurs then, given suitable conditions, an event of the other kind will occur in a certain temporal or spatio-temporal relationship to it. In short, there is an invariable concomitance between the two classes of events; but there is no compulsion, in any but a metaphorical sense. Suppose, for example, that a psycho-analyst is able to account for some aspect of my behavior by referring it to some lesion that I suffered in my childhood. In that case, it may be said that my childhood experience, together with certain other events, necessitates my behaving as I do. But all that this involves is that it is found to be true in general that when people have had certain experiences as children, they subsequently behave in certain specifiable ways; and my case is just another instance of this general law. It is in this way indeed that my behavior is explained. But from the fact that my behavior is capable of being explained, in the sense that it can be subsumed under some natural law, it does not follow that I am acting under constraint.

If this is correct, to say that I could have acted otherwise is to say, first, that I should have acted otherwise. If I had so chosen; secondly, that my action was voluntary in the sense in which the actions, say, of the kleptomaniac are not; and thirdly, that nobody compelled me to choose as I did: and these three conditions may very well be fulfilled. When they are fulfilled, I may be said to have acted freely. But this is not to say that it was a matter of chance that I acted as I did, or, in other words, that my action could not be explained. And that my actions should be capable of being explained is all that is required by the postulate of determinism.

If more than this seems to be required it is, I think, because the use of the very word determinism is in some degree misleading. For it tends to suggest that one event is somehow in the power of another, whereas the truth is merely that they are actually correlated. And the same applies to the use, in this context, of the word 'necessity' and even of the word cause' itself. Moreover, there are various reasons for this. One is the tendency to confuse causal with logical necessitation, and so to infer mistakenly that the effect is contained in the cause. Another is the uncritical use of a concept of force which is derived from primitive experiences of pushing and striking. A third is the survival of an animistic conception of causality, in which all causal relationships are modeled on the example of one person's exercising authority over another. As a result we tend to form an imaginative picture of an unhappy effect trying vainly to escape from the clutches of an overmastering cause. But, I repeat, the fact is simply that when an event of one type occurs, an event of another type occurs also, in a certain temporal or spatio-temporal relation to the first. The rest is only metaphor. And it is because of the metaphor, and not because of the fact, that we come to think that there is an antithesis between causality and freedom.

Nevertheless, it may be said, if the postulate of determinism is valid, then the future can be explained in terms of the past: and this means that if one knew enough

about the past one would be able to predict the future. But in that case what will happen in the future is already decided. And how then can I be said to be free? What is going to happen is going to happen and nothing that I do can prevent it. If the determinist is right, I am the helpless prisoner of fate.

But what is meant by saying that the future course of events is already decided? If the implication is that some person has arranged it, then the proposition is false. But if all that is meant is that it is possible, in principle, to deduce it from a set of particular facts about the past, together with the appropriate general laws, then, even if this is true, it does not in the least entail that I am the helpless prisoner of fate. It does not even entail that my actions make no difference to the future: for they are causes as well as effects, so that if they were different their consequences would be different also. What it does entail is that my behavior can be predicted: but to say that my behavior can be predicted is not to say that I am acting under constraint. It is indeed true that I cannot escape my destiny if this is taken to mean no more than that I shall do what I shall do. But this is a tautology, just as it is a tautology that what is going to happen is going to happen and such tautologies as these prove nothing whatsoever about the freedom of the will.

HUMAN FREEDOM AND THE SELF

Roderick M. Chisholm

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Directions of studying Chisholm's article:

- 1) Viewpoints of the author: Professor Chisholm is also a very popular philosopher of America currently. Many of his works and articles play eminent functions in the contemporary philosophical discussions. Chsholm's this lecture is used to criticize not only determinism and in-determinism, but also the attempt to make reconciliation between determinism and libertarianism. Otherwise, he also indicates the key points of the doctrine of libertarianism distinctly, and his arguments to support his view points are really very strong.
- 2) the strategy used in this article: The author uses successfully the method of analysis of history of philosophy, to spell out the dialectical illustration on the issue. Like other contemporary American philosophers, there are also efficient application of the method of semantic analysis and logical analysis.
- 3) Arguments: The beginning part of the article could be viewed as an argument against determinism and in-determinism. Then there is the argument for rejecting compatible-ism, namely the compromise of determinism and libertarianism. Thirdly, there is the free agent or free subject argument, that changes the topic of free will into the topic of free agent. At last, there is the argument to explain what the major points are to make the agent free, according to this opinion, as well as many other philosopher's opinion, it is autonomy and rationality that make the essence of freedom.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
agent, subject, immanent causation, transient causation, efficient cause, Kantian approach, Hobbist approach, desire, reason.
- 5) Important propositions:
 1. And we may also say, with Leibniz, that that at other things, our desire may "incline without necessitating".
 2. This means that, in one very strict sense of the term, there can be no science of man.
 3. Nothing ever occurs without cause or determining reason.
- 6) Study questions:
 1. What is the meaning of "immanent cause," of "transient cause?"
 2. How to analyze the possibilities of the real idea of the official when he accept bribes?
 3. According to Chisholm, what are the major points in make an agent free?

4. What are the reasons for him to refute the compatible-ism?
 5. Is his rejection of determinism sound or unsound?
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'A staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved by a man.'

Aristotle, *Physics*, 256a.

1. The metaphysical problem of human freedom might be summarized in the following way: Human beings are responsible agents; but this fact appears to conflict with a deterministic view of human action (the view that every event that is involved in an act is caused by some other event); and it also appears to conflict with an indeterministic view of human action (the view that the act, or some event that is essential to the act, is not caused at all.) To solve the problem, I believe, we must make somewhat far-reaching assumptions about the self or the agent—about the man who performs the act.

Perhaps it is needless to remark that, in all likelihood, it is impossible to say anything significant about this ancient problem that has not been said before. [1]

2. Let us consider some deed, or misdeed, that may be attributed to a responsible agent: one man, say, shot another. If the man was responsible for what he did, then, I would urge, what was to happen at the time of the shooting was something that was entirely up to the man himself. There was a moment at which it was true, both that he could have fired the shot and also that he could have refrained from firing it. And if this is so, then, even though he did fire it, he could have done something else instead. (He didn't find himself firing the shot "against his will", as we say.) I think we can say, more generally, then, that if a man is responsible for a certain event or a certain state of affairs (in our example, the shooting of another man), then that event or state of affairs was brought about by some act of his, and the act was something that was in his power either to perform or not to perform.

But now if the act which he *did* perform was an act that was also in his power *not* to perform, then it could not have been caused or determined by any event that was not itself within his power either to bring about or not to bring about. For example, if what we say he did was really something that was brought about by a second man, one who forced his hand upon the trigger, say, or who, by means of hypnosis, compelled him to perform the act, then since the act was caused by the *second* man it was noting that was within the power of the *first* man to prevent. And precisely the same thing is true, I think, if instead of referring to a second man who compelled the first one, we speak instead of the *desires* and *beliefs* which the first man happens to have had. For if what we say he did was really something that was

brought about by his own beliefs and desires, if these beliefs and desires in the particular situation in which he happened to have found himself caused him to do just what it was that we say he did do, then, since *they* caused it, *he* was unable to do anything other than just what it was that he did do. It makes no difference whether the cause of the deed was internal or external; if the cause was some state or event for which the man himself was mistakenly calling his act. If a flood caused the poorly constructed dam to break, then, given the flood and the constitution of the dam, the break, we may say, *had* to occur and nothing could have happened in its place. And if the flood of desire caused the weak-willed man to give in, then he, too, had to do just what it was that he did do and he was no more responsible than was the dam for the results that followed. (It is true, of course, that if the man is responsible for the beliefs and desires that he happens to have, then he may also be responsible for the things they lead him to do. But the question now becomes: *is* he responsible for the beliefs and desires he happens to have? If he is, then there was a time when they were within his power either to acquire or not to acquire and we are left, therefore, with our general point.)

One may object: but surely if there were such a thing as a man who is really *good*, then he would be responsible for things that he would do; yet, he would be unable to do anything other than just what is that he does do, since, being good, he will always choose to do what is best. The answer, I think, is suggested by a comment that Thomas Reid makes upon an ancient author. The author had said of Cato, "He was good because he could not be otherwise", and Reid observes: "This saying, if understood literally and strictly, is not the praise of Cato, but of his constitution, which was no more the work of Cato than his existence". [2] If Cato was himself responsible for the good things that he did, then Cato, as Reid suggests, was such that, although he had the power to do what was not good, he exercised his power only for that which was good.

All of this, if it is true, may give a certain amount of comfort to those who are tender-minded. But we should remind them that it also conflicts with a familiar view about the nature of God—with the view that St. Thomas Aquinas expresses by saying that 'every movement both of the will and of nature proceeds from God as the Prime Mover'. [3] If the act of the sinner *did* proceed from god as the Prime Mover, then God was in the position of the second agent we just discussed—the man who forced the trigger finger, or the hypnotist—and the sinner, so-called, was *not* responsible for what he did. (This may be a bold assertion, in view of the history of western theology, but I must say that I have never encountered a single good reason for denying it.)

There is one standard objection to all of this and we should consider it briefly.

3. The objection takes the form of a stratagem—one designed to show that

determinism (and divine providence) is consistent with human responsibility. The stratagem is one that was used by Jonathan Edwards and by many philosophers in the present century, most notably, G.E. Moore. [4]

One proceeds as follows. The expression

(a) He could have done otherwise,
it is argued, means no more nor less than

(b) If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise.

(In place of 'chosen', one might say 'tried', 'set out', 'decided', 'undertaken', or 'willed'.) The truth of statement (b), it is then pointed out, is consistent with determinism (and with divine providence), for even if all of the man's actions were causally determined, the man could still be such that, *if* he had chosen otherwise, then he would have done otherwise. What the murderers saw, let us suppose, along with his beliefs and desires, *caused* him to fire the shot, yet he was such that *if*, just then he had chosen or decided *not* to fire the shot, then he would not have fired it. All of this is certainly possible. Similarly, we could say, of the dam, that the flood caused it to break and also that the dam was such that, *if* there had been no flood or any similar pressure, then the dam would have remained intact. And therefore, the argument proceeds, if (b) is consistent with determinism, and if (a) and (b) say the same thing, then (a) is also consistent with determinism; hence we can say that the agent *could* have done otherwise even though he was caused to do what he did do, and therefore determinism and moral responsibility are compatible.

Is the argument sound? The conclusion follows from the premises, but the catch, I think, lies in the first premises, the one saying that statement (a) tells us no more nor less than what statement (b) tells us. For (b), it would seem, could be true while (a) is false. That is to say, our man might be such that, if he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise, and yet *also* such that he could not have done otherwise. Suppose, after all that our murderer could not have *chosen*, or could not have *decided*, to do otherwise. Then the fact that he happens also to be a man such that, if he had chosen not to shoot he would not have shot, would make no difference. For if he could *not* have chosen *not* to shoot, then he could not have done anything other than just what it was that he did do. In a word: from our statement (b) above ('If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise'), we cannot make an inference to (a) above ('He could have done otherwise') unless we can *also* assert:

(c) He could have chosen to do otherwise.

And therefore, if we must reject this third statement (c), then, even though we may be justified in asserting (b), we are not justified in asserting (a). If the man could not have chosen to do otherwise, then he could not have done otherwise—even if he was such that, if he *had* chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise.

The stratagem in question, then, seems to me not to work, and I would say, therefore, that the ascription of responsibility conflicts with a deterministic view of action.

4. Perhaps there is less need to argue that the ascription of responsibility also conflicts with an indeterministic view of action—with the view that the act, or some event that is essential to the act, is not caused at all. If the act—the firing of the shot—was not caused at all, if it was fortuitous or capricious, happening so to speak out of the blue, then, presumably, no one—and nothing—was responsible for the act. Our conception of action, therefore, should be neither deterministic nor indeterministic. Is there any other possibility?

5. We must not say that every event involved in the act is caused by some other event; and we must not say that the act is something that is not caused at all. The possibility that remains, therefore, is this: We should say that at least one of the events that are involved in the act is caused, not by any other events, but by something else instead. And this something else can only be the agent—the man. If there is an event that is caused, not by other events, but by the man, then there are some events involved in the act that are not caused by other events. But if the event in question is caused by the man then it *is* caused and we are not committed to saying that there is something involved in the act that is not caused at all.

But this, of course, is a large consequence, implying something of considerable importance about the nature of the agent or the man.

6. If we consider only inanimate natural objects, we may say that causation, if it occurs, is a relation between *events* or *states of affairs*. The dam's breaking was an event that was caused by a set of other events—the dam being weak, the flood being strong, and so on. But if a man is responsible for a particular deed, then, if what I have said is true, there is some event, or set of events, that is caused, *not* by other events or states of affairs, but by the agent, whatever he may be.

I shall borrow a pair of medieval terms, using them, perhaps, in a way that is slightly different from that for which they were originally intended. I shall say that when one event or state of affairs (or set of events or states of affairs) causes some other event or state of affairs, then we have an instance of *transeunt* causation. And I shall say that when an *agent*, as distinguished from an event, causes an event or state

of affairs, then we have an instance of *immanent* causation.

The nature of what is intended by the expression 'immanent causation' may be illustrated by this sentence from Aristotle's *Physics*: 'Thus, a staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved by a man.' (VII, 5, 256a, 6-8) If the man was responsible, then we have in this illustration a number of instances of causation—most of them transeunt but at least one of them immanent. What the staff did to the stone was an instance of transeunt causation, and thus we may describe it as a relation between events: 'the motion of the staff caused the motion of the stone.' And similarly for what the hand did to the staff: 'the motion of the hand caused the motion of the staff'. And, as we know from physiology, there are still other events which caused the motion of the hand. Hence we need not introduce the agent at this particular point, as Aristotle does—we *need* not, though we *may*. We *may* say that the hand was moved by the man, but we may *also* say that the motion of the **hand** was caused by the motion of certain muscles; and we may say that the motion of the muscles was caused by certain events that took place within the brain. But some event, and presumably one of those that took place within the brain, was caused by the agent and not by any other events.

There are, of course, objections to this way of putting the matter; I shall consider the two that seem to me to be most important.

7. One may object, firstly: 'If the *man* does anything, then as Aristotle's remark suggests, what he does is to move the *hand*. But he certainly does not *do* anything to his brain—he may not even know that he *has* a brain. And if he doesn't do anything to the brain and if the motion of the hand was caused by something that happened within the brain, then there is no point in appealing to "immanent causation" as being something incompatible with "transeunt causation" for the whole thing, after all, is a matter of causal relations among events or states of affairs.'

The answer to this objection, I think, is this: It is true that the agent does not *do* anything with his brain, or to his brain, in the sense in which he *does* something with his hand and does something to the staff. But from this it does not follow that the agent was not the immanent cause of something that happened within his brain.

We should note a useful distinction that has been proposed by Professor A. I. Melden, namely, the distinction between 'making something A happen' and 'doing A'. [5] If I reach for the staff and pick it up, then one of the things that I do is just that: reach for the staff and pick it up. And if it is something that I do then there is a very clear sense in which it may be said to be something that I know that I do. If you ask me, 'Are you doing something, or trying to do something, with the staff?', I will have no difficulty in finding an answer. But in doing something with the staff, I also make various things happen which are not in this same sense things that I do. I will make

various air-particles move, I will free a number of blades of grass from the pressure that had been upon them, and I may cause a shadow to move from one place to another. If these are merely things that I make happen, as distinguished from things that I do, then I may know nothing whatever about them; I may not have the slightest idea that, in moving the staff, I am bringing about any such things as the motion of air-particles, shadows, and blades of grass.

We may say, in answer to the first objection, therefore, that it is true that our agent does nothing to his brain or with his brain; but from this it does not follow that the agent is not the immanent cause of some event within his brain; for the brain event may be something which, like the motion of the air-particles, he made happen in picking up the staff. The only difference between the two cases is this: in each case, he made something happen when he picked up the staff; but in the one case—the motion of the air-particles or of the shadows—it was the motion of the staff that caused the event to happen; and in the other case—the event that took place in the brain—it was this event that caused the motion of the staff.

The point is, in a word, that whenever a man does something A, then (by 'immanent causation') he makes a certain cerebral event happen, and this cerebral event (by 'transeunt causation') makes A happen.

8. The second objection is more difficult and concerns the very concept of 'immanent causation', or causation by an agent, as this concept is to be interpreted here. The concept is subject to a difficulty which has long been associated with that of the prime mover unmoved. We have said that there must be some event A, presumably some cerebral event, which is caused not by any other event, but by the agent. Since A was not caused by any other event, then the agent himself cannot be said to have undergone any change or produced any other event (such as 'an act of will' or the like) which brought A about. But if, when the agent made A happen, there was no event involved other than A itself, no event which could be described as *making* A happen, what did the agent's causation consist of? What, for example, is the difference between A's just happening, and the agents' *causing* A to happen? We cannot attribute the difference to any event that took place within the agent. And so far as the event A itself is concerned, there would seem to be no discernible difference. Thus Aristotle said that the activity of the prime mover is nothing in addition to the motion that it produces, and Suarez said that 'the action is in reality nothing but the effect as it flows from the agent.' [6] Must we conclude, then, that there is no more to the man's action in causing event A than there is to the event A's happening by itself? Here we would seem to have a distinction without a difference—in which case we have failed to find a *via media* between a deterministic and an indeterministic view of action.

The only answer, I think, can be this: that the difference between the man's causing A, on the one hand, and the event A just happening, on the other, lies in the fact that, in the first case but not the second, the event A *was* caused and was caused by the man. There was a brain event A; the agent did, in fact, cause the brain event, but there was nothing that he did to cause it.

The answer may not entirely satisfy and it will be likely to provoke the following question: 'But what are you really *adding* to the assertion that A happened when you utter the words, "The agent *caused* A to happen"?' As soon as we have put the question this way, we see, I think, that whatever difficulty we may have encountered is one that may be traced to the concept of causation generally, whether 'immanent' or 'transeunt'. The problem, in other words, is not a problem that is peculiar to our conception of human action. It is a problem that must be faced by anyone who makes use of the concept of causation at all; and therefore I would say, it is a problem for everyone but the complete indeterminist.

For the problem, as we put it, referring just to 'immanent causation', or causation by an agent, was this: 'What is the difference between saying of an event A, that A just happened and saying that someone caused A to happen?' The analogous problem, which holds for 'transeunt causation', or causation by an event, is this: 'What is the difference between saying, of two events A and B, that B happened and then A happened, and saying that B's happening was the *cause* of A's happening?' and the only answer that one can give is this: that in the one case the agent was the cause of A's happening and in the other case event B was the cause of A's happening. The nature of transeunt causation is no more clear than is that of immanent causation.

9. But we may plausibly say—and there is a respectable philosophical tradition to which we may appeal—that the notion of immanent causation, or causation by an agent, is in fact more clear than that of transeunt causation, or causation by an event, and that it is only by understanding our own causal efficacy, as agents, that we can grasp the concept of *cause* at all. Hume may be said to have shown that we do not derive the concept of *cause* from what we perceive of external things. How, then, do we derive it? The most plausible suggestion, it seems to me, is that of Reid, once again: namely that 'the conception of an efficient cause may very probably be derived from the experience we have had... of our own power to produce certain effects'. [7] If we did not understand the concept of immanent causation, we would not understand that of transeunt causation.

10. It may have been noted that I have avoided the term 'free will' in all of this. For even if there is such a faculty as 'the will', which somehow sets our acts agoing, the question of freedom, as John Locke said, is not the question '*whether the will be free*';

it is the question '*whether a man be free*'. [8] For if there is a 'will', as a moving faculty, the question is whether the man is free to will to do these things that he does will to do—and also whether he is free *not* to will any of those things that he does will to do, and again, whether he is free to will any of those things that he does not will to do. Jonathan Edwards tried to restrict himself to the question—'Is the man free to do what it is that he wills?'—but the answer to this question will not tell us whether the man is responsible for what it is that he *does* will to do. Using still another pair of medieval terms, we may say that the metaphysical problem of freedom does not concern the *actus imperatus*; it does not concern the question whether we are free to accomplish whatever it is that we will or set out to do; it concerns the *actus elicited*, the question whether we are free to will or to set out to do those things that we do will or set out to do.

11. If we are responsible, and if what I have been trying to say is true, then we have a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen.

12. If we are thus prime movers unmoved and if our actions, or those for which we are responsible, are not causally determined, then they are not causally determined by our *desires*. And this means that the relation between what we want or what we desire, on the one hand, and what it is that we do, on the other, is not as simple as most philosophers would have it.

We may distinguish between what we might call the 'Hobbist approach' and what we might call the 'Kantian approach' to this question. The Hobbist approach is the one that is generally accepted at the present time, but the Kantian approach, I believe, is the one that is true. According to Hobbism, if we *know*, of some man, what his beliefs and desires happen to be and how strong they are, if we know what he feels certain of, what he desires more than anything else, and if we know the state of his body and what stimuli he is being subjected to, then we may *deduce*, logically, just what it is that he will do—or, more accurately, just what it is that he will try, set out, or undertake to do. Thus professor Melden has said that 'the connection between wanting and doing is logical'. [9] but according to the Kantian approach to our problem, and this is the one that I would take, there is no such logical connection between wanting and doing, nor need there even be a causal connection. No set of statements about a man's desires, beliefs, and stimulus situation at any time implies any statement telling us what the man will try, set out, or undertake to do at that time. As Reid put it, though we may 'reason from men's motives to their actions and, in many cases with great probability', we can never do so 'with absolute certainty'. [10]

This means that, in one very strict sense of the terms, there can be no science of man. If we think of science as a matter of finding out what laws happen to hold, and if the statement of a law tells us what kinds of events are caused by what other kinds of events, then there will be human actions which we cannot explain by subsuming them under any laws. We cannot say, 'It is causally necessary that, given such and such desires and beliefs, and being subject to such and such stimuli the agent will do so and so'. For at times the agent, if he chooses, may rise above his desires and do something else instead.

But all of this is consistent with saying that, perhaps more often than not, our desires do exist under conditions such that those conditions necessitate us to act. And we may also say, with Leibniz, that at other times our desires may 'incline without necessitating'.

13. Leibniz's phrase presents us with our final philosophical problem. What does it mean to say that a desire or a motive, might 'incline without necessitating'? There is a temptation, certainly, to say that 'to incline' means to cause and that 'not to necessitate' means not to cause, but obviously we cannot have it both ways.

Nor will Leibniz's own solution do. In his letter to Coste, he puts the problem as follows: 'When a choice is proposed, for example to go out or not to go out, it is a question whether, with all the circumstances, internal and external, motives, perceptions, disposition, impressions, passions, inclinations taken together, I am still in a contingent state, or whether I am necessitated to make the choice, for example, to go out; that is to say, whether this proposition true and determined in fact, *In all these circumstances taken together I shall choose to go out*, is contingent or necessary.' [11] Leibniz's answer might be put as follows: in one sense of the terms 'necessary' and 'contingent' the proposition 'in all these circumstances taken together I shall choose to go out', may be said to be necessary and not contingent. But the sense in which the proposition may be said to be contingent, according to Leibniz, is only this: there is no logical contradiction involved in denying the proposition. And the sense in which it may be said to be necessary is this: since 'nothing ever occurs without cause or determining reason', the proposition is causally necessary. 'Whenever all the circumstances taken together are such that the balance of deliberation is heavier on one side than on the other, it is certain and infallible that is the side that is going to win out'. But if what we have been saying is true, the proposition 'In all these circumstances taken together I shall choose to go out', may be causally as well as logically contingent. Hence we must find another interpretation for Leibniz's statement that our motives and desires may incline us, or influence us, to choose without thereby necessitating us to choose.

Let us consider a public official who has some moral scruples but who also, as

one says, could be had. Because of the scruples that he does have, he would never take any positive steps to receive a bribe—he would not actively solicit one. But his morality has its limits and he is also such that, if we were to confront him with a *fait accompli* or to let him see what is about to happen (\$10,000 in cash is being deposited behind the garage), then he would succumb and be unable to resist. The general situation is a familiar one and this is one reason that people pray to be delivered from temptation. (It also justifies Kant's remark: 'And how many there are who may have led a long blameless life, who are only *fortunate* in having escaped so many temptations'. [12] Our relation to the misdeed that we contemplate may not be a matter simply of being able to bring it about or not to bring it about. As St. Anselm noted, there are at least four possibilities. We may illustrate them by reference to our public official and the event which is his receiving the bribe, in the following way: (i) he may be able to bring the event about himself (*facere esse*), in which case he would actively cause himself to receive the bribe; (ii) he may be able to refrain from bringing it about himself (*non facere esse*), in which case he would not himself do anything to insure that he receive the bribe; (iii) he may be able to do something to prevent the event from occurring (*facere non esse*), in which case he would make sure that the \$ 10,000 was not left behind the garage; or (iv) he may be unable to do anything to prevent the event from occurring (*non facere non esse*), in which case, though he may not solicit the bribe, he would allow himself to keep it. [13] We have envisaged our official as a man who can resist the temptation to (i) but cannot resist the temptation to (iv); he can refrain from bringing the event about himself, but he cannot bring himself to do anything to prevent it.

Let us think of 'inclination without necessitation', then, in such terms as these. First we may contrast the two propositions:

- (1) He can resist the temptation to do something in order to make A happen;
- (2) He can resist the temptation to allow A to happen (i.e. to do nothing to prevent A from happening).

We may suppose that the man has some desire to have A happen and thus has a motive for making A happen. His motive for making A happen, I suggest, is one that *necessitates* provided that, because of the motive, (1) is false; he cannot resist the temptation to do something in order to make A happen. His motive for making A happen is one that *inclines* provided that, because of the motive, (2) is false; like our public official, he cannot bring himself to do anything to prevent A from happening and therefore we can say that this motive for making A happen is one that *inclines but does not necessitate* provided that, because of the motive, (1) is true and (2) is false;

he can resist the temptation to make it happen but he cannot resist the temptation to allow it to happen.

NOTES:

1. The general position to be presented here is suggested in the following writings, among others: Aristotle: *Eudemian Ethics*, bk ii, ch. 6; *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. iii, ch. 1-5; Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Active powers of Man* C. A. Campbell, 'Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?' *Mind*, 1951, 441-65; Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Responsibility and Avoidability'; and Richard Taylor, 'Determination and the Theory of Agency', in *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science*, ed. Sidney Hook (New York, 1958).
2. Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Active Powers of Man*, essay IV, ch. 4 (*Works*, 600)
3. *Summa Theologica*. First Part of the Second Part, qu VI (On the Voluntary and In voluntary')
4. Jonathan Edwards, *Freedom of the Will* (New Haven, 1957); G.I. Moore, *Ethics* (Home University Library, 1912), ch. 6.
5. A. I. Melden, *Free Action* (London, 1961), especially ch 3. Mr. Melden's own views, however, are quite the contrary of those that are proposed here.
6. Aristotle, *Physics*, bk. III, ch. 3; Suarez, *disputations Metaphysicae*, Disputation 18. s. 10.
7. Reid. *Works*, 524.
8. *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, bk II, ch. 21.
9. Melden, 166.
10. Reid, *Works*, 608, 612.
11. 'Letter a Mr. Coste de la Necessite et de la Contingence' (1707) in *Opera Philosophica*, ed. Erdmann, 447-9.
12. In the Preface to the *Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, in *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, ed. I. K. Abbott (London, 1959), 303
13. Cf. D.P. Henry, 'Saint Anselm's De "Grammatica"', *Philosophical Quarterly*, X (1960), 145-6. St Anselm noted that (i) and (iii), respectively, may be thought of as forming the upper left and the upper right corners of a square of opposition, and (ii) and (iv) the lower left and the lower right.

FATE -Richard Taylor

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Directions for studying the article "FATE";

- 1) Introduction to the author and author's idea: Tylor became very famous when he took the work to justify for metaphysical perspectives of doing philosophy. The article in our textbook is also a part of his outstanding works *Metaphysics*. When we read this article-"Fate, " we could see that his arguments to support his view are not really strong, there are many flaws and inconsistency in his demonstration. But currently, seldom there is any philosopher takes the viewpoint of fatalism, that is almost perished already in the history of philosophy. Anyhow, we should know that there is a doctrine of fatalism stemming in the debates on the issue of free will and determinism. Taylor's article provides us such an example.
- 2) Strategy of this article: Although in this article, some theological terms are mentioned a lot, as a matter of fact, Tylor's arguments are not really based on religious beliefs, rather are based on epistemological demonstrations. He claims that there are two kinds of resource for the theory of fatalism, one is theology, and another one is logical reasoning, his fatalism is obviously from the second resource. He also uses the method of ideal experiment, his story "Osma" is completely fictional, and it plays the central part in his illustration of fatalism.
- 3) Arguments: There are nine parts in this article. The first part could be said as a determinism and fatalism argument that tells us the connection and the difference between determinism and fatalism. The second part could be said as a past and future argument that tells us what fatalism concerns not the past but only the future matters. Then there is the resource of fatalism argument that explains the two resources of the doctrine of fatalism. Part IV and part V presents the ideal experiment of the story of Osma. The later parts are the argument of how to do logical and epistemological analysis of the story of Osma.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
Consistency, journalistic present tense, by the same token, retrospect, blank check.
- 5) Important propositions:
 1. Fatalism yields a sublime acceptance of all that life and nature offer whether to oneself or one's fellows.
 2. There is no middle ground. The principle is thus appropriately called as the law of excluded middle.
- 6) Study questions:
 1. What is the point of the law of excluded middle.
 2. What is the implication of the story of Osma?
 3. What is the difference between determinism and fatalism?

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4. Why do we say that theology is not the real resource of Tylor's fatalism?
 5. Is there any theoretical flaw in Tylor's argument justifying fatalism?
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We all, at certain moments of pain, threat, or bereavement, are apt to entertain the idea of fatalism, the thought that what is happening at a particular moment is unavoidable, that we are powerless to prevent it. Sometimes we find ourselves in circumstances not of our own making, in which our very being and destinies are so thoroughly anchored that the thought of fatalism can be quite overwhelming, and sometimes consoling. One feels that whatever then happens, however good or ill, will be what those circumstances yield, and we are helpless. Soldiers, it is said, are sometimes possessed by such thoughts. Perhaps all men would feel more inclined to them if they paused once in a while to think of how little they ever had to do with bringing themselves to wherever they have arrived in life, how much of their fortunes and destinies were decided for them by sheer circumstance, and how the entire course of their lives is often set, once and for all, by the most trivial incidents, which they did not produce and could not even have foreseen. If we are free to work out our destinies at all, which is doubtful, we have a freedom that is at best exercised within exceedingly narrow paths. All the important things—when we are born, of what parents, into what culture, whether we are loved or rejected, whether we are male or female, our temperament, our intelligence or stupidity, indeed everything that makes for the bulk of our happiness and misery—all these are decided for us by the most casual and indifferent circumstances, by sheer coincidences, chance encounters, and seemingly insignificant fortuities. One can see this in retrospect if he searches, but few search. The fate that has given us our very being has given us also our pride and conceit and has thereby formed us so that, being human, we congratulate ourselves on our blessings, which we call our achievements, blame the world for our blunders, which we call our misfortunes, and scarcely give a thought to that impersonal fate which arbitrarily dispenses both.

FATALISM AND DETERMINISM

Determinism, it will be recalled, is the theory that all events are rendered unavoidable by their causes. The attempt is sometimes made to distinguish this form fatalism by saying that, according to the fatalist, certain events are going to happen *no matter what*, or in other words, regardless of causes. But this is enormously contrived. It would be hard to find in the whole history of thought a single fatalist, on that conception of it.

Fatalism is the belief that whatever happens is unavoidable. That is the clearest expression of the doctrine, and provides the basis of the attitude of calm acceptance that the fatalist is thought, quite correctly, to embody. One who endorses the claim of universal causation, then, and the theory of the causal determination of all human behavior, is a kind of fatalist—or at Least he should be, if he is consistent. For that theory, as we have seen, once it is clearly spelled out and not hedged about with unresolved “ifs,” does entail that whatever happens is rendered inevitable by the causal conditions preceding it, and is therefore unavoidable. One can indeed think of verbal formulas for distinguishing the two theories, but if we think of a fatalist as one who has a certain attitude, we find it to be the attitude that a thoroughgoing determinist should, in consistency, assume. That some philosophical determinists are not fatalists does not so much illustrate a great difference between fatalism and determinism, but rather the humiliation to one’s pride that a fatalist position can deliver, and the comfort that can sometimes be found in evasion.

FATALISM WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE AND THE PAST

A fatalist, then, is someone who believes that whatever happens is and always was unavoidable. He thinks it is not up to him what will happen a thousand years hence, next year, tomorrow, or the very next moment. Of course he does not pretend always to *know* what is going to happen. Hence, he might try sometimes to read signs and portents, as meteorologists and astrologers do, or to contemplate the effects upon him of the various things that might, for all he knows, be fated to occur. But he does not suppose that whatever happens could ever have really been avoidable.

A fatalist thus thinks of the future in the way we all think of the past, for all men are fatalists as they look *back* on things. To a large extent we know what has happened—some of it we can even remember—whereas the future is still obscure to us, and we are therefore tempted to invest it, in our imagination, with all sorts of “possibilities.” The fatalist resists this temptation, knowing that mere ignorance can hardly give rise to any genuine possibility in things. He thinks of both past and future “under the aspect of eternity,” the way God is supposed to view them. We all think of the past this way, as something settled and fixed to be taken for what it is. We are never in the least tempted to try to modify it. It is not in the least up to us what happened last year, yesterday, or even a moment ago, any more that are the motions of the heavens or the political developments in Tibet. If we are not fatalists, then we might think that past things once *were* up to us, to bring about or prevent, as long as they were still future—but this expresses our attitude toward the future, not the past.

Such is surely our conception of the whole past, whether near or remote. But the consistent fatalist thinks of the future in the same way. We say of past things that they are no longer within our power. The fatalist says they never were.

THE SOURCES OF FATALISM

A fatalistic way of thinking most often arises from theological ideas, or from what are generally thought to be certain presuppositions of science and logic. Thus, if God is really all-knowing and all-powerful, it is not hard to suppose that He has arranged for everything to happen just as it is going to happen, that He already knows every detail of the whole future course of the world, and there is nothing left for you and me to do except watch things unfold, in the here or hereafter. But without bringing God into the picture, it is not hard to suppose, as we have seen, that everything that happens is wholly determined by what went before it, and hence that whatever happens at any future time is the only thing that can then happen, given what precedes it. Or even disregarding that, it seems natural to suppose that there is a body of truth concerning what the future holds, just as there is such truth concerning what is contained in the past, whether or not it is known to any man or even to God, and hence, that everything asserted in that body of truth will assuredly happen, in the fullness of time, precisely as it is described therein.

No one needs to be convinced that fatalism is the only proper way to view the past. That it is also the proper way to view the future is less obvious, due in part, perhaps, to our vastly greater ignorance of what the future holds. The consequences of holding such fatalism are obviously momentous. To say nothing of the consolation of fatalism, which enables a person to view all things as they arise with the same undisturbed mind with which he contemplates even the most revolting of history's horrors, the fatalist teaching also relieves one of all tendency toward both blame and approbation of others and of both guilt and conceit in himself. It promises that a perfect understanding is possible, and removes the temptation to view things in terms of human wickedness and moral responsibility. This thought alone, once firmly grasped, yields a sublime acceptance of all that life and nature offer, whether to oneself or one's fellows; and although it thereby reduces one's pride, it simultaneously enhances the feelings, opens the heart, and expands the understanding.

DIVINE OMNISCIENCE

Suppose for the moment, just for the purpose of discussion, that God exists and is omniscient. To say that God is omniscient means that He knows everything that is true. He cannot, of course, know that which is false. Concerning any falsehood, an

omniscient being can know that it is false; but then it is a truth that is known, namely, the truth that the thing in question is a falsehood. So if it is false that the moon is a cube, then God can, like you or me, know that this is false; but He cannot know the falsehood itself, that the moon is a cube.

Thus, if God is omniscient He knows, as you probably do, the date of your birth. He also knows, as you may not, the hour of your birth. Furthermore, God knows, as you assuredly do not, the date, and indeed the moment, of your conception—for there is such a truth, and we are supposing that God knows every truth. Moreover, He knows, as you surely do not, the date of your death, and even the exact moment, and the circumstances thereof—whether at that moment, known already to Him, you die as the result of accident, a fatal malady, suicide, murder, whatever. And, still assuming God exists and knows everything, He knows whether any ant walked across my desk last night, and if so, what ant it was, where it came from, how long it was on the desk, how it came to be there, and so on, to every truth about this insect that there is. Similarly, of course, He knows when some ant will again appear on my desk, if ever. He knows the number of hairs on my head, notes the fall of every sparrow, knows why it fell, and why it was going to fall. These are simply a few of the consequences of the omniscience that we are for the moment assuming. A more precise way of expressing all this is to say that God knows, concerning any statement whatever that anyone could formulate, that it is true, in case it is, and otherwise, that it is false. And let us suppose that God, at some time or other, or perhaps from time to time, vouchsafes some of his knowledge to men, or perhaps to certain chosen men. Thus prophets arise, proclaiming the coming of certain events; and things do then happen as they have foretold. Of course it is not surprising that they should, on the supposition we are making; namely, that the foreknowledge of these things comes from God, who is omniscient.

THE STORY OF OSMO

Now then, let us make one further supposition, which will get us squarely into the philosophical issue these ideas are intended to introduce. Let us suppose that God has revealed a particular set of facts to a chosen scribe who, believing (correctly) that they came from God, wrote them all down. The facts in question then turned out to be all the more or less significant episodes in the life of some perfectly ordinary man named Osmo. Osmo was entirely unknown to the scribe, and in fact to just about everyone, but there was no doubt concerning whom all these facts were about, for the very first thing received by the scribe from God, was: "He of whom I speak is called Osmo." When the revelations reached a fairly voluminous bulk and appeared to be

completed, the scribe arranged them in chronological order and assembled them into a book. He at first gave it the title *The Life of Osmo, as Given by God*, but thinking that people would take this to be some sort of joke, he dropped the reference to God.

The book was published, but attracted no attention whatsoever, because it appeared to be nothing more than a record of the dull life of a very plain man named Osmo. The scribe wondered, in fact, why God had chosen to convey such a mass of seemingly pointless trivia.

The book eventually found its way into various libraries, where it gathered dust until one day a high school teacher in Indiana, who rejoiced under the name of Osmo, saw a copy on the shelf. The title caught his eye. Curiously picking it up and blowing the dust off, he was thunderstruck by the opening sentence: "Osmo is born in Mercy Hospital in Auburn, Indiana, on June 6, 1942, of Finnish parentage, and after nearly losing his life from an attack of pneumonia at the age of five, he is enrolled in the St. James school there." Osmo turned pale. The book nearly fell from his hands. He thumbed back in excitement to discover who had written it. Nothing was given of its authorship nor for that matter, of its publisher. His questions of the librarian produced no further information, he being as ignorant as Osmo of how the book came to be there.

So Osmo, with the book pressed tightly under his arm, dashed across the street for some coffee, thinking to compose himself and then examine this book with care. Mean while he glanced at a few more of its opening remarks, at the things said there about his difficulties with his younger sister, how he was slow in learning to read, of the summer on Mackinac Island, and so on. His emotions now somewhat quieted, Osmo began a close reading. He noticed that everything was expressed in the present tense, the way newspaper headlines are written. For example, the text read, "Osmo is born in Mercy Hospital," instead of saying he *was* born there, and it recorded that he quarrels with his sister, is a slow student, is fitted with dental braces at age eight, and so on, all in the journalistic present tense. But the text itself made quite clear approximately when all these various things happened, for everything was in chronological order, and in any case each year of its subject's life constituted a separate chapter, and was so titled—"Osmo's Seventh Year," "Osmo's Eighth Year," and so on through the book.

Osmo became absolutely engrossed, to the extent that he forgot his original astonishment, bordering on panic, and for a while even lost his curiosity concerning authorship. He sat drinking coffee and reliving his childhood, much of which he had all but forgotten until the memories were revived by the book now before him. He had almost forgotten about the kitten, for example, and had entirely forgotten its name, until he read, in the chapter called "Osmo's Seventh Year," this observation: "Sobbing, Osmo takes Fluffy, now quite dead, to the garden, and buries her next to the rose

bush.” Ah yes! And then there was Louise, who sat next to him in the eighth grade—it was all right there. And how he got caught smoking one day. And how he felt when his father died. On and on. Osmo became so absorbed that he quite forgot the business of the day, until it occurred to him to turn to Chapter 26, to see what might be said there, he having just recently turned twenty-six. He had no sooner done so than his panic returned, for lo! What the book said was true! That it rains on his birthday for example, that his wife fails to give him the binoculars he had hinted he would like, that he receives a raise in salary shortly thereafter, and so on. Now how in God’s name, Osmo pondered, could anyone know that, apparently before it had happened? For these were quite recent events, and the book had dust on it. Quickly moving on, Osmo came to this: “Sitting and reading in the coffee shop across from the library, Osmo, perspiring copiously, entirely forgets, until it is too late, that he is supposed to collect his wife at the hairdresser’s at four.” Oh my god! He had forgotten all about that. Yanking out his watch, Osmo discovered that it was nearly five o’clock—too late. She would be on her way home by now, and in a very sour mood.

Osmo’s anguish at this discovery was nothing, though, compared to what the rest of the day held for him. He poured more coffee, and it now occurred to him to check the number of chapters in this amazing book. Only twenty-nine! But surely, he thought, that doesn’t mean anything. How anyone could have gotten all this stuff down so far was puzzling enough, to be sure, but no one on God’s earth could possibly know in advance how long this or that man is going to live. (Only god could know that sort of thing, Osmo reflected.) So he read along; though not without considerable uneasiness and even depression, for the remaining three chapters were on the whole discouraging. He thought he had gotten that ulcer under control, for example. And he didn’t see any reason to suppose his job was going to turn out that badly, or that he was really going to break a leg skiing; after all, he could just give up skiing. But then the book ended on a terribly dismal note. It said: “And Osmo, having taken Northwest flight 569 from O’Hare, perishes when the aircraft crashes on the runway at Fort Wayne, with considerable loss of life, a tragedy rendered the more calamitous by the fact that Osmo had neglected to renew his life insurance before the expiration of the grace period.” And that was all. That was the end of the book.

So *that’s* why it had only twenty-nine chapters. Some idiot thought he was going to get killed in a plane crash. But, Osmo thought, he just wouldn’t get on that plane. And this would also remind him to keep his insurance in force. (About three years later our hero, having boarded a flight for St. Paul, went berserk when the pilot announced they were going to land at Fort Wayne instead. According to one of the stewardesses, he tried to hijack the aircraft and divert it to another airfield. The Civil Aeronautics Board cited the resulting disruptions as contributing to the crash that followed as the plane tried to land.)

FOUR QUESTIONS

Osmo's extraordinary circumstances led him to embrace the doctrine of fatalism. Not quite completely, perhaps, for there he was, right up to the end, trying vainly to buck his fate—trying, in effect, to make a fool of God, though he did not know this, because he had no idea of the book's source. Still, he had the overwhelming evidence of his whole past life to make him think that everything was going to work out exactly as described in the book. It always had. It was, in fact, precisely this conviction that terrified him so'

But now let us ask these questions, in order to make Osmo's experiences more relevant to our own. First, why did he become, or nearly become, a fatalist? Second, just what did his fatalism amount to? Third, was his belief justified in terms of the evidence he had? And finally, is that belief justified in terms of the evidence we have—or in other words, should we be fatalists too?

This last, of course, is the important metaphysical question, but we have to approach it through the others.

Why did Osmo become a fatalist? Osmo became a fatalist because there existed a set of true statements about the details of his life, both past and future, and he came to know what some of these statements were and to believe them, including many concerning his future. That is the whole of it.

No theological ideas entered into his conviction, nor any presuppositions about causal determinism, the coercion of his actions by causes, or anything of this sort. The foundations of Osmo's fatalism were entirely in logic and epistemology, having only to do with truth and knowledge. Ideas about God did not enter in, for he never suspected that God was the ultimate source of those statements. And at no point did he think God was *making* him do what he did. All he was concerned about was that someone seemed somehow to *know* what he had done and was going to do.

What, then, did Osmo believe? He did not, it should be noted, believe that certain things were going to happen to his, *no matter what*. That does not express a logically coherent belief. He did not think he was in danger of perishing in an airplane crash even in case he did not get into any airplane, for example, or that he was going to break his leg skiing, whether he went skiing or not. No one believes what he considers to be plainly impossible. If anyone believes that a given event is going to happen, he does not doubt that those things necessary for its occurrence are going to happen too. The expression, "no matter what," by means of which some philosophers have sought an easy and even childish refutation of fatalism, is accordingly highly inappropriate in any description of the fatalist conviction.

Osmo's fatalism was simply the realization that the things described in the

book were unavoidable.

Of course we are all fatalists in this sense about some things, and the metaphysical question is whether this familiar attitude should not be extended to everything. We know the sun will rise tomorrow, for example, and there is nothing we can do about it. Each of us knows he is sooner or later going to die, too, and there is nothing to be done about that either. We normally do not know just when, of course, but it is mercifully so! For otherwise we would simply sit checking off the days as they passed, with growing despair, like a man condemned to the gallows and knowing the hour set for his execution. The tides ebb and flow, and heavens revolve, the seasons follow in order, generations arise and pass, and no one speaks of taking preventive measures. With respect to those things each of us recognizes as beyond his control, we are of necessity fatalists.

The question of fatalism is simply: Of all the things that happen in the world, which, if any, are avoidable? And the philosophical fatalist replies: None of them. They never were. Some of them only seemed so.

Was Osmo's fatalism justified? Of course it was. When he could sit right there and read a true description of those parts of his life that had not yet been lived, it would be idle to suggest to him that his future might, nonetheless, contain alternative possibilities. The only doubts Osmo had were whether those statements could really be true. But here he had the proof of his own experience, as one by one they were tested. Whenever he tried to prevent what was set forth, he of course failed. Such failure, over and over, of even the most Herculean efforts, with never a single success, must surely suggest, sooner or later, that he was *destined* to fail. Even to the end, when Osmo tried so desperately to save himself from the destruction described in the book, his effort was totally in vain—as he should have realized it was going to be had he really known that what was said there was true. No power in heaven or earth can render false a statement that is true. It has never been done, and never will be.

Is the doctrine of fatalism, then, true? This amounts to asking whether our circumstances are significantly different from Osmo's. Of course we cannot read our own biographies the way he could. Only men who become famous ever have their lives recorded, and even so, it is always in retrospect. This is unfortunate. It is too bad that someone with sufficient knowledge—God, for example—cannot set down the lives of great men in advance, so that their achievements can be appreciated better by their contemporaries, and indeed, by their predecessors—their parents, for instance. But mortals do not have the requisite knowledge, and if there is any god who does, he seems to keep it to himself.

None of this matters, as far as our own fatalism is concerned. For the important thing to note is that, of the two considerations that explain Osmo's fatalism, only one of them was philosophically relevant, and that one applies to us no less than

to him. The two considerations were: (1) there existed a set of true statements about his life, both past and future, and (2) he came to know what those statements were and to believe them. Now the second of these two considerations explains why, as a matter of psychological fact, Osmo became fatalistic, but it has nothing to do with the validity of that point of view. Its validity is assured by (1) alone. It was not the fact that the statements happened to be written down that rendered the things they described unavoidable: that had nothing to do with it at all. Nor was it the fact that, because they had been written, Osmo could read them. His reading them and coming to believe them likewise had nothing to do with the inevitability of what they described. This was ensured simply by there being such a set of statements, whether written or not, whether read by anyone or not, and whether or not known to be true. All that is required is that they should *be* true.

Each of us has but one possible past, described by that totality of statements about us in the past tense, each of which happens to be true. No one ever thinks of rearranging things there; it is simply accepted as given. But so also, each of us has but one possible future, described by that totality of statements about oneself in the future tense, each of which happens to be true. The sum of these constitutes one's biography. Part of it has been lived. The main outlines of it can still be seen, in retrospect, though most of its details are obscure. The other part has not been lived, though it most assuredly is going to be, in exact accordance with that set of statements just referred to. Some of its outlines can already be seen, in prospect, but it is on the whole more obscure than the part belonging to the past. We have at best only premonitory glimpses of it. It is no doubt for this reason that not all of this part, the part that awaits us, is perceived as given, and men do sometimes speak absurdly of altering it—as though what the future holds, as identified by any true statement in the future tense. Might after all *not* hold.

Osmo's biography was all expressed in the present tense because all that mattered was that the things referred to were real events; it did not matter to what part of time they belonged. His past consisted of those things that preceded his reading of the book, and he simply accepted it as given. He was not tempted to revise what was said there, for he was sure it was true. But it took the book to make him realize that his future was also something given. It was equally pointless for him to try to revise what was said there, for it, too, was true. As the past contains what has happened, the future contains what will happen, and neither contains, in addition to these things, various other things that did not and will not happen.

Of course we know relatively little of what the future contains. Some things we know. We know the sun will go on rising and setting, for example, that taxes will be levied and wars rage, that men will continue to be callous and greedy, and that people will be murdered and robbed. It is just the details that remain to be discovered.

But the same is true of the past; it is only a matter of degree. When I meet a total stranger I do not know, and will probably never know, what his past has been, beyond certain obvious things—that he had a mother, and things of this sort. I know nothing of the particulars of that vast realm of fact that is unique to his past. And the same for his future, with only this difference—that *all* men are strangers to me as far as their futures are concerned, and here I am even a stranger to myself.

Yet there is one thing I know concerning any stranger's past and the past of everything under the sun; namely, that whatever it might hold, there is nothing anyone can do about it now. What has happened cannot be undone. The mere fact that it has happened guarantees this.

And so it is, by the same token, of the future of everything under the sun. Whatever the future might hold, there is nothing anyone can do about it now. What will happen cannot be altered. The mere fact that it is going to happen guarantees this.

THE LAW OF THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE

The presupposition of fatalism is therefore nothing but the commonest presupposition of all logic and inquiry; namely, that there is such a thing as truth, and that this has nothing at all to do with the passage of time. Nothing *becomes* true or *ceases* to be true; whatever is truth at all simply *is* true.

It comes to the same thing, and is perhaps more precise, to say that every meaningful statement, whether about oneself or anything else, is either true or else it is false; that is, its denial is true. There is no middle ground. The principle is thus appropriately called the law of excluded middle. It has nothing to do with what tense a statement happens to express, nor with the question of whether anyone, man or god, happens to know whether it is true or false.

Thus no one knows whether there was an ant on my desk last night, and no one ever will. But we do know that either this statement is true or else its denial is true - there is no third alternative. If we say it *might* be true, we mean only that we do not happen to know. Similarly, no one knows whether or not there is going to be an ant there tonight, but we do know that either it will or else it will not be there.

In a similar way we can distinguish two mutually exclusive but exhaustive classes of statements about any man; namely, the class of all those that are true, and the class of all that are false. There are no others in addition to these. Included in each are statements never asserted or even considered by anyone, but such that, if anyone were to formulate one of them it would either be a true statement or a false one.

Consider, then, that class of statements about some particular person—yourself, let us suppose—each of which happens to be true. Their totality constitutes your biography. One combination of such statements describes the time,

place, and circumstances of your birth. Another combination describe the time, place, and circumstances of your death, Others describe in detail the rises and falls of your fortunes, your achievements and failures, your joys and sorrows – absolutely everything that is true of you.

Some of these things you have already experienced, others await you. But the entire biography is there. It is not written, and probably never will be; but it is nevertheless there, all of it. If, like Osmo, you had some way of discovering those statements in advance, then like him you could hardly help becoming a fatalist. But foreknowledge of the truth would not create any truth, nor invest your philosophy with truth, nor add anything to the philosophical foundations of the fatalism that would then be so apparent to you. It would only serve to make it apparent.

OBJECTIONS

This thought, and the sense of its force, have tormented and frightened men from antiquity, and thinkers whose pride sometimes exceeds their acumen and their reverence for truth have attempted every means imaginable to demolish it. There are few articles of faith upon which virtually all men can agree, but one of them is certainly the belief in their cherished free will. Any argument in opposition to the doctrine of fate, however feeble, is immediately and uncritically embraced, as though the refutation of fatalism required only the denial of it, supported by reasons that would hardly do credit to a child. It will be worthwhile, therefore, to look briefly at some of the arguments most commonly heard.

1. One can neither foresee the future nor prove that there is any god, or even if there is, that he could know in advance the free actions of men.

The reply to this is that it is irrelevant. The thesis of fatalism rests on no theory of divination and on no theology. These ideas were introduced only illustratively.

2. True statements are not the causes of anything. Statements only entail; they do not cause, and hence threaten no man's freedom.

But this, too, is irrelevant, for the claim here denied is not one that has been made.

3. The whole argument just conflates fact and necessity into one and the same thing, treating as unavoidable

that which is merely true. The fact that a given thing is going to happen implies only that it is going to happen, not that it has to. Someone might still be able to prevent it-though of course no one will. For example, President Kennedy was murdered. This means it was true that he was

going to be murdered. But it does not mean his death at that time and place was unavoidable. Someone *could* have rendered that statement false; though of course no one did.

That is probably the commonest “refutation” of fatalism ever offered. But how strong is the claim that something *can* be done, when in fact it never *has* been done in the whole history of the universe, in spite, sometimes, of the most strenuous efforts? No one has ever rendered false a statement that was true, however hard some men have tried. When an attempt, perhaps a heroic attempt, is made to avoid a given calamity, and the thing in question happens anyway, at just the moment and in just the way it was going to happen, we have reason to doubt that it could have been avoided. And in fact great effort was made to save President Kennedy, for example, from the destruction toward which he was heading on that fatal day, a whole legion of bodyguards having no other mission. And it failed. True, we can say that *if* more strenuous precautions had been taken, the event would not have happened. But to this we must add, *true*, they were not taken, and hence *true*, they were not going to be taken—and we have on our hands again a true statement of the kind that no man has ever had the slightest degree of success in rendering false.

4. The fatalist argument just rests on a “confusion of modalities.” The fact that something is true entails only that its denial is false not that its denial is impossible. All that is impossible is that both should be true, or both false. Thus, if the president is going to be murdered, it is certainly false that he is not—but not impossible. What is impossible is that he will be both murdered and spared.

Here again we have only a distracting irrelevancy, similar to the point just made. The fatalist argument has nothing to do with impossibility in those senses familiar to logic. It has to do with unavoidability. It is in other words concerned with human abilities. The fact that a statement is true does not, to be sure, entail that it is necessary, nor do all false statements express impossibilities. Nonetheless, no man is able to avoid what is truly described, however contingently, in any statement, nor to bring about what is thus falsely described. Nor can anyone convert the one to the other, making suddenly true that which was false, or vice versa. It has never been done, and it never will be. It would be a conceit indeed for someone now to suggest that he, alone among men, might be able to accomplish that feat. This inability goes far beyond the obvious impossibility of making something both true and false at once. No metaphysics turns on that simple point.

5. Perhaps it would be best, then, to discard the presupposition underlying the whole fatalist philosophy; namely, the idea that statements are true in advance of the things they describe. The future is the realm of possibilities, concerning any of which we should neither say it is true that it will happen, nor that it is false.

But, in reply this desperate move is nothing but arbitrary fiction, resorted to for no other reason than to be rid of the detested doctrine of fatalism. What is at issue here is the very law of excluded

middle, which, it is suggested, we shall be allowed to affirm only up to that point at which it threatens something dear. We shall permit it to hold for one part of time, but suddenly retract it in speaking of another, even though the future is continuously being converted to the past through sheer temporal passage.

Most surely, if the statement, made now, that President Kennedy has been murdered, is a true one, then the prediction, made before the event, that he was going to be murdered, was true too. The two statements have exactly the same content, and are in fact one and the same statement, except for the variation of tense. The fact that this statement is more easily known in retrospect than in prospect casts no doubt on its truth, but only illustrates a familiar fact of epistemology. A prediction, to be sure, must await fulfillment, but it does not thereupon for the first time acquire its truth. Indeed, had it not been true from the start it could not have been fulfilled, nor its author congratulated for having it right. Fulfillment is nothing but the occurrence of what is correctly predicted.

The law of exclude middle is not like a blank check, into which we can write whatever values we please, according to our preferences. We can no more make ourselves metaphysically free and masters of our desires by adding qualifications to this law than a poor man can make himself rich just by adding figures to his bankbook. The law pronounces every meaningful statement true, or, if not true, then false. It leaves no handy peg between these two on which one may hang his beloved freedom of will for safekeeping, nor does it say anything whatever about time.

Every single philosophical argument against the teaching of fatalism rests upon the assumption that we are free to pursue and realize various alternative future possibilities—the very thing, of course, that is at issue. When some of these possibilities have become realized and moved on into the past, the supposed alternative possibilities usually appear to have been less real than they had seemed: but this somehow does not destroy the fond notion that they were there. Metaphysics and logic are weak indeed in the face of an opinion nourished by invincible pride, and most men would sooner lose their very souls than be divested of that dignity which they imagine rests upon their freedom of will.

INVINCIBLE FATE

We shall say, therefore, of whatever happens, that it was going to be that way. And this is a comfort, both in fortune and in adversity. We shall say of him who turns out bad and mean, that he was going to; of him who turns out happy and blessed, that he was going to; neither praising nor berating fortune, crying over what has been, lamenting what was going to be, or passing moral judgments.

Shall we, then, sit idly by, passively observing the changing scene without

participation, never testing our strength and our goodness, having no hand in what happens, or in making things come out as they should? This is a question for which each will find his own answer. Some men do little or nothing with their lives. And might as well never have lived, they make such waste of it. Others do much, and the lives of a few even shine like the stars. But we knew this before we ever began talking about fate. In time we will all know of which sort we were destined to be.

THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM

-James Rachels

(PPD From James Rachels, *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*

New York: Random House, Inc., 1986. Reprinted by permission of Random house, Inc.)

Morality differs in every society, and is a convenient term for socially approved habits.

Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (1934)

Directions of studying Rachels' article *The Challenge of Cultural Relativism*:

- 1) The background of the author and his viewpoints: The author James Rachels was a professor of philosophy in the School of Humanities University of Alabama America. Our article is from his book *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*. This article aims to expose the main feature, the key points and theoretical consequence of the doctrine of moral relativism. According to Rachels, moral relativism is based on the thesis of culture relativism. And there are six propositions that generalize the major ideas of this doctrine. The fourth proposition " there is no universal truth in ethics" seemed the most important one. Obviously, Rachels' own viewpoint is a sort of moral or cultural realism, which means that there is objective and universal moral truth and cultural scheme.
- 2) Strategies used in this article: Most contemporary American philosophers are very up in semantic and in logic, the analysis of the meaning of words, and of the logical structure of arguments provide them main strategy of doing philosophy, Rachels' case is the same.
- 3) Arguments: There are seven parts in the article, what we need to read intensively are the "Cultural Relativism." argument in the second part. Here, Rachels indicates that it is cultural relativism makes the base for the moral relativism thesis. Then in the fourth part, there is a "consequence of cultural relativism" argument, by which the theoretical and practical problems resulted from the belief of cultural relativism are exposed clearly. In the sixth part of the article, there is Rachels' positive thesis, could be called as moral realistic argument, that presents us the theoretical points of the realism or rationalism doctrine of ethics. At last, there is the seventh part, where the benefits we can draw from the thesis of moral relativism are stated. By these arguments, Rachels makes up this classical essay that clear up almost every thing of the issue of moral relativism.
- 4) Disciplined terms:
cultural relativism, tolerance, premise, conclusion, moral progress, open mind.
- 5) Important propositions:
 1. Cultural relativism is a theory about the nature of morality.
 2. Cultural relativism, as it has been called, challenges our ordinary belief in the objectivity and universality of moral truth.

3. There is a general theoretical point here, namely, that there are some moral rules that all societies will have in common, because those rules are necessary for society to exist.

6) Study questions:

1. Rachels says that infanticide among Eskimos does not necessarily signal a different attitudes toward children from that which exists elsewhere. Why?
 2. What are the reasons by which Rachels rejects cultural relativism?
 3. Why do differences in customary behavior not always imply difference in moral beliefs?
 4. What values do all societies share as common? Do you agree with Rachels' idea?
 5. What lessons do cultural relativism teach us, according to Rachels?
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HOW DIFFERENT CULTURES HAVE DIFFERENT MORAL CODES

Darius, a king of ancient Persia, was intrigued by the variety of cultures he encountered in his travels. He had found, for example, that the Callatians (a tribe of Indians) customarily ate the bodies of their dead fathers. The Greeks, of course, did not do that—the Greeks practiced cremation and regarded the funeral pyre as the natural and fitting way to dispose of the dead. Darius thought that a sophisticated understanding of the world must include an appreciation of such differences between cultures. One day, to teach this lesson, he summoned some Greeks who happened to be present at his court and asked them what they would take to eat the bodies of their dead fathers. They were shocked, as Darius knew they would be, and replied that no amount of money could persuade them to do such a thing. Then Darius called in some Callatians, and while the Greeks listened asked them what they would take to burn their dead fathers' bodies. The Callatians were horrified and told Darius not even to mention such a dreadful thing.

This story, recounted by Herodotus in his *History*, illustrates a recurring theme in the literature of social science: different cultures have different moral codes. What is thought right within one group may be utterly abhorrent to the members of another group, and vice versa. Should we eat the bodies of the dead or burn them? If you were a Greek, one answer would seem obviously correct; but if you were a Callatian, the opposite would seem equally certain.

It is easy to give additional examples of the same kind. Consider the Eskimos. They are a remote and inaccessible people. Numbering only about 25,000, they live in small, isolated settlements scattered mostly along the northern fringes of North America and Greenland. Until the beginning of this century, the outside world knew little about them. Then explorers began to bring back strange tales.

Eskimo customs turned out to be very different from our own. The men often

had more than one wife, and they would share their wives with guests, lending them for the night as a sign of hospitality. Moreover, within a community, a dominant male might demand—and get—regular sexual access to other men's wives. The women, however, were free to break these arrangements simply by leaving their husbands and taking up with new partners—free, that is, so long as their former husbands chose not to make trouble. All in all, the Eskimo practice was a volatile scheme that bore little resemblance to what we call marriage.

But it was not only their marriage and sexual practices that were different. The Eskimos also seemed to have less regard for human life. Infanticide, for example, was common. Knud Rasmussen, one of the most famous early explorers, reported that he met one woman who had borne twenty children but had killed ten of them at birth. Female babies, he found, were especially liable to be destroyed, and this was permitted simply at the parents' discretion, with no social stigma attached to it. Old people also, when they became too feeble to contribute to the family, were left out in the snow to die. So there seemed to be, in this society, remarkably little respect for life.

To the general public, these were disturbing revelations. Our own way of living seems so natural and right that for many of us it is hard to conceive of others living so differently. And when we do hear of such things, we tend immediately to categorize those other peoples as "backward" or "primitive." But to anthropologists and sociologists, there was nothing particularly surprising about the Eskimos. Since the time of Herodotus, enlightened observers have been accustomed to the idea that conceptions of right and wrong differ from culture to culture. If we assume that *our* ideas of right and wrong will be shared by all peoples at all times, we are merely naïve.

CULTURAL RELATIVISM

To many thinkers, this observation—"Different cultures have different moral codes"—has seemed to be the key to understanding morality. The idea of universal truth in ethics, they say, is a myth. The customs of different societies are all that exist. These customs cannot be said to be "correct" or "incorrect," for that implies we have an independent standard of right and wrong by which they may be judged. But there is no such independent standard; every standard is culture-bound. The great pioneering sociologist William Graham Sumner, writing in 1906, put the point like this:

The "right" way is the way which the ancestors used and which has been handed down. The Tradition is its own warrant. It is not held subject to verification by experience. The notion of Right is in the folkways. It is not outside of them, of

independent origin, and brought to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right. This is because they are traditional, and therefore contain in themselves the authority of the ancestral ghosts. When we come to the folkways we are at the end of our analysis.

This line of thought has probably persuaded more people to be skeptical about ethics than any other single thing. *Cultural Relativism*, as it has been called, challenges our ordinary belief in the objectivity and universality of moral truth. It says, in effect, that there is no such thing as universal truth in ethics; there are only the various cultural codes, and nothing more. Moreover, our own code has no special status; it is merely one among many.

As we shall see, this basic idea is really a compound of several different thoughts. It is important to separate the various elements of the theory because, on analysis, some parts of the theory turn out to be correct, whereas others seem to be mistaken. As a beginning, we may distinguish the following claims, all of which have been made by cultural relativists:

1. Different societies have different moral codes.
2. There is no objective standard that can be used to judge one societal code better than another.
3. The moral code of our own society has no special status; it is merely one among many.
4. There is no "universal truth" in ethics—that is, there are no moral truths that hold for all peoples at all times.
5. The moral code of a society determines what is right within that society; that is, if the moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, then that action *is* right, at least within that society.
6. It is mere arrogance for us to try to judge the conduct of other peoples. We should adopt an attitude of tolerance toward the practices of other cultures.

Although it may seem that these six propositions go naturally together, they are independent of one another, in the sense that some of them might be true even if others are false. In what follows, we will try to identify what is correct in Cultural Relativism, but we will also be concerned to expose what is mistaken about it.

THE CULTURAL DIFFERENCES ARGUMENT

Cultural Relativism is a theory about the nature of morality. At first blush it seems quite plausible. However, like all such theories, it may be evaluated by subjecting it to

rational analysis; and when we analyze Cultural Relativism we find that it is not so plausible as it first appears to be.

The first thing we need to notice is that at the heart of Cultural Relativism there is a certain *form of argument*. The strategy used by cultural relativists is to argue from facts about the differences between cultural outlooks to a conclusion about the status of morality. Thus we are invited to accept this reasoning:

1. The Greeks believed it was wrong to eat the dead, whereas the Callatians believed it was right to eat the dead.
2. Therefore, eating the dead is neither objectively right nor objectively wrong. It is merely a matter of opinion, which varies from culture to culture.

Or, alternatively:

1. The Eskimos see nothing wrong with infanticide, whereas Americans believe infanticide is immoral.
2. Therefore, infanticide is neither objectively right nor objectively wrong. It is merely a matter of opinion, which varies from culture to culture.

Clearly, these arguments are variations of one fundamental idea. They are both special cases of a more general argument, which says:

1. Different cultures have different moral codes.
2. Therefore, there is no objective "truth" in morality. Right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture.

We may call this the *Cultural Differences Argument*. To many people, it is very persuasive. But from a logical point of view, is it a *sound* argument?

It is not sound. The trouble is that the conclusion does not really follow from the premise—that is, even if the premise is true, the conclusion still might be false. The premise concerns what people *believe*: in some societies, people believe one thing; in other societies, people believe differently. The conclusion, however, concerns *what really is the case*. The trouble is that this sort of conclusion does not follow logically from this sort of premise.

Consider again the example of the Greeks and Callatians. The Greeks believed it was wrong to eat the dead; the Callatians believed it was right. Does it follow, *from the mere fact that they disagreed*, that there is no objective truth in the matter? No, it does not follow; for it *could* be that the practice was objectively right (or wrong) and that one or the other of them was simply mistaken.

To make the point clearer, consider a very different matter. In some societies, people believe the earth is flat. In other societies, such as our own, people believe the earth is (roughly) spherical. Does it follow, *from the mere fact that they disagree*, that there is no “objective truth” in geography? Of course not; we would never draw such a conclusion because we realize that, in their beliefs about the world, the members of some societies might simply be wrong. There is no reason to think that if the world is round everyone must know it. Similarly, there is no reason to think that if there is moral truth everyone must know it. The fundamental mistake in the Cultural Differences Argument is that it attempts to derive a substantive conclusion about a subject (morality) from the mere fact that people disagree about it.

It is important to understand the nature of the point that is being made here. We are *not* saying (not yet, anyway) that the conclusion of the argument is false. Insofar as anything being said here is concerned, it is still an open question whether the conclusion is true. We *are* making a purely logical point and saying that the conclusion does not *follow from* the premise. This is important, because in order to determine whether the conclusion is true, we need arguments in its support. Cultural Relativism proposes this argument, but unfortunately the argument turns out to be fallacious. So it proves nothing.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF TAKING CULTURAL RELATIVISM SERIOUSLY

Even if the Cultural Differences Argument is invalid, Cultural Relativism might still be true. What would it be like if it were true?

In the passage quoted above, William Graham Sumner summarizes the essence of Cultural Relativism. He says that there is no measure of right and wrong other than the standards of one's society: “The notion of right is in the folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin, and brought to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right.”

Suppose we took this seriously. What would be some of the consequences?

1. *We could no longer say that the customs of other societies are morally inferior to our own.* This, of course, is one of the main points stressed by Cultural Relativism. We would have to stop condemning other societies merely because they are “different.” So long as we concentrate on certain examples, such as the funerary practices of the Greeks and Callatians, this may seem to be a sophisticated, enlightened attitude.

However, we would also be stopped from criticizing other, less benign practices. Suppose a society waged war on its neighbors for the purpose of taking

slaves. Or suppose a society was violently anti-Semitic and its leaders set out to destroy the Jews. Cultural Relativism would preclude us from saying that either of these practices was wrong. We would not even be able to say that a society tolerant of Jews is *better* than the anti-Semitic society, for that would imply some sort of transcultural standard of comparison. The failure to condemn *these* practices does not seem “enlightened”; on the contrary, slavery and anti-Semitism seem wrong *wherever* they occur. Nevertheless, if we took Cultural Relativism seriously, we would have to admit that these social practices also are immune from criticism.

2. *We could decide whether actions are right or wrong just by consulting the standards of our society.* Cultural Relativism suggests a simple test for determining what is right and what is wrong, all one has to do is ask whether the action is in accordance with the code of one’s society. Suppose a resident of South Africa is wondering whether his country’s policy of *apartheid*—rigid racial segregation—is morally correct. All he has to do is ask whether this policy conforms to his society’s moral code. If it does, there is nothing to worry about, at least from a moral point of view.

This implication of Cultural Relativism is disturbing because few of us think that our society’s code is perfect—we can think of ways it might be improved. Yet Cultural Relativism would not only forbid us from criticizing the codes of *other* societies; it would stop us from criticizing our *own*. After all, if right and wrong are relative to culture, this must be true for our own culture just as much as for others.

3. *The idea of moral progress is called into doubt.* Usually, we think that at least some changes in our society have been for the better. (Some, of course, may have been changes for the worse.) Consider this example: throughout most of Western history the place of women in society was very narrowly circumscribed. They could not own property; they could not vote or hold political office; with a few exceptions, they were not permitted to have paying jobs; and generally they were under the almost absolute control of their husbands. Recently much of this has changed, and most people think of it as progress.

If cultural Relativism is correct, can we legitimately think of this as progress? Progress means replacing a way of doing things with a *better* way. But by what standard do we judge the new ways as better? If the old ways were in accordance with the social standards of their time, then Cultural Relativism would say it is a mistake to judge them by the standards of a different time. Eighteenth-century society was, in effect, a different society from the one we have now. To say that we have made progress implies a judgment that present-day society is better, and that is just the sort of transcultural judgment that, according to Cultural Relativism, is impermissible.

Our idea of social *reform* will also have to be reconsidered. A reformer such as

Martin Luther King, Jr., seeks to change his society for the better. Within the constraints imposed by Cultural Relativism, there is one way this might be done. If a society is not living up to its own ideals, the reformer may be regarded as acting for the bet: the ideals of the society are the standard by which we judge his or her proposals as worthwhile. But the "reformer" may not challenge the ideals themselves, for those ideals are by definition correct. According to cultural Relativism, then, the idea of social reform makes sense only in this very limited way.

These three consequences of Cultural Relativism have led many thinkers to reject it as implausible on its face. It does make sense, they say, to condemn some practices, such as slavery and anti-Semitism, wherever they occur. It makes sense to think that our own society has made some moral progress, while admitting that it is still imperfect and in need of reform. Because Cultural Relativism says that these judgments make no sense, the argument goes, it cannot be right.

WHY THERE IS LESS DISAGREEMENT THAN IT SEEMS

The original impetus for Cultural Relativism comes from the observation that cultures differ dramatically in their views of right and wrong. But just how much do they differ? It is true that there are differences. However, it is easy to overestimate the extent of those differences. Often, when we examine what *seems* to be a dramatic difference, we find that the cultures do not differ nearly as much as it appears.

Consider a culture in which people believe it is wrong to eat cows. This may even be a poor culture, in which there is not enough food; still, the cows are not to be touched. Such a society would *appear* to have values very different from our own. But does it? We have not yet asked why these people will not eat cows. Suppose it is because they believe that after death the souls of humans inhabit the bodies of animals, especially cows, so that a cow may be someone's grandmother. Now do we want to say that their values are different from ours? No; the difference lies elsewhere. The difference is in our belief systems, not in our values. We agree that we shouldn't eat Grandma; we simply disagree about whether the cow *is* (or could be) Grandma.

The general point is this. Many factors work together to produce the customs of a society. The society's values are only one of them. Other matters, such as the religious and factual beliefs held by its members and the physical circumstances in which they must live, are also important. We cannot conclude, then, merely because customs differ, that there is a disagreement about *values*. The difference in customs may be attributable to some other aspects of social life. Thus there may be less

disagreements about values than there appears to be.

Consider the Eskimos again. They often kill perfectly normal infants, especially girls. We do not approve of this at all; a parent who did this in our society would be locked up. Thus there appears to be a great difference in the values of our two cultures. But suppose we ask *why* the Eskimos do this. The explanation is not that they have less affection for their children or less respect for human life. An Eskimo family will always protect its babies if conditions permit. But they live in a harsh environment, where food is often in short supply. A fundamental postulate of Eskimo thought is: "Life is hard, and the margin of safety small." A family may want to nourish its babies but be unable to do so.

As in many "primitive" societies, Eskimo mothers will nurse their infants over a much longer period of time than mothers in our culture. The child will take nourishment from its mother's breast for four years, perhaps even longer. So even in the best of times there are limits to the number of infants that one mother can sustain. Moreover, the Eskimos are a nomadic people—unable to farm, they must move about in search of food. Infants must be carried, and a mother can carry only one baby in her parka as she travels and goes about her outdoor work. Other family members can help, but this is not always possible.

Infant girls are more readily disposed of because, first, in this society the males are the primary food providers—they are the hunters, according to the traditional division of labor—and it is obviously important to maintain a sufficient number of food gatherers. But there is an important second reason as well. Because the hunters suffer a high casualty rate, the adult men who die prematurely far outnumber the women who die early. Thus if male and female infants survived in equal numbers, the female adult population would greatly outnumber the male adult population. Examining the available statistics, one writer concluded that "were it not for female infanticide... there would be approximately one-and-a-half times as many females in the average Eskimo local group as there are food-producing males."

So among the Eskimos, infanticide does not signal a fundamentally different attitude toward children. Instead, it is a recognition that drastic measures are sometimes needed to ensure the family's survival. Even then, however, killing the baby is not the first option considered. Adoption is common; childless couples are especially happy to take a more fertile couple's "surplus." Killing is only the last resort. I emphasize this in order to show that the raw data of the anthropologists can be misleading; it can make the differences in values between cultures appear greater than they are. The Eskimos' values are not all that different from our values. It is only that life forces upon them choices that we do not have to make.

HOW ALL CULTURES HAVE SOME VALUES IN COMMON

It should not be surprising that, despite appearances, that Eskimos are protective of their children. How could it be otherwise? How could a group survive that did *not* value its young? This suggests a certain argument, one which shows that all cultural groups must be protective of their infants:

1. Human infants are helpless and cannot survive if they are not given extensive care for a period of years.
2. Therefore, if a group did not care for its young, the young would not survive, and the older members of the group would not be replaced. After a while the group would die out.
3. Therefore, any cultural group that continues to exist must care for its young. Infants that are *not* cared for must be the exception rather than the rule.

Similar reasoning shows that other values must be more or less universal. Imagine what it would be like for a society to place no value at all on truth telling. When one person spoke to another, there would be no presumption at all that he was telling the truth—for he could just as easily be speaking falsely. Within that society, there would be no reason to pay attention to what anyone says. (I ask you what time it is, and you say “Four o’clock.” But there is no presumption that you are speaking truly; you could just as easily have said the first thing that came into your head. So I have no reason to pay attention to your answer—in fact, there was no point in my asking you in the first place!) Communication would then be extremely difficult, if not impossible. And because complex societies cannot exist without regular communication among their members, society would become impossible. It follows that in any complex society there *must* be a presumption in favor of truthfulness. There may of course be exceptions to this rule: there may be situations in which it is thought to be permissible to lie. Nevertheless, these will be exceptions to a rule that *is* in force in the society.

Let me give one further example of the same type. Could a society exist in which there was no prohibition on murder? What would this be like? Suppose people were free to kill other people at will, and no one thought there was anything wrong with it. In such a “society,” no one could feel secure. Everyone would have to be constantly on guard. People who wanted to survive would have to avoid other people as much as possible. This would inevitably result in individuals trying to become as self-sufficient as possible—after all, associating with others would be dangerous. Society on any large scale would collapse. Of course, people might band together in

smaller groups with others that they *could* trust not to harm them. But notice what this means: they would be forming smaller societies that *did* acknowledge a rule against murder. The prohibition of murder, then, is a necessary feature of all societies.

There is a general theoretical point here, namely, that *there are some moral rules that all societies will have in common, because those rules are necessary for society to exist*. The rules against lying and murder are two examples. And in fact, we do find these rules in force in all viable cultures. Cultures may differ in what they regard as legitimate exceptions to the rules, but this disagreement exists against a background of agreement on the larger issues. Therefore, it is a mistake to overestimate the amount of difference between cultures. Not *every* moral rule can vary from society to society.

WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM CULTURAL RELATIVISM

At the outset, I said that we were going to identify both what is right and what is wrong in Cultural Relativism. Thus far I have mentioned only its mistakes: I have said that it rests on an invalid argument, that it has consequences that make it implausible on its face, and that the extent of cultural disagreement is far less than it implies. This all adds up to a pretty thorough repudiation of the theory. Nevertheless, it is still a very appealing idea, and the reader may have the feeling that all this is a little unfair. The theory *must* have something going for it, or else why has it been so influential? In fact, I think there *is* something right about Cultural Relativism, and now I want to say what that is. There are two lessons we should learn from the theory, even if we ultimately reject it.

1. Cultural Relativism warns us, quite rightly, about the danger of assuming that all our preferences are based on some absolute rational standard. They are not. Many (but not all) of our practices are merely peculiar to our society, and it is easy to lose sight of that fact. In reminding us of it, the theory does a service.

Funerary practices are one example. The Callatians, according to Herodotus, were “men who eat their fathers”—a shocking idea, to us at least. But eating the flesh of the dead could be understood as a sign of respect. It could be taken as a symbolic act that says: We wish this person’s spirit to dwell within us. Perhaps this was the understanding of the Callatians. On such a way of thinking, burying the dead could be seen as an act of rejection, and burning the corpse as positively scornful. If this is hard to imagine, then we may need to have our imaginations stretched. Of course we may feel a visceral repugnance at the idea of eating human flesh in any circumstances. But what of it? This repugnance may be, as the relativists say, only a matter of what is

customary in our particular society.

There are many other matters that we tend to think of in terms of objective right and wrong, but that are really nothing more than social conventions. Should women cover their breasts? A publicly exposed breast is scandalous in our society, whereas in other cultures it is unremarkable. Objectively speaking, it is neither right nor wrong—there is no objective reason why either custom is better. Cultural Relativism begins with the valuable insight that many of our practices are like this—they are only cultural products. Then it goes wrong by concluding that, because *some* practices are like this, *all* must be.

2 The second lesson has to do with keeping an open mind. In the course of growing up, each of us has acquired some strong feelings: we have learned to think of some types of conduct as acceptable, and others we have learned to regard as simply unacceptable. Occasionally, we may find those feelings challenged. We may encounter someone who claims that our feelings are mistaken. For example, we may have been taught that homosexuality is immoral, and we may feel quite uncomfortable around gay people and see them as alien and “different.” Now someone suggests that this may be a mere prejudice; that there is nothing evil about homosexuality; that gay people are just people, like anyone else, who happen, through no choice of their own, to be attracted to others of the same sex. But because we feel so strongly about the matter, we may find it hard to take this seriously. Even after we listen to the arguments, we may still have the unshakable feeling that homosexuals *must*, somehow, be an unsavory lot.

Cultural Relativism, by stressing that our moral views can reflect the prejudices of our society, provides an antidote for this kind of dogmatism. When he tells the story of the Greeks and Callatians, Herodotus adds:

For if anyone, no matter who, were given the opportunity of choosing from amongst all The nations of the world the set of beliefs which he thought best, he would inevitably, after Careful consideration of their relative merits, choose that of his own country. Everyone without exception believes his own native customs, and the religion he was brought up in, to be the best.

Realizing this can result in our having more open minds. We can come to understand that our feelings are not necessarily perceptions of the truth—they may be nothing more than the result of cultural conditioning. Thus when we hear it suggested that some element of our social code is *not* really the best and we find ourselves instinctively resisting the suggestion, we might stop and remember this. Then we may be more open to discovering the truth, whatever that might be.

We can understand the appeal of Cultural Relativism, then, even though the theory has serious shortcomings. It is an attractive theory because it is based on a

genuine insight—that many of the practices and attitudes we think so natural are really only cultural products. Moreover, keeping this insight firmly in view is important if we want if we want to avoid arrogance and have open minds. These are important points, not to be taken lightly. But we can accept these points without going on to accept the whole theory.

PART VI
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

-Editor

Political philosophy is concerned with the study of political issue. But some of the political issues are of only trivial, short-term or secondary sense, while others are of long-term and of fundamental sense, the solution of these issues would incline, even would dominate the solution of all the other issues, such as the issue of the nature of political power, the class, Party, state, government, the ideal social institution of a nation or of human kind. Particularly the issue of ideal social institution, the theories on this issue always is a mirror that reflect thinkers' understanding all the other fundamental political issues. In addition, when the study of this issue is engaged, a thinker needs to consult with the study of knowledge of many other fields, such as the study of economics, sociology, morality, history, even the study of human nature, the epistemology and the world view. He needs to enter a critical and liberal thinking of the limitless realms of human culture. That is what only the discipline of philosophy of politics is available to do.

There are more than 160 nations today in the world, and each one of them is associated with a certain kind of political institution, while a certain doctrine of political philosophy is embraced. The system of dictatorship system is always based on the doctrine of despotic or its weak form-authoritarianism. The democracy system is always based on political liberalism, no matter the traditional or the new ones. The system of communism, or in its weak thesis form-socialism is always associated with Marxism. What we select in our textbook are the ones that represent each of the above doctrines excellently. One thing more to be noticed is that, why we select Engel's article *Socialism from Utopian to Scientific* is aimed to provide a historical materialism perspective to the readers. It is not a sort of dogma for us to apply to judge the value of other doctrine, but it is really a goof reference.

In the history of modern European philosophy, Hobbes may be the first one to investigate political issues in philosophical way, and he proposes the doctrine of arbitrary-ism systematically. Hobbes argues that the world is a materialist and mechanical one, the law of physical motion dominates every thing of the world including human being. That is the desires and impulse, the motivation of realizing these desires and impulse make the nature of human being. And he thought that people must be aggressive and greedy, struggle and conflict, even endless wars must be the primary feature of human being when they are in the state of nature of anarchy. To eliminate the wars and the secure everyone's life, people voluntarily give up their unlimited liberty and submit is to the sovereign, That is the origin of the famous "*natural law or natural right*" thesis. Political power is founded on the need of human security. But he insisted that as soon as the power is submitted, then no more

reason for people to get it back. Any attempt to divide or weaken the power would be the unleashing the natural ferocity of the individual. A dictatorship then is sensible, the scientific form of government. Hobbes' doctrine of despotism is the product of his times, when there was terrible turmoil and numerous sacrifice of people's life to get some confused goal of some body's during the beginning part of the seventeenth century of England, when the original authority of society is abolished.

However, both democratic and anarchists charge Hobbes' form of government, especially the unlimited power government, for it can itself foster conflicts and human destruction. In the twentieth century, for example, Hitler and Mussolini perceived a state as a person, need to extend his strength by expansion and conquer, the result has been massive killing and butchery. Many thinkers perceive that on the bases of record, putting power in the hands of a hero or a messiah, hardly nourish political stability or human mutual survival.

The limited –government theory is the beginning form of liberalism and John Locke is the model of this doctrine. His political writing, particularly the *Second treatise of Government*, which is excerpt in our readings, provided the theoretical justification for the effort of Parliament to curtail the powers of Crown. Locke's theory on "natural state of human" and his "function of government is to protect people's life and property" thesis is very like Hobbes, but he stresses that the government must abide the wills of majority of people. People are entitled to modify, to limit the power of government. He also suggests that the legitimacy of Law and government need to be founded on majority, or else, people holds the right to rebel. Political theory is always parallel with the political practice, during the twentieth century movement of democracy sweeping most part of the world, there occurs the much more critical liberalism. Mill, who lives in the ending part of nineteenth century and the beginning part twentieth century, says that a pre-government society is a myth, but the function and the power of government are really varies a great deal. He cares that, which form of government is most useful in promoting the happiness of people. To him, there is little doubt that democracy is superior to other political systems. But democracy must prevent a new form of tyranny in modern society-the "tyranny of majority." Thus, government must be as tolerant as possible. He suggests that interfering with individuals only when they threaten harm to other. A genuine democratic society will cultivate individuality by tolerating beliefs and life styles that are eccentric, unorthodox. Mill claims: " you are entitled to think and act as you like, not because it is your right in Lockean sense, but because such activity is useful to you and others.

A contemporary of Mill's, Marx, the father of modern communism, addresses the question whether the ensuring freedom and developing individuality could really make universal happiness for human being? His historical materialism claims that a

society is organized so that to provide proper mode of productivity, to produce, to provide material needs for its members. A ruling class rises which determines the way the productive force will be used, initiate and promote certain ruling idea, and erect a political state to secure its power. The only "freedom" cherishes modern capitalism, is the freedom of hiring cheaper labor, to exploit the labor. The only freedom enjoyed by working class is to be sold as slaves, to be alienated as non-human being. The basic value of communism society is to eliminate privacy-the resource of social evils, to realize a sort of social equality, to make every of human being develop their talent, to play their function, to create their happiness. And the class struggle, the revolution and proletariat dictatorship over capital class is the only way to realize this ideal social system. All Marxist ideas on issues of political philosophy are based on the above assumption, that is the distinctive essence of the communism doctrine.

However, critics of communism argue that the capitalist democracy is compatible with socialism, even it does indeed requires socialism. Especially capitalism's excesses are cubed through the government intervention, through the function of labor unions, the moral pressures or whatever other means. What is more, they strongly recommend that the ideal feature of a society can be achieved without a bloody and violent revolution, it is better to get it through balls instead of bullets. They blame the actual communist governments that seem to be ruthless and repressive, they claim that the state of these communist countries ruled by elite or bureaucratic essentially serve for the benefits of themselves, and they will never surrender their power to people. The above criticisms are completely misleading, but they really worth our comprehensive investigating and answering.

The doctrine of anarchism and some other minor doctrines on the issue of social political ideal seldom get realized practically, but it is also necessary for our study to find their rational accordance, to make our understanding of the issues more dialectical. We provide readers an article written by a modern anarchist Robert Paul Wolff who denies that the state has any authority to command obedience from the citizens. Wolff's viewpoint on state power is primarily based on moral agent and moral freedom thesis. He claims that a moral agent must be autonomous, or self-legislating, thinking and judging for him or herself, and accept responsibility for his or her actions. Thereby permitting government to dictate how he or she should act, and remain a moral agent, that is a contradiction. Therefore, state can not issue binding command to individuals. A citizen holds no duty to obey a law simply because it is not directly resulted from his or her own reasoning. The paradox of this doctrine is that whether the individual's reason can be compatible with government's volition, whether there could be media to reconcile opinions of governing and the governed. No doubt, the ideal of anarchism is of no too much practical value, but we

could not ignore its theoretical value. This doctrine reflects the alienation, the flaw between governments and their people in many countries currently.

We must be able to resolve the theoretical paradox of our political philosophy, In order to resolve the practical problems of the backward political system of our nation. From the reading of the articles of this part, students or reader of this book may form some elementary understandings of the knowledge in this field.

IN DEFENSE OF DICTATORSHIP

-Thomas Hobbes

(PPD From Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan and Philosophical Rudiments*, From the English works of Thomas Hobbes, Vols. II and III, Sir William Molesworth, ed., London, 1839.)

Direction of studying Hobbes' article:

- 1) Background of the author and his viewpoint: Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was the first philosopher to systematically apply physical principle to ethical and political study. He interpreted all psychological being of human kind as the physical being of the natural world, and interpreted all the motions, the development of human history as the motions and evolutions of natural world. By this analogy, he inferred out his famous "natural state of human being" thesis and his "human nature", "natural law" thesis. To understand Hobbes' political philosophy, we need to check the England State of Hobbes' times. When there is the power division between Parliament and the King, and this led to terrible civil war lasted for half a century. And Hobbes' own life experience made him a friend of the nobles and the monarch, so it is not difficult to recognize why his political theory aims to defend for the plausibility, the absolute sovereign of the king, of the Monarch dictatorship system. When he escaped to France after the revolution of England in 1642, there, he was respected for being a materialist, the ancestor of atheism, but not for his defense of monarch arbitrary-ism. That reflected also the real function Hobbes' thought played in the history of European philosophy.
- 2) Arguments of Hobbes' defense of dictatorship: The beginning part of the article provides us Hobbes' famous "natural state of human being" or "natural law, natural right" argument. This argument indicates that based on the understanding of human affairs as two kinds of physical motion, one is called as *animal motion*, while another is called as *voluntary motion*, he finds the principle natures of man: desires of pleasure and fears of pain. Then there occur three resources of conflicts among people: competition, diffidence and glory, which make people in the condition of endless wars when no common power existed. Secondly, there is Hobbes' "*nature of power*" argument. It holds that to overcome the savage state of human society and to protect the life of every member of the society, human capacity of reasoning finds the necessary requirement of government and law that play functions of protecting the peace order of human life. Here, Hobbes presents us three rules of reason: endeavor for peace, lay down the unlimited right of liberty, to form conventional rule and to form a commonwealth. He makes a definition for so called *commonwealth* as persons' covenants, aimed to provide peace and defense for its members. Then there is a "sovereign of monarchy" argument. It claims also three decrees: as soon as the natural right of persons is transferred to the monarch, they hold no more reasons to get it back. The sovereign is like a person, must be unified and can not be divided into parts. A sovereign holds the right to do whatever necessary since its nature is to benefit the whole society. Hobbes stresses on that the sovereign is responsible to do censor work, to make sure

what opinions and doctrines prevailed are right or wrong.

- 3) Strategy: Hobbes derives his conclusions of political power from his approach of human nature, and then derives the conclusion of human nature from his assumption of the nature of physical world. This seemed a way of pure deduction reasoning and *a priori* inference, seldom is there any inductive and *posterior* argument used to support his viewpoints.
 - 4) Disciplined terms;
nature of man, right, law of nature, commonwealth, sovereign, LEVIATHAN, propriety, representative, Parliament.
 - 5) Classic propositions:
 1. Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war.
 2. A law of nature, *lex naturalis*, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life.
 3. From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the right, and faculties of him, or them, on whom sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.
 - 6) Study questions:
 1. What are the major content of Hobbes' "natural law" or "natural right" theory?
 2. Hobbes takes the mechanical explanation of natural world and the physical explanation of human being as his foundation of political philosophy, is there any flaw or problem for his theoretical basis or and reasoning?
 3. Hobbes argues that right and wrong, justice and injustice, would not exist prior to the founding of a commonwealth. Why is this? Do you agree?
 4. Evidently, Hobbes sees little danger of the sovereign using the position of power to attack his or her subjects. Assuming that Hobbes is essentially correct about human nature, could you convince a monarch to be strong excluding benevolent?
 5. Why, according to Hobbes, can there be "no breach of the covenant" by the sovereign?
 6. Hobbes insists that the sovereign is censor of all ideas and opinions on the ground that a "doctrine repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than peace and concord can be against the law of nature." Do you agree? Why or why not?
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There be in animals, two sorts of *motions* peculiar to them: one called *vital*; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the *course* of the *blood*, the *pulse*, the *breathing*, the *concoction*, *nutrition*, *excretion*, etc. to which motions there needs no help of imagination: the other is *animal motion*, otherwise called *voluntary motion*; as to *go*, to *speak*, to *move* any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, etc.; and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense, has been already

said in the first and second chapters. And because *going*, *speaking*, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of *whither*, *which way*, and *what*; it is evident, that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are...

As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in appearance; to the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, odour, etc.: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or aversion, to or from the object moving. But the appearance, or sense of that motion, is that we either call *delight*, or *trouble of mind*.

This motion, which is called appetite, and for the appearance of it *delight*, and *pleasure*, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused delight, were not improperly called *jacunda*, a *juvando*, from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, *molesta*, *offensive*, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital.

...Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth *good*: and the object of his hate and aversion, *evil*; and of his contempt, *vile* and *inconsiderable*. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; not any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves.

...In the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. For WAR, consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of *time*, is to be considered in the nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather, lieth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the

nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short...

All society therefore is either for gain, or for glory; that is, not so much for love of our fellows, as for the love of ourselves. But no society can be great or lasting, which begins from vain glory. Because that glory is like honour; if all men have it no man hath it, for they consist in comparison and precellence. Neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in myself; for every man must account himself, such as he can make himself without the help of others. But though the benefits of this life may be much furthered by mutual help; since yet those may be better attained to by dominion than by the society of others, I hope no body will doubt, but that men would much more greedily be carried by nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain dominion, than to gain society. We must therefore resolve, that the original of all great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had towards each other, but in the mutual fear they had of each other.

The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men, partly in their mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to pass, that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to ourselves the least security. For if we look on men full-grown, and consider how brittle the frame of our human body is, which perishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdom itself perisheth with it; and how easy a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest: there is no reason why any man, trusting to his own strength, should conceive himself made by nature above others. They are equals, who can do equal things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest things, namely, kill, can do equal things. All men therefore among themselves are by nature equal; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the civil law...

Among so many dangers therefore, as the natural lusts of men do daily threaten each other withal, to have a care of one's self is so far from being a matter scornfully to be looked upon, that one has neither the power nor wish to have done otherwise. For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil,

but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward. It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows. But that which is not contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly, and with right. Neither by the word *right* is anything else signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his natural faculties according to right reason. Therefore the first foundation of natural right is this, that *every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members...*

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws, and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it...

To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no *mine* and *thine* distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason.

The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them.

And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature...

A LAW OF NATURE, *lex naturalis*, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound *jus*, and *lex*, *right* and *law*: yet they ought to be distinguished: because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

And because the condition of man, as hath been declared in the precedent chapter, is a condition of war of every one against every one: in which case every one is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, *that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.* The first branch of which rule, containeth the first, and fundamental law of nature; which is, *to seek peace, and follow it.* The second, the sum of the right of nature; which is, *by all means we can, to defend ourselves.*

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law; that *a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.* For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then there is no reason for any one, to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose himself to peace...

From that law of nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to another, such rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third; which is this, *that men perform their covenants made:* without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war.

And in this law of nature, consisteth the fountain and original of. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right

to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is *unjust*; and the definition of *injustice*, is no other than *the not performance of covenant*. And whatsoever is not unjust, is *just*.

But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either part...are invalid; though the original of justice be the making of covenants; yet injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away; which while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant; and to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools: for they say, that *justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own*. And therefore where there is no *own*, that is no propriety, there is no injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety; all men having right to all things: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice, consisteth in keeping of valid covenants: but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that propriety begins...

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, on one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, *I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner*. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that MORTAL GOD, to which we owe under the IMMORTAL GOD, our peace and

defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, to define it, is *one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence.*

And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have *sovereign power*; and every one besides, his SUBJEEN.

...I observe the *diseases* of a commonwealth, that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is, *That every private man is judge of good and evil actions.* This is true in the condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws; and also under civil government, in such cases as are not determined by the law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of good and evil actions, is the civil law; and the judge the legislator, who is always representative of the commonwealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the commonwealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgments they shall think fit; whereby the commonwealth is distracted and *weakened.*

Another doctrine repugnant to civil society, is that *whatsoever a man does against his conscience, is sin*; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evil. For a man's conscience, and his judgment is the same thing, and as the judgment, so also the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law, sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a commonwealth; because the law is the public conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power, further than it shall seem good in his own eyes... There is [another] doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a commonwealth; and it is this *that the sovereign power may be divided.* For what is it to divide the power of a commonwealth, but to dissolve it; for powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the laws, endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the legislative power...

A *commonwealth* is said to be *instituted*, when a *multitude* of men do agree, and *covenant, everyone, with every one*, that to whatsoever *man, or assembly of men*, shall be given by the major part, the *right to present* the person of them all, that is to

say, to be their *representative*; every one, as well he that *voted for it*, as he that *voted against it*, shall *authorize* all the actions and judgments, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men

. From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the *rights*, and *faculties* of him, or them, on whom sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former covenant to anything repugnant hereunto. And consequently they that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant, to own the actions, and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot without his leave cast off monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it, to another man, or other assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to own, and be reputed author of all, that he that already is their sovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do: and because it is injustice for a man to do anything, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign, a new covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person; which none doth but god's lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with god, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders' own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant; or he must make a several covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one person: and if

he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void; because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right of every one of them in particular...

...No man that hath sovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his subjects punished. For seeing every subject is author of the actions of his sovereign; he punisheth another for the actions committed by himself.

And because the end of this institution, is the peace and defence of them all; and whosoever has right to the end, has right to the means; it belongeth of right, to whatsoever man, or assembly that hath the sovereignty, to be judge both of the means of peace and defence, and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord at home, and hostility from abroad; and, when peace and security are lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,

It is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published. For the actions of men proceed from their opinions; and in the well-governing of opinions, consisteth the well-governing of men's actions, in order to their peace, and concord. And though in matter of doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating the same by peace. For doctrine repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than peace and concord can be against the law of nature. It is true, that in a commonwealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfulness of governors, and teachers, false doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary truths may be generally offensive. Yet the most sudden, and rough bursting in of a new truth, that can be, does never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the war. For those men that are so remissly governed, that they dare take up arms to defend, or introduce an opinion, are still in war; and their condition not peace, but only a cessation of arms for fear of one another; and they live, as it were, in the precincts of battle continually. It belongeth therefore to him that hath the sovereign power, to be judge, or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace; thereby to prevent discord and civil war.

... It is annexed to the sovereignty, the whole power of prescribing the rules, whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects; and this is it men call *propriety*. For before constitution of sovereign power, as hath already been shown, all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth war: and therefore this

propriety, being necessary to peace, and depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power, in order to the public peace. These rules of propriety, or *meum* and *tuum*, and of *good*, *evil*, *lawful*, and *unlawful* in the actions of subjects, are the civil laws; that is to say, the laws of each commonwealth in particular; though the name of civil law be now restrained to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome; which being the head of a great part of the world, her laws at that time were in these parts the civil law...

But a man may here object, that the condition of subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands. And commonly they that live under a monarch, think it the fault of monarchy; and they that live under the government of democracy, or other sovereign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form of commonwealth; whereas the power in all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same: not considering that the state of man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any form of government can possibly happen to the people in general, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of sovereign governors, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the damage or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigour, consisteth their own strength and glory; but in the restiveness of themselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, that is their passions and self-love, through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, namely moral and civil science, to see afar off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoided.

IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM

-Robert Paul Wolff

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Direction of studying Wolff's article:

- 1) Background of the author and his viewpoint: Robert Paul Wolff (1933-) is a professor of University of Massachusetts of America. During his first year of teaching service, he once announced to his students in the class that he would solve the fundamental problem of political philosophy. But in the middle of that semester, he had to admitted the failure of his earlier promise in his class, that he could not discover the grand solution. Eventually, Wolff was led to the position of political anarchism-the view that no State has legitimate authority over its citizens. His reasons are from both human realities and from theoretical deductions. He provided several arguments to support his view, but the article in our book primarily introduces his theoretical arguments-free will of agent argument to support his anarchism.
- 2) Wolff's argument of free will agent: This argument is consisted mainly of the following theses: Person is held moral responsible for two reasons, one is that person holds free will, another is that person holds reason, only if person's action is grounded on these two premises, then it makes sense for judge person's actions as praiseworthy or blamable. But the function of government is to apply authority over individual persons, most people feel so strongly the force of tradition or bureaucratic that they need to accept unthinkingly the claims which are made by their nominal ruler. Under this condition, person's autonomy would no more works, and the responsibility of the agents is logically eliminated. His conclusion is that to resolve the conflict, the only way is to cancel the existence of government, since it is not available to quit from human free will.
- 3) Studying questions:
 1. What does Wolff mean by autonomy?
 2. How can a person forfeit his or her autonomy, according to Wolff?
 3. Why, according to Wolff, can you forfeit your autonomy but not your responsibility?
Give examples of situations in which a person does this.
 4. Authority is legitimate power. Why, according to Wolff, can no government (state) ever possess authority to issue commands to its citizens?
 5. "That which is anarchic within me (which is very strong) tunes in strongly to the idea of a society in which people decide for themselves what taxes to pay, what rules to obey, when to cooperate and when not to cooperate with the civil authorities. But that which is reasonable within me, which I am glad to say most often prevails, recognizes that societies so structured do not exist and cannot exist" (William F. Buckley). How would Wolff respond to Buckley? Do you think Buckley is right?

The fundamental assumption of moral philosophy is that men are responsible for their actions. From this assumption it follows necessarily, as Kant pointed out, that men are metaphysically free, which is to say that in some sense they are capable of choosing how they shall act. Being able to choose how he acts makes a man responsible, but merely choosing is not in itself enough to constitute *taking* responsibility for one's actions. Taking responsibility involves attempting to determine what one ought to do, and that, as philosophers since Aristotle have recognized, lays upon one the additional burdens of gaining knowledge, reflecting on motives, predicting outcomes, criticizing principles, and so forth.

The obligation to take responsibility for one's actions does not derive from man's freedom of will alone, for more is required in taking responsibility than freedom of choice. Only because man has the capacity to reason about his choices can he be said to stand under a continuing obligation to take responsibility for them. It is quite appropriate that moral philosophers should group together children and madmen as beings not fully responsible for their actions, for as madmen are thought to lack freedom of choice, so children do not yet possess the power of reason in a developed form. It is even just that we should assign a greater degree of responsibility to children, for madmen, by virtue of their lack of free will, are completely without responsibility, while children, insofar as they possess reason in a partially developed form, can be held responsible (i.e., can be required to take responsibility) to a corresponding degree.

Every man who possesses both free will and reason has an obligation to take responsibility for his actions, even though he may not be actively engaged in a continuing process of reflection, investigation, and deliberation about how he ought to act. A man will sometimes announce his willingness to take responsibility for the consequences of his actions, even though he has not deliberated about them, or does not intend to do so in the future. Such a declaration is, of course, an advance over the refusal to take responsibility; it at least acknowledges the existence of the obligation. But it does not relieve the man of the duty to engage in the reflective process which he has thus far shunned. It goes without saying that a man may take responsibility for his actions and yet act wrongly. When we describe someone as a responsible individual, we do not imply that he always does what is right, but only that he does not neglect the duty of attempting to ascertain what is right.

The responsible man is not capricious or anarchic, for he does acknowledge himself bound by moral constraints. But he insists that he alone is the judge of those constraints. He may listen to the advice of others, but he makes it his own by determining for himself whether it is good advice. He may learn from others about his moral obligations, but only in the sense that a mathematician learns from other mathematicians—namely by hearing from them arguments whose validity he

recognizes even though he did not think of them himself. He does not learn in the sense that one learns from an explorer, by accepting as true his accounts of things one cannot see for oneself.

Since the responsible man arrives at moral decisions which he expresses to himself in the form of imperatives, we may say that he gives laws to himself or is self-legislating. In short, he is *autonomous*. As Kant argued, moral autonomy is a combination of freedom and responsibility; it is a submission to laws which one has made for oneself. The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but not *because* he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense of the word, *free*.

Since man's responsibility for his actions is a consequence of his capacity for choice, he cannot give it up or put it aside. He can refuse to acknowledge it, however, either deliberately or by simply failing to recognize his moral condition. All men refuse to take responsibility for their actions at some time or other during their lives, and some men so consistently shirk their duty that they present more the appearance of overgrown children than of adults. Inasmuch as moral autonomy is simply the condition of taking full responsibility for one's actions, it follows that men can forfeit their autonomy at will. That is to say, a man can decide to obey the commands of another without making any attempt to determine for himself whether what is commanded is good or wise.

This is an important point, and it should not be confused with the false assertion that a man can give up responsibility for his actions. Even after he has subjected himself to the will of another, an individual remains responsible for what he does. But by refusing to engage in moral deliberation, by accepting as final the commands of the others, he forfeits his autonomy. Rousseau is therefore right when he says that a man cannot become a slave even through his own choice, if he means that even slaves are morally responsible for their acts. But he is wrong if he means that men cannot place themselves voluntarily in a position of servitude and mindless obedience.

There are many forms and degrees of forfeiture of autonomy. A man can give up his independence of judgment with regard to a single question, or in respect of a single type of question. For example, when I place myself in the hands of my doctor, I commit myself to whatever course of treatment he prescribes, but only in regard to my health. I do not make him my legal counselor as well. A man may forfeit autonomy on some or all questions for a specific period of time, or during his entire life. He may submit himself to all commands, whatever they may be, save for some specified acts (such as killing) which he refuses to perform. From the example of the doctor, it is obvious that there are at least some situations in which it is reasonable to give up one's autonomy. Indeed, we may wonder whether, in a complex world of

technical expertise, it is ever reasonable *not* to do so!

Since the concept of taking and forfeiting responsibility is central to the discussion which follows, it is worth devoting a bit more space to clarifying it. Taking responsibility for one's actions means making the final decisions about what one should do. For the autonomous man, there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as a *command*. If someone in my environment is issuing what are intended as commands, and if he or others expect those commands to be obeyed, that fact will be taken account of in my deliberations. I may decide that I ought to do what that person is commanding my to do, and it may even be that his issuing the command is the factor in the situation which makes it desirable for me to do so. For example, if I am on a sinking ship and the captain is giving orders for manning the lifeboats, and if everyone else is obeying the captain *because he is the captain*, I may decide that under the circumstances I had better do what he says, since the confusion caused by disobeying him would be generally harmful. But insofar as I make such a decision, I am not *obeying his command*; that is, I am not acknowledging him as having authority over me. I would make the same decision, for exactly the same reasons, if one of the passengers had started to issue "orders" and had, in the confusion, come to be obeyed.

In politics, as in life generally, men frequently forfeit their autonomy. There are a number of causes for this fact, and also a number of arguments which have been offered to justify it. Most men, as we have already noted, feel so strongly the force of tradition or bureaucracy that they accept unthinkingly the claims to authority which are made by their nominal rulers. It is the rare individual in the history of the race who rises even to the level of questioning the right of his masters to command and the duty of himself and his fellows to obey. Once the dangerous question has been started, however, a variety of arguments can be brought forward to demonstrate the authority of the rulers. Among the most ancient is Plato's assertion that men should submit to the authority of those with superior knowledge, wisdom, or insight. A sophisticated modern version has it that the educated portion of a democratic population is more likely to be politically active, and that it is just as well for the ill-informed segment of the electorate to remain passive, since its entrance into the political arena only supports the efforts of demagogues and extremists. A number of American political scientists have gone so far as to claim that the apathy of the American masses is a cause of stability and hence a good thing.

The moral condition demands that we acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy wherever and whenever possible. Sometimes this involves moral deliberation and reflection; at other times, the gathering of special, even technical, information. The contemporary American citizen, for example, has an obligation to master enough modern science to enable him to follow debates about nuclear policy

and come to an independent conclusion.[1] There are great, perhaps insurmountable, obstacles to the achievement of a complete and rational autonomy in the modern world. Nevertheless, so long as we recognize our responsibility for our actions, and acknowledge the power of reason within us, we must acknowledge as well the continuing obligation to make ourselves the authors of such commands as we may obey. The paradox of man's condition in the modern world is that the more fully he recognizes his right and duty to be his own master, the more completely he becomes the passive object of a technology and bureaucracy whose complexities he cannot hope to understand. It is only several hundred years since a reasonably well educated man could claim to understand the major issues of government as well as his king or parliament. Ironically, the high school graduate of today, who cannot master the issues of foreign and domestic policy on which he is asked to vote, could quite easily have grasped the problems of eighteenth-century statecraft.

The defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. It would seem, then, that there can be no resolution of the conflict between the autonomy of the individual and the putative authority of the state. Insofar as a man fulfills his obligation to make himself the author of his decisions, he will resist the state's claim to have authority over him. That is to say, he will deny that he has a duty to obey the laws of the state *simply because they are the laws*. In that sense, it would seem that anarchism is the only political doctrine consistent with the virtue of autonomy.

Now, of course, an anarchist may grant the necessity of *complying* with the law under certain circumstances or for the time being. He may even doubt that there is any real prospect of eliminating the state as a human institution. But he will never view the commands of the state as *legitimate*, as having a binding moral force. In a sense, we might characterize the anarchist as a man without a country, for despite the ties which bind him to the land of his childhood, he stands in precisely the same moral relationship to "his" government as he does to the government of any other country in which he might happen to be staying for a time. When I take a vacation in Great Britain, I obey its laws, both because of prudential self-interest and because of the obvious moral considerations concerning the value of order, the general good consequences of preserving a system of property, and so forth. On my return to the United States, I have a sense of reentering *my* country, and if I think about the matter at all, I imagine myself to stand in a different and more intimate relation to American laws. They have been promulgated by *my* government, and I therefore have a special obligation to obey them. But the anarchist tells me that my feeling is purely sentimental and has no objective moral basis. All authority is equally illegitimate, although of course not therefore equally worthy or unworthy of support, and my obedience to American laws, if I am to be morally autonomous, must proceed from

the same considerations which determine me abroad.

The dilemma which we have posed can be succinctly expressed in terms of the concept of a *de jure* state. If all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of autonomy possible, then there would appear to be no state whose subjects have a moral obligation to obey its commands. Hence, the concept of a *de jure* legitimate state would appear to be vacuous, and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened man.

Note:

- 1) 1 This is not quite so difficult as it sounds, since policy very rarely turns on disputes over technical or theoretical details. Still, the citizen who, for example, does not understand the nature of atomic radiation cannot even pretend to have an opinion on the feasibility of bomb shelters; and since the momentous choice between first-strike and second-strike nuclear strategies depends on the possibility of a successful shelter system, the uninformed citizen will be as completely at the mercy of his "representatives" as the lowliest slave.

LIMITED GOVERNMENT: THE NATURAL RIGHT APPROACH

John Locke

(PPD from John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government*, edited by Thomas P. Reardon.

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Direction of studying Locke's article:

- 1) Background of the author and his viewpoint: John Locke (1632-1704) made great contributions to the theory of epistemology and some other areas. His most brilliant idea is that he inaugurated the doctrine of *political liberalism* that is also called as 'Natural Right Approach on Limited Government' in the history of European thought. Although Locke also took nature of human being thesis and the natural law thesis similar to that of Hobbes' to be the premises of his politics, he derived a quite different conclusion about the ideal political system. Locke claimed that even government's right was resulted from people's consent aimed to protect their life and property, but there is no warrantee for governments to perform their duty all the time. Accordingly, the power of governments needed to be limited. It is the majority of people and individual citizens who legally hold the right to limit government's power. Locke also claimed that legal property must be generated from laboring upon nature, this thesis points to property privilege of the feudal aristocrats, his idea on private property vividly reflected the political and economical aspiration of bourgeoisie of his times. Locke proposed that people hold right to revolution when government was out of their control, this approach predicted the revolution of North America theoretically.
- 2) Arguments Locke used to support his position: There are eleven parts in the article. The central idea of the first seven ones could be generalized as Natural Law argument, in which Locke presented his understanding of human nature and the resource of the political power, quite similar to that of Hobbes'. The eighth through the tenth part of the article provided readers Locke's Limited Government argument, which suggested to prevent bad government occurring, majority of people need to apply their force to control, to monitor and to dominate the performance of government's power. The last part of the article could be generalized as Revolution argument, in which, Locke assured the legitimacy of people's revolution whenever there occurred sorts of government of despotic or arbitrary, and interests of majority of people was violated. The last argument made Locke not only a democratic, but also a revolutionary.
- 3) Disciplined terms:
paternal power, despotic power,, arbitrary power, absolute power, revolution, majority,
- 4) Important propositions:
 1. Thirdly, *despotic power* is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another to take away his life whenever he pleases.

2. When ever the legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the property of people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people who are thereupon absolved from any further obedience, and are left to the common refuge which God has provided for all men against force and violence.

5) Study questions:

1. On what two grounds does Locke claim to base his theory of property?
2. Locke says that a person can forfeit his or her rights. When does this occur?
3. What does Locke mean by "majority"? Historically, how has Locke's "majority" been interpreted in the United States or in other Western countries ?
4. Locke says that "the greater part [of men] are no strict observers of equity and justice," and therefore that life in the State of Nature is "very unsafe, very unsecure." Is this characterization of man really any different from Hobbes's? If not, why does Locke support limited government instead of dictatorship?
5. Is Locke's revolution argument plausible? Is there any problem in his theory?

**PPD Editors' note:* The editors have deviated from the original order of paragraphs in some cases and have provided the headings.

DEFINITION OF POLITICAL POWER

Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death and, consequently, all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.

THE STATE OF NATURE

To understand political power right and derive it from its original, we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection; unless the lord and master of them all should, by any

manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty...

THE LAW OF NATURE AND RIGHTS

But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker—all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business—they are his property whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure; and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy another, as if we were made for one another's uses as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself and not to quit his station willfully; so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice to an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE LAW OF NATURE

And that all men may be restrained from invading others' rights and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which wills the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation; for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain if there were nobody that in that state of nature had a power to execute that law and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if anyone in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, everyone may do so; for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, everyone must needs have a right to do...

THE STATE OF WAR

And hence it is that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power does thereby put himself into a state of war with him, it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life; for I have reason to conclude that he who would get me into his power without my consent would use me as he pleased when he got me there, and destroy me, too, when he had a fancy to it; for nobody can desire to have me in his absolute power unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e., make me a slave. To be free from such force is the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him as an enemy to my preservation who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away everything else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of society, would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth must be supposed to design to take away from them everything else, and so be looked on as in a state of war...

PROPERTY: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence; or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah and his sons; it is very clear that God, as King David says (Psalm CXV. 16), "has given the earth to the children of men," given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever come to have a property in anything. I will not content myself to answer that if it be difficult to make out property upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam in his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man but one universal monarch should have any property upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavor to show how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners...

Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed

his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature has placed it in, it has by this labor something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others...

LIMITS TO PROPERTY

It will perhaps be objected to this that "if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the earth, etc., makes a right to them, then any one may engross as much as he will." To which I answer: not so. The same law of nature that does by this means give us property does also bound that property, too. "God has given us all things richly" (I Tim. vi. 17), is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor fix a property in; whatever is beyond this is more than his share and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few spenders, and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself and engross it to the prejudice of others, especially keeping within the bounds set by reason of what might serve for his use, there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established...

FLAWS IN SOCIETY WITHOUT GOVERNMENT

If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, why will he give up his empire and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer that though in the state of nature he has such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name "property."

The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths and

putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting:

First, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong and the common measure to decide all controversies between them; for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest as well as ignorant for want of studying it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.

Secondly, in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge with authority to determine all differences according to the established law; for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness to make them too remiss in other men's.

Thirdly, in the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offend will seldom fail, where they are able, by force, to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.

Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniences that they are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments and societies themselves...

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND MAJORITY RULE

Whenever, therefore, any number of men are so united into one society as to quite every one his executive power of the law of nature and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political or civil society. And this is done wherever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people one body politic,

under one supreme government, or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with, any government already made; for hereby he authorizes the society or, which is all one, the legislative thereof to make laws for him as the public good of the society shall require, to the execution whereof his own assistance, as to his own decrees, is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And wherever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature...

For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority; for that which acts any community being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way, it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority; or also it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see that in assemblies empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole and, of course, determines, as having by the law of nature and reason the power of the whole...

But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property—for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse—the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's property by providing against those three defects above-mentioned that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people...

TYPES OF POWER

First, then, *paternal* or *parental power* is nothing but that which parents have over their children to govern them for the children's good till they come to the use of reason or a state of knowledge wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern themselves by—capable, I say, to know it as well as several others who live as free-men under that law. The affection and tenderness which God has planted in the breast of parents toward their children makes it evident that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only of the help, instruction, and preservation of their offspring. But happen it as it will, there is, as I have proved, no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death at any time over their children more than over anybody else; neither can there be any pretense why this parental power should keep the child, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of his parents any further than having received life and education from his parents obliges him to respect, honor, gratitude, assistance, and support all his life to both father and mother. And thus, it is true, the paternal is a natural government, but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political. The power of the father does not reach at all to the property of the child, which is only in his own disposing.

Secondly, *political power* is that power which every man having in the state of nature has given up into the hands of the society and therein to the governors whom the society has set over itself, with this express or tacit trust that it shall be employed for their good and the preservation of their property. Now this power which every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts with to the society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to use such means for the preserving of his own property as he thinks good and nature allows him, and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others so as, according to the best of his reason, may most conduce to the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind. So that the end and measure of this power, when in every man's hands in the state of nature, being the preservation of all of his society—that is, all mankind in general—it can have no other end or measure when in the hands of the magistrate but to preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions, and so cannot be an absolute arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved, but a power to make laws, and annex such penalties to them as may tend to the preservation of the whole, by cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt that they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. And this power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of those who make up the community.

Thirdly, *despotical power* is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another to take away his life whenever he pleases. This is a power which neither nature gives—for it has made no such distinction between one man and another—nor compact can convey, for man, not having such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man such a power over it; but it is the effect only of forfeiture which the aggressor makes of his own life when he puts himself into the state of war with another. For having quitted reason, which God has given to be the rule betwixt man and man and the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of the force of war to compass his unjust ends upon another where he has no right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts by making force, which is theirs, to be his rule of right; he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person and the rest of mankind that will join with him in the execution of justice, as any other wild beast or noxious brute with whom mankind can have neither society nor security. And thus captives, taken in a just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power, which, as it arises not from compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the state of war continued; for what compact can be made with a man that is not master of his own life? What condition can he perform? And if he be once allowed to be master of his own life, the despotical arbitrary power of his master ceases. He that is master of himself and his own life has a right, too, to the means of preserving it; so that, as soon as compact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute power and puts an end to the state of war who enters into conditions with his captive...

THE LEGITIMACY OF REVOLUTION

The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative is that there may be laws made and rules set as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society; for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure by entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making. Whenever the legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people who are thereupon absolved from any further obedience, and are left to the common refuge which God has provided for all men against force and violence. Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society, and either by ambition, fear, folly, or corruption,

endeavor to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people, by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty and, by the establishment of a new legislative, such as they shall think fit, provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said here concerning the legislative in general holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him—both to have a part in the legislative and the supreme execution of the law—acts against both when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society...

Here, it is like, the common question will be made: Who shall be judge whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust? This, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people, when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I reply: The people shall be judge; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well and according to the trust reposed in him but he who deposes him and must, by having deposed him, have still a power to discard him when he fails in his trust? If this be reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment where the welfare of millions is concerned, and also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater and the redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous?

LIMITED GOVERNMENT THE UTILITARIAN APPROACH -John Stuart Mill

(PPD From *On Liberty* by John Stuart Mill, first published in 1859, many editions.)

Direction of studying Mill's article:

- 1) John Stewart Mill (1803-1873) was one of the most outstanding thinkers of the nineteenth century. His father, James Mill, a famous economist and a social philosopher, and the founder of utilitarianism, raised Mill according to a strict plan, to make Mill into a democratic, intellectual, social reformer. Noticed that utilitarianism is not same thing as egoistic, the former doctrine seeks the means to realize happiness for the whole of human being, the interests of individuals is considered as harmony with all men. In his essay *On Liberty*, first published in 1859, he moves the liberalism much further than that of Locke's. Different from the theoretical foundation of Locke's, Mill's democratic ideas are based on the foundation of practical requirements of human life, called utilitarian approach. He denies the traditional thesis of the natural state and natural right, natural law of human being, particularly, he denies the majority principle of democracy as a sort of "tyranny of majority, and proposes the principle of tolerance. This principle requires that everybody holds the right of pursuing his happiness in his own way, only if the differentiated individuality is cherished and flourished, then the creative ideas and creative practices in a society could be cultivated, the society could overcome the impedes of traditional customs, the prevailing fallacies. The principle of tolerance and the principle of individuality, as well as his principle of utility make the distinctive feature of Mill's political philosophy.
- 2) Arguments of Mill's: The limitation of government's power argument perceives that in human history, rulers or governments always plays function of antagonistic to the people whom they ruled. To make immunities from the tyranny and corrupted power, people needs political liberty of right, including the freedom of press, freedom of association, freedom of thinking, specific resistance, or general rebelling, and so on. The toleration of minority argument holds that the value, the religion, the opinion or behavior models of minority, of minimum individuals need to be protected as long as no criminal is resulted. To oppress the minority is also a kind of despotic. The argument of utilitarianism repeats the fundamental statements of the whole of his social philosophy: the care of utility is the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions, the same as the issue of government's power. And it must be the utility on the broadest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of human as a progressive being. The individuality argument stresses on that the free development of individuality needs to be considered as the one of the leading essentials of wellbeing. This claim sounds very like the one that Marx once announced in *Communist Manifesto*.
- 3) Disciplined terms:
freedom of press, freedom of association, freedom of thinking, tyranny of majority,

utilitarian, dogma, individuality, toleration.

4) Important propositions:

1. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of political rulers.
2. That (it might seem) was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people.
3. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.
4. if it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of wellbeing; that is not only a co-ordinate element with all like that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things.

5) Study questions:

1. Both Locke and Mill propose the limitation of government viewpoint, what are the differences between their theses?
2. Do you agree with Mill's principle of tolerance and his arguments against the tyranny of majority? What is your reason?
3. According to Mill, what is the content of individuality, and why does the individuality of every one need to be protected?
4. What is the sole justification for society to interfere in the lives of its members? What are the illegitimate reasons?
5. Mill calls for plural voting whereby individuals with proven superior intelligence would have more than one vote in election. Do you agree with him or not? What are your reasons?
6. Comparing Mill liberalism with Marx' class struggle theory, make some comments on Mill's theory.

The subject of this essay is not the so-called liberty of the will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed of philosophical necessity, but civil or social liberty, the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. A question seldom stated and hardly ever discussed in general terms, but which profoundly influence the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make it self recognized as the vital question of the future. It is so far from being new, that in a certain sense, it has divided mankind almost from the remotest ages, but in the stage of progress into which the more civilized portions of the species have now entered, it presents itself under new condition, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment.

The struggle between liberty and authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of the history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly i that of

Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular government of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of governing one, or a governing a tribe or caste. Who derives their authority from inheritance or conquest, who at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precaution might be taken against the oppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defense against his beak and claws. The aim therefore, of patriots was of set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community, and this limitation was what they mean by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties of right, which it was to be regarded as breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebelling, was held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks, by which the consent of community. Or of a body some sort, supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary to some of the more important acts of the governing power. To the first of these modes of limitation, the ruling power, in most European countries, was compelled, more or less, to submit. It was not so with the second, and to attain this, or when already in some degree possessed, to attain it more completely, became everywhere the principle object of the lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind were contend to combat one enemy by another, and to the ruled by a master, on condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations beyond this point.

A time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think a necessary of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appealed to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way alone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their advantage. By degrees this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever such party existed; and supersede, to a

considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself. That (it might seem) was resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of people. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified with the people; that their interests and will should be the interests and will of the nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of its tyrannizing over itself. Let the ruler to be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made. Their power was but the nation's own power, concentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise. This mode of thought or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of European liberalism, in the Continental section of which it still apparently predominates. Those who admit any limit to what a government may do, except in the case of such government as they think ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of Continent. A similar tone of sentiment might by this time have been prevalent in our own country, if the circumstances which for a time encourage it had continued unaltered.

But in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation. The notion that people have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French Revolution, the worst of which were the work of a usurping few, and which, in any case, belong not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made it self felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of nations; and criticism which want upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrase as "self-government," and the "power over themselves," do not express the true state of the case. The "People" who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the "self-government" spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people, their majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as majority, :the people, consequently may desire to oppress a part of their number, and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals lose nine of its

importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is to the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in European society, to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations, "the tyranny of majority" is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.

Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of majority is at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread chiefly as operating through the acts of public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society itself the tyrant-society collectively over the separate individuals compose it- it means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of political functions. Society can and does execute its own mandates, and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandate at all in things with which it ought not to meddle , it practice a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though usually upheld by such more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough, there needs protection also against tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rule of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter development, and if possible, prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence, and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

But through this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit- how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control- is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conducts, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things, which are not fit subject for operation of law. What these rules should be is the principle question in human affairs; but if we expect a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and scarcely any two countries have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it , than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed, The rules which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the

magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says, a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the first. The effect of custom in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessarily that reasons should be given, either by one person to others or by each to himself. People are accustomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings on subject if this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that every body should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledge to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reason, can only count as one person's preference, and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still many only many people's liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supposed, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and his chief guide in the interpretation even of that. Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blamable, are affects by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes, their reason, at other times their prejudices or superstitions; often their social affections, not seldom their antisocial ones, their envy of jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness; but most commonly their desires or fears for themselves-their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest. Wherever there is ascendant class, a large portion of morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and it's feeling of superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots, between planters and Negros, between prince and subjects, between nobles and roturiers, between man and woman, has been for the most part of the creation of these class interests and the sentiments thus generated react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of the ascendant class, in their relations among themselves. Where, on the other hand, a class, formerly ascendant, has lost its ascendancy, or where its ascendancy is unpopular, the prevailing sentiment frequently bear the impress of an impatient dislike or superiority. Another grand determining principle of the rules of conduct, both in act and forbearance, which have been enforced by law or opinion, has been the servility of mankind towards the supposed preference or aversions of their temporal masters or their Gods. This servility, though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence; it made men burn magicians and heretics. Among so many

baser influences, the general and obvious interests of society have of course had a share, and a large one, in the direction of the moral sentiments; less, however, as a matter of reason, and on their own account, than as a consequence of the sympathies and antipathies which grow out of them; and sympathies and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interest of society, have made themselves felt in the establishment of moralities with quite great force.

The liking or disliking of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling, have left this condition of things unassailed in principle, however they may come onto conflict with it in some of its details. They have occupy themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its liking or disliking should be a law to individuals. They preferred endeavoring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular point on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defense of freedom, with heretics generally . . . The great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his religious belief. Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the mind of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves. One person will bear with dissent in matters of church government, but not of dogma; another can tolerate everybody, short of a Papist or a Unitarian; another everyone believes in revealed religion; a few extend their charity a little further, but stop at the belief in a God, and in a future state. Whenever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed

The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used by physical force in the form legal penalties, or moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their member, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to other. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He can not rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the

opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desire to deter him must be calculate to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury . . . Liberty, as a principle, had no application to any states of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion . . . , compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.

It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be the utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interest of man as progressive being. Those interests, I contended, authorized the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each which concerns the interests of other people. If anyone does an act hurtful to others, there is a *prime facie* for punishing him by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform . . . such as to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defense, or in any other joint work necessary to the society of which he enjoy the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenseless against ill- usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do., he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case, he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil is, comparatively speaking, the exception. In all things which regard the external

relations of the individual, he is *de jure* amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and, if need be, to society as their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the case; either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external protections; judging himself all the more rapidly, because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the judgment of his fellow-creatures.

But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affect only himself, of if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation, when I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance; for whatever, affects himself, may affects others through himself, and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It compromises, *first*, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiments on all subjects, practical or speculative, science, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of the individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much important as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. *Secondly*, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subjects to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. *Thirdly*, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite for any purpose not involve harm to others; the person combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper

guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind are graters gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest

The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defense would be necessary of the "liberty of the press" as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest of the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of question, besides, has been so often and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it need not be specially insisted on in this place. Though the law of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it was in the tome of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety; and, speaking generally, it is not constitutional countries, to be apprehended, that the government, whether completely responsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, except when doing so it make itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public. Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produce by its collision with error

As it is useful that while mankind is imperfect there should be different opinions, so is that there should be different experiment of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try

them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concerns others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person's own character, but the traditions of customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principle ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

In maintaining this principle, the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means toward an acknowledged end and itself. If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of wellbeing; that is not only a co-ordinate element with all like that is designed by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; there would be no danger that liberty should be undervalued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary difficulty. But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking, as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account

He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who choose his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, actively to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. It is possible that he might in some good path, and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. Supposing it were possible to get house built, corn grown, battle fought, causes tried, and even churches erected and prayers said, by machinery-by automatons in human form-it would be a considerable loss to exchange for these automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the more civilized parts of the world, and who assuredly are but starved specimens of what nature can and will produce. Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing

COMMUNISM **(Socialism: from Utopian and Scientific)** **-Friedrich Engels**

(PPD From Friedrich Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, the 1892 edition.)

Direction of studying Engels' article:

- 1) Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) was a son of a wealthy German manufacturer, but he turned his political position to working class when he was very young. Engels worked together with Karl Marx to found the doctrine of Marxism, or in another term, scientific communism, scientific socialism. Although Engels is usually considered as the secondary figure in the inauguration of Marxism, many important principles and contents of the doctrine is actually worked out by him first, they occurred in Engels' work first, and then are theoretically accomplished by Marx. Such as the basic principles of historical materialism, the major principles of political economics, these theories were illustrated by Engels' book earlier before Marx' works, even the most important document of Marxism-*Communist Manifesto*, the earliest manuscript was also written by Engels, and then was modified and rewritten by Marx. The most brilliant works of Engels were made out during the late time of his life. Our article is an excerpt from Engels' *Socialism: Utopian to Scientific*, that is actually a re-writing or abstraction of the third part of his work *Anti Duhring*, published around eighteen seventies, this book as Engels claimed, was an achievement of Marx and Engels' collaborate working. And it made almost all the theoretical points of Marxism, scientific socialism thoroughly illustrated. Marx's ideas on the political ideal of human society once was presented in some earlier works of Marx and Engels, but there was never before any work could be perfectly demonstrated as the article we selected here. From reading of this article, we will be clear what the connection and what the difference between Marxism and its theoretical ancestor-Utopian socialism are; what the major content and principle of historical materialism and scientific socialism are; what the feature of Marxist political ideal social system would be. Although we have only few pages here in the article, the backbone, the essential framework of Marxism and Scientific socialism are presented here completely and clearly.
- 2) Argument with which Engels used to illustrate scientific socialism: The beginning part of the article could be generalized as production force and production modes argument, which show us the theoretical foundation of scientific socialism-the major principles of historical materialism. This argument demonstrates that the realization of socialism must be based on the economic development of human society. Then there is the argument of criticism of capitalism and proposal of socialism, which through the analysis of the internal tensions of capitalist institution, demonstrates the necessity of the socialist economic system in human history. At last, there is the argument of class struggle and revolution, which shows us that the only way to overthrow capitalism and to actualize socialism is seize the state power, and then to change all the parts of social construction.

3) Disciplined terms:

social structure, production force, modes of production, commodities, social ranks, class, animal kingdom, the kingdom of freedom, revolution.

4) Important propositions:

1. The materialist concept of history starts from the proposition that production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure.
2. Modern socialism is nothing but the reflex, in thought, of this conflict in fact; its ideal reflection in the minds, first, of the class directly suffering under it, the working class.
3. The proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of production into state property.

5) Study questions:

1. Based on Engels' arguments, what are the essential motivation of social changes and the development of human history?
 2. Why is the capitalism definitely eliminated and socialism definitely brought about?
 3. Engels sees capitalism as structurally flawed, as seen in inescapable, periodic economic crises, such as unemployment, overproduction, and even depression. Has capitalism changed to avoid such consequences?
 4. Some critics of communism describe the leaders of the Communist party in the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, as "surrogate bourgeoisie." What does that mean, and do you agree or disagree?
 5. Why does Engels say that with communism, for the first time, human beings will make their own history first time? Do you agree?
 6. Why, according to Engels, are there classes, and why are they in conflict?
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The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the Means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in men's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought not in the *philosophy*, but in the *economics* of each particular epoch. The growing perception that existing social institutions are unreasonable and unjust, that reason has become unreason and right wrong. [1] is only proof that in the modes of production and exchange changes have silently taken place with which the social order, adapted to earlier economic conditions, is no longer in keeping. From this it also follows that the means of getting rid of the incongruities that have been

brought to light must also be present, in a more or less developed condition, within the changed modes of production themselves. These means are not to be invented by deduction from fundamental principles, but are to be discovered in the stubborn facts of the existing system of production.

What is, then, the position of modern socialism in this connection?

The present structure of society—this is now pretty generally conceded—is the creation of the ruling class of today, of the bourgeoisie. The mode of production peculiar to the bourgeoisie, known, since Marx, as the capitalist mode of production, was incompatible with the feudal system, with the privileges it conferred upon individuals, entire social ranks and local corporations, as well as with the hereditary ties of subordination which constituted the framework of its social organization. The bourgeoisie broke up the feudal system and built upon its ruins the capitalist order of society, the kingdom of free competition, of personal liberty, of the equality, before the law, of all commodity owners, of all the rest of the capitalist blessings. Thenceforward the capitalist mode of production could develop in freedom. Since steam, machinery, and the making of machines by machinery transformed the older manufacture into modern industry, the productive forces evolved under the guidance of the bourgeoisie developed with a rapidity and in a degree unheard of before. But just as the older manufacture, in its time, and handicraft, becoming more developed under its influence, had come into collision with the feudal trammels of the guilds, so now modern industry, in its more complete development, comes into collision with the bounds within which the capitalistic mode of production holds it confined. The new productive forces have already outgrown the capitalistic mode of using them. And this conflict between productive forces and modes of production is not a conflict engendered in the mind of man, like that between original sin and divine justice. It exists, in fact, objectively, outside us, independently of the will and actions even of the men that have brought it on. Modern socialism is nothing but the reflex, in thought, of this conflict in fact; its ideal reflection in the minds, first, of the class directly suffering under it, the working class.

Now, in what does this conflict consist?

Before capitalistic production, i.e., in the Middle Ages, the system of petty industry obtained generally, based upon the private property of the labourers in their means of production; in the country, the agriculture of the small peasant, freeman or serf; in the towns, the handicrafts organized in guilds. The instruments of labour—land, agricultural implements, the workshop, the tool—were the instruments of labour of single individuals, adapted for the use of one worker, and, therefore, of necessity, small, dwarfish, circumscribed. But, for this very reason they belonged, as a rule, to the producer himself. To concentrate these scattered, limited means of production, to enlarge them, to turn them into the powerful levers of production of the

present day—this was precisely the historic role of capitalist production and of its upholder, the bourgeoisie. In the fourth section of *Capital* Marx has explained in detail how since the fifteenth century this has been historically worked out through the three phases of simple co-operation, manufacture and modern industry. But the bourgeoisie, as is also shown there, could not transform these puny means of production into mighty productive forces without transforming them, at the same time, from means of production of the individual into *social* means of production only workable by a collectivity of men. The spinning-wheel, the hand-loom, the blacksmith's hammer, were replaced by the spinning-machine, the power-loom, the steam-hammer; the individual workshop, by the factory implying the co-operation of hundreds and thousands of workmen. In like manner, production itself changed from a series of individual into a series of social acts, and the products from individual to social products. The yarn, the cloth, the metal articles that now came out of the factory, were the joint product of many workers, through those hands they had successively to pass before they were ready. No one person could say of them: "I make that; this is *my* product..."

In the mediaeval stage of evolution of the production of commodities, the question as to the owner of the product of labour could not arise. The individual producer, as a rule, had, from raw material belonging to himself, and generally his own handiwork, produced it with his own tools, by the labour of his own hands or of his family. There was no need for him to appropriate the new product. It belonged wholly to him, as a matter of course. His property in the product was, therefore, based *upon his own labour*. Even where external help was used, this was, as a rule, of little importance, and very generally was compensated by something other than wages. The apprentices and journeymen of the guilds worked less for board and wages than for education, in order that they might become master craftsmen themselves.

Then came the concentration of the means of production and of the producers in large workshops and manufactories, their transformation into actual socialized means of production and socialized producers. But the socialized producers and means of production and their products were still treated, after this change, just as they had been before, i.e., as the means of production and the products of individuals. Hitherto, the owner of the instruments of labour had himself appropriated the product, because, as a rule, it was his own product and the assistance of others was the exception. Now the owner of the instruments of labour always appropriated to himself the product, although it was no longer *his* product but exclusively the product of the *labour of others*. Thus, the products now produced socially were not appropriated by those who had actually set in motion the means of production and actually produced the commodities, but by the *capitalists*. The means of production, and production itself, had become in essence socialized. But they were subjected to a form of

appropriation which presupposes the private production of individuals, under which, therefore, everyone owns his own product and brings into market. The mode of production is subjected to this form of appropriation, although it abolishes the conditions upon which the latter rests. [2]

This contradiction, which gives to the new mode of production its capitalistic character, *contains the germ of the whole of the social antagonisms of today*. The greater the mastery obtained by the new mode of production over all important fields of production and in all manufacturing countries, the more it reduced individual production to an insignificant residuum, *the more clearly was brought out the incompatibility of socialized production with capitalistic appropriation...*

But the perfecting of machinery is making human labour superfluous. If the introduction and increase of machinery means the displacement of millions of manual by a few machine-workers, improvement in machinery means the displacement of more and more of the machine-workers themselves. It means, in the last instance, the production of a number of available wageworkers in excess of the average needs of capital, the formation of a complete industrial reserve army, as I called it in 1845, available at the times when industry is working at high pressure, to be cast out upon the street when the inevitable crash comes, a constant dead weight upon the limbs of the working class in its struggle for existence with capital, a regulator for the keeping of wages down to the low level that suits the interests of capital. Thus it comes about, to quote Marx, that machinery becomes the most powerful weapon in the war of capital against the working class; that the instruments of labour constantly tear the means of subsistence out of the hands of the labourer; that the very product of the worker is turned into an instrument for his subjugation. Thus it comes about that the economizing of the instruments of labour becomes at the same time, from the outset, the most reckless waste of labour power, and robbery based upon the normal conditions under which labour functions; that machinery, "the most powerful instrument for shortening labour time, becomes the most unfailing means for placing every moment of the labourer's time and that of his family at the disposal of the capitalist for the purpose of expanding the value of his capital." (*Capital*, English edition, p. 406) thus it comes about that the overwork of some becomes the preliminary condition for the idleness of others, and that modern industry, which hunts after new consumers over the whole world, forces the consumption of the masses at home down to a starvation minimum, and in doing thus destroys its own home market. "The law that always equilibrates the relative surplus population, or industrial reserve army, to the extent and energy of accumulation, this law rivets the labourer to capital more firmly than the wedges of Vulcan did Prometheus to the rock. It establishes an accumulation of misery, corresponding with accumulation of capital. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time, accumulation of

misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole, i.e., on the side of the class that produces *its own product in the form of capital*." (*Capital*, p. 661) And to expect any other division of the products from the capitalistic mode of production is the same as expecting the electrodes of a battery not to decompose acidulated water, not to liberate oxygen at the positive, hydrogen at the negative pole, so long as they are connected with the battery....

Whilst the capitalist mode of production more and more completely transforms the great majority of the population into proletarians, it creates the power which, under penalty of its own destruction, is forced to accomplish this revolution. Whilst forces on more and more the transformation of the vast means of production, already socialized, into state property, it shows itself the way to accomplishing this revolution. *The proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of production into state property.*

But, in doing this, it abolishes itself as proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions and class antagonisms, abolishes also the state as state. Society thus far, based upon class antagonisms, had need of the state. That is, of an organization of the particular class which was *pro tempore* the exploiting class, an organization for the purpose of preventing any interference from without with the existing conditions of production, and, therefore, especially, for the purpose of forcibly keeping the exploited classes in the condition of oppression corresponding with the given mode of production (slavery, serfdom, wage-labour). The state was the official representative of society as a whole; the gathering of it together into a visible embodiment. But it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself represented, for the time being, society as a whole: in ancient times, the state of slaveowning citizens; in the Middle Ages, the feudal lords; in our own time, the bourgeoisie. When at last it becomes the real representative of the whole of society, it renders itself unnecessary. As soon as there is no longer any social class to be held in subjection; as soon as class rule, and the individual struggle for existence based upon our present anarchy in production, with the collisions and excesses arising from these, are removed, nothing more remains to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer necessary. The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the representative of the whole of society—this is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state. State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not "abolished." It *dies out*. This gives the measure of the value of the phrase "*a free state*," both as to its justifiable use at times by agitators, and as to its ultimate scientific insufficiency; and also of the demands of the so-called anarchists for the abolition of the state out hand....

The socialized appropriation of the means of production does away, not only with the present artificial restrictions upon production, but also with the positive waste and devastation of productive forces and products that are at the present time the inevitable concomitants of production, and that reach their height in the crises. Further, it sets free for the community at large a mass of means of production and of products, by doing away with the senseless extravagance of the ruling classes of today and their political representatives. The possibility of securing for every member of society, by means of socialized production, an existence not only fully sufficient materially, and becoming day by day more full, but an existence guaranteeing to all the free development and exercise of their physical and mental faculties—this possibility is now for the first time here, but *it is here*. [3]

With the seizing of the means of production by society, production of commodities is done away with, and, simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by systematic, definite organization. The struggle for individual existence disappears. Then for the first time man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of Nature, because he has now become master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social action, hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of Nature foreign to, and dominating him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man's own social organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have hitherto governed history pass under the control of man himself. Only from that time will man himself, more and more consciously, make his own history—only from that time will the social causes set in movement by him have, in the main and in a constantly growing measure, the results intended by him. It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom.

Note:

1. Mephistopheles, in Goethe's *Faust*.
2. It is hardly necessary in this connection to point out that, even if the form of appropriation remains the same, the *character* of the appropriation is just as much revolutionized as production is by the changes described above. It is, of course, a very different matter whether I appropriate to myself my own product or that of another. Note in passing that wage-labour, which contains the whole capitalistic mode of production in embryo, is very ancient: in a sporadic, scattered form it existed for centuries alongside of slave-labour. But the embryo could duly develop into the

capitalistic mode of production only when the necessary historical preconditions had been furnished.

- 3 A few figures may serve to give an approximate idea of the enormous expansive force of the modern means of production, even under capitalistic pressure. According to Mr. Giffen, the total wealth of Great Britain and Ireland amounted, in round numbers, in

1814 to £2,200,000,000.

1865 to £6,100,000,000.

1875 to £8,500,000,000.

An instance of the squandering of means of production and of products during a crisis, the total loss in the German iron industry alone, in the crisis 1873-1878, was given at the second German Industrial Congress (Berlin, February 21, 1878) as £22,750,000.

APPENDIX: My Paper Contributed to the XXIst World Philosophy Conference, section of contributed papers: Teaching Philosophy. May 5, 2002. (The Conference is dated on Aug.10th/2003, and is held in Istanbul, Turkey.)

Major Problems for the Reformation of Teaching Philosophy in China

There are serious problems in the teaching philosophy in the universities of China currently, and these problems can be generalized as “poverty,” “crisis” and “inferiority”. “Poverty” refers that the teaching philosophy as a general credit course is politicized, is over simplified and is limited within too narrow fields. “Crisis” refers that the number of qualified students who apply for undergraduate and graduate study majoring in philosophy declines a lot. For the short of qualified applicants, some departments of philosophy face the danger of being eliminated. “Inferiority” refers that the quality of teaching philosophy in China is inferior to the ones of developed countries. Comparing teaching philosophy in China with that of developed countries, we will find that the causes of our problems are primarily resulted from the basic structure, the course systems of our teaching philosophy. To change the above situations, we must follow the essential nature of philosophy, follow the requirement of social practice, and we must consider the experience of famous universities in developed countries, these are three key points for our consideration on reformation of teaching philosophy in China.

In recently years, there have been heated discussions on the reformation of teaching philosophy in universities of China. The value of these discussions is that they expose the urgent problems in the development of teaching philosophy of China to everyone disciplined in philosophy. These discussions also make the theoretical study of teaching philosophy flourish in China. We have made a great deal of progress in teaching philosophy in universities of China. But we must be aware of some problems which are becoming more and more serious, and these problems could be generalized as “poverty,” “crisis,” and “inferiority” of teaching philosophy in China.

The “poverty” of teaching philosophy refers to that teaching philosophy as **general credit course** in university of China is considered as a course of political study, or simply education of Marxism, and then is simplified as the teaching of textbooks about Marxism. These textbooks are written officially. Students’ aim of studying this kind of course is only to handle the exam, and to get the credit hours. The politicized, over-simplified, exam-mode and the dogmatic way of teaching make our philosophy teaching as a general credit course seemed an empty shell lacking substance and vitality.

The “crisis” primarily refers to the difficult situation of **teaching philosophy as major disciplined courses**. In most universities of China, the number of qualified students who apply for undergraduate and graduate program in the departments of philosophy is declining. Students graduating from discipline of philosophy face the difficult task of finding proper jobs. Many professors teaching philosophy intend to change their majors. Because no qualified students apply for the major of philosophy, departments of philosophy of some universities are forced to cease admission for several years. Some of them try to open courses of other disciplines, some departments of philosophy have changed their titles, or they attach the title of Department of Philosophy to the title of other disciplines, and their departments bear very little resemblance to true departments of philosophy. These situations of crisis also occur in departments of philosophy of famous universities of China. There the crisis is not revealed by devoid of applicants for philosophical study, but is revealed by the decay in the quality of applicants. 90% of the undergraduate students who were admitted last year by Department of Philosophy in Jilin University actually were forced to study philosophy, because all the other departments of this university were override, they do not have other choice other than the Department of Philosophy. 80% of the graduate students who were admitted last year were female, and traditionally, male students are considered more appropriate in studying philosophy. In Jilin University, most of the undergraduate students majoring in philosophy will enter the MA program study without the requirement of any qualified exam. Students with MA degree of any discipline can easily find jobs in China now, or else, the resource of applicants for our philosophy major in these kinds of universities also would break off. In addition, no students in universities of China are allowed to transfer his or her majors. If allowed, almost no student would have continued studying philosophy in universities of China.

The “inferiority” primarily refers to the problems of the **quality of philosophy education in China**. The talents specializing in philosophy who are educated in universities of China are inferior to the ones in universities of advanced countries. Following the coming of the times of globalization, the times of internationalization of higher education, we must be aware that in some sense, China is a super country of philosophy, for there are more than thirty thousand of philosophers in China at present. This number is much greater than the total number of philosophers in America, in Great Britain, in Europe and Japan. We also publish many philosophical books and articles each year. But from the view of the function that China plays in the achievements of worldwide philosophy, China is a minor country. It is pointed out that the articles and books written by Chinese philosophers and been published in foreign countries are very few; Chinese philosophy professors invited as speakers or guest professors by universities of foreign countries are very few. Seldom is there any

Chinese philosopher who receives an international award or prize in philosophy.

Currently, the tide of globalization is sweeping through the world. The globalization covers not only the field of economical activities, but also the fields of culture, education and higher education. It required that all resources of faculties, students, materials and information in universities be distributed across the borders of countries. The day of "World Organization of Higher Education" is coming very soon, it will force all over the world to participate in the global competition for quality and efficiency in teaching. If the departments of philosophy in universities of China can not foster students with sufficient disciplined knowledge and a high capacity for competition, then they will be like the backward enterprises of China, automobile production, for example, and will face the danger of being eliminated. Currently, there are many departments of philosophy in universities in undeveloped countries, as well as in developed countries that are being eliminated not long after being founded.

In order to meet the requirements of the market system that was founded recently in China, and discussed at the 1999 **"National Conference of Chinese Education,"** government officers proposed to industrialize the enterprise of higher education in China. We know that universities are different from the manufacturing industries that produce material merchandise and aim to obtain short term financial profits, whereas, universities foster talented persons and aim to obtain complicated, long term profits for society. But no matter material merchandise or educated persons, no matter the aim of long term-interests or the aims of short term-interests, we are all inclined to follow the law of value and the law of competition in the market system. All persons holding lower values or with no possibility of actualizing their value, and the departments of philosophy that could not foster persons with the ability required for competition, will not functionally survive themselves. It is obvious that the tide of globalization and the founding of the market system make the situations of "poverty," "crisis" and "inferiority" in China much more serious now.

Concerning the cause of the problems and the difficult situation for teaching philosophy in universities of China, some people stress the external elements. They argue that because the government officials claim philosophy as a discipline which must be limited in its development, and because the market system encourage people to get short term-interests, because they ignore the deep- level reasoning of human being, philosophy inevitably falls into difficult situation. In fact, the above arguments are not valid. We know that even the present scale, the present quality of teaching philosophy in universities of China can not survive well; how could it be imagined that we would expand the scale of teaching philosophy and expect more students to apply for the philosophy major? In addition, the market system is not a foreign world that has nothing to do with philosophy. On the contrary, it is the internal motivation to push for philosophy development. We will not agree to the strategy that makes

philosophers in China give up their major and to engage in other business, to engage in commercial activities, so that to handle the situation of the market system. What we should do is to actualize the value of philosophy itself in the market system based on the reformation and reconstruction of teaching philosophy in China.

Many people propose that we need to search for the causes of the difficult situation of philosophy education from the view of internal, but not from the external elements. They suggest that of the causes for the “crisis” of philosophical education, the most important one is that the goal of our teaching philosophy is not scientific. Consequently, there are constructional problems in aspects of our course system. Comparing teaching philosophy in our country with that of some developed countries, we will see that it is not the case that we have fostered too many philosophical talents, but that our philosophical talents are not strong enough. For example, at the present time, in the undergraduate programs of departments of philosophy in China, the credits for disciplined courses always comprise more than 60% of the total of the required credits. Essentially, this is a mode of fostering disciplined talents. What is more, most of our disciplined courses are concerned with traditional philosophy, and lack a connection with natural science and social science. This system of teaching philosophy for undergraduate programs was formed during the years of the 1950s through the 1960s. At that time, there was no Ph.D. or MA education system in the universities of China, and all students graduating from universities were assigned jobs by the government. Now everything has been changed. We foster numerous disciplined talents with highest degree. Philosophical disciplined positions are filled by these people, and are not open to those with only degrees of BA.

We can see that in American or in Britain universities, undergraduate of studying philosophy is always combined with studying majors of social science or natural science. Some universities divide teaching philosophy into the systems of teaching philosophy as a major discipline and teaching philosophy as a minor discipline, and they further divide the major discipline teaching into some systems that stress different fields of natural or social science, as well as humanities. This kind of teaching system are to provide students with a broad intellectual foundation and a major other than the major of philosophy, give them multiple talents and to help them find jobs in various fields. What we should do is to consider the experience of famous universities of developed countries, to reconstruct our system of teaching philosophy.

Concerning the “poverty” of teaching philosophy as a general credit course, in fact, it is resulted from the fallacy of our present structure of philosophical teaching in which the general credit course teaching and the major disciplined course teaching are separated as dual independent systems. All of the professors, the classes, students and other resources of these two systems are separated absolutely. Professors who engage in teaching general philosophical courses are severely limited by teaching very few

courses, such as the course of "Principles of Marxism." Their teachings are devoid of other fields of philosophy. This system also restrains students' capabilities. Students who study philosophy as general credit courses face only very narrow fields and attain very low levels of philosophical achievements. In universities of developed countries, the general structure of teaching philosophy is multiple and flexible. It is made up of many systems such as teaching philosophy as a general credit course, teaching philosophy as a major discipline, teaching philosophy as a minor discipline, teaching philosophy as combined disciplines, teaching philosophy as liberal education and so on. There is no absolute separation between the general credit course teaching and the major discipline course teaching, between students majoring in philosophy and students majoring in other disciplines. Their general credit courses cover many fields of philosophy, and also are divided into different sub-systems that stress various fields of natural or social science. It is not necessary for us to copy the above experience of teaching philosophy in developed countries, but it is very helpful for us to study their experience.

In conclusion, only if we clarify the present situation and problems of teaching philosophy in the universities of China; and only if we reform the basic structure, the systems of our teaching philosophy, then will it be possible for us to find the best way to develop our teaching philosophy. To follow the requirement of the essential nature of philosophy, to follow the requirement of social practice, to consider the experience of famous universities in developed countries, these are three key points for our consideration on reformation of teaching philosophy.

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